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Preface
This book marks the final steps on a long journey that started out in 1998, when I realized 
the key role that institutions play in delivering development results. Initially, my focus was 
on natural resources management institutions, as I was strongly convinced that if we want 
people, specifically the rural poor, to protect the environment, we need to provide relevant 
incentives. Then, as I started working on broader agriculture and rural development issues, I 
quickly realized that, to achieve their livelihood objectives, people need to access a wide range 
of specific goods and services that they consume and transform. In the absence of relevant 
institutional arrangements, these goods and services cannot be effectively availed, or they 
cannot be accessed or consumed and/or transformed by the people. I came to the conviction 
that, in fact, to a large extinct, the lack or the weakness of institutions explain why African 
countries are struggling to achieve food and nutrition security. Indeed, overall, the institutional 
systems those countries inherited from the colonial powers were rather designed to serve the 
interest of the metropolis, and where not conducive for their development. Moreover, for about 
or more than hundred years, these countries have not been responsible to design their own 
institutions, hence, the lack of knowledge with regard to building institutional systems that 
will deliver effectively and efficiently for the people.  By institutional system, I mean a specific 
range of interactive structures of voluntary cooperation that people in a society set-up and 
operate to resolve collective action problems, for the benefit of all the members of the society. 
Institutions are the rules and organizations that regulate social interactions. While recognizing 
that the lack of will of leaders can represent a critical limiting factor, I concluded that Africans 
need knowledge on how to set-up new institutional arrangements or upgrade existing ones. 
To provide such a knowledge, I decided to develop a methodological framework that will guide 
people individually and collectively, to craft the institutional arrangements that will enable 
them achieving their development aspirations. But the idea to develop the Method for Analysis 
and Negotiation to Governance (MANGO) matured when I contacted Professor Wouter de 
Groot, from whom I received the right type of stimulus to be able to carry-out and finalize this 
undertaking. Along the line, in discussing with professor de Groot, we realized that the idealistic 
construction of a framework somewhere out in the blue does not suffice. For a framework 
to really do work, the framework should be built in an interaction between conceptual logic, 
theoretical considerations and, most of all, applications in the field. In other words, framework 
construction is an interactive process, and this in turn implied that my journey of developing 
MANGO would be a long one! And thus, the process of developing MANGO has been long, 
luckily supported by my professional activities. I developed successive versions of MANGO 
and improved them one after the other, as I performed assignments (missions) in the areas 
of natural resources management, rural, agriculture and food systems development, in many 
African countries and elsewhere in the world, since 2000. The version of the MANGO framework 
presented in this book builds on the lessons learned from those field tests. 
Most of the case studies in this book are drawn from missions I performed for the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), an agency committed to fighting rural poverty. 
My special gratitude to the IFAD officials who facilitated my work, specially, Norman Messer, 
Abdoulaye Touré, Perrin Saint-Ange, David Kingsbury, Mohamed Beavogui and Mohamed 
Manssouri. By seeking to use institutional analysis to improve delivery to the rural poor, you 
have provided the groundwork for testing and improving the design of MANGO. 
A very special gratitude goes out to Dermot Shields, Philip Townsley, Rathindra Roy and Henry 
Anim-Somuah. I learned a lot while teaming with you in various occasions to perform field 
missions, deliver trainings, and improve our methodological approaches. 
Alberta Mascaretti, in her capacity of Chief Service Africa of the FAO Investment Center has been 
very supportive during the last three years of this work. Many thanks.
I want to thank my wife Ophelia who has always stimulated me to do this and never complained 
about this private project run in parallel with my already very time consuming professional life. 
I am grateful to my late father Charles L. A. Onibon. My professional life has flourished on the 
path he told me early on as being where I have potential. I owe it all to you, Papa. 
I am also grateful to my mother, Rosaline A. Onibon and my siblings who have provided me 
through moral support and prayers. 
To my children Opeyemi, Morenike, Omontola, Laolu and Tomi, I would like you to see in this 
work an indicator of the commitment we must have for the development of our beloved Africa. 
Thank you for your sacrifice and support. 
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Part A
Introduction
In this part, I develop the broad objective (Section 1.4) and specific objectives (Section 3.1) of the 
MANGO framework, set in a background of discussing the concepts of development, governance 
and institutions. I end with a brief discussion on the framework development process and the 
structure of the book. 
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Development 
Development is at the heart of this book. In this first chapter, I’m sharing the thoughts that 
about 32 years of experience as development practitioner and facilitator have generated in me, 
reinforcing them with references from the literature. Firstly, I review the concept and attempt 
to clarify what development is, from various perspectives. Secondly, I discuss the purpose of 
development. Thirdly, I explain that genuine development is a process of internal transformation 
in which the object is also the subject. The process must be led, lived and its results owned 
by the people who aspire and act individually and collectively for development. The process 
leading to development results is always complex, with intertwined social and technological 
dimensions. As development practitioner, our role is therefore to accompany and stimulate 
(facilitate) that internal change process, in order to ensure the ownership of development by the 
people. Finally, I conclude that given the complexity of development and the challenges it poses 
to people, leaders, researchers and development facilitators, it will be helpful to make available 
a methodological framework that helps in facilitating genuine development processes. 
1.1  Exploring the concept
In his article on understanding institutional change, Gerard Roland (2004) stressed that 
“understanding the conditions for successful economic growth and development is becoming 
an increasingly central question in economics”. In the same vein, this book deals with 
development issues, specifically with how a human society can bring about development by 
improving existing institutions.
Nooteboom (2006) defined institutions as rules or habits that condition (enable and 
constrain) action, apply universally to a group of people, have normative content or import, and 
carry sanctions for non-compliance, including non-material sanctions such as loss of legitimacy. 
According to (Hodgson, 2006) ‘Institutions are systems of established and embedded social 
rules that structure social interactions’. In a rational choice perspective, Moe (2005) writes that 
institutions are structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action problems 
and benefit all concerned. Throughout this book, ‘institutions’ will be defined as the rules and 
organizations that regulate social interactions. 
As put by North (2003), institutions work as the incentive systems that structure human 
interactions, i.e. their economic, political and social activity. In other words, institutions create 
(or hamper, destroy) human development. This book works on this causal linkage. The notion of 
human development is critical to understand this object and I will further develop this concept 
in the present chapter.
Human development results can be thought of as the state of wellbeing or livelihood 
outcomes that people can achieve within a society. People individually and collectively achieve 
their standard of living, by accessing and making use of specific goods and services, depending 
on their context. The possibilities for individuals to access these assets and their capacity to 
successfully make use of them is determined by the institutions that shape the way things 
work within the society. My personal conviction is that an enabling institutional environment 
is a critical condition for peace, economic and social progress. This conviction led me to engage 
1  
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in the development of the Method for Analysis and Negotiation to Governance (MANGO), a 
framework for crafting institutional arrangements to improve development results. MANGO 
is designed to be useful for developing countries, particularly in Africa, where managing the 
development process tends to be a big challenge for governments and society. The primary 
mandate of governments or enabling agencies in general, in my perspective, is to promote 
development by creating the conditions for people to organize themselves and work individually 
and collectively to improve their state of wellbeing. 
Aspiration to development moves peoples and nations. However, despite the progress 
recorded in the second half of the 1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa has entered the 21st century, with 
most countries classified in the pack of the poorest countries (World Bank 2000, UNDP 2000). 
According to the British historian John Iliffe (1995), the share of Africa in the global economy 
reached its lowest point since a millennium. This led Axelle Kabou (1991), to write an iconoclastic 
book entitled in French ‘Et si l’Afrique Refusait le Développement?’ in which she questions 
whether Africans really should want development. According to Steven Smith (2003), Africa 
is rather facing a development process that is led by foreign values: explorers, colonizers and 
development experts from the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have 
switched Africans into a world that they do not fully recognize as their own. This leads to the 
following questions: What is development and what is its purpose? What does development 
mean for individuals, societies and countries? How does development occur? How can a human 
society manage to set development objectives and achieve them? 
The concept of development reminds us the welfare of human beings and human society. 
Development encompasses changes in various features of human condition. Chambers (2004), 
uses the notion of ‘good change’. Though the notion of change makes the definition simple, 
it raises questions about what is good, what sort of change matters, and what are the various 
views of individuals and social groups with regard to these values? Indeed, the conception 
of welfare varies according to individuals, societies and countries, and there is no uniform 
or unique answer (Kambur, 2007). Therefore, any development agenda is value-laden and 
there is not one privileged view on ‘the good things to do’. Clearly, as Thomas (2004) argues, 
development is ‘contested, complex, and ambiguous’. Its dimensions are diverse, including 
economic, social, political, legal and institutional structures, as well as technology (physical 
and natural sciences, engineering and communications), the environment, religion, the arts 
and culture. The practical features of development like access to education and health care, 
employment opportunities, availability of clean air and safe drinking water, peace and security, 
and so on, are what make the quality of life of people. Development is about national wealth 
which reflects the quantity of resources available to a society, but beyond that, the allocation 
of those resources within a country is an important issue. Development policies will result in 
more or less equitable distribution of income among social groups. They determine the shares 
of resources used to provide health and education services and the effects of production and 
consumption on people’s environment. 
The term ‘sustainable development’ is widely used nowadays. According to the classical 
definition given by the United Nations’ World Commission on Environment and Development 
in 1987, development is sustainable if it meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. This definition assumes that 
intergenerational equity would be impossible to achieve in the absence of present-day’ social 
equity and if the economic activities of some social groups continue to jeopardize the well-
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being of other social groups or people living in other parts of the world. It also stresses the 
relationships among the three major interrelated areas: economic, social and environmental. 
For development to continue, it should balance the interests of different groups of people, 
within the same generation and among generations, and simultaneously in these three major 
interrelated areas. That is why sustainable development implies equitable and balanced 
development. 
As Corbridge (1995) said, there is just too much to know about development. My own 
perspective is to look at development from two perspectives. First, the end result of development 
is the wellbeing of people. Second, development is a process of change or institutional 
transformation. People can improve their wellbeing if they can access goods and services that 
they consume and transform. To improve people’s access to and capacity to consume and 
transform these assets, human society has to set up adequate institutional arrangements. 
1.2  The purpose of development 
Human development is effective when people can express their full potential and lead a life 
of production and creativity, in accordance with their needs and interests (UNDP, 2002). Thus, 
development means expanding people’s choices to live according to their values. Development 
is effective when people have the possibility to live longer and healthier and have access to the 
knowledge and resources needed for a decent standard of living and to participate in community 
life. The concept encompasses both economic growth and empowering people. Economic 
growth is necessary to broaden the range of people’s choices. But it is also necessary to provide 
conditions for people to choose what they can do and be in life. 
Development facilitators and international development agencies use indicators to 
measure which countries are more developed and which are less. Thomas (2004) characterizes 
this instrumental approach as ‘a vision or measure of progressive change’ and Gore (2000) 
relates it to ‘performance assessment’. Likewise, the MANGO framework proposes to perceive 
development as a progressive change leading to medium term outcomes that can be measured 
by performance indicators. This is in line, for instance, with the poverty reduction objectives and 
the millennium development goals (MDG) adopted in 2000 by the largest-ever meeting of heads 
of state, hosted by the United Nations. 
From the MANGO perspective, using indicators to measure development outcomes should 
not mean that what is good for people’s wellbeing is based on a set of quasi-universal values, 
reflecting only a government’s objectives. Development is embedded in structures, relations, 
culture and politics of the development subjects (actors). Therefore, the voice of the people and 
the specific perspectives of various social groups should be reflected in defining development 
outcomes and the way they will be achieved. MANGO doesn’t promote a paternalistic approach 
with regard to what should be people’s aspirations and the process to achieve aspired outcomes. 
Rather, it emphasizes the need for development results and process to be owned by the people. 
Therefore, it is critical to leave the set of development criteria (what is to be achieved) and the 
strategies to achieve these outcomes open to the participants. 
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1.3  The development process
A state-changing process  
Development is process by which an object (in our case an individual, a human society, a country) 
changes from a current non-satisfactory state of wellbeing to a better one. Through the change 
process, individuals develop their personal skills. At a country level, sector development (i.e. 
agriculture, health, education, transport, industry...) and regional development are considered 
as components of national development. As the result of the change process, the national 
level enables sector and regional levels to create the conditions necessary for people to access 
the specific goods and services they need to achieve their wellbeing aspirations. The changed 
state consists of both those improved conditions that enable people to more fully express their 
potentials as well as the improved wellbeing state they thus achieve. 
In nature, the development of species seems to have been programmed to follow a destiny, if 
certain conditions are met. A seed will germinate if conditions of temperature and humidity are 
met. A plant will grow and abundantly flourish and produce fruits, if other conditions of lights, 
nutrients etc. are fulfilled. Analogously, actors such as governments, international development 
agencies, and development facilitators are interested in the specific conditions to be fulfilled for 
the development of a specific sector, region or country. This leads to the following questions, 
with regard to the lessons we can learn from development experiences in various contexts and 
different regions of the world: what knowledge do we have of such conditions? How can we 
develop and disseminate such knowledge and use it to promote development in other contexts? 
Responding to these questions has been the main motivation for developing MANGO.  
 
Figure 1: Development as an internal transformation process
The object is also the subject of development
As shown in Figure 1, an element E develops by changing from its initial state ‘E-is’ to a developed 
state ‘E-ds’, through a process of internal transformation, marked or not by intermediate states. 
Element E is the subject of this change process, because it drives the transformation process that 
results in the developed state. Element E made the transformation. It’s also E that has changed 
by acquiring the new or developed state as the result of the change process. Therefore, E is also 
the object the development process. This is the defining feature, of what can be called genuine 
development. The subject driving the process is at the same time the object that changes.
Genuine development is well illustrated by examples in nature. In normal conditions, a seed 
germinates and develops into a plant; a flower blossoms, leaving the state of floral node to 
Element E
E-is: Initial State E-ds: Developed State
E-dsE-is Internal Transformation Process
Element E
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deploy all its beauty. Likewise, in a human society, the improvement of people’s wellbeing is 
the result of internal changes in the way things are organized and function, which is to say, the 
institutions of that society. But in a human society, the interests of individuals and social groups 
usually diverge. Therefore, defining the standard of welfare the people aspire to, deciding on 
the required changes and performing the transformational process that would lead to achieving 
that outcome is confronted with difficult choices.
The internal transformation process 
In a human society, the move from a non-satisfying initial state to a developed state is 
confronted by two methodological challenges. 
The first one is about agreeing on the objectives. How can a society, a social group or a country 
as a whole assess the current state of development and set targets for improvement? To begin 
with, groups and cultures may differ in their (perception of) development criteria or the weight 
given to these. Some will focus basically only the individual level, while others may also have 
relational values such as connectedness to place or community, high on the development list. 
Or a rich country confronted with ‘jobless growth’ may put the creation of jobs, as this enables 
meaningful participation of people in society, higher on the list than growth per se – contrary 
to a poor country that is as yet fully focusing on increasing incomes.  Moreover, groups and 
cultures tend to differ on the target levels set on criteria. Egalitarian cultures may be unsatisfied 
with a degree of inequality (Gini coefficient) that more hierarchical cultures may willingly 
accept, for instance. Therefore, a critical issue is about the normative values that are given to the 
variables used to characterize the state or level of development. The question therefore is: How 
to choose criteria and targets that reflect the aspirations of different social groups? Who should 
lead the process? How to ensure that the voices of various social groups are considered? How to 
give a role to the poor (usually voiceless people) in making those choices? 
The second challenge is constituted by the choices with regard to the transformation process 
that will lead to achieving the improved outcomes. What changes need to be operated? What 
knowledge and/or technologies are available for use? What evidence do we have that these will 
lead to the desired improved outcomes? And how to distribute cost and benefits over various 
social groups, future generations and nature?  Finding adequate responses to these questions 
would help developing countries, specifically African countries, to accelerate their journey on 
the path of development. 
Stimulating the development process 
In some cases, it can be useful or even necessary to boost the development process. External 
support is then often brought into play to support internal transformation. For example, a baby 
who does not receive care and interactions is doomed to wither fairly quickly.  Likewise, groups 
facing severe problems may find it difficult to set objectives and perform development tasks 
successfully, even if motivated to do so. In such cases, there is a need to accompany the internal 
transformation process. This leads us to examine the role of development facilitators. 
Development can be stimulated by both internal and external facilitators (Figure 1).  Internal 
facilitators are members of the system to be changed and might even have the balance of 
power at their advantage within the system. Their role is delicate. They have to provide the 
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stimuli necessary for the transformation of the system, though the change might affect them. 
In addition, they have to show fairness and equity vis-à-vis the other stakeholders. Sector 
reform (health, education, transport...) offers an example. The Central Government, through 
the concerned Ministry, can create conditions that can stimulate or inhibit the transformation 
process. Often, a Ministry is the coordinator of the sector, but it can also be affected by the 
change. It is therefore also part of the system. By creating conditions that enable the change 
process, it positions itself as an internal pacemaker. 
External facilitators (international development agencies, development facilitators, NGOs) 
are not part of the system and therefore not directly affected by the change process. Their role 
should be limited to provide the stimuli necessary for the internal transformation process to 
take place, leaving the system itself to evolve and generate the desired outcomes. The delicacy 
of development facilitators’ role is a point of attention in this book. Indeed, when the developed 
state does not derive from an internal transformation process, we create pseudo-development 
instead of genuine development.
Figure 2: Development process with internal and external pacemaker
  
Development and pseudo-development
A state of development can be thought of as built up in three causal levels, with the lower ones 
underlying the upper, more emergent ones.
– The first one is the state of wellbeing. 
–  The second one is the range of goods and services or supplies that people consume and 
transform to meet their needs and fulfill their wellbeing aspirations. 
–  Third, some conditions of the institutional environment are necessary for these goods 
and services to be produced sustainably and made available at a cost that is affordable for 
individuals, society and nature. 
When people cannot access the goods and services they need to achieve their aspirations for 
wellbeing, some conditions of the institutional environment must be improved. These are 
determined by factors such as policy and regulatory framework, the way financial, technical and 
human resources are allocated, the market rules, the customs, and culture and so on. When in 
a society or country, those conditions are no longer appropriate, governing bodies or enabling 
Internal Transformation Process
Element E Element E
E-is
IF
E-is: Initial State
E-ds: Developed State
IF: Internal Facilitator
EF: External Facilitator
E-ds
IF
EF
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agencies have to organize their revision. Creating an enabling environment is their core 
mandate, but they cannot afford to change the rules that govern the operation of the society 
without involving the political, economic and social actors concerned. Indeed, development 
results are closely related to governance, i.e. the relationship between the state and society. 
According to Girishankar, et al. (2001), governance is the pivot upon which rely the prospects 
for poverty reduction in Africa. The lack of development results derives from an institutional 
environment that is not consistent with the physical, geographical, cultural characteristics of 
the society. A process of institutional change will then be required. 
We record a pseudo-development when the wellbeing improvement enjoyed by people 
in a given human society is not the result of an internal transformation process. Imagine, 
for instance, the health sector in a poor country, characterized by an acute lack of hospitals, 
laboratories, health staffs, pharmacies, and hence a dearth of access to health services for 
citizens. Through international cooperation, in a few years, foreign experts could be posted 
in the department of health to design various projects. Foreign funds could be mobilized, 
and competent companies recruited to perform the works. Functional health infrastructures 
could be built and managed, and citizens could then enjoy far better access to health services. 
Unfortunately, then however, the process that generated these results might not have been 
appropriated by national institutions. In that case, internal capacity to develop, maintain and 
especially operate health infrastructures would not be in place. If for any reason the cooperation 
would stop, there would be nobody to operate hospitals, laboratories and pharmacies, these 
infrastructures would deteriorate quickly, and people would lose the facility created. They 
would be even worse off than before the process started, because much the old make-do 
institutions, knowledge and so on would have been superseded and lost under the weight of the 
externally imputed ones. In this example, the improved health system does not derive from an 
internal process of transformation. It was the result of a pseudo-development process in which 
facilitators did not intervene in a way that allows the internal transformation process to take 
place. Pseudo-development can be tolerated only in cases where it is necessary to respond to 
emergencies. In a poor country facing serious health problems (for example the Ebola outbreak 
in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2014), one can design a ‘pseudo-development’ step marked 
by a massive external intervention, which allows rapid response to desperate situation. But 
then, once the situation is under control, the intervention must be completed by promoting an 
internal process of institutional change in the health sector and perhaps in other related sectors. 
Such a reform process must be planned and led by the country itself, with appropriate external 
assistance. 
A good example comes from a bridge to be built across a minor river in Nyanza province 
in Kenya (de Groot, personal communication, 14 March 2018). A design, made by a foreign 
consultant and to be executed by a foreign company, was available. The provincial engineer of 
the Ministry of Works however, decided to ignore this and put his own office to work, aided by a 
foreign engineer-volunteer. The locally made design was much simpler, such that it now could 
be constructed by Ministry staffs, supervising local people. Thus, development became one step 
more internal, also generating a lot of local knowledge and pride. It was also realized, however, 
that this knowledge could not easily spread, because the design was unique for that specific 
site. Therefore, a system with prefabricated concrete beams was designed, in which local people 
and/or the Ministry could make the locally diverse bridge abutments on site, while the beams, 
very narrow and therefore manageable without large equipment on site, were constructed 
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under strict supervision on the Ministry’s yard. This enabled a foreign design (of the beams) to 
be mixed with a large amount of local work and learning. The system once installed, was used 
to construct more than 60 bridges all over the province by the Ministry and local people and was 
emulated by other provinces in the country.
1.4  The broad objective of the MANGO framework 
The result of development is the improvement of people’s wellbeing. Genuine development 
takes place sustainably when a human society goes through an internal process of changing the 
arrangements in place that shape political, economic and social life. Such a process is complex, 
with social and technological dimensions. In order to represent genuine development, this 
process must be led by the actors themselves. How can this process take place in an effective 
manner? Many conditions need to be fulfilled, obviously, e.g. with respect to openness and 
honesty of the participants. The process will however also be helped along by the presence of 
a methodological framework, i.e. a coherent, valid and efficient set of prescriptions of how to 
go about. That is what the framework called MANGO (‘Method for Analysis and Negotiation to 
Governance) aspires to be. MANGO’s broad objective is to represent a methodological framework 
that can be used by concerned actors and facilitators (internal and external) to stimulate the internal 
process of change in the institutional arrangements that can generate genuine human development 
results.  
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Development institutional challenges 
 
Aim and overview
In this second chapter I further discuss the challenge of bringing about development results. I 
found it helpful to do so, based on the concept of governance, which leads to questioning the 
way political, social and economic life is organized and works in a society. After reviewing the 
notion of governance, this chapter makes a retrospective of constructing or reconstructing 
institutions in Africa. It concludes that, due to cultural and historical reasons, mastering 
governance reforms is a complex challenge in most of the Sub-Saharan African countries.    
2.1  Governance 
We defined institutions as the rules and organizations that regulate social interactions. In 
accordance with Wikipedia contributors (2018), the concept of governance relates to the way 
institutions hang together and interact; they define that governance is the way the institutions 
are structured, sustained, regulated and held accountable in a society. The concept of governance is 
widely discussed among development practitioners, policy makers and scholars. Its interest for 
MANGO resides in the fact that it refers to the conditions needed for development to be effective. 
The concept of governance includes the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which 
citizens articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, fulfill their obligations and manage 
their differences. For Hyden (1998), governance refers to the setting and administration of the 
rules that govern the interactions between government and civil society actors, in order to 
reach decisions that are effectively implemented. According to Woodhouse, (1997), governance 
in environmental management can be defined as the processes and structures of power and 
authority, cooperation and conflict that govern the process of decision making and dispute 
resolution relating to the allocation and use of resources, through the interaction between 
organizations and social institutions. It is enlightening to review the evolving definition of the 
governance concept by the World Bank. According to the Bank’s own definition, governance 
encompasses the form of political regime; the process by which authority is exercised in the 
management of a country’s economic and social resources, for development; and the capacity 
of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions (World 
Bank, 1992, 1994, 2000a). 
After the turn of the millennium, the World Bank made a remarkable shift towards good 
governance as a key concept, thus introducing a normative dimension addressing the quality 
of governance (Santiso, 2002). A good governance system puts requirements on the process of 
decision-making and public policy formulation Researchers at the World Bank Institute have 
distinguished six main dimensions of good governance: (i) voice and accountability, which 
includes civil liberties and political stability; (ii) Government’s effectiveness, which includes 
the quality of policy making; (iii) public service delivery; (iv) the lack of regulatory burden; (v) 
the rule of law, which includes protection of property rights; (vi) independence of the judiciary; 
and (vii) control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999). In their attempt to 
develop worldwide Good Governance indicators, Kaufmann et al (2010) defined governance as 
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“the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) 
the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”. 
In accordance with OECD (2009), governance may be examined at country, sector or thematic 
program levels. This implies that a framework like MANGO, designed primarily for sector and 
program work, fits well in the governance concept. 
The concept of governance is interesting for MANGO because it captures three major issues 
with regard to managing and facilitating development processes. The first one refers to 
development outcomes or standards of welfare. Indeed, the end result of a good governance 
system (i.e. managing public affairs in a transparent, accountable, participatory and equitable 
manner) is to improve people’s welfare. What quality and/or quantity level of health, education, 
housing, income, safety etc., for which social group? The second issue concerns the rules of 
the game. What arrangements or rules governing public sectors are likely to lead to achieving 
these outcomes? Who sets what rule? How are decisions made with regard to sharing of roles 
and resource allocation? How is arbitration performed?  How are citizens (particularly the 
most vulnerable) voices articulated in these processes? The third issue refers to the adaptation 
mechanisms in place to identify problems and perform necessary changes, including the 
redistribution of power and benefits among social groups. These series of questions are further 
discussed in this book. 
2.2  Governance reform 
In 2002, the World Bank published a report entitled “Can Africa claim the 21st century?” (World 
Bank, 2002). This report is the result of a collaborative effort that began in October 1998, when 
representatives of various institutions, including the African Development Bank, the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the World Bank met to undertake a study on 
the prospects for economic and social development in sub-Saharan Africa in the 21st century. 
It established the consensus that in most African countries, governance – or more precisely 
the relationship between the state and society – is the pivot upon which rely the prospects 
for poverty reduction. In accordance with Girishankar et al. (2001), any assessment of poverty 
or under-development in Africa is incomplete without a focus on the rules governing the 
involvement of poor citizens in the major chains of economic life. In the same line, the report 
stressed the need for poor countries to perform reforms in order to improve the quality of 
arrangements governing sectors such as health, education, and transport, as well as regional 
development. It concluded that, though the poor performance of African countries can be 
explained by history and geography, good policies and strong institutions can mitigate the 
effect of exogenous factors. The authors proposed strategies for ushering self-reinforcing 
processes of economic, political, and social development. According to them, progress is crucial 
on four fronts: (i) improving governance and resolving conflicts; (ii) investing in people; (iii) 
increasing competitiveness and diversifying economies; and (iv) reducing aid dependence and 
strengthening partnerships.
MANGO is about facing these challenges of building good governance. It explores how 
actors within a society (individuals, enabling agencies, private operators, non-governmental 
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organizations etc.) can establish or enhance the institutional arrangements necessary to 
improve the welfare of the people, in accordance with their values.  
2.3  Retrospective of constructing governance in Africa 
The disempowerment era 
The colonial era plunged the African people in a situation of disempowerment with regard to 
the construction of the institutions that governed them. During the pre-colonial period, African 
people had been living according to their own cultural values and traditional systems. The 
colonial administration had however alienated these customary systems (Manu and Oduro, 
2008; Lavigne Delville, 1999) and built new institutions oriented to serve the interests of the 
metropolis. For this reason, but also because Africans did not have the required skills, Africans 
were excluded from the process of governance construction during the colonial period that 
lasted for about one century in certain cases. Worse, those governance systems put in place 
by the colonizer were often far from meeting the requirements of good governance, even when 
these were in force in the colonizer state itself. Any good governance system must respect 
the principle of checks and balances, for example, (i) the balance between a central state and 
sufficiently autonomous regions; (ii) a good combination of the efficiency that markets bring 
with legislation to protect the entities that have no voice on the market, such as women, 
children, nature and the poor; and (iii) the balance between the three powers, legislative, judicial 
and executive. In general, governance systems within the colonizing countries themselves met 
these requirements to a certain extent. However, the governance systems that the colonizer 
states installed in the colonies were rather designed for economic exploitation of overseas 
territories, and consequently did not comply with the governance principles mentioned above. 
Indeed, the colonizing states did not export and implant the whole of their governance systems. 
They exported the executive in full and the markets in full, but their ‘balancing institutions’ only 
very weakly and partially. In the ‘trias politica’, the legislative and judiciary powers remained 
rudimentary. While the power of the central government was oversized, regional autonomy 
was ignored. Effects of markets were not tempered by equity mechanisms. Market forces 
were allowed to expand unabated, geared towards the enrichment of the colonizing states. 
As explained by Settles (1996), “the economic goals of colonialism were simple: to provide 
maximum economic benefit to the colonizing power at the lowest possible price… To the British, 
French, Portuguese and Germans, the primary colonizing nations, the individual needs of their 
colonial subjects were not important”. Basically, the colonies were run not like countries but 
like plantations.  Hence, the protection of balanced institutions was reserved for the expats and 
the bosses. Unfortunately, these poor-quality governance systems served as the foundation for 
the new independent states. Moreover, instead of looking for ways to improve them, emerging 
African elites tended to take advantage of the situation for their personal interests. They often 
selfishly perpetuated it, rather than investing in building innovative institutional mechanisms 
consistent with good governance principles. Nowadays, this complacency of leaders to make 
profit from weak institutional arrangements and the lack of institutional know-how still 
represents critical constraints for improving governance in Africa. As a result, societal problems 
accumulate, leading to conflicts and even civil war in some cases. 
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The paralyzing duality: new states versus traditional institutions 
The paralyzing cohabitation of traditional institutions with the new states constitutes another 
challenge facing African countries. As discussed in case study 1 (Chapter 14: The Nago traditional 
natural resources management system in Benin), traditional institutions have sometimes 
survived quite remarkably, keeping a degree of isolation from the harmful influences of the 
colonizer and later the independent states. Thus, governance systems nowadays are still marked 
by a deep ambivalence of ‘traditional versus state system’. (Biaou et al., 1995) and (Lawry, 1990) 
identified this ambivalence generated by the intervention of the state in rural legislation, 
as one of the causes of natural resources mismanagement, leading to the destruction of 
the environment. Onibon et al. (1998) and Soumaré (1998) have qualified this ambivalence 
as a paralyzing dualism and identified it as one of the challenges facing natural resources 
governance. This paralyzing dualism can also be observed in other areas such as justice, 
education and health. It raises the question of ownership of the institutions by the people to 
whom they apply, as explained in the previous chapter. 
2.4  A conclusion for framework development 
The international consensus on the causal links between the quality of governance and the 
level of development of a society is now clearly established. The state of wellbeing citizens 
can enjoy in a country is ultimately the result of the quality of governance of public action. 
Underdevelopment and poverty are to a large extent the results of bad governance. Therefore, 
to improve the welfare of their people, developing countries have to perform reforms in 
different sectors of economic and public life. They have to improve the performance of public 
administration in general. The roles of enabling agencies in leading those reforms is critical. 
Unfortunately, as explained above, the historical context of African countries is marked by a 
long period of disempowerment with regard to building institutions for the people. The result 
of this situation is the lack of knowledge with regard to conducting governance reforms. In 
addition, in contexts where people are confronted to high level of poverty, they are often not 
eager to invest in such a collective action. Though sometimes, the lack of political will from 
African leaders explains the failure of governance reforms, it is also undeniable that the lack of 
know-how is a fundamental cause. In their analysis of the decentralization of natural resources 
management in Africa, Onibon and Bigombe-Logo (2000) concluded that the success of such a 
process requires a good knowledge of the functioning of governance systems and an emphasis 
on legal, organizational and technical issues. A methodological model, operational and flexible 
enough to be adapted to each context is essential, they said, to better guide decentralization 
processes. In the same line, Imperial (1999), reviewing studies on ecosystem management 
approach, concluded that their main weakness resides in the fact that they rarely use a 
theoretical model to analyze specific issues on institutional arrangements and performance. 
According to Grumbine (1994), organizational change, adaptation of management methods, the 
important role of values, are critical themes, not addressed enough in the literature.     
In total, in the next decades, development and poverty reduction will confront African 
countries to the need to perform institutional reforms. In the context of globalization, the 
aspiration of the people for a better life will result in increasing pressure on governments, and 
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leaders cannot afford to continue postponing the necessary changes. The reforms needed to 
solve practical socio-economic development problems will be progressively at the heart of 
the public debate in Africa. In the short and medium term, progress, poverty reduction, and 
maintenance of peace, will confront African countries with a need to master reform processes. 
The aim of this book is to help develop the skills needed to enable these countries to meet this 
challenge, in conditions where leaders show effective political will.
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Developing MANGO: the method 
In this chapter, I present the process of developing MANGO. I start by expanding the broad 
objectives of MANGO defined in Section 1.4, presenting the specific objectives, i.e. the problems 
to be solved by MANGO as a methodological framework. Then I describe the steps (Sections 
3.2 and 3.3) of developing the framework, which are: (i) initializing MANGO and (ii) developing, 
testing and improving MANGO. Then, I present the current version of MANGO (Section 3.4) and 
the structure of the book (Section 3.5).  
3.1  Specific objectives of MANGO 
To analyze the feasibility of institutional reforms, we need to first understand how an 
institutional system, or a human activity system is structured and how it operates. This will 
help identify and analyze the sources of system dysfunctions and conclude on what system 
elements have to be fixed to solve problems. MANGO attempts to respond to this need, through 
helping to map institutional systems and analyzing their components. 
Once we understand the system, the question that follows is how to successfully organize 
and manage its transformation. This involves both social and technical aspects. 
In order to represent genuine development, collective action is at the heart of institutional 
reform. Organizing and managing such a collective action is a challenge for developing 
countries, specifically where there is a lack of knowledge with regard to building modern 
institutions. It is necessary to confront the views from many social actors such as businesses, 
experts and the poor, in a process that ideally should be supported by people who are affected 
or not by the situation. Therefore, developing technical argumentation to justify the choice 
options and facilitate negotiation is fundamental in bringing about institutional change. For 
example, for a sector reform, it is helpful to review experiences that have been successful locally 
and elsewhere, in order to develop proposals adapted to the conditions of the local context. 
Against this background, the specific objectives of the MANGO framework are to provide 
responses to the following series of questions: (i) How to get stakeholders to commit and 
cooperate for such a collective action? (ii) How to map the system at stake, understand 
the way it operates, identify the problems within the system and analyze them? (iii) How to 
technically develop proposals for change based on argumentation adapted to local context? (iv) 
How to successfully use these proposals to inform decision making, ensure that stakeholders 
are committed and will keep engaged for implementation? and (v) What should be done to 
successfully manage and monitor the implementation process?   
3.2  Initializing MANGO
I developed MANGO based on the following hypothesis:  
“There is a need, and it’s possible to design a methodological model aiming at providing flexible 
and adaptable guidelines for institutional reforms. The methodological model should provide 
insights for guiding both the collective action process and the development of technical 
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proposals for change. Its use would help developing countries improve their capacity to perform 
the institutional transformation required to reduce poverty and promote development”.  
To confirm that hypothesis, I first did a literature review, then designed and tested MANGO.  
Literature review 
The literature review consisted of three main axes. The first axis was about the structure and 
functioning of governance systems. I reviewed existing approaches with regard to mapping a 
human activity system and understanding the cause to effects links between its components. 
The second axis consisted of examining the social feasibility of institutional reforms, given the 
plurality of actors and the diverging interests within a society. I explored how individuals as 
well as organized and unorganized social groups behave, and what motivates their attitudes 
when confronted with a need for change. I came to the conclusion that though it is not an 
easy enterprise, it is possible to successfully perform institutional reform, if one understands 
some key principles that shape the way human societies function. The third axis was about the 
technical feasibility of institutional reforms. My concern was how to develop change proposals 
based on technical argumentation, in order to facilitate dialogue, choice and decision-making. 
I concluded that the world is rich in development experiences. Whatever is the focus and scope 
of a reform, it is very often possible to draw lesson from those experiences and to adapt them to 
the context of the concerned society.       
Initial design of MANGO 
The idea to develop MANGO came to me, when in 1998-1999, I performed a study on natural 
resources management issues in an area populated by the Nago people (my own ethnic group) in 
the Center of Benin. The study revealed a paralyzing duality between the official forest resources 
management system and the Nago traditional system for natural resources management. At 
the end of the assignment, I felt the need to develop a framework that I could use to map the 
Nago traditional system for natural resources management and demonstrate its relevance 
and liveliness, in order to inform natural resources management decentralization policy. 
Moreover, I felt that such a framework might be useful to promote the institutions that Africa 
needs to accelerate its development. In 2000, while working on the decentralization topic 
within the Community Forestry Unit of the Forestry Department of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, I prepared a concept note presenting a proposal for 
providing technical support to the decentralization of natural resources management in West 
African countries. The idea was to promote a decentralization that is inclusive for both local 
official and traditional authorities. After the approval of the concept note, I started the design 
of the framework. I performed several field missions in Burkina Faso and Mali, in support to 
the decentralization of the forestry sector. The first elements of MANGO were developed during 
these missions and improved as I received feedback from counterparts and colleagues. At that 
initial stage, the focus was mainly on crafting institutional arrangements for natural resources 
management.  
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3.3  Developing, testing and improving MANGO
After the missions mentioned above, the development and improvement of MANGO went 
through a long process that started when, in 2002, I used MANGO to present an analytical 
description of the Nago traditional system for natural resources management, using data 
collected 1998-1999 (see Case Study 1). Subsequently, I was tasked as consultant to work with 
my colleagues Philip Townsley and Norman Messer, to develop the IFAD guide to institutional 
analysis for rural development programs. IFAD is the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development. Its core mandate is to support developing countries in combating rural poverty. 
The proposed guide was based on the initial design of MANGO. The objective was to strengthen 
the capacity of development practitioners to integrate institutional issues in the design, 
implementation and evaluation of rural development projects and programs. The draft guide 
was tested through a series of trainings attended by IFAD country portfolio managers as well as 
project coordinators and staffs. 
The first training (a three days’ workshop) was organized in Montepulciano in Italy in 2005 and 
attended by 20 experts. At starting, most of the participants were skeptical, wondering what 
understanding institutions would add to their expertise and effectiveness. But the evaluation 
at the end of the second day showed that all participants had become enthusiastic. In the final 
evaluation of the training, participants were asked to express what they learned and explain 
how they will use it in their work. They recognized the utility of the model and tools proposed 
at all the four stages (identification-formulation, appraisal-commitment; implementation-
supervision; and evaluation-conclusion) of a project cycle. Specifically they recognized that: (i) 
the module on analyzing development results (see chapter 10) helps improve the development of 
project logical framework; (ii) the module on action arenas (see chapter 11) helps understand how 
development results are generated and therefore improve project design; (iii) the institutional 
triangle (see Chapter 5) is a powerful tool that helps develop proposals aiming at improving the 
quality of governance; (iv) analyzing the institutional context (see chapter 12) helps to identify 
the conditions required to create a more conducive environment for stakeholders. They also 
pointed out the need to further work to make the model more user-friendly. Specifically, they 
emphasized the need to simplify the vocabulary and improve the explanation of the model 
(Onibon et al. 2005). Based on those recommendations, I worked with my colleagues to improve 
the training materials, and four other trainings were organized. The first one was attended again 
by IFAD country portfolio managers in Rome in Italy in 2006. The second, third and fourth were 
organized in 2007, for project coordinators and staffs, in Accra for West African English-speaking 
countries, in Yaounde (Cameroun) for Central African French-speaking countries, and Fada 
Ngourma (Burkina Faso) for West African French-speaking countries. Those trainings helped to 
confirm the utility and reshape the presentation of the different pillars of MANGO, as well as the 
jargon. 
Moreover, between 2003 and 2015, I had several opportunities to field-test the MANGO 
framework in various contexts. 
–  The first series of tests consisted of using MANGO in troubleshooting missions to support 
ongoing problematic development projects. These tests revealed the power of MANGO in 
helping stakeholders identify problematic arrangements and agree on corrective solutions. 
They are presented in Case Studies 2, 3 and 4 in this book. Case Study 2 is about supporting 
the reform of a development fund in Mali. Case Study 3 consisted of using MANGO to help 
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adjust the strategy of a micro finance program in Cameroon. In Case study 3, I used MANGO to 
explain the failure of a micro finance project in Niger.  
–  The second series of tests (in Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo) consisted of using MANGO to 
support the development of agriculture value chains, considered as human activity systems. 
Almost all the features of MANGO were tested: analyzing results, mapping action arenas, 
analyzing the institutional context, developing a reform proposal, managing the stream of 
collective action and the stream of technical analysis etc. These tests were also accompanied 
by training sessions attended by value chain stakeholders. They helped to definitively agree 
on the jargon currently used and improve the presentation of the whole MANGO model. They 
are presented in case study 5, with a focus on the case study in Nigeria.     
3.4  Current version of MANGO
The presentation of MANGO will certainly continue to improve. The version I present in this book 
is the result of about 15 years of efforts. It is built on the lessons learned from the series of tests 
presented above and further described in the annexes. 
The methodological model presented in the next chapters is conceived for a large audience. 
Enablers, leaders, development practitioners and any person interested in improving people’s 
welfare will find in MANGO insights and tools for better understanding how institutions affect 
development results, designing purposeful institutional reforms, and accompanying their 
implementation. Using MANGO will help avoid pseudo-development results, by emphasizing 
the ownership of development results and development processes by the people concerned.  
3.5  Structure of the book 
This book consists of 4 complementary parts. 
–  Part A is devoted to introducing MANGO. It consists of 3 chapters. In chapter 1, I review the 
concept of development: the purpose, the complexity of the process and how it can be 
facilitated. Chapter 2 deals with the institutional challenges that bringing about development 
poses to individuals and the society. I review the notions of governance and institutional 
reforms and present a retrospective of constructing institutions in Africa. I conclude chapter 
2 by clarifying the needs for developing MANGO. In chapter 3, I explain the approach used and 
steps in developing MANGO. 
–  Part B is entitled ‘MANGO: a framework for enabling development institutions’. Devoted to 
the presentation of the methodological model, it consists of 3 chapters. In chapter 4, I present 
the theoretical background of MANGO, i.e. the fields of knowledge and theoretical models 
that inspired me in developing the framework. Chapters 5 and 6 are very complementary. 
Chapter 5 displays the components of an institutional system as proposed by MANGO, and 
the causal links between them. Chapter 6 then presents how to use MANGO, its object and 
audience, characteristics and principles. It also describes the process of using MANGO which 
consists of iterative steps, through a stream collective action intertwined with a stream of 
technical process.
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–  In Part C, I present approaches and tools to using MANGO in practice. Entitled ‘MANGO in 
action’, Part C consists of 8 chapters. In chapter 7, the reader will find guidance on how to map 
a human activity system or institutional system, whatever are the problems at the source 
of the analysis. It also highlights how to identify the critical issues for in-depth analysis and 
how to plan the stream of collective action process and the stream of technical process. 
Subsequently, chapters 8 and 9 provide guidance on how to deal with these two processes 
in practice. Chapter 8 explains the challenges of the collective action process and proposes 
useful approaches and tools. Likewise, chapter 9 explains the importance of the technical 
process, and provides practical approaches and tools. In chapters 10 to 12, the user will find 
further approaches and tools for analyzing system results (chapter 10), action arenas (chapter 
11) and the institutional context, i.e. the three components of a human activity system 
and their elements. Chapter 13 provides insights on how to capitalize all the information 
generated by the analysis to help stakeholders agree on key reform proposals and develop an 
action plan for change. 
–  In part D, the reader will find it useful to read the 5 Case Studies presented in Chapters 14 to 
18. They deal with describing and analyzing a human activity system, troubleshooting rural 
development programs as human activity system, explaining causing factors of the failure 
of a rural development program, and planning value chains development. The experience of 
using MANGO is described, as well as the lessons learned. Thus, the case studies also serve as 
the empirical ‘proof of the pudding’ that MANGO really works. 
–  Finally, Part E, Chapter 19 presents the conclusions on developing MANGO. It elaborates on the 
strengths, limitations, caveats and outlook of the framework. 
A guide to the reader
It may be useful to read this book from the first to the last page, following the normal sequence 
of chapters. The book is structured such that readers can also choose their own sequence 
however, moving from one chapter to another one, and visiting the case studies where they will 
find concrete examples of using MANGO. For example, it may be practical to start by discovering 
the overall presentation of the MANGO framework presented in Part B. Then the reader might 
seek to understand the justification of the methodological model, by reading Part A. If more 
interested by practical issues, they might choose to read Part C – Mango in action, and then Part 
D – Case Studies. Here, the reader might even choose to first read chapters 10, 11 and 12, devoted 
to analyzing the components of an institutional system, and then chapter 8 and 9, devoted 
to managing respectively the streams of collective action process and technical process. Or, 
depending on their interest, they might go the other way, starting with chapter 8 and 9. In any 
case, it is recommended to read chapter 13, as its presents how to use the information developed 
throughout the process, to prepare a plan of action for change.  At any moment, the reader can 
examine the theoretical background of MANGO, presented in chapter 4.

Part B
A framework for crafting institutional 
arrangements in development
In this part, I introduce the user to MANGO. In Chapter 4, I present the theoretical background, 
against a backdrop of the system thinking approaches that inspired the development of 
MANGO. In Chapter 5, the reader is introduced to MANGO, including the main components of 
governance systems and the causal links between them. Then in chapter 6, I present a broad 
explanation on using MANGO. 
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Theoretical background of MANGO 
In this chapter, I present the body of knowledge and theoretical models that inspired building 
the MANGO framework. Section 4.1 presents a review of systems approaches, specifically the 
soft systems methodology (SSM). As explained by Peter Checkland, the originator of SSM, 
using systems rules and principles helps to structure our thinking about real-world messy 
situations. MANGO shares with SSM the idea that by comparing the world as it is, with some 
models of the ideal world, we can better understand problematic situations and find solutions. 
Secondly, I review the concept of human activity system (Section 4.2), which is the application 
of soft systems methodology to purposeful human activity situations. Thirdly, in Section 4.3, 
the chapter presents the inspiration from the institutional analysis and development (IAD) 
framework developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues. IAD is also an approach to dealing 
with complex institutional issues. Finally, in Section 4.4, I present the other sources that inspired 
me in developing MANGO. These are: (i) inspirations from natural resources management 
developed by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR); (ii) integrated water 
resources management, specifically the approach proposed by the Global Water Partnership 
(GWP); and (iii) using governance norms. 
4.1  System thinking  
The term system thinking suggests the idea that systems provide a way of thinking about any 
kind of problem. MANGO is built on the assumption that human activity situations can be dealt 
with using a system approach. 
Systems 
There are many real-world systems, e.g. biological systems, non-living natural systems 
(landscape, solar system…), social systems, technical systems (bridges, computer programs…), 
institutional systems (legal system, education system, health system, planning system…), etc. 
Much system terminology is pervaded by terms appropriate to biology. Thus, a system can be 
defined as an entity or a complex consisting of components hierarchically organized, generating 
specific properties different from those of each separate component and with communication 
and control capabilities that enable it to survive by adapting to changes in the environment. 
Checkland (1981) defined system thinking as a model of a whole entity. When applied to human 
activity, the model is characterized fundamentally in terms of hierarchical structure, emergent 
properties, communication and control. When applied to natural and manmade entities, the 
emerging properties of the whole are the crucial characteristic. According to Atkinson and 
Checkland (1988), although in the literature most authors have addressed the definition of 
systems in various ways, the consensus on the characteristics of a system relies on two pairs 
of ideas: (i) the emergence of properties and hierarchy and (ii) communication and control for 
survival. 
In all this, it should be noted that especially the latter idea does not make sense for most 
non-living systems. Clocks, bridges, computers etc. obviously do have system properties that 
emerge out of the combination of their parts but do not control, communicate or adapt, while 
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truly living systems do. Within this distinction, it can be noted as well that institutional systems 
appear to form an intermediate category. They too are systems indeed but relatively loose 
ones, depending much on the actions of their living components (human actors). But often, 
adaptability is inscribed into the institutional system itself, by holding rules that prescribe 
actors how to bring about system change; these are the ‘rules of collective choice making’ 
and the underlying ‘constitutional rules’ in Ostrom’s (1990) book ‘Governing the Commons’. 
This way, actors act to change an institutional system in ways prescribed by the deeper layers 
of same institutional system. In such a case, the system undergoes genuine development 
even though the system cannot be said to change itself. For MANGO, focusing as it does on 
institutional systems, can work with a relatively modest definition of what makes a system: a 
system is a well-ordered whole, distinct from its surroundings. Being well ordered, systems have 
characteristics on their own system levels that components (sub-systems) do not have: a house 
has properties that the individual components such as walls, doors, ceiling, roofing do not have; 
a legal system has an effect that the separate injunctions, instruments, courts etc. do not have. 
Likewise, social systems generate properties (e.g. a level of welfare people in the society can 
enjoy) that their individual components (rules and mechanisms to enforce the rules, agencies…) 
could not generate if disconnected.
Obviously, not everything in the world is well-ordered whole. Many problems and situations, 
for instance, are called messy. This degree of disorder is dynamic, however. Systems may fall 
apart (i.e. loose well-orderedness, loose ‘systemness’, increase entropy), and the other way 
around, they may gain in coherence, order and effectiveness (as MANGO tries to achieve). Often, 
seemingly chastised systems do have a certain degree of order (‘systemness’), but this order is 
hard to discover. What, for instance, is the systemness, the underlying order, visible in Trump’s 
first year of presidency? In the analysis of Bouie (2018), the underlying order is the defense of 
white supremacy. 
Emergence of properties and hierarchy
The specific taste of a dish is a property emerging from the mixture of various ingredients. Also, 
when it comes to clocks or cars or institutional systems, the emergent properties are the very 
purpose of blending the components. 
For many system thinkers such as Checkland & Scholes (1990), the concept of emergence 
of properties reflects a perception of reality as appearing in the form of hierarchical levels. In 
biology, this hierarchy is a real one: the organism rules, the organs serve. In their turn, the organs 
rule, the cells serve. The same with, for instance a clock; the only reason for a crank to exist in a 
clock is to serve the clock, i.e. serving its function to tell the time. This is not necessarily the case 
in all systems, however, especially social ones. A legal system certainly rules people’s behaviors 
to a good extent (we hope), but it is not its own purpose. It exists to serve people (i.e. improve 
well-being at the level of the constituent parts) by creating a well-ordered greater whole. For 
that reason, the constituent parts have all the right to change an institutional system if well-
being is not served. They may do so evolutionary (i.e. following a pathway prescribed by existing 
institutions of collective choice) or revolutionary. MANGO, obviously, is made to help create 
change in an orderly, hopefully therefore efficient, manner.
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Communication and control for survival
For Checkland and Scholes (1990), a set of components hierarchically organized and generating 
specific properties need to have communication and control capabilities in order to adapt to 
permanent changes in its environment. Communication processes enable the system to collect, 
analyze and understand the changes that occur in the real world. Control capabilities then allow 
it to adapt and survive in order to continue generating properties. In principle, any governance 
system should contain institutions serving this pair of features that allow it to identify 
the adjustment needs and to consequently adapt. Communication processes and control 
capabilities can be formalized, transparent and effective or not. They can serve the interests of 
the ultimate beneficiaries of the system and/or those particular of the system governing bodies, 
though these two interests may be divergent. 
Systems approach, systems methodology
As human beings, we enjoy the capacity to perceive the world around us, interpret and give a 
meaning to it. Every day we build and rebuild unconsciously, a sort of personal framework for 
analysis and construction, but we also go further by consciously using tools that improve our 
observations and methods that allow us to interpret the realities we face. The MANGO model 
is built on this idea of using a systems approach to analyze human development problems and 
design alternative solutions.  
Sometimes, we perceive some real-world situations as disorderly or even chaotic. The systems 
approach offers a structured way to address such situations. It is a methodological approach, 
flexible and open to better define a situation and explain how things work. A systems approach 
aims to discover the ‘systemness’ in situations, that is to discover order in situations, on the 
level of the system as a whole, i.e. without falling back to the system level of the components. 
For a well-ordered situation such as a house, a system approach is trivial. We see immediately 
what the order is.  A forest is a less ordered situation, and a systems approach is less easy.  We 
need the concepts of system ecology (food chains, energy flows…) to come see the ‘systemness’, 
the order of the forest. After that, we call the sum of all ordered aspects the forest eco-system. 
Ecological concepts have quality if they help us efficiently and effectively to discover the 
‘systemness’, the order, in biological situations. Social situations are often even messier than 
forests. Social system approaches then help to discover the order and act on it.
Soft system methodology (SSM; Checkland 1983, 2000), human activity systems (HAS; Blair & 
Whitson, 1971), institutional analysis and development (IAD, Kiser & Ostrom , 1982) and MANGO 
are examples of such social system approaches, i.e. groups of concepts to help discover and 
improve the order in social systems. Because they try to be systematic, their summary pictures 
(see chapter 5 on MANGO) look themselves like systems. But this is not to confuse them with 
real-world systems, of course. They remain methodological models to better understand 
and improve real-world systems. The present chapter and Chapter 5 focus on the conceptual 
grounding and coherence of MANGO. Chapter 6 and following chapters focus on that ultimate 
goal: MANGO in use to analyze and improve development situations. 
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4.2  Soft systems methodology 
The ‘hard systems’ approach, also known as system engineering methodology, deals with well-
defined problems. It helps put in place a system designed to generate a clearly defined objective. 
Hard systems thinking assumes that the world is a set of systems (i.e. is systemic) and that 
these can be systematically engineered to achieve objectives. It combines both management 
and technology knowledge. Soft systems methodology (SSM) addresses problem situations 
that are not well defined. Checkland and Scholes (1990) refer to these as messy or ill-structured 
problem situations, because the questions ‘what is the system?’, ‘what are its objectives?’, 
‘what to do?’ and ‘how to do it?’ tend to be elusive and contextual. According to Checkland (1983, 
2000), in the soft system tradition, the ‘systemness’ of the world is not taken for granted and 
counterbalancing this, much emphasis is put on the systemness (the systematic proceeding) of 
the process of inquiry.  
Ramo & Saint-Clair (1998) wrote an interesting book entitled ‘The systems approach – fresh 
solutions to complex problems through combining science and practical common sense’. 
According to these authors, in the systems approach, the focus is on the analysis and design 
of the whole, as distinct from focus on the components or the parts. The approach insists upon 
looking at a problem in its entirety, considering all the facets, all the intertwined parameters. 
It seeks to understand how they interact with one another and how they can be brought 
into proper relationship for the optimum solution of the problem. Their systems approach 
relates the technology to the need, and the social to the technological aspects. It starts by 
asking exactly what the problem is and what criteria should dominate the solution and lead 
to evaluating of alternative avenues. The systems approach looks for a detailed description 
of a specified combination of people and apparatus – with such concomitant assignment 
of functions, designated use of materials, and pattern of information flow, that the whole 
system represents a compatible, optimum, shaped as an interconnected ensemble yielding the 
upgraded performance desired.  
4.3  Human activity system 
The term human activity system was used for the first time by Blair and Whitson (1971), to 
designate a methodological model to understand and intervene in a meaningful way to manage 
everyday situations. The emergent property of a system of human activities is often the end 
result toward which it is directed. Thinking about this outcome as the well-being of a social 
group, we consider a human activity system as a governance system. As a complex whole, the 
governance system may contain smaller systems, and it may be part of a bigger governance 
system. For example, in the education system, we can distinguish subsystems dealing with 
primary, secondary, vocational etc. education.  The national education system itself can also be 
considered as part of a bigger, albeit very loose, system determined by international standards. 
The perception that we have of a governance systems and governance problems is relative. 
Depending on the values and knowledge we apply, we could develop other perceptions. Therefore, 
when considering any problematic governance situation, we might consider at starting several 
scenarios of governance systems. In MANGO, we do so through the voices of stakeholders and 
experts, guided by an abstract representation of governance systems in general.
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4.4  Institutional analysis and development (IAD)
Origin and interest
The analytical framework IAD was developed by E. Ostrom and her colleagues (Kiser and Ostrom 
1982; Ostrom 1986, 1990; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 2002, Crawford & Ostrom, 1995) and Koontz 
(1997), as an approach to deal with complex institutional issues. According to Ostrom, the IAD 
framework has its roots in classical political economy, neoclassical microeconomic theory, 
institutional economics, the theory of public choice, the economics of transaction costs and the 
theory of non-cooperative games. Since then, it has been used in various contexts such as the 
study of metropolitan organizations, rural infrastructure development in developing countries, 
privatization in developed countries, and developing macro-political systems, and many cases 
of governing common goods.
There are many reasons why the IAD framework is interesting for MANGO. As noted by Imperial 
(1999), the IAD framework has several attributes that make it interesting to analyze institutional 
arrangements. The first of these attributes is that it recognizes a full range of transaction costs 
associated with the implementation of policies. Secondly, it draws attention on the conditions 
of the context (e.g. physical, social and economic), that affect institutional arrangements and 
performance. Thirdly, the IAD method suggests a variety of criteria to identify strengths and 
weaknesses in the different institutional arrangements that can be used to implement a policy. 
Ostrom describes the IAD framework as a kind of scaffolding that supports the inquiry, by 
helping to identify relevant variables to explore, and providing a language.
Action arena 
The IAD approach considers any governance system as composed of a set of conceptual units, 
called action arenas. The analysis is then focused on the main action arenas of the system, 
identifying their constraints and explaining the cause to effects links between their operation 
patterns and results. Each action arena consists of two basic components: the action situation 
and the actors involved. It is also influenced by a range of external factors that are the rules in 
use, the attributes of the physical world, and the attributes of the community. 
The action situation 
An action situation is a situation in which people aim to achieve certain goals. If the goal is 
development, it can be called a development action situation. Ostrom (2005) describes any 
action situation as composed of the same set of seven variables: (i) participants (ii) their 
positions, (iii) their action, (iv) the potential outcomes, (v) the transformation functions, (vi) 
information, and (vii) the rewards. 
Participants 
While a minimal action situation will be marked by a single participant, in an institutional 
system, action arenas are characterized by a plurality of participants, being individuals or 
agencies (organizations).
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Positions
The position is the place or role of an actor compared to other actors in a process or chain of 
actions generating a result. For example, in a fertilizer delivery arena, we may find positions 
such as the ones of a company that imports or manufactures the product, a national quality 
agency that controls the quality of the product, input dealers that distribute the fertilizer in 
rural areas, farmer organizations that order fertilizer for their members, farmers who order and 
use fertilizer, and bankers who provide financing to other players.  In most action situations, 
the number of positions is less than the number of participants. What a participant can or 
cannot do in a position depends on how other positions are crafted. To get a complete view 
of a position, we must examine the actions that the actor can carry out, and how these can 
affect the results. For example, an individual occupying a position officially insignificant in the 
hierarchy may still have a decisive influence on the final results of an organization. Participants 
can also be the enablers who decide how the system will operate and for whose benefit. When 
such a system has to go through a reform, each participant is confronted with the question of 
whether to cooperate or not, in order to change the system. The IAD model prescribes to focus 
not on individual personalities, a temporary factor, but rather on the structural factors that are 
the actions that individuals are likely to perform because of their specific positions. However, 
the analysis of the actors as individuals is important, because according to their abilities, social 
positions and personal motivations, individuals can positively or negatively influence the 
agencies and processes within which they operate. 
 
Actions
The third element is the set of actions that participants can carry out at one stage or another 
of the process. The fact that each actor has a multitude of action possibilities, makes a human 
activity situation complex. To deal with that complexity, the IAD model prescribes to focus on 
those actions that are most critical to the results.
Potential outcomes
Through their actions, participants in an action situation affect the potential outcomes. 
For example, food security, increased farmers’ revenues, increased agriculture exports and 
decreased food imports are potential outcomes of reforming the agriculture sector. Obviously, 
these results depend on a set of factors such as the agro-ecological conditions, the weather, 
changes in market prices in a context of globalization and the socio-cultural context. The reform 
process appears as a quest to identify a series of actions that actors must take individually 
and collectively to improve the ability of the society to generate these outcomes, taking these 
external factors as given. 
Transformation functions
Through a series of actions, one or more participants in an action situation, transform 
combinations of inputs into intermediate or final results. The IAD model refers to the process 
to generate a result or set of results as a transformation function. In a human activity system, 
transformation functions can be the functions of production or distribution of goods and 
services that people need, to realize their wellbeing aspirations. Transformation functions can 
also be the functions of creating the conditions required to render the institutional environment 
conducive, such as enactment of new rules, e.g. on role-sharing, resource allocation or access to 
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benefits. In a reform process, transformation functions are performed when the actors cooperate 
to analyze the governance issues, identify alternative institutional arrangements, analyze them, 
negotiate and adopt the best ones they can accommodate. The certainty of transformation 
functions varies according to the complexity of the situation. In simple situations, it’s easy to 
demonstrate the evidence that the combination of a set of specific measures will invariably 
generate the same type of results. But human activity systems are generally complex, and it 
is not always easy to define with certainty a transformation function, and the results to which 
it may lead. This illustrates the importance of developing argumentation in the stream of 
technical process, presented in chapter 9. 
Information
As emphasized by Ostrom (1990), the transformation process largely depends on the range 
of information that each participant can access at each stage. This information may include 
expertise in general, technology, opportunities, constraints and rules of the game. By accessing 
the appropriate information, a participant at each stage can modulate its behavior. Also, the 
rationality of choices to be made in terms of institutional arrangement is highly dependent on 
the available information. Unfortunately, in many cases, complex action situations confront to 
asymmetries in access to information. Some actors might have poor knowledge of the physical 
or social world and/or the rules in use might intentionally or unintentionally limit their access 
to information.
Rewards
The rewards are not to be confused with the results. For example, in a reform process, a positive 
result for the whole society might be achieved at the cost of sacrifices made by some participants, 
for which that result do not compensate the effort they invested. For other participants, the 
new equilibrium obtained may be frankly beneficial. Another group of participants who did not 
engage in the reform process might bitterly regret having lost the opportunity to negotiate for 
an equilibrium more advantageous for them. Regardless of the outcome for society in general, 
the rewards can be positive or negative for individual actors, and thus will weigh heavily in their 
decision to cooperate for change or to defend the status quo.
The actors 
An actor is a single individual, a group or a corporation that carries out one or more activities in 
the system. One of the challenges of institutional analysis is to identify the behavior of actors 
in an action arena. To do this, IAD uses four key variables: (i) the preferences of each actor, with 
regard to the results expected, balanced with the investments and sacrifices they are willing to 
invest to achieve these results; (ii ) the informational capabilities of an actor, i.e. the information 
to which the participant can access, and that they are able to process, retain and use; (iii) the 
selection criteria the actor uses for deciding upon a particular course of action; and (iv) the 
resources (time, intellectual, physical, financial)... which the actor invest in the action situation. 
To predict the likely behavior of each actor, the analyst will make assumptions by combining 
these factors. As explained by Popper (1967), by identifying actor behaviors, the analyst will be 
able to imagine the types of results that the action situation is likely to generate. 
In Chapter 5, I further present three categories of actors (enablers, suppliers and users). While 
traditional institutional analysis has tended to focus on understanding the structures and 
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capacities of the organizations and agencies that fall into the categories of enablers and suppliers, 
MANGO puts more emphasis on the users. Indeed, as mentioned by Onibon, Messer, & Townsley 
(2008), where the relationship between users and institutions are supportive and characterized by 
clear division of roles, transparency and accountability and where there is effective participation 
and communication within these relationships, the users will be supported in creating viable 
and sustainable livelihoods. The Nago traditional system for natural resources management 
presented in Case Study 1 – Chapter 14, shows an example of such a governance system, where 
the relationship between users and enablers is conducive. But, where, as is often the case, the 
relationships between these different actors in development, and their respective roles are 
confused or unclear, and where accountability, participation and communication are lacking, 
the users (specifically the poor) are less likely to receive the sort of support they need in order to 
overcome their poverty. We find examples of such poor governance systems in the development 
action situations analyzed in the case studies presented in Chapters 15, 16 and 17. 
4.5  Other sources of inspiration 
Inspirations from forest resources management institutions
Mayers and Bass (1999), wrote on institutional arrangements in the forestry sector on behalf 
of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), based mainly on 
consultative studies conducted by multidisciplinary teams of professionals in seven developing 
countries and four developed ones. The main conclusions of this work with regard to the 
characteristics of a good policy and factors of a good policy process inspired the construction of 
the MANGO framework. 
The characteristics of a good policy
Mayer and Bass noted that institutional adjustments in the forestry sector were often made 
without actors’ participation and mainly promulgated forestry restrictions rather than 
stimulating actors to practice good forestry. They concluded that it is important to create 
opportunities for stakeholders to organize themselves in order to establish institutions 
adapted to their values and context. Successful policies, they pointed out, can only be the 
result of agreement between the users and suppliers of forest products and services. Alone, 
the authorities and elites will not succeed. Thus for political processes to be effective, we must 
ensure that stakeholders access relevant information and engage in debate and partnership 
to reach mutual agreement. Good policies are have the following characteristics: (i) they 
emphasize and reinforce the objectives of interest groups (for forests);  (ii) they are based on 
a shared vision, while avoiding getting lost in the complexities; (iii) they clarify the criteria for 
selecting priorities; (iv) the costs and benefits to be shared by different groups (this includes 
future generations) at various levels (local, regional , national) are determined and made 
available to stakeholders; (v) the incentives necessary to stimulate the various actors to fulfill 
their commitments are clarified; (vi) they define how to manage change and risk, particularly 
when information on costs and benefits is incomplete and resources limited; (vii) they include 
measures aiming at increasing the internal capacity for implementation; and (viii) finally, they 
generate the forest goods and services that people want and are willing to manage and pay for.
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Factors determining a good policy process
Mayers and Bass also examined the process to achieve a good policy. From case studies, they 
concluded that the following factors are critical for a process of formulating a good policy. 
Firstly, it’s important to get stakeholders agree on a clear definition of the goals of sustainable 
forest management, including the broader requirements of sustainable forest management. 
Thus, policy makers must understand the needs of people in terms of forest goods and 
services. Secondly, stakeholders’ participation is crucial. It’s important to understand the 
plurality of perspectives, in supporting participants to negotiate, agree on solutions and build 
partnership for implementation. Thirdly at starting, it is crucial to get stakeholders agree on 
the rules of the game, e.g. for priority setting, the agenda for negotiations, the transparency 
and arbitration mechanisms. Fourthly, policy makers must take the influences from other 
sectors into account; this can be done by using strategic planning approaches, impact 
assessment, active information and lobbying to influence wider processes and decision 
levels identified as important outside the sector. Fifth, a good monitoring of the sector and 
strategic information on its assets, the demand and consumption, which help to continuously 
improve the political process. Sixth, subsidiary factors are important, i.e. the devolution of 
decision-making to the lowest sensible level. It is also at that level that a good capacity for 
implementation and monitoring must be guaranteed. Seventh, access to relevant information 
(on the causes of the problem, the optional solutions, the rules governing the negotiation 
and the decision-making mechanisms etc.) must be guaranteed for all stakeholders and 
throughout the process. 
Following Mayers and Bass, the analyst must recognize the multiplicity of actor perspectives 
and the political nature of the game. Policies are based on assumptions, and we should be 
open to confront or integrate various perspectives. The potential impact that derives from 
social commitment of actors in favor of a vision or a goal is more important than their 
rationality or their rightness or wrongness. Therefore, a reform process is a negotiation process 
in which all stakeholders must be engaged. The fact that players ignore the perspectives of 
each other can support the maintenance of the status quo. Thus, it is important to help the 
different groups of actors to formulate their own and understand other’s perspectives, and 
to examine the prospects resulting from alternative equilibria. It’s through negotiation that 
actors can overcome their differences and agree to establish a new equilibrium to which they 
can at least accommodate. The negotiation process must be flexible enough to allow people 
to express their differences. Sometimes the consensus may be difficult to establish. In these 
cases, it is sometimes better not to force a consensus that people will not be committed to 
implement. The authors recommend to look for what they call ‘non-consensual approach’, 
which according to them can help temporarily manage conflicts, but will not lead to a 
permanent solution. In such a case, it’s important to establish mechanisms to ensure that 
the different actors monitor the new equilibrium in order to progressively revise and adapt the 
arrangements established. Finally, a reform must be flexible enough to adapt as experience 
will highlight healthier options. Our understanding of things is always imperfect, and it’s 
difficult to perfectly understand the patterns of human interaction. Each reform process 
should rely on the lessons of experience, and be opened to progressive adaptation, as new 
knowledge will be generated.
As shown in Chapters 7 (Mapping the Governance System), 8 (The Stream of Collective Action) 
and 9 (The Stream of Technical Process – General Aspects), we find the inspirations from Mayers 
46 Part B
and Bass in the following features of MANGO: (i) the end users and their livelihood are at the 
center of the institutional analysis; (ii) however, the interests and perspectives of other actors 
are carefully considered; and (iii) the process of analysis and negotiation is transparent for all 
actors. 
Inspirations from integrated water resources management
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is an approach to promote the coordinated 
development and management of water, land and related natural resources, in order to 
maximize the economic and social wellbeing of the people, without compromising the 
sustainability of vital ecosystems. The interest of IWRM increased following the international 
conferences on water and the environment held in Dublin and Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Global 
Water Partnership (GWP) was created in 1996 to conceptualize the implementation of IWRM. 
Its authority with regard to policy making derives from two main factors. Firstly, the GWP is a 
network open to all organizations interested in the management of water resources, including 
both developed and developing countries, government authorities, specialized bodies of 
the United Nations, development banks, bilateral and multilateral development agencies, 
professional associations, research institutes, NGOs and the private sector. Secondly, the GWP 
has a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) which is a group of twelve persons, all specialists and/
or scientists of international reputation in all areas related to water management. The TAC has 
published a series of articles, TAC Background Papers’, of which number 4 is devoted to the IWRM 
methodological framework. The TAC Background Papers 4 (GWP, 2000) and (GWP, 2014) present 
three complementary components of a ‘national integrated water resources management 
system’: (i) an enabling environment; (ii) institutional roles; and (iii) management instruments 
(figure 3). These three components must be developed and strengthened at the same time. 
Figure 3: The general framework for IWRM (adapted from GWP, 2014) 
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Enabling environment
Governments as enablers must in consultation with all stakeholders formulate national 
water policies, enact water resources legislation, ensure separation of regulating and service 
provision functions, encourage and regulate the private sector, and invest in the dialogue with 
neighboring countries. They must create forums and mechanisms, including information and 
training, to facilitate stakeholders’ participation in decision-making. To render the environment 
conducive, it is necessary to ensure the rights and benefits of all stakeholders (individuals, 
firms and organizations in the public and private sectors, local authorities and community 
organizations) and to protect public goods such as intrinsic environmental values. 
Institutional framework or institutional roles
The concept of institutional framework was chosen to cover the sharing of roles and powers 
between the participants in water resources management system. For the TAC, unclear 
delineation of responsibilities of different stakeholders, inadequate coordination mechanisms, 
legal gaps or overlaps, and the inability to match the responsibilities, authority and capacity 
for action, constitute barriers to integrated management of water resources, and arguably, the 
proper functioning of any institutional system. It is necessary to ensure that all organizations 
and agencies at all levels and across sectors are participating and talking to each other. 
Coordination must be anchored at the highest apex level, coordination bodies must be created 
at river basin levels, responsibility must be devolved to the lowest appropriate level and human 
and institutional capacity must be developed. Likewise, the respective roles of public and private 
sectors must be clarified. This reminds us of the notion of roles and positions of the actors in 
the IAD model. In a human activity system, it must be specified, what actions are compulsory, 
allowed or not allowed for each category of actors.
Management instruments
The innovation here is that the GWP proposes to consider management tools as an essential 
component of an institutional system. The TAC defines management instruments as tools 
and methods through which decision-makers are able to choose rationally and wisely, 
among different possible actions, including for allocating resources. The following tools 
are recommended to ensure a sound management of the water sector: (i) water resources 
assessment tools (data collection networks and assessment techniques, environmental impact 
assessment techniques, risk management tools); (ii) communication and information (to 
raise awareness, informed stakeholders participation); (iii) allocation and conflict resolution 
(allocation through market, allocation based on the valuation of costs and benefits, conflict 
resolution tools – downstream versus upstream sector, human versus nature…); (iv) regulatory 
instruments (direct controls such as rights, standards, land use plans…; economic instruments 
such as prices, tariffs, subsidies, incentives, fees, charges, market taxes…; encouraged self-
regulation such as product labeling); (v) technology (research and development, technology 
assessment, technology choice guidelines); (vi) financing (investment by users, governments 
and donors, private sector, banks providing high return to society).
For MANGO, the IWRM approach has been inspirational to designing the structure of an 
institutional system (system results, institutional context and action arenas) presented 
in Chapter 5, specifically the description of the two components on system results and 
institutional context  
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Inspirations from governance norms
Policy outcomes are evaluated using normative criteria and the same criteria are (logically) used 
to design these policies to begin with. As an example, Fig. 3 shows that for the IWRM, the key 
criteria are efficiency, equity and sustainability.  PCIV is an approach to systematize chains of 
normative criteria, starting out from principles (P), which are then made operational in criteria (C) 
and further into indicators (I) and verifiers (V). The usefulness of PCIV is now widely recognized, 
particularly in analyzing the governance of natural resources (Richtie et al., 2000; CIFOR, 1999; 
Hanna, 1996). The PCIV idea helps to link wisdom (principles), knowledge (criteria), information 
(indicators) and data (verifiers) in a conceptually coherent whole. Principles express ideals, e.g. 
in terms of material well-being, participation in society, health, community, relationship with 
nature and sustainability. Criteria are standards that allow us to judge the extent to which we 
adhere to the principles. They reflect knowledge and express a state, a condition to be met by an 
aspect of the institutional system. Indicators are variables that inform us about the status of a 
particular criterion. They are somehow the components of a criterion. Verifiers are formed by the 
data necessary to measure or estimate the value taken by an indicator. 
There are many reasons why the PCIV approach is interesting for institutional analysis. Firstly, 
it is a good communication tool. The process of developing a PCIV structure together allows 
reform participants to break address barriers of mistrust, to share perspectives, knowledge 
and experiences, but also to open up to other external knowledge. Ritchie et al. (2000) report 
the experiences of developing criteria and indicators at the local level, in a process of mutual 
learning between actors and for the combination of local and exogenous knowledge, in order to 
guide action towards the sustainable management of forests. According to Richie at al., getting 
actors to jointly develop criteria and indicators before addressing problems and positions 
has many other benefits. It helps create openness among stakeholders and establish mutual 
collaboration.  Both scientific and indigenous knowledge can be exploited, while actors identify 
knowledge gaps and discover their different perspectives. The defined criteria and indicators 
help to set governance goals and implicitly also point the way to mutually acceptable policy 
actions. 
In that line, the European Commission has developed a set of principles as guidelines for 
cooperation in the water sector in 1999. Likewise, CIFOR has developed principles, criteria and 
indicators for sustainable forest management (CIFOR 1999). Hanna (1996) has proposed a set of 
variables that can be used to support the discussion between stakeholders, with regard to the 
outcomes of governance. These are equity, efficiency and sustainability. These same variables 
are proposed by several other authors such as Thomson & Schoonmaker Freudenberger (1997) 
and de Groot W. (1992). The World Bank in developing its strategic approach to supporting 
decentralization also provides equity, efficiency, and stability as variables to reflect the 
final objectives of decentralization policy (Livtack et al., 2000). The IWRM approach already 
mentioned (Fig. 3), also expresses the same triplet of efficiency, equity and sustainability/
stability. It should be noted at this point that any proclamation of official, universally applicable 
policy goals, however perfect they may be in themselves, carries the danger of killing the local 
PCIV discussions that yield so many process benefits. The universal goals should therefore be 
left benevolently vague and not worked out into further systematic sets of sub-criteria etc.  
As shown in Chapter 10, in MANGO, we provide a set of evaluative criteria to analyze system 
results, i.e. the wellbeing of the people, the supplies that the system generates and that the end 
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users need to achieve their wellbeing aspirations, and the governance of the system. Moreover, 
through the streams of collective action (Chapter 8) and technical process (Chapter 9), the 
MANGO process stimulates the discussion and negotiation among concerned actors on the 
current results, their explanatory factors, and the people’s aspirations for the future.  
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Presentation of the MANGO structure 
This chapter presents an overview of MANGO. The reader will discover the three components 
of an institutional system, as proposed by MANGO. In practice, institutional analysis consists 
of mapping these three components, examining the key elements that compose each of them 
(Section 5.1), and explaining the causal links between them (Section 5.2). 
5.1  The three components of a governance system 
Any action situation can be considered as a governance system composed by 3 major 
components: (1) the results of the system; (2) the action arenas within which the results are 
generated; and (3) the context of the development situation. This 3 components structure is 
inspired by the institutional analysis and development framework (Ostrom et al. 2002), the 
soft system methodology (Checkland and Scholes 1990) and the approach for integrated water 
resources management (Global Water Partnership 2000) presented in chapter 4.  Figure 4 shows 
the picture of this general methodological model. 
Figure 4: The general methodological model
The broad arrows show the primary causality between the context, the action arenas and results. 
The narrow arrows indicate the possibilities of feedback: results influencing arenas and context, 
and arenas influencing context.    
5.2  The basic methodological model of mango
As shown in Figure 5, the basic methodological model of MANGO is adapted from the 
general methodological model. MANGO proposes to consider any development situation as 
a governance system composed by the same 3 major components, i.e. the results, the action 
arenas, and the context.  In the context however, it is depicted as useful to distinguish between 
the institutional context (the focus of MANGO) and other contexts. Again, the broad arrows show 
the causal links, but new ones appear too: the dashed lines are the ones not usually analyzed 
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in MANGO. Usually, MANGO works on the ‘ceteris paribus’ assumption that the dashed causal 
lines are constant (same climate, same soils, same laws, same culture…). Only this is usually so, 
not a matter of principle. Therefore, we keep them visible in the basic MANGO picture.  So, in this 
basic MANGO picture, we have three types of arrows: 
–  The broad arrows show the links that capture the primary attention, the backbone so to speak 
of MANGO. 
–  The narrow arrows, show the bottom-up influences (e.g. action arena proposing to change a 
law), drawn in as soon as relevant in a MANGO process.
–  The dashed arrows, usually assumed constant in MANGO application, but drawn in as soon as 
of substantial relevance.  
Figure 5: The basic methodological model for MANGO
Figure 6 shows the simplified methodological model for MANGO. Any development situation is 
a governance system characterized by its results, which are generated by a set of specific action 
arenas, which are influenced by the institutional context. 
Figure 6: Simplified methodological model for MANGO
System results
The right-hand side of Figure 7 shows that in MANGO, the Results are specified on three levels: 
outcome results, the underlying delivery results and the underlying governance results. These 
OTHER CONTEXT
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are measured, as shown on the left-hand side, by three variables or indicators: (i) the state of 
wellbeing or livelihood outcome achieved by people; (ii) the supplies or goods and services that 
the system can deliver to meet the people’s needs; and (iii) the quality of the governance of the 
system. 
Figure 7: System results
Outcome results: ‘Wellbeing’ 
Understanding the casual links between the level of wellbeing people achieve and the 
institutional arrangements in place within a purposeful human activity system is the main 
concern of institutional analysis. It is important to appreciate the extent to which institutional 
arrangements support or hinder different social groups, especially the poorest, in the realization 
of their aspirations to wellness. That is why institutional analysis conducted using MANGO 
includes an evaluation of the wellbeing of the concerned social groups.  The state of wellbeing is 
the final result, i.e. the ultimate goal of any human activity system. We’ll refer to it as people’s 
results, because they are found on the level of individuals. 
Delivery results: ‘Supplies’ or ‘goods and services’
People cannot achieve or improve their wellbeing indices if they do not have access to certain 
essential goods and services. For example, goods and services such as water, seeds, fertilizer, 
financial services, and market access are necessary for the improvement of farmers’ incomes. 
A farmer who has good access to those supplies can increase his or her production and income, 
and therefore enhance the state of wellbeing of the family. The production and distribution of 
the quantity of quality goods and services or supplies needed by people constitute the second 
level of results of a purposeful human activity system in MANGO. It is useful to distinguish 3 
categories of supplies: (i) capital goods; (ii) core services and enabling services (figure 7):  
–  Capital goods are those goods that are used by producers who produce other goods and 
services. In agriculture, seeds, fertilizers, and equipment are example of capital goods used by 
farmers. Raw materials and equipment are example of capital goods used by processors.  
RESULTS
Wellbeing
Supplies
Capital goods
Core Services
Enabling Services
Governance quality
Outcome Results
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–  Core services are those services that are used by producers to produce other goods and 
services.  In agriculture, access to loan and knowledge are examples of core services used by 
farmers and processors. 
–  Enabling services are those services that are not delivered directly to producers, but contribute 
to secure the delivery of the capital goods and core services they need. For example, as 
shown in Case Studies 3 and 4, the enforcement of the rural financing sector regulation 
through regular inspections of micro finance institutions and sanction of defaulters appears 
as a necessary condition to ensure the effective delivery of quality micro finance services 
to farmers. Likewise, a seeds certification service is necessary to deliver quality seeds 
Sometimes, users might not be aware of enabling services. 
In using MANGO, we recognize that these supplies are generated not only by direct suppliers, 
but by whole supply arena in which suppliers operate along with other actors. The distinction 
between the three categories of supplies is important because they are generated by the specific 
type of arenas presented below.  
Governance result: ‘governance quality’
Factors like the way production resources are allocated across the society, the participation of 
different social groups in decision-making, the accountability of suppliers to users and enablers 
to the people etc. determine the capacity of a human activity system to generate the goods and 
services people need. They also determine the capacity of individuals to consume and transform 
these goods and services in order to improve their standard of leaving. Such factors reflect the 
quality of governance of an institutional system. These are the results generated by a group of 
actors called enablers or enabling agencies whose role is to shape the institutional context, in 
order to render it conducive for the people. Any failure in these roles will generate constraints 
that will limit the capacity of people, specifically the most vulnerable, to achieve their wellbeing 
aspirations. 
Action Arenas 
MANGO defines an action arena as sub-system that is a constituent part of a governance system. 
In accordance with Ostrom et al. (1994), an action arena is a purposeful whole that generates an 
intermediary result of the system. Within those action arenas, there are players who perform 
a series of actions, which combine to produce one or more intermediary results. As shown in 
Figure 8, MANGO distinguishes the supply arenas from the governance arenas: 
–  The supply arenas are (i) the capital good arenas, (ii) the core service arenas and (iii) the enabling 
service arenas that generate the three categories of supplies. As with the enabling services 
themselves, enabling service arenas are often overlooked by end users.
–  The governance arenas are those arenas that generate the givens of the institutional context 
(policies, regulation, incentives, resource allocation patterns…) that affect the system. In 
using MANGO, it is recommended to focus on the governance arenas that generate those 
institutional factors that need to be upgraded. 
For example, in the seeds value chain presented in Case Study 5, we have a capital goods 
arena that delivers foundation seeds to seed farmers, a core service arena that generates their 
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access to technical advice, an enabling service arena that performs on the on-farm controls 
and certification of the final product, and a governance arena that is supposed to refine the 
procedures for seeds control and certification. In Case Study 3, a project funded by IFAD to 
support the micro finance sector in Cameroon was mandated to help build among others, three 
major action arenas: (i) a governance arena devoted to generate the norms and rules governing 
the micro finance sector, (ii) an enabling service (supply) arena that was expected to enforce 
compliance to those rules; and (iii) a core service (supply) arena that was expected to provide 
financial services to the poor, particularly in rural and suburban areas.
 
Figure 8: Action arenas
Identifying significant action arenas
A purposeful human activity system often involves a complex of action arenas, but for practical 
reasons, institutional analysis will focus on the most significant ones. The identification of these 
significant action arenas is results-based. Each key supply and each factor of the institutional 
context that needs to be upgraded to foster the system can be identified with an arena. Since 
each of these results can itself be a combination of several other intermediary results, an action 
arena may contain a number of smaller ones. Similarly, it can itself be part of a larger arena.  It 
is convenient to designate an action arena by the function that its results suggest, for example 
in a commodity chain: seed arena, extension services arena, water supply arena, financing 
services arena and certification arena.  Within each of these, specific arrangements are in place, 
and series of actions take place to generate the expected results. These processes are further 
discussed in Chapter 11. 
Analyzing action arenas 
According Ostrom (2005), an action arena is composed of: (i) an action situation involving 
participants in positions who must decide among diverse actions, in the light of the 
Supply arenas
Capital good arenas
Core service arenas
Enabling service arenas
Governance arenas
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information they possess about how actions are linked to potential outcomes and about the 
costs and benefits of actions; and (ii) actors participating in the action situation and who have 
preferences, information processing capabilities, selection criteria, and resources. For the 
MANGO framework, it’s practical to consider an action as composed of: the actors involved, their 
roles and responsibilities and their ability to perform these roles, the relationships they develop 
with other actors, the rules and incentives that regulate action patterns and shape the way actors 
behave in performing their respective mandates. 
Analyzing action arenas is fundamental in using MANGO. It helps identify which factors 
within the arrangements in place explain the current results and which arrangements should be 
revised to improve the outcomes. Traditionally, institutional analysis was focused primarily on 
understanding the structure and capabilities of organizations and agencies. In accordance with 
Onibon et al. (2008), MANGO rather focuses the user on the relationships between actors and 
to include the transaction costs associated with these relationships. These transaction costs 
are related to the research, treatment and provision of information, coordination (negotiation, 
monitoring and enforcing agreements), and to the strategic interactions between actors, giving 
the asymmetries in access to information, resources and benefits (Imperial 1999). Integrating 
them brings added value to the analysis. 
Figure 9: The institutional triangle
The institutional triangle (Figure 9) provides a set of tools for analyzing relationships between 
actors in an action arena. As already explained, in using MANGO, we distinguish three categories 
of actors: enablers, suppliers, and users. The term enabler or enabling agencies is used to 
describe those players who develop policies, regulations, and establish rules for the allocation 
of productive resources, the contribution to charges, and the sharing of benefits. Their role 
is to create the conditions required to make the institutional context conducive. Among the 
enablers, the roles of the promoter and facilitator of a reform are particularly important. The 
promoter is the authority or agency that sponsors the institutional analysis and the overall 
reform process and has the power to stop the dynamic. An expert using MANGO to assist the 
promoter and system stakeholders throughout the process is a typical example of a facilitator. 
As explained in Chapter 1, the facilitator can be an internal actor (who is also affected by the 
system), appointed by the promoter, ideally in consultation with stakeholders. The facilitator 
can also be an external actor, for example a consultant or an international development agency. 
By suppliers we mean the category of actors involved in the production and distribution of goods 
and services expected of the system. Because suppliers deliver goods and services, they are also 
Enablers
User
Suppliers
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referred to as delivery agencies. Finally, the term user is chosen to designate those who produce 
the final result of the institutional system, by consuming and transforming the goods and 
services generated, to achieve a certain state of wellbeing. Users are also referred to as end users 
or final beneficiaries of the institutional system. To ensure quality governance, the relationship 
between these three categories of actors should be characterized by a clear division of roles, 
transparency, participation, effective communication and accountability. 
The institutional context
In analyzing a supply arena, we focus on the internal institutional arrangements that 
determine the way it functions. But, often, factors that determine the roles actors play, the 
way relationships are articulated, the patterns of actions, the resources allocation etc. are to be 
found not inside the action arena, but within the broader institutional context. The institutional 
context, also referred to as institutional environment, can be seen as the whole of formal laws, 
regulations, and procedures as well as the informal conventions, customs, and norms that 
stimulate some socio-economic activities and behaviors and restrain others. In MANGO, 
we analyze the institutional context through the following core factors: the policies, the legal 
framework, the financing and incentive mechanisms, and the system management instruments. 
In accordance with Onibon et al. (2008), beyond these factors, the analysis will also look at the 
powers and processes, which are deeper aspects of the institutional context, often imperceptible 
and therefore ignored (Figure 10). 
Figure 10: The Institutional Context
The policies
Policies are the means by which decision makers can influence the achievement of economic, 
social and environmental objectives. The formulation of policy is a fundamental role of enabling 
agencies. Through their policies, enablers determine the way all stakeholders including the state, 
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can perform activities. Appropriate policy is one that encourages and promotes a framework 
for participation, satisfaction of beneficiaries according to their needs, and sustainable 
development. Beyond the policies themselves, institutional analysis conducted by MANGO 
must be open to political factors, such as: (i) the way policies are made, (ii) the mechanisms in 
place to ensure their implementation, (iii) the feedback mechanisms to assess end users’ views 
on the impact of current policies, (iv) the degree of conflict or harmony between the key policies 
governing directly or indirectly a human activity system. 
The legal framework
To enforce the implementation of policies, enablers are also required to develop the legal 
framework which sets the rules for the sharing of roles, allocation of resources and benefits, and 
the relationships between actors. For a purposeful human activity system, the legal framework 
is meant to facilitate investments in complex and long-term arrangements, reduce transaction 
costs, ensure appropriate regulatory controls, and provide legal and economic mechanisms to 
enable the resolution of contract disputes. The legal framework provides the context for the 
development of organizations, community, individuals, public and private sectors’ activities. It 
clarifies the rights and responsibilities of the users vis-à-vis the suppliers, and the ones of the 
public sector vis-à-vis the private sector. Moreover, it formalizes the process of production and 
distribution of goods and services, and therefore the mechanisms that can facilitate or hinder 
the access of different social groups (especially the most vulnerable) to the goods and services 
produced. The legal framework is an instrument to promote social justice and sustainability. 
To do so, it must bear the values of fairness to current and future generations and assign legal 
status to end user organizations. 
Financing and incentive mechanisms
Financing and incentives mechanisms are important in institutional analysis. Monetary, fiscal 
and trade policies generally affect the pace and type of economic development, in particular 
the delivery of goods and services such as electricity, drinking water, health services, financial 
services, transportation and telecommunications. Through their economic and public investment 
policies, enablers can significantly influence the efforts for development and poverty reduction. 
In principle, they should allocate resources to the investments that are most likely to generate 
the range of goods and services that users need. For example, to achieve poverty reduction 
objectives, they may choose to give priority to investments in favor of the most vulnerable. 
Incentive mechanisms are tools to improve the efficiency of suppliers (public and private sector), 
and therefore the quality of public expenditures. For example, mechanisms that promote public 
– private partnership often generate significant improvements in the efficiency of production 
and distribution of goods and services. The government’s economic policies can promote or 
inhibit private sector involvement in the delivery of the goods or services. By stimulating private 
companies’ investments enablers will facilitate their access to more efficient technologies, 
and thus contribute to improving the efficiency of the delivery of required goods and services. 
Policies that promote equitable access to adequate micro finance services enable the poor to 
have access to basic resources for their sustainable development. Incentives can contribute 
significantly to the sustainability of the delivery of goods and services. Thus, increasingly, 
governments adopt policies for recovery and cost-sharing as a means to mobilize the resources 
necessary for the sustainable delivery of goods and services such as energy, drinking water, 
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health and education. By setting prices at affordable levels, they encourage the consumption of 
these goods and services. In performing an institutional analysis aimed at reducing poverty, it is 
important to see whether or not the charges are within the reach of the poorest. 
Management instruments
In accordance with the Global Water Partnership (GWP, 2013), we define management 
instruments as the elements and methods that inform the choice between alternative 
institutional arrangements.  These include a wide range of quantitative and qualitative 
methods based on required disciplines, according to the system. To inform decision-making, 
the MANGO user will identify and select the group of instruments that better suit the specific 
reality of the concerned system, considering the existing social and political equilibriums, 
available resources, geographical, historical, social and economic contexts, and ensure their 
proper application. For example, for agriculture commodity value chains, relevant disciplines 
could include market analysis, crops, livestock or fishery engineering, environmental sciences, 
sociology and economics, system engineering, legal science.  Overall, we can distinguish nine 
classes of management instruments presented in Box 1.  
BOX 1 – MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS (ADAPTED FROM GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP, 2013)
 
–  Physical resources assessment tools – These are methods to collect, analyze and model 
the information from the relevant physical resources including their biological and 
human use aspects. For example, in dealing with an agriculture commodity value 
chain or the water sector as human activity systems, the relevant physical resources 
are respectively the agro-ecological potential and the hydrological resources.   
–  Planning tools – They describe the content and process of planning and integrate the 
specific environmental, social and economic aspects of the concerned system.
–  Demand management tools – They propose actions aimed at improving the efficiency 
in the consumption and transformation of the generated supplies, by the end users. 
This might include incentives for recycling and reuse of some inputs.
–  Social change instruments – These are tools to incentivize system players in adopting 
behaviors that enhance the way the system operates and upgrade its results. 
–  Conflict resolution tools – These tools are critical for system stability. They aim to 
foresee, prevent and manage conflicts, favoring win-win solutions.  
–  Regulatory instruments – They determine the way action arenas operate, by 
prescribing what actors can do and cannot do, the standards that require or allow for 
their actions, the standards for the process of production and for the quality of the 
supplies and some of the outcome results… 
–  Economic instruments – These are tools such as pricing systems, fines and subsidies, 
market access facilities, aiming at incentivizing system players to enhance their 
productivity and value addition. 
–  Information management and exchange – They aim at improving system actors’ 
participation to decision making, by promoting their access to relevant information. 
–  Assessment Instruments – Risk and vulnerability management tools, environmental 
and economic assessment tools… are important for system equity as they help to 
design plans that will benefit for all social layers, specifically, the most vulnerable.               
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Powers and processes 
Beyond the factors of the institutional context mentioned above lie powers and processes. 
While they are often deeply rooted in society, powers and processes can be completely invisible 
in the spheres of politics, regulation and resource allocation Onibon et al. (2008). They can be 
grouped into three broad categories: informal institutions, the rights recognized by the society 
and the non-apparent political processes. Unwritten rules, culture and tradition are examples 
of informal institutions. Systems are often (almost always) governed by unwritten rules that 
determine the relationships between actors. It is also important to take into account culture and 
tradition insofar as they affect the norms generally accepted by the people within the system, 
whether they are enablers, suppliers or end users. The institutional analysis should include the 
understanding of the rights recognized within the human society, i.e. the rights of different 
social groups (ethnic or religious groups, women, children, elderly...) and the universal rights 
of access to goods and basic services. Finally, the way politicians manage to increase power 
and make decisions can be relevant in MANGO-led analysis, especially if these processes occur 
outside the formal political and regulatory framework and therewith virtually imperceptible 
to the eye of the profane. Decrypting these political processes can be relevant in MANGO 
applications, e.g. helping to understand why certain elements of a regulation are popular 
with politicians while other elements are stalling. For example, the Nago traditional system 
for natural resources management presented in Case Study 1 – Chapter 14, is deeply rooted in 
the Nago’s culture and tradition and affects the effectiveness of the current official system for 
forest resources management. Unfortunately, the key features of this system are ignored by the 
forestry administration officials.   
5.3  Summary of the MANGO Structure 
In summary, improving the state of wellbeing of individuals is the final result of human 
development program. This outcome is generated by the end users or final beneficiaries of the 
human activity system. It’s called people’s result. To realize their wellbeing aspirations, these 
beneficiaries, according to their conditions, must consume and transform a specific set of 
supplies. The production and distribution of these goods and services are the results of suppliers. 
When the delivery of a supply is considered problematic, the analysis should identify the supply 
arena which is responsible for the supply of these goods and/or services. Within an arena, we can 
find the three categories of actors: users, suppliers (public and private) that produce goods and 
services and ensure their distribution, and enablers who set the rules in deciding the division 
of roles, the nature of relationships, resource allocation, and access to benefits. The extent to 
which end users can access a supply and effectively transform it to achieve their aspirations for 
wellbeing depends on the way the supply arena operates. It also depends on governance arenas 
that are responsible for laying down the rules of the game: decision on goods and services to be 
supplied, sharing of roles, relationships between the actors, allocation of resources, sharing of 
costs, and access to benefits. The results of governance arenas or governance results are assessed 
through values such as equity, efficiency and sustainability. These values are themselves driven 
by policy, legal framework, financial and incentives mechanisms, powers, i.e. the factors of the 
institutional context in the broadest sense of the term. The enablers cannot afford to make the 
rules without involving the other two categories of actors, the suppliers and users. Through 
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electoral processes, people trust mandates to enablers and renew or withdraw them, as they 
appreciate positively or negatively the results of the institutional system. This is why, even in 
the governance arenas, we still have the three categories of actors. 
Figure 11 shows the causal links between the three components an institutional system. The 
institutional context determines the rules of operation of supply arenas which generate the 
goods and services people need. The assessment of these results by the users might generate 
changes in the elements of the institutional context, which will generate new set operational 
rules for action arenas, which will generate new set of results, perpetuating the institutional 
cycle. Institutional analysis using MANGO will help to understand and manage these 
components and linkages. 
Figure 11: The causal links between the three components of an institutional system
Power and processes
Policies
Legal Framework
Financing and incentive
mechanisms
 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
RESULTS
Welfare
Supplies
Governance quality
ACTION ARENAS
Governance arenas
Delivery arenas

  63
Using MANGO
This chapter deals with the questions: what is MANGO for? Who can use MANGO, and how to do 
so?  In Section 6.1, I present MANGO’s objectives and intended users. Subsequently in Section 
6.2, the reader will discover the range of applications of MANGO, while Section 6.3 deals with the 
requirements its application. Section 6.4 focuses on the limitations of MANGO and in Section 
6.5, I introduce the user to the process of using MANGO. 
6.1  Object and audience 
As stated earlier, MANGO is a methodological model that provides guidance and tools to 
analyze how institutions affect development results, identify and formulate reform proposals 
acceptable to stakeholders, in order to improve people’s welfare. For any problematic purposeful 
human activity system, using MANGO will help bringing stakeholders together to: (i) clarify 
the development problems they face, (ii) map the human activity or institutional system; (iii) 
identify the problematic institutional arrangements and analyze them; (iv) formulate reforms 
necessary to correct those dysfunctional arrangements and to which they can accommodate; 
and (v) plan, implement, monitor and evaluate these reforms. As actors in the activity system, 
users, suppliers and enablers will be encouraged to share their opinions with regard to the 
problem analysis and options for change.  The resulting reform proposals could touch on many 
institutional factors, such as (i) a more adequate sharing of roles between actors; (ii) enhancing 
actors and agencies’ capacity to play their roles; (iii) effective incentive measures; (iv) new 
rules of the game and mechanisms to ensure more transparency, feedback and accountability 
in the relationship between actors; (v) more equitable reallocation of productive resources, 
contribution to charges, and access to benefits; or (vi) new mechanisms to monitor the way the 
system functions and evaluate the achievement of expected results. 
The envisaged direct users of MANGO are strategy and policy makers, development facilitators 
(for example project designers and managers, experts within international development 
agencies), managers and reform promoters within public and private agencies. This implies that 
ultimately, MANGO should be shaped, e.g. in terms of jargon and visualization, such that these 
stakeholders can use the model after only a minimum of training. The present shape of MANGO 
does not live up fully to that promise yet (see Chapter 19), e.g. because the present book focuses 
much on MANGO’s theoretical foundation and empirical proof-of-concept. Consequently, the 
many times that MANGO has already been used by the envisaged users (see for instance the 
Case Study chapters), this has been supported by a MANGO facilitator additional to a short 
MANGO training.
In many field applications of MANGO such as those described in the Case Studies, 
stakeholders participate that have lower levels of formal education than the envisaged direct 
users. A farmers’ group leader may be an example. Such participants may often express to 
“not understand” MANGO. This cannot be helped within the bounds of the formal MANGO 
formulations themselves, which can only remain relatively abstract in order to assure multi-
applicability and leaving space for participants to find their own ‘concretizations’ of the 
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concepts – see for instance the PCIV discussion in Section 4.5. The way out here is to realize that 
“not understand” refers to the MANGO terms (‘relevant agencies’, ‘delivery system’, ‘criteria’ 
etc.) rather than to the MANGO concepts, and what these mean in the context of a concrete 
MANGO application. Therefore, explanations of the term in the concrete context, e.g. by other 
participants, will tend to suffice to make also these stakeholders full, albeit more indirect, users 
of MANGO.
6.2  MANGO’s range of application 
MANGO can be used in a desk study way, or to support a process of collective action. In the desk 
study mode of application, the expert(s) go through all the MANGO aspects aiming at a full 
description of an institutional development situation or problem. There is nothing against that, 
of course, but the present dissertation focuses on the ‘real’, field-level application of MANGO, 
with all stakeholders participating. 
The framework can be used at all stages of the cycle of institutional development. As shown 
in Case Study 5, in the formulation phase, it helps identify better institutional arrangements 
for implementation, thus increasing the chances for success. In the course of action (see 
examples of Case Studies 2 and 3), it will help understand arising problems and revise the 
implementation arrangements. During the evaluation phase (see example of Case Study 4), its 
use will help to better understand and explain what institutional factors affected the results, 
whether good or not. 
Finally, the application of MANGO requires methodological rigor, but it is flexible. It does not 
require the use of a mass of quantitative data. Likewise, it is not always necessary to apply the 
full MANGO. Depending on the situation, the MANGO facilitator will call for the most useful and 
convenient aspects of the methodological model.
6.3  Requirements for effective application of MANGO 
The requirements for successful application of MANGO are of two basic kinds. The first is 
conceptual, the second is operational.
Conceptual requirements
Frameworks conceptualize the world in a certain way, which is the very reason why they can 
be useful. For this to happen, however, the structure that the framework lays upon the world 
should be sufficiently congruent with the situation at hand. It does not make much sense, for 
instance, to apply a macro-economic framework on a situation that everybody defines as a 
marital conflict. 
The requirement or conceptual congruence is a matter of degree. A framework such as 
Problem-in-Context (PiC; de Groot 1992) for instance, conceptualizes the world as made up 
of problems and their causes, focusing on environmental problems in particular. Thus, the 
framework may work perfectly with these problems but less with other problems (e.g. poverty 
or health) and even less with problems that are not congruent with environmental problems 
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at all, e.g. criminal acts, and work only very partially in situations that participants define as 
opportunities rather than problems. Moreover, the relationships in PiC primarily concern 
causal ones (physical and social) rather than, for instance, geographic ones.  In a situation of 
spatial planning, for instance, it may make much more sense to use a spatial (e.g. Geographic 
Information System – based) framework and apply PiC only on specific problem spots within 
that overall framework.
The same holds for MANGO. It shares its focus on causality with PiC, implying a requirement 
that participants applying MANGO should also define their situation as determined by causal 
relationships to a large degree. Moreover, MANGO conceptualizes the world primarily in terms of 
institutions and livelihoods, with the role of the state set primarily as supplier of opportunities. 
This, as the Case Studies will show, is congruent with a wide range of important situations in the 
developing world, but evidently not with all of them. 
The conceptual ‘fit’ of framework and world can be improved by adapting the framework. More 
importantly here, it can also be measured by the response of the stakeholders in the situation 
to the framework, when proposed as tool for analysis and improvement. This measurement 
has been done in the earliest stages of each of the MANGO applications described in the Case 
Studies. It should be noted here that this measurement takes place basically automatically 
when the position of the MANGO proposer is weak compared to the stakeholders. As explained 
in Section 19.2, this would change if MANGO application would somehow be prescribed and 
forced upon the stakeholders. 
Operational requirements
The MANGO model shares the same operational requirements as described by Kessler (2003) for 
the Strategic Environmental Analysis (SEAN) model. A proper use of MANGO must comply with 
the following core principles:
–  Inclusion of a plurality of stakeholders. It is important to remember that the standard of 
wellbeing that people aspire to, and therefore the range of goods and services they need to 
achieve these outcomes, varies among different social groups. Each of these user categories is 
characterized by different assets and vulnerabilities. That is why the process of using MANGO 
must include a thorough analysis of the different categories of users and their livelihoods as 
early as possible.
–  Stakeholders’ participation. In using MANGO, we must ensure the involvement of key 
stakeholders (especially the most vulnerable groups) in the whole MANGO process. Getting 
the three categories of actors (users, suppliers and enablers) to participate and agree on new 
modalities they can accommodate to, is a critical to ensure balanced outcomes and smooth 
implementation.  
–  Orientation towards the future. MANGO aims to improve the quality of governance and 
not the punishment of people who have sinned in the past. MANGO purposely hides this 
retributive dimension and resolutely turns towards the future.  Obviously, this can only work 
if participants are willing, however implicit, to address issues of the past in other arenas than 
the MANGO application. 
–  Openness and rationality.  MANGO applications may lead to new insights and governance 
innovation; participants should have no irrational objections against such discoveries. 
Overall, MANGO applications require a commitment to a broad rationality that enables 
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genuine deliberations. This requirement also holds for the contexts (e.g. governmental, 
political) in which MANGO-generated proposals will have to be implemented.
–  Technical requirements.  MANGO is designed for efficiency, e.g. delivering results in days and 
not in weeks of analysis. Obviously however, there are minimum requirements for budget, 
available data, venue etc. for the applications.
6.4  Limitations of MANGO application 
Basically, MANGO’s limitations are just the reverse of the requirements. 
To be successful, MANGO applications are limited to situations that sufficiently resonate 
with how situations are conceptualized in MANGO, which is to say, situations formulated in 
terms of livelihoods, institutions and causality. If such a resonation is not found, either through 
reflection or through measuring the responses of stakeholders, framework adaptation or the 
search for an alternative framework is warranted.  
On the operational level, MANGO cannot properly be applied if some stakeholders want to 
exclude others; the same when major stakeholders do not want to participate. If stakeholders 
are blocked from clear identification of the governance issues, doing MANGO leads to merely 
superficial results; and if stakeholders are fixed on redress of the past (e.g. evictions or 
apartheid), there simply is no MANGO spirit yet. If political contexts are such that any governance 
reform proposal will be blindly rejected, doing MANGO does not make much sense. Another set 
of limitations is the lack of data and the lack of funding and time to organize participation. 
For example, in Case Study 5, available data and funding for stakeholders’ participation to the 
MANGO process, was critical for analyzing and developing proposals to improve agriculture 
commodity value chains governance.
MANGO limitations can be soft or hard. The soft ones are negotiable, or surmountable if 
there is enough time. For example, in Case Study 2, I had had the opportunity during an initial 
field mission, to convince the leaders of the Sahel Development Fund Associations to put the 
past to rest and commit to the future-oriented MANGO process in order to find solutions to 
the conflictual situation affecting their associations.  In Case Study 5, it took time to mobilize 
funding to perform the value chain profiling exercises. As for the hard limitations, doing MANGO 
does of course not make much sense in the middle of a civil uprising or when all actors are fully 
focused on redress of the past. In the same line, in 2017, it was not possible to use MANGO to 
support the preparation of the National Agriculture Investment Plan in Rwanda, because the 
timeline set by the political authorities was too short and non-negotiable.
6.5  Overview of the MANGO process 
When the stakeholders are in place and the requirements met, using MANGO means to enter into 
a process that, supported by the MANGO structure (Chapter 5), combines a stream of collective 
action with a stream of technical analyses. These two streams interact, each informing the 
other. Checkland and Scholes (1990) refer to them respectively as ‘cultural stream’ and ‘logic 
driven stream’. The two streams are briefly introduced below and further developed in chapters 8 
(collective action) and 9 (technical process).  
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The stream of collective action 
The MANGO approach considers a reform process as a process of collective action that consists 
of getting different stakeholders of a development action situation to cooperate in order 
to change the non-satisfying institutional status quo. That status quo is determined by the 
institutional arrangements in place. It is characterized by the levels of system efficiency and 
equity between different social groups, present and future generations, with regard to access 
to productive resources and benefits, as well as contribution to charges. As pointed out by 
Olson (1965), some of the concerned actors may be motivated by their personal interests and 
might tend to not cooperate for change. Moreover, often the people most disadvantaged by the 
equilibrium in place lack the resources (financial, intellectual, moral) to contribute to change. 
Thus, to enhance the chance for success, in using MANGO, we need to stimulate stakeholders to 
cooperate to carrying-out the collective action. However, it is important to notice that MANGO’s 
requirement of broad rationality assumes that actors do not act just to spite others. The stream 
of collective action is geared towards making this assumption come true. 
 The stream of technical analysis
MANGO provides a set of theoretical and practical tools that help analyze the current 
institutional arrangements and the factors that explain their levels of efficiency, equity and 
stability, but also to develop new arrangements that are efficient, equitable and sustainable. 
The problems underlying the reform can be localized in one or the other component of the 
institutional system. It could be related to the standard or welfare people aspire to achieve. 
It may concern difficulties that people meet in accessing the goods and services they need to 
achieve their wellbeing aspiration. It may also be related to factors that make the institutional 
context not conducive to the supply of these goods and services. Whatever the problem, the 
analysis conducted using MANGO establishes the causal links between the state of wellbeing 
of people, their access to and level of consumption of the goods and services they need, the 
delivery arenas that generate these goods and services, the factors of the institutional context 
that determine the way the system functions, and the governance arenas responsible of these 
factors. The process will dwell on the characterization of users, the analysis of their state of 
wellbeing and goods and service needs, the delivery arenas and the institutional context. In 
linking these elements one to the other, the process quickly becomes complex. This is why it is 
important to keep in mind that the purpose is to improve the welfare of the people who should 
remain at the center of the analysis (Figure 12).
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Figure 12: The stream of technical analysis
The interactions between the two streams
The steam of collective action and the stream of technical analyses interact and inform each 
other. For example, in a MANGO process aiming at improving the performance of the rice value 
chain (Case Study 5), farmers raised concerns with regard to meeting quality requirements. In 
the last years, their paddy was often rejected by the millers, hence, they were reluctant to join a 
value chain agreement. This collective action issue triggered a technical analysis to understand 
why farmers could not meet the quality requirements. The technical analysis led to the 
proposal that farmers should access a set of improved technologies to ensure homogenous rice 
plantations and improved post-harvest operations for quality paddy, including: laser leveling 
of irrigated plots to allow water evenly across the plots; mechanization of sowing operations to 
get the rice plants growing homogenously; mechanization of harvesting, threshing and drying 
operations to ensure quality paddy. Then, the cost and benefits of these technologies as well as 
the arrangements to ensure farmers will access them in a way that is economically viable and 
sustainable, were issues brought back to the stream of collective action and discussed to reach 
agreement.     
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Part C
MANGO in action
Although seldom followed in realty, MANGO has an idealized flow of application depicted in 
figure 13. This is also the way in which Part C is organized. The numbers in the blocks are the 
numbers of the coming chapters. Mapping the system (chapter 7) is the pre-analysis done by 
the analyst (MANGO applier or expert) on his/her own. The two streams are then presented in 
Chapters 8 (collective action) and 9 (technical analyses). Chapters 10 (results), 11 (action arenas) 
and 12 (institutional context) elaborate on how to conduct the stream of technical analyses. 
Planning for change (Chapter 13) then wraps it all up in an action-oriented manner.   
Figure 13: The flow of MANGO in Action 
7. Mapping the system
8. The Stream of Collective Action
10. Analyzing the System Results
9. The Stream of Technical Analysis
9. Planning for Change
11. Analyzing Action Arenas
12. Analyzing Institutional Context
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Mapping the governance system 
This chapter deals with all components of MANGO (i.e. the governance system), as pre-analysis 
performed by the MANGO analyst, setting the scene for the later (in-depth and participatory) 
analyses discussed in the subsequent chapters. Remember, a key assumption in developing the 
MANGO framework is that by using a model to represent a problematic human activity situation 
as a system, we can better understand the problems and find solutions. In this chapter, the 
reader will discover how a user of MANGO can develop such a model that represents a human 
activity system. I first present the way the problem might be expressed by the concerned people 
or the promoter/authority sponsoring the analysis or reform. Then, I discuss how to pre-identify 
the causal chain by examining the critical issues in the tree compartments of the human activity 
system, i.e. the results, the action arenas and the institutional context. This exercise leads to 
describing the relevant elements of these three components and the links between them. Thus, 
we generate a model that represents the problematic system. Finally, I explain how, based on the 
information collected through that exercise, the user of MANGO will plan the detailed analysis 
of the modeled system.     
7.1  The expressed problem as entry point 
In general, people express problems as complaints, wishes, or concerns. Whatever the form of 
the complaint, in using MANGO, it is recommended to first identify in which of the components 
of the institutional system, the problem is located. This makes the entry point for the analysis. 
Figure 14 gives the overview of possible entry points, and the text below gives the examples. 
The expressed problem is located in the System results component
The expressed the problem might relate to the state of wellbeing of specific social groups 
or the whole population. Examples are: (i) employees of a firm decide to go on strike if the 
management does not increase their wages by 20 percent; (ii) cotton production is decreasing 
because producers are unhappy with their revenues; (iii) because of the rapid increase in prices 
over the last five years, access to housing is out of reach for civil servants; (iv) according to a 
report recently published by the Ministry of health, life expectancy for workers in the mining 
sector is significantly lower than the national average. 
Figure 14: Locating the expressed problem in the system 
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Often, the expressed problem is located in the delivery results. It might concern end users’ 
difficulties in accessing specific goods and services. It can point out issues like the quantity, the 
quality, or the price of the goods and services, or the capacity of users to effectively consume 
and convert them to improve their livelihood outcome. Examples are: (i) the population in 
the suburban and rural areas do not have access to drinking water and electricity; (ii) cowpea 
producers do not have access to agricultural inputs and market opportunities; (iii) women and 
young people do not have a secure access to land for agricultural production; (iv)  the attendance 
rates of maternity clinics is declining in rural and poor urban areas; (v) cotton farmers who 
used the new seed variety subsidized by the Government recorded a decrease of their yield; (vi) 
about forty percent of the horticulture farmers using the new technology recommended by the 
extension department are complaining they don’t record an increase of their production; (vii) 
despite the wide access to scholarships and other measures implemented by government to 
improve the performance of the education system, the level of student failure is still above 50%. 
Alternatively, the expressed problem might directly raise governance issues. It might 
target the equity of the system, the efficiency of its operation or its durability. Examples are: 
(i) the evaluation of the implementation of the education sector reform has revealed that in 
rural areas, secondary school attendance by children is still far lower than in urban areas; (ii) a 
recent analysis of the management of the cotton value chain has revealed that the transaction 
costs generated by the inter-profession’s administration are too high; (iii) the Government is 
reinvesting in the rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructures, though no solution has been found 
so far to ensure their sound management.   
The expressed problem is located in System arenas
Sometimes, the expressed problem points out issues related to dysfunction of one or more 
action arenas. It can be related to delivery arenas. Examples are: (i) there is an urgent need to 
review the procedures for the provision of seeds and fertilizer to improve the efficiency and 
lower the price for cotton growers; (ii) users’ association is urging the Government to reform 
energy sector in order to improve delivery for both domestic and industrial uses. The problem 
might also show concern with regard to the dysfunction of governance arenas. Examples are: (i) 
cotton growers and government agreed there is a need to review the pricing mechanism; (ii) fees 
collection and management system in all irrigated perimeters is to be reformed.
The expressed problem is located in the Institutional environment
Sometimes the expression of the problem points the finger directly at one or more factors 
(policy, legal framework, resource allocation mechanisms etc.) of the institutional context 
considered as unfavorable. Examples are: (i) according to a recent report on the climate of 
business in agriculture, the Government is reluctant to liberalize inputs supply and agricultural 
mechanization services; (ii) the living conditions of the population deteriorates because the 
taxes on essential commodities are too high; (iii) the new law on rural land rather protects 
landowners against poor farmers... 
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7.2   Pre-identifying the causality chain 
From the expressed problem to tracking issues through the system 
Whatever the expressed problem or entry point of the analysis and the component of the system 
in which it is located, the next step is to reconstruct as much as possible the whole causal chain 
of the problem, as shown in Figure 11. This consists to examine how the problem is reflected in 
each of the three blocks of the institutional system, by establishing the cause to effects links. 
For example, an expressed problem is: ‘most of rice farmers are not able to reimburse their 
inputs loan due to lower yields than expected and an unaffordable fertilizer price’. This problem 
is located in the system results component. It points out the incapacity of farmers to effectively 
transform the inputs and financing service they consume, to improve their yield. Clearly, the 
levels of production and income achieved by these farmers are below their expectation. One 
possible explanatory factor located in the system results sphere, is that because farmers 
lack access to agricultural extension services, they misuse the technology. Another possible 
explanatory factor is that the procurement and distribution of fertilizer is not efficient, hence 
the price is too high. The outcome is that rice farmers, instead of improving their revenues 
became indebted, meaning the deterioration of their state of wellbeing. These issues in the 
system results component raise critical issues in the sphere of system arenas. With regard to the 
delivery arenas, how is the procurement and distribution of fertilizer organized? What changes 
in these delivery mechanisms can lead to more affordable prices to the producers? How is the 
access of rice growers to extension services organized? What measures should be implemented 
to enhance their access to technology? With regard to governance arenas, what are the 
fertilizer pricing mechanisms? Do producer organizations have a voice in these mechanisms? 
Similarly, in the sphere of institutional context, the following issues can be raised: (i) what is the 
government’s policy with regard to taxes on import of agricultural inputs and products? (ii) Has 
the government opened the domestic market to imported rice which could result in reducing 
the price of local rice in the market? (iii) To whom are the government’s extension services 
accountable?  
In summary, the analyst explores a first description of the causal chain in which we find the 
following key elements: (i) the characteristics of the population or social groups affected or 
end-users; (ii) how the problem affects their livelihood outcomes, (iii) the concerned supplies 
and the supply arenas to be analyzed, (iv) the major issues in these identified supply arenas; (v) 
the potential factors of the institutional context involved and the possible governance arenas 
one could envision investigating; and (vi) the methods one could envision using to analyze the 
results of the supply and governance arenas identified. At this stage, the causality will be in the 
form of hypotheses. It is important for the analyst to seek the respective opinions of enablers 
(including the promoter), suppliers and affected end users on these hypotheses. 
Characterization of end users 
The next step is to characterize the end users. These are the members of the social groups or the 
people that rely on the consumption and transformation of the goods and services generated 
by the system, to achieve their livelihood outcome. They should not be confused with suppliers 
that provide (produce and/or distribute) these goods and services and with enablers whose role 
is to make the institutional context conducive. The analysis of these two categories of actors 
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will intervene as their roles are pointed out during the analysis. The advantage of focusing on 
the end users from the outset is that the analysis directly targets the mechanisms by which 
the livelihood outcomes of these social groups are positively or negatively affected. In line with 
Elster (1989), de Groot (1992), Thomson and Schoonmaker -Freudenberger (1997), the analysis will 
focus on the three categories of factors that characterize the concerned social groups, which are: 
(i) motivational factors; (ii) capacity factors and (iii) underlying factors. 
Motivational factors. These regard the motivations, desires, priorities, aspirations of the actors, 
without assuming that the whole of the problem is economic, e.g. focusing only on incomes. 
People also desire to be heard. And they always desire to have a meaningful life, irrespective 
of income. The analysis of motivational factors focuses on the degree to which a development 
situation is only economic. Often it will be, sometimes not. For example, in Case Study 2, the 
key motivational factor for the leaders of the Sahel Development Fund Associations was not 
economic. Rather they wanted the sharing of role between them (as board members) and the 
staffs (specifically the directors) of the executive agencies at national and regional levels to be 
adequately balanced and clarified.  
Capacity factors. The review of the assets that each user group can access will help to 
understand the scope of their opportunities, and the types of goods and services they may need, 
and therefore the types of support they might need the enablers to provide. In accordance with 
Bebbington (1999) and Onibon et al. (2008) the most important assets to be considered in using 
MANGO are: 
–  The human assets that include food and access to food, health, education, knowledge and 
technology (whether acquired by experience, through tradition, learning or formal education), 
and access to employment opportunities.
–  Personal assets which determine the ability of people to take part in collective action to bring 
about changes in institutional arrangements. They concern their sense of self-esteem, their 
confidence in their skills and abilities, their emotional well-being, their sense of spiritual 
satisfaction and beliefs to a set of spiritual values, their ability and willingness to assert 
themselves, claim their rights and influence their environment. 
–  The natural assets include renewable resources. Generally, access to these resources is 
regulated by the state, but one way or another, people usually have some form of access to 
land and the produce of the land, water and aquatic resources, trees and forest products, 
wildlife, food and fiber gathering, the benefits of biodiversity and services provided by 
elements of the natural environment (such as watershed protection).
–  The produced assets are generally derived from the transformation or development of natural 
assets. Examples include infrastructure such as roads and transport vehicles, security shelter 
and buildings, water supply and sewerage network, the power grid, the market facilities 
and communication infrastructure. We should also mention tools and technologies such 
as production equipment, seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, information technology and 
communication, and traditional techniques.
–  Social assets (social capital) also determine the scope of opportunities available to people. 
They include factors such as family ties and affinities, networks, formal and informal 
connections, forms of sponsorship, neighborhoods, mechanisms of representation and 
participation in decision-making, and leadership.
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–  Finally, the review of financial flows is informative. These are wages, income from the 
processing or sale of other assets, individual and collective savings, remittances, credit (formal 
or informal, through banks, NGOs or local systems such as tontine), annuities and pensions.
Once the various assets are examined, the analyst will look at how concerned individuals 
combine and transform them to achieve their wellbeing aspiration. Access to a wide range and 
or a significant number of assets confer a certain level of security. People heavily dependent 
on a single asset are potentially very vulnerable, especially in developing countries where 
financial incomes tend to be weak and insecure. The mode of access is also an issue. The assets 
are not necessary property: they can also be rented or borrowed, shared with others as common 
property, or open access. People often transform assets into wellbeing by converting and/or 
commercializing them. For example, a natural asset such as land can be converted into financial 
assets, either by selling or renting out, or selling products of the land. Physical assets such as 
irrigation infrastructure or power grid determine access to goods and services such as water 
for agriculture, electricity, used as an input in economic activities. An analysis of assets will 
help understanding the type of goods and services that people need to achieve their welfare 
aspiration. 
The underlying factors. These include historical, geographical, social and cultural factors:  
–  Historical factors explain at least in part, the situation of people today. In some contexts, the 
history of the population (ancestry, migration, conflicts ...), can greatly affect their choices, 
priorities and standards of wellbeing to which they can aspire.
–  Geographical factors, more specifically, the characteristics of the place where people live 
influence their opportunities and desires, as well as the potential results they are able to 
achieve. In agricultural areas, soil quality is an obvious example.
–  Social factors are equally important. Depending on the political context, ethnic origin or 
belonging to a class or caste can strongly determine options and opportunities for people. Age 
often explains the level of prosperity, the old and the young being the most disadvantaged. 
Finally, gender is a major social factor, mainly due to the fact that women are often subjected 
to forms of cultural and social discrimination.
–  Cultural factors such as religion, traditions, family relationships, solidarity rules etc. also 
explain the behavior of people (what they accept or do not accept to do), the safety nets and 
other opportunities that they may have.
By assessing the strengths of the people, we approach the analysis in a positive perspective. The 
review described above of the characteristics and strengths, results in an overall assessment 
of what people are missing and what problems confront them. The emphasis should be on the 
current capabilities of the end-user groups and the extent to which institutions can strengthen 
these capabilities.
Appreciating how the system affects the end users’ livelihood outcomes
Once we have a good understanding of the end users, the next step is to appreciate how the 
system affects them. The effects and impacts on end users are the final results of the system 
under study. As already explained these results are produced by end users themselves, by 
consuming and transforming the goods and services generated. Figure 15 gives an overview. 
78 Part C
Figure 15: From delivery results to livelihood outcomes
To identify the impacts, the MANGO user examines which aspects of the wellbeing of end 
users are determined by the system. Is it the acquisition of knowledge or specific know-how, 
income, health, housing conditions? In the example of rice growers presented above, the system 
probably failed to improve their know-how with regard to using improved technologies. They 
end up indebted, instead of increasing their revenues.  
To identify the effects of the system, we will focus on the consumption and transformation of 
the supplies delivered and incorporated by the end users as inputs in their livelihood strategies. 
We will first establish the list of supplies that end users would expect from the system. Then, 
we will check if there is a problem in the consumption or in the transformation of these inputs. 
The fact that people do not consume the goods and services available can lead to several 
hypotheses, e.g. the costs are beyond their reach; access is geographically difficult; the quality 
of the goods and services does not meet the required standard, or for any reason (i.e. lack of 
knowledge or know how) the end users do not succeed in using the supplies. In the example of 
rice famers presented above, they consume fertilizer, but do not increase their yield as expected. 
The problem is in the transformation process. The assumptions can be: the quality of the supply 
is not good enough; the quantity is not enough; end users do not master the knowledge or know 
how with regard to transforming the good or service they access; the incorporation of these 
supplies in the production system is not profitable... Ultimately, identifying the effects of the 
system consists of examining delivery results, by answering the following questions: what are 
the supplies that the system generates for end users? What problems they encounter in the 
process of consumption and conversion of these goods and services that explain the level of 
achievement of their wellbeing aspiration? At this stage, we just focus on understanding these 
problems. 
Identifying supply arenas
As mentioned in Section 5.1, we distinguish three kinds of supply arenas: (i) the capital good 
arenas; (ii) the core service arenas; and (iii) the enabling service arenas. To identify these supply 
arenas, we will first categorize the list of goods and services established in the previous step. We 
will classify in the same supply arena, the capital goods, core services or enabling services that 
are likely to be delivered through the same set of mechanisms (actors, relationship, rules…). 
Each group of such supplies identified with a set of delivery mechanisms, delimit a supply 
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arena. It is advisable to name each action arena after the category of supplies it generates. For 
example, in a rice value chain, an input arena is a capital good arena that generates the delivery 
of fertilizer and certified seeds to farmers. The water service arena is a core service arena that 
delivers access to irrigation water to them. The financing arena is another core service arena that 
delivers loans to farmers and processors. The seeds certification arena is an enabling service 
arena that contributes to ensuring farmers’ access to quality seeds. 
Pre-identifying the major issues in each supply arena 
As already explained, in an action arena, the production and distribution of goods and / or 
services is the work of a group of actors that play specific roles, use resources and develop 
relationships, according to specific rules of the game. As we know, each these actors have their 
own motivations and interests. A good pre-identification of problems in each action arena is 
essential for the preparation of the next steps of the analysis. Dysfunctions can be located at 
several levels:
–  Is the sharing of roles at stake? Is there any important function that is not well taken care of? 
Are roles shared adequately? 
–  Do the actors seem to lack capacity? Which actors? What types of capacity is at stake? How are 
we going to assess these skills and establish the needs? 
–  Are there any problems in the relationship between the actors? Do these problems concern 
transparency, accountability, feedback, or equity issues? 
–  Are some arenas confronted to the lack of instruments (technical, legal, financial...)? What are 
the specific consequences of this lack of tools? How do we argue these problems?
–  Are key actors sufficiently motivated? Which actors? What kind of motivation is it (financial, 
social status, promotion, coercion ...)? Is it a lack or insufficiency of motivation? 
At this point, the analyst may realize that, recurring problems usually have their roots in the 
institutional context. It is therefore interesting to group similar problems in order to pre-identify 
the concerned governance arenas. 
Pre-identifying the governance arenas at stake
The information compiled so far with regard to the issues identified in the supply arenas will 
be used to examine which causal factor we can find in the institutional context. As already 
explained, these factors may be found in the following areas:
–  Policies. Are there any political factors non-conducive for the end-users or for those delivery 
agencies responsible for the supply of goods and services? Which? How to explain the 
causality? 
–  The legal framework. Could we find the causes of some of the dysfunctions identified in the 
regulations? What regulations are at stake? How will we develop arguments to substantiate 
the facts?
–  Financing mechanisms. To what extent the way enablers allocate resources affects negatively 
the operation of certain supply arenas? How are we going to demonstrate the causality? 
–  Incentives mechanisms. In some cases, dysfunctions recorded in a supply arena may be due to 
the lack of instruments (technical, financial, legal...) necessary to stimulate the actors? How 
to demonstrate the importance and the need to implement such instruments?
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By answering the questions above, the analyst explores the key factors of the institutional 
environment that appear problematic and the main issues behind each of these factors. 
After this exercise, it often serves to search for arenas that may address more than one 
contextual issue. For example in the reform of the micro finance sector in Niger (Case Study 4), 
the same governance arena was in charge of revising both the policy and the legal framework.    
Exploring methods for assessing the results of the supply and 
governance arenas identified
At this stage, the user of MANGO will explore the knowledge, skills and tools that will be needed 
for the detailed assessment the results of the supply and governance arenas in the next stage. 
The following series of questions are to be answered: 
–  With regard to the production of goods and/or services, how do we assess the range and 
quality available? How do we measure the quantities? How do we appreciate the cost and 
efficiency issues? What skills do we need?
–  As regard the distribution of these supplies, how do we assess the issues of efficiency and 
effectiveness, equity of access for different social groups? What skills do we need?
–  How do we assess the robustness and stability of the institutional arrangements for the 
production and distribution of goods and services?
–  How do we demonstrate the way the identified factors of the institutional context affect the 
operation the supply arenas? What types of knowledge, skills and tool can we use? 
–  How do we analyze the way that the concerned governance arenas operate? 
7.3  Describing the governance system 
By compiling the information developed so far, the user of MANGO will be able to propose a 
model representing the system. This done by summarizing the key elements identified in each of 
the three system components (Results, Action Arenas and Institutional Context) and describing 
the causality between them. I recommend to conclude system mapping exercise by starting with 
the results components. Here the user of MANGO will summarize the description of the concern 
social groups, and the aspects of their wellbeing state (outcome results) affected by the system. 
Then findings with regard to the problematic delivery results (the supplies those people need), 
and to the governance results identified will be summarized.  Subsequently, each of the supply 
and governance arenas identified will be shortly described. The major issues identified in each 
action arena are summarized. Finally, the information on the factors of the institutional context 
that shape the operation of the action arenas are summarized, emphasizing those aspects of the 
institutional context that are linked to the problematic issues in the supply action arenas. 
7.4  Planning the detailed analysis 
At the end of this preliminary analysis, the contours of the institutional system under study 
appear clearly, indicating the key issues for the participatory in-depth analysis. The user of 
MANGO will first clarify the content of the in-depth analysis, and then plan the streams of 
technical and collective action processes. 
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Clarifying the content of the in-depth analysis
The task here is to review the main issues raised in the previous steps in each of the three 
compartments of the system, the techniques and approaches (evaluative, causality, normative) 
as well as the expertise that will be used to demonstrate the problems, argue their causes and 
develop alternative proposals. The data to be collected and how they will be processed and 
analyzed must be specified. For example, in the results component, if we identify the income 
of rice growers as one of the key aspects of their state of wellbeing, we must at this stage clarify 
how to measure the income of these people, the primary and secondary data that we’ll need, the 
approach and method to collect and analyze these data. Suppose that in an action arena, the 
division of roles between public and private sector actors in the delivery of inputs has been listed 
as a problematic factor. How will we demonstrate the inadequacy of the division of roles? What 
kind of political argumentation can we use? Finally, how do we establish the causality between 
the inadequate sharing of roles in the inputs arena and the low revenues of rice growers?
Planning the technical and collective action processes
Based on the results of the preliminary analysis, the user of MANGO will develop an action 
plan that outlines the activities to be undertaken, the costs, the responsible actors, and the 
approximate dates. A good definition of these activities will facilitate the conduct of the process. 
Moreover, even if we maintain the flexibility to adapt to the pace of collective action, it is always 
useful to give a timetable and regularly update it, considering the progress on the ground. 
Finally, we must consider the issue of financial resources. In some contexts, the promoter of 
the analysis will be reluctant to invest in research and process that will reveal weaknesses in 
enablers’ policies. Contrarily, in other contexts, leaders need the analysis to justify the need 
for changing some of the institutional arrangements in place. Whatever the situation, it must 
be remembered that the analysis conducted using MANGO must find a balance between the 
cost and the technical quality of the analysis that should be just good enough to guarantee its 
stakeholder-based character.
Planning the stream of collective action process presented in Chapter 8 is much more complex. 
The goal is to bring divergent stakeholders to cooperate in analyzing the causal factors of the 
problematic institutional arrangements, and to develop, adopt and implement alternative 
options. Along the process, it is important not only to collect the views of stakeholders, but also 
to create the conditions that enable them to cooperate and negotiate solutions for the future. In 
general, in addition to the information on the opportunities and desires of the players gathered 
in the previous steps, it may be necessary to conduct a more thorough analysis of the behaviors, 
motivations and capacities of some actors to contribute to the analysis.  When dealing with 
groups that are so affected that they no longer have the resources to contribute to the process, 
specific support must be put in place to help them formulate their positions and present their 
proposals.
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The stream of collective action 
The participants of a MANGO process not only need to be enlightened with the technical analyses 
presented in chapters 9 to 13. They also need to be willing to enter into a process of collaboration, 
that is, develop a joint vision, and enter into a process of give-and-take, of feeling some sort of 
common responsibility and so on. But why would they do so? In social science parlance, this is 
often called the problem of collective action. The present chapter will first explore that problem 
and then explore ways out that are implementable in settings such as the MANGO process. The 
aim is to familiarize the reader with a set of tools we can use to help a governance system’ actors 
to agree on their common problems, the causing factors and some possible options for solution, 
in order to bring about peaceful social changes that can be sustained. Section 8.1 presents the 
collective action challenge. Sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 deal respectively with understanding actor 
choices, creating a positive atmosphere, and facilitating negotiations. 
8.1  The collective action challenge 
A development action situation faces a collective action challenge, when, instead of behaving in 
the whole society’s best interests, too many actors choose to pursue individual profit. According 
to Ostrom (1990), the problem of collective action is that often, purely rational actors would 
not enter into the required cooperation, and thereby not realize their common good. To better 
understand the collective action challenge, it is interesting to explore the concept of social 
dilemma. 
A social dilemma is a situation in which, an individual profits from selfishness unless everyone 
chooses the selfish alternative, in which case the whole group loses (Allison et al., 1996). 
The prisoner’s dilemma is a famous theoretical example of social dilemma. It shows why two 
completely rational individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best 
interests to do so. Dieckert (2012) presents the prisoner’ dilemma as an illustrative example of a 
‘game of cooperation’ as follows: 
‘There are two robbers that have been caught, but the police have no evidence who the main 
culprit is. If both robbers cooperate and do not talk, the police cannot do anything, and both 
get only a slight punishment. If, however one of the robbers defects and tells the officers that 
the other one did it while he was merely standing by, the defector will be set free and the other 
robber will go to jail for a long sentence. If both robbers talk to the police, both will get punished, 
although they do get some reduction as they have talked to the police. The problem is now that, 
even though it is jointly optimal to hold tight, doing so is not individually rational. Suppose the 
players have agreed to hold tight and player 1 does honor the agreement, player 2 can gain from 
defecting. Since the same reasoning is true for player 1, the outcome is that both robbers talk to 
the police and get a sentence higher than they would have had when cooperating’.  
Dieckert (2012) presents another type of social dilemma, a ‘game of coordination’ as follows: 
‘There are two actors: one who likes to listen to Stravinsky and another who likes to listen to 
Bach. Now picture that both are at work and agree to go a concert (both prefer to go to a concert 
together rather than alone), but they have not decided where to meet. So, if actor 1 goes to the 
Batch concert and his partner goes there too, actor 1 gets a payoff of 2 and actor 2 gets a payoff 
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of 1. If actor 1 goes to the Stravinsky concert and actor 2 goes there too, actor 1 gets a payoff of 
1 and actor 2 gets a payoff of 2. But if Actor 1 goes to the Batch concert and actor 2 goes to the 
Stravinsky concert (or vice versa), both are alone, and get a payoff of zero. So even though there 
is slight conflict of interest, this game is mainly about coordination. For if actor 1 goes to the 
Bach concert, actor 2 can do no better than going there too, and is actor 2 goes to the Stravinsky 
concert, actor 1 cannot gain from not going there as well. In technical term, the game has two 
good solutions and the problem consists really of which one to select’.
In the perspective of social dilemmas, processes such as MANGO can fail. Yet, as shown in 
the two examples above, they have a potential of success, and in fact, they often succeed. How 
can that be? One approach to solve this riddle is exemplified by the road taken by Ostrom, who 
went on to study the empirical key characteristics of obviously successful examples of collective 
action – in her case, examples of common property management. The other road is to stay 
with the realm of game theory and design a rule that stimulates collaboration. This has been 
done by Axelrod (1984) who found the ‘tit-for-tat’ rule that actors trust each other until one 
of them defects. Other important work here is by Olson (1965) who found that the problem of 
collective action especially prevails in large groups. This already explains in part why MANGO-
type settings, collective action is not impossible. MANGO groups are small, the collective goal 
tends to be clear and actors, knowing each other, may trust each other enough to enter into a 
tit-for-tat like game of negotiation. Lesson 1 for the MANGO facilitator is that these characteristics 
should be guarded and stimulated by the facilitator during the MANGO process. 
Yet, this is not all there to say about collective action stream in MANGO. Other inspiration 
comes from that actors, being humans, are not purely rational. Rational choice theory does not 
predict, for instance, that imbibing a wee bit too much alcohol with the MANGO facilitator might 
help the MANGO process along. Yet it sometimes does. These ‘irrationalities’ are not always 
helpful; they may sometimes make the collective action problem even worse. For instance, 
actors my hate each other so much that they find pleasure in just harming the other – spiteful 
action, as Elster (1989) calls it. In many other instances, however, ‘irrationality’ helps collective 
action along. Social norms, for instance, often prescribe collaboration for the common good, 
irrespective of the direct consequences for the actor (Elster 1989). The coming sections explore 
some of these aspects, geared towards what, in my experience is typical in MANGO applications. 
These aspects are: (i) understanding actor choices; (ii) dealing with emotions; and (iii) facilitating 
negotiations. 
8.2  Understanding actors’ choices 
Quite often, people are much more willing to cooperate if they feel understood – by other actors 
but certainly too by the MANGO facilitator. This the focus of the present section. 
Understanding actors’ modes of reasoning
As summarized by de Groot (pers. comm.), human motivations can be of many kinds, which 
may be called ‘modes of reasoning’. They are, e.g.: (1) short-term economic (immediate gain); 
(2) long-term economic (also gain, but later, hence more depending on good reputation, 
reciprocity, trustworthiness, sustainability etc.); (3) care, membership of group, maintenance 
of relationships; (4) honor, reputation, noblesse, solidarity in own group; and (5) autonomy, 
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having a meaningful life. This list is nicely related to theories. Numbers 1 and 2 express economic 
preferences, rational choice theory and the morality of the homo economicus. Number 3 expresses 
the ethics of care (Gilligan 1987). Number 4 expresses the homo honoris ethics (de Groot 1992). 
Number 5 relates to modern theory on human motivation such as self-determination theory 
of Ryan and Deci (2000) and the work of Kruglanski and Orehek (2011) – ‘Quest for Significance’. 
People are contextual, which is to say that they tend to enter into certain modes of reasoning, 
depending on the social context. And what is their social context during a MANGO application? 
If people are in a MANGO workshop with mode X prevailing, they tend also to respond in mode 
X. Or, in bilateral settings, if they are approached in mode X, e.g. by the MANGO facilitator, they 
will tend to respond in mode X. This works also biologically: if I yawn, you yawn; if I lean back, 
you lean back. In other words, if the MANGO facilitator is a good ‘atmosphere setter’, he can 
manipulate certain trends of responses into the outcomes. This power will not go to every length, 
of course. If the facilitator would have buttered his participants too far out of their basic mode 
of moral reasoning, today’s Yes will be No tomorrow, or after the workshop. MANGO facilitators 
should be aware of this power of manipulation but also its limits, morally and practically.     
Understanding the opportunities and desires of actors 
The actions of an individual pass through two filters. The first filter is independent of the actor. 
It’s constituted by the physical, economic, legal and psychological constraints which determine 
what is called the scope of opportunities of the individual. This field of opportunities delineates 
the number of actions that he may choose to undertake. The second filter is the mechanism 
which action will be chosen from this set of opportunities. This involves his desire. 
Opportunities, desires, motivations
The concept of scope of opportunities reminds us of what we have called the conditions of the 
institutional context in Chapter 5. When the institutional context is not conducive, people do 
not have access to the supplies they need to achieve their wellbeing aspirations.  But when, 
by improving the institutional arrangements, the society establishes a new equilibrium that 
makes the context more favorable, people see the range of goods and services to which they 
have access, i.e. their scope of opportunity, widen. In standard economics and social psychology, 
the range of opportunities is often implicitly considered endless, focusing the whole science on 
the motivational (desires) side of the coin, under terms such as preferences or attitudes. Stigler 
and Becker (1977), in their book ‘De gustibus non disputatum’ however argue that people have 
essentially the same preferences but differ only by their scope of opportunities. For example, in 
a poor country, the scope of opportunities is often so narrow, that individuals may be reduced, 
in many cases, to a single choice. In such a context, there is no choice. That is why the Marxists 
argue that, in contexts where the constraints are so enormous that it does not remain any 
choice, the preferences are not so important, even if they may differ depending on individuals 
or societies. 
Elster (1989), mentioned two other reasons why examining the scope of opportunities is 
important, when analyzing the interactions between individuals. First of all, the opportunities 
for an individual can be observed by everyone, whereas its intentions cannot be. In addition, it 
is easier to change the conditions or circumstances of the people, than to change their desires. 
This means that a society can influence, or even condition the behavior of its members, by 
shaping in a certain way, the institutional environment that broadens or restricts their range 
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of opportunities. Elster’s idea appears to neglect that even though institutions indeed cannot 
change people’s desires, they can to a large extent influence the degree to which satisfaction 
of desire is associated with certain actions, e.g. by subsidizing the one action and punishing 
(taxing, levying) the other. Roughly put, regulatory policy instruments operate on people’s 
options, while economic instruments operate on people’s degrees of satisfaction (motivations, 
as de Groot 1992 calls these).
It follows that for understanding actors’ perspectives and choices in a MANGO application, 
both their opportunities and their desires must be understood to some degree. Another reason 
why desires are important is that the collective action that MANGO participants are supposed 
to engage in must itself be desired. Lack of desire can kill action. In addition, desires and 
opportunities can influence one another.
The influences between the desires and opportunities of actors
The influences between desires and range of opportunities are very important in a process of 
reform. They have been widely explored by Elster in his books ‘Sour Grapes’ (Elster 1983: chap. III), 
‘Ulysess and the Sirens’ (Elster, 1984: chap. II), and ‘Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences’ (Eslter 
1989: chap. II). Elster describes three types of influences: (i) of opportunities on the desires; (ii) 
of the desires on the opportunities; and (iii) desires and opportunities generated by a common 
cause.
Figure 16: Influences between desires and opportunities
Source: Elster (1989)
Arrow A in figure 16 reflects a context in which the opportunities determine the desires. For 
example, in a health sector reform process, the choice of standards is critical. It will determine 
the quality of the health centers at various levels (clinics, district hospitals, reference hospitals 
etc.), the number of doctors per capita, the protocols to apply for common diseases, etc. It is clear 
that, the more a country is poor, the more it will be compelled to lower the standards of quality. 
But, if by any chance, the country witness economic growth with a sustainable improvement 
of public revenues, the rulers may decide to allocate a part of these public funds to the health 
sector. They can then commit to higher quality standards of their health system. The widening 
of their range of opportunity has influenced their desire.
Arrow B reflects a context in which the opportunities are influenced by desires. This can be 
illustrated by the debate on the bankruptcy of the social security system in a country. Before 
the crisis, the social security system was functioning properly, allowing the majority of the 
population to access good health services. Unfortunately, because it has given the opportunity 
of excessive medication (excessive use of expensive drugs) to patients and physicians, the 
system went to bankruptcy. All stakeholders (the patients or ordinary citizens, the medical 
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corps, and the political authorities) have felt the crisis as a threat for the society. Thus, they went 
through rounds of negotiations that have led to a new equilibrium (collective desire) marked 
by the reduction of opportunities in terms of medicines and types of medical acts eligible for 
reimbursement. 
Arrows C reflect the fact that desires and opportunities may have a common cause. In the 
example of the bankruptcy of the social security system mentioned above, the citizens are faced 
with a drastic reduction of their scope of opportunities in terms of access to health care. Their 
acceptance (desire) of the new equilibrium as well as the new scope of opportunities, have both 
been determined by the crisis. Desires and opportunities generated by a common cause can 
go in the same direction or the opposite direction. As mentioned by Elster, when a society, due 
to acute governance problems, is in a very bad shape, people are very motivated to rebel. But 
then, their ability to do so is often reduced. Let’s imagine a rural population fallen into an acute 
crisis (poverty, famine, crisis of authority etc.) due to the degradation of the natural resources 
on which it depends. This crisis can lead to both, a willingness of individuals to exert pressure on 
the authorities to demand reforms (desire) and unfortunately, an inability for the peasants, the 
most affected social group, to organize themselves to carry out such a collective action (lack of 
opportunities); this is often called the ‘poverty trap’. Indeed, this would require time, knowledge 
and financial resources, which generally the people who are virtually wiped out by a problem 
do not have. The peasants less affected could carry out such an action, but they may be less 
inclined to do so. In such a case, where a crisis generates the desire for the actors affected to 
act, while limiting their scope of opportunities to do so, the intervention of a pacemaker or 
facilitator becomes necessary, and using MANGO will be helpful. 
Accompanying collective choices and rationality
Establishing the rationality of collective choices 
As already mentioned, the process of institutional reform is a process of collective choice. 
Firstly, there is a choice to make with regard to the future outcomes the society would like to 
achieve. What livelihood outcome results, for which social groups? What goods and services 
these groups would need to achieve such development aspirations? Secondly, the society has 
to choose which institutional arrangements should be put in place to ensure the achievement 
of these results. Often, a society confronted to these challenges, will have several options, and 
individuals as well as social groups might have their own preferences. The rationality of these 
collective choices is therefore of particular interest and has been analyzed by several authors. 
Luce & Raiffa (1957) have described the relationship between preference, utility and actions in 
their book ‘Games and decision’. They put a particular emphasis on the theory of games and 
the theory of risky choice. We can also mention the work of Friedman (1986) on the theory of 
games applied to the economy, the work of Ostrom and her colleagues on the rules and games 
in the management of renewable natural resources (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994), etc. But 
our focus here will be especially on the rational formation of an opinion. This subject has been 
treated in the collection of essays published by Diamond and Rothschild in 1978. In rational 
choice, actions are chosen because they are a way to achieve a given objective. For example, 
in revising a bill, the changes to be introduced in the new bill should be carefully chosen, to 
ensure appropriate responses to the specific problems posed by the current act. Rational choices 
involve the order of preference or, to speak a language of economics, the utility function. For a 
reform process, the rational options are those which we can establish clearly that they would 
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lead to specific results. The challenge for the institutional analysis is to establish enough of this 
evidence, overcoming the uncertainty that often leads to indeterminacy (Luce and Raiffa 1975).
17: Convincing the actors of the evidence of the options’ rationality 
Figure 17 shows the mechanisms of our actions’ rationality. Together, evidence and beliefs 
determine our scope of opportunities within which, our desires enable us to make a choice. 
Moreover, to a very large extent, they determine what we think about the satisfaction that the 
opportunities will give. The institutional analysis must play skillfully with all these psychological 
factors to get the stakeholders to collectively explore and at best, chose the best options. For 
that purpose, the analysis must establish the evidence of the causal links between certain types 
of outcomes and some specific institutional arrangements. 
Figure 17: The mechanisms of our actions rationality
Adapted from Elster 1989 
Integrating the principle of foresight
The question of foresight intervenes when we think about the future results that our various 
optional choices could generate. By doing so, we can avoid falling into the trap of myopia. In 
practice, the principle of foresight reminds us of the environmental issues and those related to 
future generations, as well as options more productive in the long term and therefore ultimately 
more beneficial. Consider an option A which will give higher benefits, but in the future, and an 
option B which will give lower benefits, but immediately. To be rational, we must avoid choosing 
the immediate advantages of option B, but rather commit to wait for the future results of option 
A. To get people act with this rationality, it is first necessary to establish clearly the advantage 
of A over B. But according to Elster (1989), even in the face of such evidence, human beings can 
still be tempted by the irrational choice. In such a case, by providing people with information 
on the lessons from past experiences, one will be able to give them enough motivation to 
choose to wait. For that purpose, the user of MANGO must be able to establish the advantage 
of A on B. This can be done by using a deliberative process. In accordance with Fearon, (1998), 
a deliberative process can be defined as a process allowing a group of actors to receive and 
exchange information, to critically examine an issue, and to come to an agreement which will 
inform decision making. Participants in a deliberative process have the opportunity to critically 
examine an issue by weighing the pros and cons of the options available. 
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8.3  Creating a positive atmosphere 
In view of what has been said about modes of reasoning in section 8.1, a facilitator of a MANGO 
application must be familiar with and even capable to manage the emotions of the participants. 
Emotions are powerful states of mind. We do not decide to have them, but instead, we are under 
their control. In accordance with de Souza (1987), our emotions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
are important in assessing the results of our actions. As found by Kahneman (2011), emotions are 
in fact our prime decision-makers; rational deliberations tend to come in later and basically only 
to justify our emotional decisions. For Alloy and Abrahamson (1979), and Lewisohn et al. (1980), 
emotions give both a sense of life and disrupt our cognition. 
Understanding actors’ emotions
Figure 18: Evidence of a better future
Source: Elster (1989)
In his book ‘ Sadder but wiser – Rationality of Emotion ‘, Elster (1985) presents a typology of 
emotions. He first distinguished the major emotions. They can be positive, such as joy, good 
taste, a beautiful view, love, or sad (disgust, fear, hatred, humiliation, anxiety, etc.) or unrelated 
to their desirable or undesirable character, such as anger. Some other emotions are in various 
ways parasites of these major emotions. They derive from past or future opportunities, loss 
or lack of such opportunities, or experience of other persons. Thus, anticipation and hope as 
well as the apprehension and anxiety are directed towards a certain or possible future. Similar 
emotions are directed towards the past.
Elster (1989) gives very interesting explanations on the feeling that an individual who believes 
he was mistreated, may have. The sufficient conditions for him to experience such terrible 
emotion are: (i) the individual perceives the situation as morally bad; (ii) they see this as having 
been created intentionally and not as the fruit of chance or the invisible hand of a natural or social 
cause; (iii) they perceive the situation as a problem that a social intervention can correct. Thus, 
the sense of injustice results from the combination of: ‘it should be otherwise’; ‘this is someone’s 
fault if it is not otherwise’; ‘we could arrange for it to be otherwise’ and finally, ‘it could have been 
otherwise’. When one of these conditions lacks, envy and/or resentment may occur. 
Elster presents another class of emotions generated more by the loss rather than the lack 
of these conditions, with a sense of grievance and disappointment if the major emotion lost 
is negative, or a sense of relief if it is positive. In fact, the cessation of a positive or negative 
emotion not only brings us back to a neutral or stable emotional state, but also tends to 
generate an emotional state of opposite sign. 
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In a social transformation process such as a MANGO application, it’s important to get 
stakeholders generate hope emotions, by helping them to see as clearly as possible, the potential 
benefits of the reform. It is especially important for actors that support the reform, to generate 
feelings of hope that are more intensive than their feelings of regret. The hope will be more 
intensive only if the evidence establishes that the estimated future average gain is greater than 
the average gain obtained in the past (Figure 18). In addition, it is necessary to estimate the losses 
that could occur for certain layers or the whole society and anticipate the feelings of regret that 
these people could generate. If some players have to lose something, it’s imperative to minimize 
the unfortunate sentiment attached to the past that they are likely to generate. This could require 
some negotiation with the other actors, in order to minimize their losses. Anyway, it’s important 
for the user of MANGO, to pay attention to the feelings that changes that may arise as rupture, 
might generate for some actors. This implies a process of negotiation, in which optimal solutions 
are sought to prevent them as much as possible from unnecessary losses.
The way we experience emotions over time is another interesting topic. This is explored 
by Solomon and Corbit (1978) in their article ‘An opponent - process theory of motivation’. 
They describe the contrast between emotions that we experience in self-realization and 
in consumption. As shown in Figure 19, the satisfaction or sadness that we derive from 
consumption or self-realization episodes, depends on the duration of each episode, but also 
on the repetition of these episodes. Some actions begin with unpleasant emotions (sadness), 
and finish with emotions more enjoyable. That is the case of writing a book. But by repeating 
these actions, the difficulties at starting decline, as the quality of the work improves, leading to 
growing satisfaction. Other actions begin with great satisfaction. That is the case, when we take 
a nice drink. But this satisfaction will decrease over time. As we repeat the action, at each new 
episode, the initial satisfaction will decrease, and our level of enjoyment over time will decrease. 
This might explain why, in the short term, our emotions control us, while in the long term, we 
can to some extent control them. Similarly, a reform process might give at its early stages some 
feelings of grief. Even, players who initially wanted the reform might prove saddened when 
it comes time for reflection, analysis, solutions seeking, and negotiations between actors. 
Therefore, there is a need for the user of MAGO as facilitator, to be able to manage participants’ 
psychology, maintain their commitment at a high enough level for the process to continue. For 
that purpose, it is important, starting from the beginning of the reform process, to convince 
the concerned players that the expected results will largely offset (at least in the long term) the 
potential benefits the society could sacrifice.
Figure 19: Contrast between emotions
Source : Elster, 1989:66
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The coupling of opposite emotions is another highlight raised by Elster. We cannot aspire to 
pleasant emotions without risking unpleasant emotions. If your football team wins a match, 
you’ll be happy, but you must prepare yourself to the idea that it may lose. That’s why Elster 
said, the purpose of Buddhism is to get human being control emotions, and not just to prevent 
unpleasant ones. In the same vein, as facilitator of a reform process, the user of MANGO must 
control his personal emotions. Indeed, they are hopeful of enjoying the pleasurable emotions 
that will derive from the success of the negotiations and later the adoption and even the 
successful achievements of the reform. But they will surely go through unpleasant emotions as 
well. They also must be capable of helping other stakeholders managing their emotions, when 
the process is going through difficult times. Finally, emotions play a major role in the functioning 
of social norms. When the violation of a norm by an individual causes the envy or the disapproval 
of others, the fear of being envied or disapproved, leads the tempted individual to keep the 
line. This fear slips imperceptibly into emotional feelings of shame and guilt, which generally 
support social standards. These emotions are critical, because they stimulate and disturb us, and 
because through their link with social norms, they stabilize social life. They also interfere with 
our thought processes, making them less rational than they would have been otherwise (Elster, 
1989; de Sousa, 1987). Therefore, it may be advantageous to establish rules to govern the conduct 
of a reform process. If they were accepted by the players at the start, the rules will function as 
social norms, which will force people to stay in shape, and modulate their rationality.
Managing actors’ emotions
In order to manage participant actors’ emotions, the MANGO expert must try to give the MANGO 
process an inspired positive atmosphere, by using approaches such as Appreciative Inquiry (AI) 
or Positive Psychology (PP).
Appreciative Inquiry 
Appreciative Inquiry (AI) is a method that focuses people on their ‘excellences’, being what they 
can do and can do well in spite of their limitations, problems etc. According to Bushe (2011), 
David Cooperrider, the creator of AI resisted writing a book on how to do AI until the turn of the 
millennium, because he wanted people to focus on the philosophy behind this approach and 
not see it as a technique. As a result, many different ways of doing AI have proliferated. However, 
the user of MANGO may consider using the 4D model (Discovery, Dream, Design, Delivery) of AI 
presented by Bushe as almost universally described as the AI method.  
During the discovery stage, the MANGO expert will get participants reflect and discuss the 
best of what is concerning the system under reform. For example, in Case Study 5, value chain 
players are asked to inquire into their best experience of doing business together, or the best 
business models they can find around. As a result, they convince themselves on the feasibility 
improving value chain performance, by improving the way they do business individually and 
collectively. In case Study 2, the Members of the Sahel Development Fund (SaDEF) Associations 
were asked to recall the good experiences with regard to local and traditional associations, 
that are effective in delivering expected results without being conflictual. By doing so, they 
rediscover their capacity as a human society to reform the problematic (low service delivery and 
highly conflictual) SaDEF system.  
The dream stage has also been helpful in Case Study 5. The MANGO facilitator works with other 
experts to get participants to jointly figure out what would be their value chain at its best. As 
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such, value chain actors define their common aspirations as system members, with regard to 
improved value chain performance. They agree on common target indicators, using variables 
such as, productivity, yields, value addition, sharing of value addition, revenue, sharing of 
revenue…  However, as put by Bushe, the dream phase often results in something more symbolic 
and less tangible. But as far as I am concerned, I strongly recommend, to make the dream as 
much as possible tangible. For example, in Case Study 2, the members of the Sahel Development 
Fund Association (SaDEF) in Mali, formulated the dream as: the SaDEF system is more effective 
in delivering services (see Section 15.4) to the people, and operating according to agreed rules 
(see Section 15.6).  
During the design stage, the MANGO expert, along with other experts as needed, will support 
system actors to develop proposals on what to do, what institutional arrangements should be 
set up, to make the dream a reality. As explained by Bushe, at this stage, social architecture 
processes are employed where a model of design elements is used to identify categories for 
participants to organize around and create change proposals. In a MANGO process, it is at 
this stage, that the MANGO expert gets system actors to agree on system arenas and on the 
innovative institutional arrangements shaping the operation of these arenas. In the AI language, 
these change proposals are called possibility statements or design statements (Mohr et al. 2003; 
Watkins and Mohr, 2001).      
The delivery stage – If well performed, the first three D phases are expected to highly motivate 
system actors to collaborate for change. But while energy for change is high, there is a risk the 
process would lead to a spotty implementation. To avoid such implementation failure, the 
delivery stage consists of getting system actors to discuss and agree on what actions should be 
implemented by who, with whom, when, using what resources, under what rules etc. to bring 
about the change as designed. In opposition to improvisational process of implementation 
(Barett, 1998), I recommend in using MANGO to consider supporting system actors in developing 
an implementation plan (see Chapter 13: Planning for change). In the plan for change, system 
actors agree on how to get the new institutional arrangements fully operational.     
Positive Psychology
Just like Appreciative Inquiry, Positive Psychology is a current in psychology that aims to help 
people by praising what they do well rather than punishing what they do wrong. As explained 
by Ilona Boniwell (2006) in her book Positive Psychology in a Nutshell, according to positive 
psychologists, for most of its life mainstream psychology (sometimes also referred to as 
‘psychology as usual’) has been concerned with the negative aspects of human life; there have 
been pockets of interest in topics such as creativity, optimism and wisdom, but these have not 
been united by any grand theory or a broad, overarching framework; this rather negative state 
of affairs was not the original intention of the first psychologists, but came about through a 
historical accident. Positive Psychology places a lot of emphasis on being a new and forward-
thinking discipline. Christopher Peterson defines Positive Psychology as the scientific study of 
what makes life most worth living, and according to Kate Hefferon and Ilona Boniwell (2011), it 
concentrates on positive experiences at three time points: (1) the past, centering on wellbeing, 
contentment and satisfaction; (2) the present, which focuses on concepts such as happiness 
and flow experiences; (3) the future, with concepts including optimism and hope. According to 
these authors, not only does positive psychology distinguish between wellbeing across time 
points but it also separates the subject area into three nodes: (1) the subjective node, which 
encompasses things like positive experiences and states across past, present and future; (2) 
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the individual node, which focuses on characteristics of the ‘good person’; and (3) the group 
node, which studies positive institutions, citizenship and communities. Inducing positive 
emotions, committing acts of kindness and enhancing social connections enable individual 
and societal flourishing, demonstrating the usefulness of the discipline for individual, group 
and community wellbeing. In managing MANGO processes, I found it practical to use PERMA, 
the mnemonic for the five elements (Positive Emotions, Engagement, Relationships, Meaning 
and purpose, and Accomplishments) of Martin Seligman’s (2011) well-being theory, elaborated 
below.   
Positive emotions such as excitement, satisfaction, pride and awe can be stimulated by 
supporting system actors discussing and agreeing on positive outcomes. In Case Study 5, 
outcomes such as equitable market relationship between farmers and market players (suppliers, 
off-takers), increased farmers revenues and increased access of value chain players (farmers and 
firms) to financing generated such positive emotions. 
Actors’ engagement is also critical. From my experience, it is important to make sure that 
all actors involved are committed to work towards a defined change, and any player who 
is charge of any specific action for change is effectively committed to generate the expected 
results. Engagement involves passion for and concentration on the task at hand. Effective 
actors’ engagement can be reached only if the positive outcomes are understood and wanted, 
and there is enough incentives (resources, skills, power and rewards – including happiness for 
altruist players, honor, pride…) to perform specific tasks. For example, in Case Study 5, while it 
was agreed to mechanize many agriculture operations (sowing, harvesting, threshing, sorting…) 
previously performed by manpower (farmers, family members and workers) in order to achieve 
competitiveness of cereals value chains, representatives of agriculture mechanization service 
providers showed commitment only when (i) they realized the costs of the various services to be 
provided are beneficial to them; and (ii) the measures Government would implement to enhance 
their capacity (smart subsidies for equipment, technical and managerial trainings) were clearly 
listed in the plan for change. That means, the engagement of one actor may depend upon the 
engagement of other actors, hence the importance of relationship.    
Relationships are all important in fueling positive emotions, and in a MANGO process, all 
actors matter. The MANGO facilitator will watch particularly, the nexus of relationships between 
enablers, service providers and end–users. It is through relationships that these three categories 
of players receive, share and spread positivity to others. The process of discussing objectives and 
institutional arrangements beneficial to everyone will benefit from a relationship of cordiality 
and trust. At the same time, such a process also allows actors to initiate and strengthen such 
relationships. As put in Wikipedia, in fact, relationships can be strengthened by reacting to 
one another positively. From my experience, it is fundamental for the MANGO facilitator to 
stimulate such positive relationships among the various system actors. Even more important, 
the MANGO facilitator must strive to win the trust of each of the participant actors and relate 
cordially with them. Fortunately, the very nature of his work, facilitating agreement between 
actors on shared objectives, and institutional arrangements acceptable to all, ends up helping 
him in this important dynamic of building trust. 
Meaning is also known as the purpose of the system reform endeavor. Indeed, despite 
potential challenges, working with meaning drives people to continue striving for a desirable 
goal. It is important for the MANGO facilitator to constantly help system players individually and 
collectively, respond to the question ‘why are we engaged in this endeavor’. To my experience, in 
development situations, clarifying how the reform will positively affect the livelihood outcomes 
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of concerned people, provides meaningful reason for most system actors to pay the required 
efforts to bring about the required changes. 
Accomplishments are important. People will maintain their efforts and commitment, as 
the successive intermediary results are recorded. Therefore, it is important for the MANGO 
facilitator, to help system actors to decompose each meaningful result (output or outcome) 
into a chain of intermediary results outcomes and outputs and define a way of measuring and 
share information on such progressive accomplishments. Hence the importance of setting up 
effective arrangements to communicate on these progressive accomplishments and on their 
explanatory factors.  
8.4 Facilitating negotiations 
As facilitator of a reform process, the user of MANGO must have some basic negotiation 
skills. Below, I elaborate on using social norms, building cooperation among the actors, and 
facilitating agreements.  
Using social norms 
Rational action is ’consequential’, steered by the results we aim to achieve. Actions can also be 
guided by social norms, that is, rules that state that something should be done (or not) because 
it is the good (or bad) thing to do, without looking at the consequences (Bendor and Swistak 
2001). From a sociological perspective, social norms are informal understandings that govern 
many behaviors in a society (Scott and Marshall 2015). Social norms are partially supported 
by the approval or disapproval of others, who are often guided by a social ‘meta-norm’ that 
violations of social norms should be punished, if only by raised eyebrows (Elster 1989). They 
are also so typically internalized in actors, making them supported as well by emotions 
embarrassment or guilt when violated. Social norms can be simple rules of the type ‘do this’ 
or ‘don’t do that’. Other norms are more complex rules, e.g. taking a conditional form like, ‘If 
you have done this, you should also do that’ (e.g. keeping promises) or ‘if others do this, you 
should also do this’ (fairness) or ‘if it is good for the group as a whole, do it’ (e.g. be member of 
the labor union).  Most social norms arise as social conventions, others are more consciously 
constructed in a collective action, e.g. taking the form of a code of honor or code of conduct 
(Elster 1989). In accordance with Cancian (1975), a good knowledge of social norms will help the 
MANGO facilitator understanding the functioning of a group in a MANGO application.
As put by Bendor and Swistak (2001), social norms can be deductively derived from principles 
of rational choice as mechanisms that are necessary to stabilize behaviors in a large class of 
evolutionary games. For MANGO, the particular interest of social norms is that they can be 
used in negotiations. Indeed, wage standards, norms of equitable distribution of surplus 
between capital and labor, etc. are used by an employer to convince employees to accept a level 
of income, and the same standards can in other conditions be used by employees to demand 
improvements.  Another interesting aspect of social norms is that because insofar they are 
internalized (as they often are), social norms are reinforced by emotions and then do not need 
strong external sanctions or incentives to work. Therefore, social norms are helpful in guiding 
negotiations in a process of reform. As Cancian (1975) suggests, any facilitator of a reform 
process will have an interest to know social norms and to search for those who can be helpful 
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to promote the development of the new equilibrium. Getting actors to agree on the rules of the 
game of the reform process is already a way to govern the process by a social norm. 
Organizing cooperation among actors
Bringing participants to a mutual and beneficial cooperation is one of the key challenges facing 
any facilitator of a reform process, hence a MANGO facilitator. According to Michael Tomasello 
(2008), in the contemporary study of human behavioral evolution, the central problem is 
cooperation. But what is typically meant by cooperation is altruism, because altruism is the big 
theoretical fish, the modeling challenge. In the same vein, having analyzed various explanatory 
factors, Elster (1989) in the ‘Interaction’ chapter of his book ‘Nuts and Bolts for the Social Science’, 
concluded that the trend for cooperation is rather due to some kind of non-selfish reasons. He 
proposes to classify stakeholders into three categories, according to their motivation. Some are 
referred to as Kantian, following the ‘categorical imperative’ that one should do what would 
be good for everyone to do. Others are utilitarian: they want to promote the common good. 
Others are motivated by fairness norms: they do not want to go it alone but will cooperate 
when many others do.  The Kantians could then act as a trigger or catalyst for the utilitarians, 
which in turn, when sufficient actors do it, act as catalysts for people motivated by norms of 
fairness. For each player in this last category, the number of cooperators required to catalyze 
them will vary. Some of them, by shame, will be easily brought to cooperate, while others will 
do so when almost everyone has already acceded to the cooperation. For some, the total sum of 
Kantians and utilitarians will be sufficient. For others, the sum of Kantian and utilitarian and 
those who have been catalyzed by the sum of Kantian and utilitarian may be sufficient, and 
so on. According to the constellation of motivations, the reaction chain can go up to universal 
cooperation or stop a bit earlier. By carefully observing the participating actors and classifying 
them according to these three categories, the facilitator of the reform process will more easily 
organize the necessary cooperation between them.
According to Elster (1989), the ‘Tit for Tat’ strategy is a simple function that persuades people 
to start collaborating (cooperating), (e.g. mirroring the behavior of the facilitator, see under 
‘modes of reasoning’), and only stop doing so if others defect. If all adopt this principle, all 
will cooperate in every interaction. Under certain conditions, continues Elster, the universal 
adoption of the Tit for Tat is an equilibrium. If some adopt it, no one can do better than to adopt 
it himself. The universal adoption of the principle ‘Never cooperate’ is also an equilibrium, but 
with a rather rare occurrence. 
Facilitating negotiations to reach agreements
The negotiation of the agreements will determine to a large extent the effectiveness of the 
new institutional arrangements. Basically, only free and informed consent will assure that a 
negotiated agreement holds out during its implementation. The MANGO facilitator must pay 
attention to the basics of negotiation. Based on the MANGO experiences, this section discusses 
planning, transparency and clarity, threats and coalitions and some additional sources of 
inspiration.  
To ensure it moves smoothly, the negotiation process must also be well planned. This refers to 
what Mayers and Bass (1999) called reform management models. It involves first to specify the 
object or objects of the negotiation. These are in fact the key elements of the reform: the expected 
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benefits, the rules governing the access to these benefits (who, how, when?), the respective roles 
of the various actors, the costs to society, the current actors, future generations... For example, 
in a reform of the education sector, the ease of access for children is a matter of key concern for 
the poor. Therefore, the negotiation will deal with the following critical issues: (i) proximity of 
various categories of schools at various levels; (ii) access to the school supplies for children and 
educational material for teachers; (iii) the availability of teachers, etc. As shown in this example, 
the negotiation issues can be quite complex. That is why it can be necessary to develop an initial 
document to clarify the fundamental issues. It will be important for each of the participants to 
have the time and capacity to state their opinion on this core document and to appreciate the 
opinions of others. Furthermore, it is important to set the rules of the game of negotiation, such 
as decision-making procedures. For example, in Case Study 2, the very first step of the reform 
process of the Sahel Development Associations consisted of getting the members and other 
stakeholders to agree not only on the need, but also on what to reform and how to conduct the 
reform process. Often, for instance, the search for consensus is the best guarantee to secure an 
effective deal, and this model has been followed in all/most applications of MANGO. However, 
the search for consensus does not exclude that there are decisions subject to a vote. In any 
case, it will be important that the rules governing the decision-making procedures are clear and 
accepted by the participants from the outset. 
Transparency of the information about the costs and benefits of the reform is also critical. 
Transparency appeared to be a prevalent factor in most applications of MANGO where system 
actors had to defend clear vested interests (see Case Studies 2 and 5). The process will often be 
confronted by a range of possible equilibriums, each of them leading to costs and benefits for 
each actor, and the whole society. What is important here is to avoid an actor to give its approval 
for an equilibrium by ignoring the costs of his choice. If at any time during implementation, they 
realize the gap, they will be tempted to question the new equilibrium. If an outcome acceptable 
by all is obvious or put in evidence, the negotiation will be facilitated. The lack of evidence as to 
the costs and benefits of any equilibrium will always hinder in the smoothness of the process. 
An actor who approves an agreement, but remains with whiff of doubt, may pose a threat to 
the effectiveness of the new equilibrium. Therefore, the MANGO facilitator must invest in the 
establishment of the greatest possible clarity of the merits of each optional solution to the 
stakeholders, e.g. through a specific study in-between workshop sessions. In principle, such 
studies should analyze issues from the perspectives of the various protagonists, including with 
some emphasis the most vulnerable groups that usually have less capacity to assess costs and 
benefits through their own knowledge. 
Another key element is the need for a rapid assessment of the capacity of social groups to 
take an active part in the negotiation process. Indeed, it may be necessary to support certain 
groups of actors in the process. This begins with the continuous clarification of MANGO’s (and 
any other framework’s) abstract terminology (see section 6.1). An important role may also be 
played by specific advice support actions, e.g. helping farmer groups to more clearly see the 
(dis)merits of proposals in an agricultural plan they are negotiating with the government. For 
example, in Case Study 5, it appeared necessary for MANGO facilitators, to pay additional effort 
in building farmer leaders’ capacity to participate in negotiating upgraded and smallholder 
inclusive business models for value chain development. 
Threats and formation of one or more coalitions are two other factors the MANGO facilitator 
should consider. Threats can be used to force a social group or player to accept an equilibrium 
not necessarily advantageous for them. For example, in a negotiation on agricultural taxation, 
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farmers may threaten the Government to no longer produce cotton. One can establish the 
economic evidence of the rationality of such a threat, and if cotton is a major source of foreign 
currency, such a threat may lead the Government to revise downward its claims. Yet in view of 
what was discussed under the headings of appreciative inquiry and positive psychology above, 
it is clear that the reform process will tend to be more successful if we can to avoid threats to be 
used. The art of doing so is to invite more positive frames to say essentially the same things. For 
example, in the cotton case, the farmer organizations could prepare a document which shows 
that under the proposed taxation, continuing with cotton would be economically irrational or 
even impossible. Even if some figures underlying the document would not be fully true, and 
even if the government would know that, it will allow all participants to continue negotiating in 
a positive atmosphere. 
The formation of one or more coalitions is a factor that can complicate or instead facilitate the 
conduct of a negotiation process. Coalitions may facilitate negotiations between institutional 
actors, thus contributing to reduce costs. They can also lead to complications in the case where 
two coalition groups fail to find common ground of understanding, or in the case of a coalition 
made of normally opponent actors perceived by other categories as malignant actors trying 
to take advantage of the situation at any cost. For the MANGO facilitator, coalitions therefore 
provide a subtle challenge. 
Finally, the MANGO facilitator may also consider using Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
as a means to get disagreeing system actors to come to an agreement short of litigation. ADR 
is much focused on avoiding court proceedings, e.g. in divorces, through a mediator. One of 
the core principles of ADR useful in applying MANGO is to ‘focus people on what they really 
need’, i.e. to try move participants away from their engrained positions and into the things that 
really count for them. For MANGO, this looks somewhat like the principle of keeping the focus 
on the end users. The MANGO facilitator can find resources on ADR in the literature and adapt 
them to the context of the concerned society. Likewise, the MANGO facilitator, might consider 
using available knowledge on ‘Building trust and social capital’. Coleman (1988) uses the term 
social capital to refer to all human relationships. He defines social capital as the value of these 
aspects of social structure to actors as resources that they can use to achieve their interests. He 
regards organizational structures as resources which can be combined with other resources to 
produce different system-level behavior or, in other cases, different outcomes for individuals. 
Coleman’s concept of social capital includes those human factors presented above, such as: 
obligations, expectations, and trustworthiness of structures; information channels; and norms 
and effective sanctions. For the sake of simplicity, and for MANGO, I define social capital as the 
links, shared values and understandings that enable individuals and social groups concerned 
by a development situation, to trust each other and so work together towards enhanced 
governance system. And finally, the MANGO facilitator may find it useful to study Ostrom’s 
(1990) ‘Governing the Commons’ and especially her design principles for successful institutions 
that manage physical common properties such as irrigation systems, forest, fisheries or ground 
water basins. After all, both the negotiation process and the final result of institutional reform 
are common properties in a way and translating Ostrom’s findings to these situations may yield 
fertile results. Only, the present chapter has to stop somewhere, and that point is here.  
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The stream of technical process: 
general aspects 
This chapter does not focus on one of the three technical components of MANGO separately. It 
rather gives a set of general concepts for the approach of the three components. For instance, 
when will the analyses be more empirical (descriptive), more evaluative or more normative 
(design-focused)? More retrospective or prospective? And what types of arguments would be 
most effective? Though the answers will never be fully straightforward, the reflections help 
the MANGO user to better plan the analyses and have deeper responses to proposals and 
events during MANGO applications. Section 9.1 introduces the scope of the analyses and the 
importance of externality checks. In Section 9.2, I elaborate on how to combine empirical and 
normative analyses. Finally, Section 9.3 deals with the types of argumentation that can be used 
in the stream of technical process.   
9.1  Scope of the analyses and the externality checks 
Usually, MANGO applications will focus on a well-defined action system (e.g. a sector, a program, 
a project), usually with some well-defined goals (e.g. economic development or a narrower goal 
such as service delivery). These define the scope of the MANGO analyses. Automatically then, 
it also defines what lies outside that scope. These can be defined as other values (e.g. cultural 
development, political development, community strengthening, environmental conservation), 
often embedded in other sectors such as education, conservation or local government. 
The system-of-scope of any MANGO application is seldom a neutral add-on to other systems. 
A project is meant as a good thing, but it can do harm to other good things. In economics, this is 
called external effects. A few examples from the ‘MANGO world’ are:
–  Economic development undermining a sustainable traditional system (see Case Study 1)
–  A program duplicating an existing government structure and thereby potentially undermine 
it (see Case Study 2)
–  A project trying to do what the market can do better (see Case Study 3).
The MANGO user should be well aware of this fact. It is part of his/her professional ethic to never 
accept blindly which scope of analysis is set before him/her in the Terms of Reference of his/her 
assignment. In order to make this as operational as possible in MANGO applications, checks 
for external effects are built in at several places of the MANGO framework. In general, the two 
operational questions are: (1) will the system-of-scope of the MANGO application replicate what 
others can do just as well or better? In various operational forms, this question will find its place 
in MANGO’s efficiency criteria; and (2) will the system-of-scope of the MANGO application harm 
other values or structures that embody these? In various operational forms, this question will 
find its place in several other spots in MANGO, usually at the end of criteria lists, see for instance 
in Section 10.1.
It will usually be impossible to answer these questions to a full extent, e.g. making a full 
impact assessment on these other values.  Given their special position as external to the MANGO 
application scope however, they may be answered through the ethical principle of Do No Harm 
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(Ross, 1988), setting as the ‘safe minimum standard’ that the action can be accepted if it can be 
made plausible that the action makes no external value worse off. This is the (original) Pareto 
principle (de Groot 1992).
9.2  Combining empirical and normative approaches 
Throughout the stream of technical process, the user of MANGO will get system stakeholders 
exploring together four types of questions.
As already explained, it is recommended to start the analysis by examining the present 
and desired result variables. It is therefore necessary to develop and use relevant methods 
to measure the three levels of results (outcomes, delivery and governance results) presented 
in section 5.1. A proper analysis of results provides a solid foundation for the analysis. At this 
stage, the analysis uses an evaluative approach, and the information used are the values taken 
by the indicators. A general approach to analyzing results is further developed in chapter 10. 
Secondly, the MANGO process must explain the facts. Then, the analysis must establish which 
factors of the institutional system explain the results and how, by examining the problematic 
arrangements within the action arenas, and the factors on the institutional context, that 
determine these arrangements. The questions here are descriptive and explanatory (causal). 
Chapters 11 and 12 respectively present approaches to analyze action arenas and the institutional 
context. Thirdly, the analysis should suggest or prescribe the actions required to solve problems 
and improve performance. The approach here is normative, and the information is in the form 
of recommendations. The approach to planning for change is further developed in chapter 
13, but chapters 11 and 12 also present some insights. The use of evaluative and normative 
approaches implies that we cannot be content with only social science disciplines. The analysis 
must go beyond these, using knowledge pertaining to various areas of public governance 
(administration, finance, sector policies, decentralization and regional policies…), as well as 
economics, welfare and distributional ethics, systems analysis and ‘sector sciences’ such as 
agriculture or health.
The types of questions can be classified into the scheme depicted in Table 1. 
Table 1: Approaches and types of questions 
 
Approches Aim Types of questions
Empirical Constructing truth Descriptive questions
Explanatory questions
Normative Constructing goodness Evaluative questions
Design questions
The empirical approach aims at constructing truth. The focus is on the discovery of facts, their 
interpretation and their compilation into true, or at least true enough, models, narratives, 
predictions etc.  Empirical questions come in two types: descriptive questions (what is/was/will 
this be?) and explanatory questions (how did/does/will this come about?). 
As with truth claims, the world abounds in goodness claims. These claims are attached to 
policy recommendations, development plans, and technological artefacts and so on. For all of 
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these, the truth is trivial: of course, the plan, the software package and the bridge are true. Their 
aim and claim are ultimately normative, i.e. ethical: the bridge, for instance, should be safe, 
beautiful, efficient and so on.
The normative approach aims at constructing goodness. The focus is on the discovery of 
‘valuabilities’, their interpretation and their compilation into valuable wholes. Normative 
approaches can be used to guide the future (Coplin , 1974), e.g. in policy or technical designs. 
Other questions are geared primarily towards normative analysis (evaluation). Thus, we have 
two types of normative questions: evaluative questions (was/is/will this be good in terms of 
normative criteria?) and design questions (can this be made good/better?). 
 In its own modest way, MANGO contains all these types of questions. We can use a descriptive 
approach to unravel a situation, as illustrated in Case Study 1 (The Nago Traditional System for 
Natural Resources Management). In several Case Studies (2, 3, and 4), the MANGO application 
used the explanatory approach in searching for failure factors, as well as evaluative approach 
to assess system results. Finally, as in Case Studies 3, 4 and 5, MANGO was used as a design 
tool, drafting the portrait, the causal map of an ideal action system. In fact overall, MANGO is 
basically a design (a method designed for efficient and effective work) for the creation of other 
designs, i.e. value laid down in reform proposals. It serves the MANGO user to be aware of the 
character, roles and relevance of all four types of questions, both in the design and running 
of practical applications and in his/her own learning process that may search for knowledge 
acquisition in all directions, e.g. including design methods.
9.3  Types of argumentation 
Elements in argumentation 
To demonstrate the mechanisms that that govern a system, the user of MANGO needs to 
develop relevant arguments. For all reform players, argumentation is critical in establishing 
the evidence of the cause to effects links between the non-satisfying results and some specific 
factors of the institutional arrangements in place. Similarly, evidence-based arguments will be 
necessary to explain what results the proposed alternative arrangements are likely to generate. 
Without argumentation, it is difficult for an actor to form an opinion on the optional they can 
make. Toulmin (1958) defines political argument as the primary means of conducting debates 
on political issues. In accordance with Toulmin (1958) and Dunn (2013), argumentation can be 
built around six elements: (i) relevant information; (ii) political assertion; (iii) assumptions; (iv) 
justification; (v) refutation; and (vi) accuracy. 
–  Relevant information is information that derives from the use of any method, quantitative or 
qualitative, to establish significant evidence about a problem or system at stake. 
–  Policy Statement. Once relevant information is developed it’s useful to complete it with a 
policy statement which expresses its consequence in policy-making terms. A policy statement 
is a matter of negotiation between the participating actors, who may or may not support it. 
Policy statements can also be used to incrementally manage a process of analysis, with each 
stage marked by one or more sub-conclusions formulated as a policy statement. This allows 
stakeholders to observe the behavior of others and build their contingency strategy. 
–  Supporting assumptions are used to enhance the passage from relevant information to the 
policy statement. An example can be, for instance, that farmers are assumed to have access 
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to enough information to take advantage of an improved delivery system, which may give 
rise to a discussion of further underlying assumptions, e.g. about literacy rates or mobile 
communication. Obviously in any MANGO application, open discussions about assumptions 
are essential to gain common confidence in the normative and/or empirical strength of policy 
statements. 
–  Justifications. Justifications are arguments that add more (normative) weight to policy 
statements, e.g. pointing at the constitutional rights that are involved, the destitute poverty 
of the beneficiaries, and the economic importance of the sector or our ethical obligations to 
care for nature. Arguments such as these often play a role in MANGO applications, due to their 
connections to the poor, food security, natural resources and so on. 
–  Refutations. Sometimes it may be necessary to negotiate a condition under which the policy 
statement is not or only partially valid. Such a condition, is called a refutation by Jones (1977). 
Refutations often take the form of “except if X”, or “unless Y”, e.g. in a MANGO context: 
“unless the market shows to be able to play this delivery role”. 
The different forms of argumentation
In accordance with Dunn (2013), the MANGO facilitator can consider using the following six 
types of argumentation: (i) authority argumentation; (ii) classifier form; (iii) intuitive form; (iv) 
narrative form; (v) pragmatic type; and (vi) ethics-based argumentation. In practice, in each 
Case Study, I used the forms of argumentation that I found appropriate for the case at hand and 
convenient for the audience. 
–  The authority argumentation is based on assertions that the plausibility derives mainly from 
the fact that they are issued by an authoritative source, such as an agency specialized in a 
particular field of science, a religious leader, a political leader with a widely acknowledged 
charisma… For example, a supporting assumption established by the Global Water 
Partnership may be used to support the plausibility of an assertion in a water sector reform 
process.  
–  The classifier form refers to argumentation that belongs to a certain class. For example, goods 
are classified in four categories, i.e. public goods, private goods, common pool goods, and 
toll or club goods. It’s plausible that all goods classified under each of these categories meet 
a number of identical management principles. When these principles are established for a 
specific good, then one can argue that it is quite plausible that they apply to other goods 
of the same class. To take another example, because water and forests can be classified as 
natural resources, this form of argument can be used to draw a parallel between knowledge 
acquired in the water sector and the establishment of principles for managing the forestry 
sector, and vice versa. 
–  The intuitive form of argumentation is based on our personal intuitions deriving from the 
combination of our experience and thinking. However, if the player using the intuitive form 
of argumentation doesn’t have a certain level of authority in the concerned field, other actors 
might contest the argumentation. 
–  The narrative form is used very often. It explains the cause-to-effect linkages between specific 
factors and the results of the system at stake. For example, by demonstrating how some 
specific aspects of the tax and imports policies render the business climate non-conducive for 
agriculture development, we use the narrative form of argumentation. 
–  The pragmatic type of argumentation is also used very often. It derives from motivations 
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(goals, value, and intention), similarities (cases of similar businesses or aspects of reforms) or 
analogies (for example of cause-to-effect links identified in several sectors). 
–  The ethics-based argumentation is also quite helpful. It is established on the basis of moral 
principles (honesty, transparency) or social norms, widely recognized by society, and that any 
group of players can easily contest. 
Dunn (2013) describes two other forms of argumentation that are less used, and could be called 
‘explicitly scientific’, contrasting, for instance, with the narrative form in which the scientific 
evidence is more implicit. Dunn’s two types are the statistical argumentation and analytical 
argumentation. In the statistical argumentation, plausibility is established from samples, the 
assumption being that what is true for the sample, will also be for any group or sub-group of the 
sampled population. In exploratory reform processes, i.e. one not triggered by a crisis, but rather 
motivated by a desire for progress, there is time to use this type argument. In the analytical 
argumentation, the plausibility is demonstrated by using valid methods or universal rules 
(economics, mathematics, etc.) to develop the assertion. 
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Analyzing the system results 
When entering in the in-depth analysis of the technical process, the user of MANGO must bear 
in mind and use as much as possible the knowledge presented in chapter 8 (on the stream of 
collective action) and in chapter 9 (general aspects of the technical process). 
Regardless of the way the problem is expressed, it is recommended to start MANGO’s in-depth 
analysis by focusing on the results of the system at hand. As already explained, this will be done by 
establishing the chain of causality between: (i) the wellbeing of end users; (ii) the supplies that the 
system generates and that those people use, consume and convert to generate their standard of 
wellbeing; and (iii) the governance of the system (see Figure 11). To appreciate these different levels 
of results, we will use evaluative criteria to compare the current situation with the ideal situation 
to which people aspire. It is actually that comparison that generates the feelings of satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction that people express vis-à-vis the system. Evaluative criteria express values such 
as indices of well-being, access to goods and services, quality of governance that different social 
groups expect the institutional arrangements to generate. For convenience, the MANGO user can 
start out with a set of standard criteria, but these need to be adapted to the local context and, 
during the interactions with the stakeholders, to the visions of these stakeholders. This chapter 
provides guidance on dealing with the results-focused analysis. Section 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3 deal 
respectively with analyzing outcome results, delivery results and governance results. 
10.1  Analyzing outcome results  
As explained in Section 5.1 the outcome results of a human activity system are analyzed 
through the indices of wellbeing that the system enables people to achieve. These indices 
may vary for each social group. It is important, however, that the MANGO user can avail of a 
balanced general set of initial criteria. These can be summarized as: (i) standard of living; (ii) life 
expectancy; and (iii) knowledge and expertise; and (iv) other qualities of personal and community 
life. Furthermore, it is important to remember that peace and security are major requirements 
for social welfare. Without security, it is almost impossible to guarantee access to supplies for 
people, especially for the most vulnerable social groups. Usually however, peace and security 
issues are outside MANGO’s scope, hence positioned as assumptions or refutations in MANGO 
policy recommendations.
–  The Standard of living of a particular social group, expresses the combined achievement of 
one or more of the following results: increased income; food security; housing conditions; 
access to transportation facilities; access to primary health care and suchlike. Depending 
on the context, the analysis will focus on the most relevant of these variables. The role of 
the institutional analyst is precisely to help the different concerned social groups, in close 
consultation with enablers and suppliers, to determine what are their expectations regarding 
these various facets of wellbeing, and to what extent these expectations are met.  
–  Life expectancy – Several methods suitable for measuring life expectancy will be found in the 
literature, the UNDP approach to measuring human development (UNDP 2000, UNDP 2007) 
has shown to be well applicable in MANGO use. The aim is to assess the number of extra 
years of life expectancy at birth, thanks to the effects of specific institutional arrangements 
that enablers have put in place. The ratio ‘number of years gained by a certain date / life 
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expectancy at birth (years) at the time when institutional arrangements were put in place’ 
can be calculated. But beyond the measure itself, it must be remembered that the purpose of 
the analysis is to explain the mechanisms by which institutions deliver goods and/or services 
that positively affect life expectancy. Therefore, it’s important for the analysis to establish the 
evidence of such mechanisms. 
–  Knowledge and expertise – For people to consume and transform goods and services within 
their reach, they need to acquire some knowledge and have mastered a certain level of specific 
know-how. The United Nations consider the acquisition of knowledge and expertise as one 
of the three dimensions of human development and propose to measure these variables by 
combining adult literacy rates with the enrollment rate at the primary, secondary and tertiary 
school (UNDP 2007). In using MANGO, I propose to focus on the knowledge and know-how that 
end users need to realize their wellbeing ambitions. The proposed approach is therefore more 
adapted to each context: (i) consider the end user groups, their characteristics as brought out 
in the previous steps, their activities and the goods and services they use or need to use; (ii) 
consider other key players listed in action arenas, whether suppliers or enablers, and summarize 
their roles; (iii) then, consider the type of knowledge and expertise which different groups of 
end users primarily, and optionally other key players, need to properly fulfill their roles.
–  Other qualities of personal and community life – People do not live by economic values only. 
People do not always prefer being a lone factory laborer earning 200 dollars over being 
a respected free farmer inside a well-working community, earning only 100 dollars. People 
also aspire to live a meaningful life in a place they belong. As Ryan and Deci (2000), for 
instance, in their Self Determination Theory, people value autonomy and connectedness. 
As demonstrated in Case Study 1 (Chapter 14), development projects are not neutral in this 
respect, focusing as they do on economic development (sometimes not cultural or political 
development, not biodiversity or land conservation). Therefore, the MANGO user, aware of the 
scope of his analyses (see Chapter 9), should be conscious of what value lie external to this 
scope, and check for possible detrimental impacts of his system-of-scope on these values.  
10.2  Analyzing delivery results 
The aim of analyzing delivery results is to assess the extent to which the human activity system 
succeeds in making a variety of quality supplies available to end users and to what extent those 
people are able to access, consume and effectively transform those supplies to improve their 
state of wellbeing. The criteria of this assessment are discussed underneath. 
Criteria to evaluate the production of supplies
Jointly, four variables evaluate the goods and services that an institutional system generates: 
the range, quality, quantity and cost of supplies.
–  Range of supplies. MANGO proposes first to examine whether the institutional system under 
study generates the different categories of supply that people need. For example, agriculture 
producers need a broad range of goods such as improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, 
mechanization equipment, and services such as extension services, financing services, 
market access. For a water supply system, drinking water is the supply, but the analysis 
will have to take an interest in intermediary goods and services such as drilling services, 
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development of mini water supply systems, manual or solar pumps, and spare parts for these 
pumps or repair services of these devices, training of water management committees and so 
on. Then, for each type of supply, we will examine the variety of supply available in the market. 
In developing countries and especially the rural areas, this variety is often not accessible to 
users, leaving them in a situation of little choice and high (basically monopolistic) prices. 
Therefore, the evaluation compares the range (types and brands?) that is actually available 
with the desired range.
–  With regard to quality of supplies, products meet specific qualifications in terms of ease of 
application, performance, impact on health and external effects such as sustainability. 
Depending on the situation, some specific technical skills may be required, for example 
to characterize a phytosanitary product used for the conservation of cowpea seeds. This 
specific input has a trade name and may be characterized by its active material (chemical 
composition). But beyond that, ease of handling, harm to human health, storage easiness, 
etc. are other key relevant features. For cowpea improved seeds, beyond the trade name of 
the variety, germination rate, resistance to insects, and organoleptic quality of the variety… 
are all defining characteristics that should be mentioned.  A general issue that plays an 
important role in the analysis of the quality of supply is that ease of application is often an 
important decision factor for consumers, especially when performance (quality of effect, 
cost of maintenance etc.) is more difficult to assess. The same holds for health effects and 
externalities. Obviously, information on these aspects must be available to consumers. 
In some instances, MANGO users should not shy away from a certain level of benevolent 
paternalism towards these aspects, e.g. avoiding great enthusiasm to bring unhealthy or 
unsustainable products to consumers, even if these are not (yet) ruled out by law. 
–  With regard to the amount of supplies, the exercise here is to compare the supply and 
demand. Are the necessary quantities of the essential goods and services that constitute the 
livelihoods of various social groups available? To answer this question, we must measure both 
the demand and supply of goods and services, using quantitative indicators.
–  Cost of supplies. In examining the issue of costs, it’s important to make the distinction 
between the cost to the consumer, to society and to the environment. The cost to the 
consumer is the price the consumer must pay to acquire the good or service, but also the 
recurrent costs involved in using them. For example, a rice grower association that buys a 
pump must include the cost of fuel and engine maintenance. If the engine is aging fast and 
crashes frequently, fuel consumption and maintenance costs may increase significantly and 
even become prohibitive, even if the price of the engine was very affordable. The costs to 
society derive from the fact that sometimes the cost of a product borne by the consumer is 
lower than the actual costs. The pumps may in the longer run deplete groundwater resources, 
for instance, or undermine existing surface water systems (de Groot and Tadepally, 2008). In 
other circumstances, the externalities may be positive, e.g. when the pumps are only used 
for drinking water and may improve the health situation of a whole village. Subsidies or 
levies may be used to internalize the externalities for the users. Therefore, the assessment of 
costs to society is always an important element in institutional analysis. The analysis needs 
to find methods and to integrate these issues in the assessment of the costs of production 
and distribution of the supplies and integrate these in the development of policy proposals. 
MANGO is as yet not provided with such tools. This implies that in cases where external 
effects (environmental or social) can be deemed important, MANGO applications need to 
seek outside help, e.g. from conservation economics.
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Assessing the distribution of supplies
Here, the assessment focuses on the results of the distribution mechanisms set up to allow end 
users to access goods and services. For example, for the distribution of drinking water in a poor 
neighborhood of a big city, two alternatives could be considered: (1) promote private operators 
who will sell water to households; (2) connect households to water network. Because the local 
habitat is precarious, and the subscription cost is too high and not affordable for households, 
the second option might be discarded. Then, the chosen mechanism might be to promote 
private operators who sell water to households in compliance with quality standards and fixed 
prices. Two initial criteria are generally used to assess the performance of delivery mechanisms: 
efficiency and equity.
The efficiency of delivery mechanisms
The analysis of the efficiency of delivery mechanisms includes issues of cost and effectiveness 
already examined. Distribution chains should be designed to deliver supplies on time and at an 
affordable price. If delivery is not sustained, users will not be loyal. As mentioned above, the 
physical proximity (distance to go to reach the water point, clinic, school, place of delivery of 
fertilizer ...) is also an important factor, especially for the most vulnerable social groups. The 
evaluation will then assess whether the institutional arrangements are in place to have the 
most effective routes possible at the most affordable cost. Finally, there is the externality check 
if no other, existing system, market or otherwise, might do the job at lower cost. 
The equity of the distribution
Here, the analysis will examine if the results of the distribution are fair to everyone. More 
specifically, we must determine whether the institutional arrangements in place, allow the 
most vulnerable social groups to effectively access the essential goods and services they need. A 
good level of equity generally reflects the political will of the enablers, when these arrangements 
were agreed upon and put in place. Indeed, the establishment of delivery mechanisms always 
confronts governing bodies to policy choices regarding equity between regions within a 
country, the neighborhoods of a city, urban and rural areas, social strata, generations ... If we 
want to reach a new stable equilibrium, we must do our best to establish the most appropriate 
mechanisms that ensure effective access to the goods and services that are essential for the 
most vulnerable social groups.
The analysis of the distribution can often be helped by the following more concrete 
questions. (1) Are the goods and services easily accessible? Analyzing the ease of access consists 
of answering the following questions. Firstly, we need to examine the cost. How much does an 
end user have to pay to access a specific good or service? Do the members of the social group 
concerned consider the cost affordable for them? Do they need payment facilities (credit, 
payment by installments ...)? What mechanisms are in place to enable them to benefit from 
such facilities? (2) Secondly, is the issue of where (at which place) the good or service is available. 
Depending on the nature of the good or service and the proximity of the place of availability, 
the end user may face some transportation charges that may be too high. (3) Thirdly, 
sometimes some factors of discrimination within a society may make the access difficult for 
some groups. For example, in some contexts, women have access to agricultural inputs, only 
if all men are fully served. (4) Finally, sustainability of access is a critical aspect to be examined. 
Is the good or service always available on due time? Do end-users meet some stock shortages, 
Chapter 10 109
or delivery delays? A good or service that is not sustainably delivered cannot be considered as 
accessible. 
Assessing the level of consumption and transformation of goods and 
services 
Once we have analyzed the level of access, the analysis will examine the question of whether 
people successfully manage to consume and transform the goods and services they access. 
–  Consumption is the first step of the transformation process by which end users value goods 
and services, to achieve their well-being indices. The commonly used indicator is the rate of 
consumption of each type of goods and/or services by the members of various social groups, 
especially in the most vulnerable ones. Responding to this question will feed the causality 
analysis. A low consumption reflects bottlenecks: the quality is not appreciated; the cost is 
not affordable; the good or service is not an input that people really need... 
–  Assessing the transformation of inputs is a more difficult task. In some cases, the 
transformation process is very direct. This is the case for a malaria patient consuming 
healthcare and medicine. If this care package is effective, his body responds directly. In 
other cases, the transformation takes place through a longer and more complex process and 
requires the user to control a minimum of technology, and sometimes to have some other 
complementary inputs. This is the case of a farmer who must use improved seeds, apply 
fertilizer and pesticides, according to very specific technical instructions. This is also the case 
of a student. Following courses is not enough. They must revise their lectures, exercise and 
prepare exams. In any case, the most appropriate variables for assessing the effectiveness 
of the transformation of inputs must be used. For example, the percentage of patients that 
recover from an illness after receiving a care package, the percentage of students passing 
after completing a course, the rate of improvement in productivity realized by the farmer… 
are all indicators of the quality of transformation process. Results indicating a transformation 
process poorly controlled by the end user will help raising the following questions: does the 
supply require the use of some simple or more complex techniques? Did the end-users master 
these techniques? If yes, does the quality of the supply comply with the required standard? 
–  Finally, there is again the externality check. The MANGO application might be focused 
on one delivery system (e.g. delivery of fertilizer), but could no other delivery system (say 
water supply) do a better job in improving the well-being of vulnerable groups? And could 
the system of scope, e.g. the fertilizer, do harm to other values, e.g. the sustainability of soil 
fertility or ground water (drinking water) quality? 
10.3  Analyzing governance results 
As already explained, while the indices of well-being are the results of end-users and the 
production and distribution of goods and services are the results of suppliers, governance results 
are generated by the enablers within the institutional system. Governance results cover the basic 
values that enablers set on behalf of society, namely: (i) equity and social justice; (ii) economic 
efficiency; and (iii) stability (robustness, durability) of institutions. Measuring governance 
results consists of assessing the extent to which these values and objectives are achieved. 
Several initial second-order variables are proposed to identify each of these in the early stages 
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of MANGO applications, to be further discussed and refined with the stakeholders during the 
MANGO process. Because these variables are difficult to quantify, the exercise is often complex. 
If well conducted, the assessment of governance results will contribute significantly to clarify 
the aspects of the institutional arrangements that must be addressed. Indeed, the violation 
of the basic values of governance always generates the deterioration of social wellbeing in the 
short, medium or long term. The debate on governance values is particularly useful in a process 
of reform. Who makes the choices with regard to the values that the new system must comply 
with? What is the voice of different social groups in the choice of these values? 
Assessing the equity value of an institutional system
The equity values are of great importance for peace and social progress. They are usually 
prescribed by constitutional rules. To assess their effectiveness in a society, MANGO proposes 
the following variables: (i) representation of stakeholders; (ii) clarity of processes; (iii) access to 
information; (iv) degree of consensus; and (v) distributional effects.
Representation of actors
The aim is to assess the extent to which different social groups have a voice and can effectively 
influence the functioning of the governance arenas that are shaping the way the human activity 
system works. In principle, these arenas were identified during the previous steps. They carry 
the processes that leads to policy choices, the rules of the game, the allocation of resources, 
decisions about access to benefits and so on. Are the various social groups concerned formally 
or informally represented in theses decision-making processes? How are their respective 
representatives appointed? Do they have the means to effectively influence the decisions? Are 
they accountable to their social group members? Sometimes the concerned social groups are 
not formally represented in the decision-making mechanisms but are consulted during the 
policy process. In that case, the analysis we will examine the way in which the consultations are 
made. Do they allow gathering the views and opinions of the people? To what extent enablers 
take these views into account in their decision? To what extent are indigenous knowledge, 
know-how and know-be of members of the various social groups are actually valued? 
Finally, we must take into account the representation of those called the absent players. 
These are the future generations and nature, regarded as stakeholders whose key feature here 
is that they cannot defend themselves. In practice the analysis will examine the extent to which 
decision-making mechanisms integrate considerations for future generations and nature, 
e.g. through law or through ‘stand-in representatives’ such as a ministry of environment or a 
conservation NGO.
Clarity of processes
Here the analysis will assess the extent to which the decision-making processes and those 
governing the general operation of the institutional system are clear for all stakeholders. These 
processes are in principle determined by a set of formal and/or informal rules. Among the 
most important, are: (i) the processes for setting-up policies and regulations, (ii) the policy and 
regulatory framework in force, more specifically the rules governing the allocation of resources, 
administrative and financial management, production and distribution of goods and services, 
profit sharing, monitoring and evaluation... Often through ignorance or hidden interests, the 
rules governing these processes are absent or inaccessible to the most vulnerable. If they exist, 
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the analyst will consider whether it is easy to check for compliance, if denunciation is possible, 
and whether positive or negative sanctions are effective.
Access to information
The ability of an actor to contribute to the functioning of an institutional system and to draw 
benefits from it depends on their access to a minimum package of information, including the 
rules governing the operation of the system, and all the technical processes required for the 
production and/or consumption of the goods and services generated. Therefore, ensuring 
access to an adequate level of information for all is a measure of equity. 
The degree of consensus
The consensus strengthens the legitimacy of an institutional system and that of its rulers. In 
addition, a decision-making process that helped achieve stakeholders’ consensus, was certainly 
fairly open to the participation of all. Therefore, the degree of consensus is an indicator of the 
level of equity of a human activity system. The analyst will appreciate the extent to which the 
rules governing the main arenas of the system were made on a consensual basis. It will consider 
whether the rules prescribed modes of operation that respect the principle of consensus.
Distributional effects
Here, the analysis examines equity in terms of access to the goods and services generated, 
for different social groups. By principle, the institutional arrangements governing access to 
benefits must guarantee a certain level of fairness. Addressing the benefits issue requires a good 
methodological approach. The analyst will conduct a first step in identifying the range of goods 
and services that people belonging to different social groups expect from the institutional 
system. Where appropriate, this range may include products conferring intangible benefits such 
as cultural and spiritual wellness. Then, for each priority supply, the analyst will examine the 
level of access for each social group members. Finally, there is the externality check, the MANGO 
analyst reflecting if other, existing institutions such as local government or farmer associations 
might not serve equity values just as well or even better. 
Assessing the efficiency of the system  
An institutional system is considered efficient if over the years, its governance generates 
increased benefits, coupled with the reduction of transaction costs and the maintenance of the 
resilience of physical capital. These are the three evaluative criteria proposed for the assessment 
of efficiency.
–  Trends of benefits – If in assessing the distributive effects, we examine who has access to what 
level of benefits, it’s rather the trends in the benefits generated by the whole system that we 
consider in assessing its efficiency. In principle, during the previous steps, the different types 
of goods and services were listed. The trends may be reflected by several variables, which 
over time can take more positive or more negative values: (i) the widening or narrowing of 
the range of choice; (ii) the improvement or deterioration in the quality; (iii) the increase or 
decrease of the quantities available; (iv) the increase or decrease in access costs ... Dealing 
with these variables is not an easy task. Often data collected over several years are needed. 
If such information is missing or incomplete, the analyst will have to use a more qualitative 
approach. Anyway, a good methodological preparation is necessary.
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–  Transaction costs – The financial charges of the system and its smoothness are the two 
indicators to be considered in the assessment of transaction costs. Calculating the financial 
burden is technically possible. For example, to assess the transaction cost of running a project 
as a governance system, we could: (i) estimate the cost of what the program management 
unit, local salaried workers and external experts spend on governance and bureaucracy 
issues (writing reports, writing ToRs, going to governance meetings etc.); (ii) multiply that 
by their daily rate; (iii) add the material cost of the governance travel, venue etc. Then we get 
a total sum in dollars. We divide that by what a farmer is making in the area per year (500 
$?), and we get the salaried governance cost in local livelihood years per year (= how may local 
families could have lived from that money one full year). We could also estimate how many 
days the non-salaried participants spend on the governance. That is, local people such as 
farmers. Assuming that the same people are the family’s key earners that that they can work 
for some 200 days per year: 1 day of their participation in governance is 1/200th livelihood 
unit. By doing the multiplication, we get the non-salaried governance cost in local livelihood 
years per year. If we add it up, we have the governance cost in local livelihood years per year. 
We can then compare that with the gross benefit of what is being governed. For instance, 
a loan of 20 million, with a disbursement period of 10 years, has a gross benefit of 2 million 
per year. If we divide that by what the farmers are making per year and we get a gross benefit 
of 2,000,000 / 500 = 4,000 local livelihood years per year. ‘Grosse’ here being how many 
families we would support by simply giving the money away to them. So insightfully, we 
can compare the salaried and non-salaried cost, the cost with the benefit, the cost with the 
cost of other agencies, and so on. However, assessing the transaction costs can be delicate 
and complicated when it comes to complex systems that are usually not transparent. Here, 
the institutional analysis will use competent expertise in financial analysis, to collect and 
process the relevant information. 
–  The assessment of the smoothness of the administration consists of identifying unnecessary 
administrative financial, technical… bureaucracy. Because these are sensitive issues, the 
analyst must develop a structured approach to ensure that investigations are successfully 
conducted. Also, at this point an externality check might do good work. The question is: while 
we are focusing on the MANGO analyses within our given scope, could not an institution, non-
governmental or traditional, do the government’s job much more efficiently? For instance, 
because they are gathering and deliberating already anyway, and can simply add our scope, 
e.g. governing an extension program, to their scope of affairs? An analogous but less radical 
reflection concerning transaction costs is: while we are here doing a formal assessment, 
most likely to result in the design of a good, balanced formal system of governance, with all 
its costly elements of representation, voting, scale levels, written interactions, checks and 
balances, monitoring and sanctions – could a much more informal structure (say a yearly 
gathering of everybody with the ‘report’ simply being the video recording of it all) possibly do 
the same job at much lower cost?   
–  Appreciating the resilience of the physical capital is to assess the extent to which the 
institutional system generates its results, while preserving the physical capital. By physical 
capital we mean the nature, but also important physical facilities such as infrastructure 
(roads, buildings, power grid, water systems, gutters ...), machinery and other equipment 
used in the production of major supplies generated by the system. For example, the 
generators which produce power for a city might deteriorate progressively. In the absence of a 
good damping and maintenance system, this equipment can be lost after a certain moment, 
Chapter 10 113
and the energy production would be disrupted. The assessment of the condition of such 
facilities and equipment covers the quality of maintenance, the evaluation of the residual 
value, and the investment needs. Here as well, the institutional analysis will use the required 
technical expertise and technologies. Regarding the elasticity of nature, we will use statistics 
to determine the trends in the state of ecological capital in a certain time horizon.
Assessing the stability of the system
Several evaluative criteria of second order are proposed to assess the macro-stability of an 
institutional system, again to be discussed and refined during the MANGO application: (i) 
propensity to conflicts; (ii) the degree of consensus: (iii) the ability to prevent long-term 
degradation; (iv) subsidiarity and the separation of powers; (v) institutional memory; (vi) 
stability of actors and rules; and (vii) the existence of adjustment mechanisms. These factors 
combine to determine the level of fragility or robustness of the system, i.e. its institutional 
stability. 
–  Propensity to conflicts – In the short or medium term, a system that has a high propensity 
to generate conflicts will end being questioned and challenged. It is not stable. The 
institutional analysis will therefore have an interest in the types of bright or latent conflicts 
arising and disrupting the system, their frequencies, and the actors involved. Especially, it 
will seek to identify which factors of the institutional arrangements constitute the causes, 
and to describe the clearest way possible, the chain of causality. Indeed, as long as these 
problematic institutional arrangements are not detected and corrected, the system will retain 
its propensity to generate conflicts. One example can be found in Case Study 2, where supply 
agents, i.e. units with a commercial interest in the governance decisions, were found on the 
councils making the same governance decisions. 
–  In assessing the degree of consensus, the aim is to do a critical analysis of the current level of 
consensus within the system. The respective appreciation of the key actors on the political 
and regulatory framework, the sharing of roles, the rules governing relationship between 
actors, access to resources and benefits... will give an idea of the degree of consensus. A 
low level of consensus is indicative of the need for adjustment and therefore reflects the 
risk of instability. In case study 2, the lack of consensus among the members of the Sahel 
Development Fund Associations on their system’s operational rules triggered the reform 
process. Likewise, in case study 5, in most cases value chain players were eager to cooperate 
to develop upgraded business models, because they were not happy with the flawed existing 
business arrangements. 
–  With regard to the ability to prevent long-term degradation of the physical capital (facilities, 
infrastructure, and ecological capital) are analyzed by taking a look ahead. The analysis takes 
into account the conclusions of the assessment of trends of the physical capital in the long 
term and establishes the cause to effects links between these trends and the problematic 
factors in the institutional arrangements. This exercise helps develop hypothesis with regard 
the ability of the system to ensure the maintenance of its physical capital in the future. 
For example, an irrigated area witnessed a deterioration of dikes and frequent faults in the 
pump. The analysis of the institutional arrangements revealed that the management of fees 
and amortization accounts is weak, and a maintenance system has not been established. It 
concluded that if these institutional arrangements are not revised, the area could quickly lose 
the functionality of its facilities and equipment.
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–  The assessment of compliance with the subsidiarity and the separation of powers is important. 
According to the principle of subsidiarity, a competency must be exercised at the lowest 
level where it can be efficiently. Similarly, according to the principle of separation of powers, 
no player should combine the functions of governing with those suppliers or end user. The 
non-observance of these principles reflects a discard with respect to these two particularly 
important institutional principles. The institutional analysis will seek to scrutinize the 
system to identify cases where the violation of these rules is problematic. 
–  The memory of an institutional system can be gathered through the traditions of operation in 
place and the potential for reconstructing the history of the system. The lack of institutional 
memory is a factor of instability. A tradition is established when for key operating processes, 
the procedures, the approach, the actors involved and their sequences of intervention, the 
tools to be used, the financial resources to invest... are clearly established (documented or 
not), put in practice and well mastered by concerned actors. The concept of institutional 
tradition does not refer to fixed and immutable mechanisms. It can happen that these 
processes are adjusted, and once the new way of doing has emerged in practice, it becomes 
tradition. An institutional system has built a strong tradition when for each action arena 
there are well-established procedures and instruments, adequate, known and used by 
everyone. Therefore, the analysis will examine the existence of a tradition, within governance 
and delivery arenas. In fact, the concept of tradition is very similar to that of clarity of 
processes outlined above. The history of a system is determined by including everything that 
can help reconstitute the traditional paths (mechanisms and procedures) of the system and 
the processes by which they were established. It is usually revealed by the analysis of its key 
players’ archives. The quality of the archives is therefore an important factor. By combining 
the appreciation of traditions and the potential for the reconstitution of the history of a 
system, we can appreciate its institutional memory. A system without institutional tradition 
cannot ensure transparency, effectiveness and efficiency, and equity... and therefore cannot 
be stable. A system that is not able to reconstitute its history, cannot learn and capitalize 
lessons on how the significant institutional arrangements have emerged. It will be difficult 
for such a system to conduct adjustments in softness.
–  Assessing the stability of actors and rules of the game is also important. If the actors or 
their roles or the rules of the game change too frequently, even in the existence of a good 
institutional memory, the institutional system will not deliver the expected results efficiently 
and sustainably. This is why institutional analysis must assess the issue of the stability of the 
players as well as the rules governing the functioning of key system arenas.
–  System adjustment mechanisms – Since there is no perfect institutional system, it is 
necessary that any system is a learning and adaptable system, equipped with monitoring and 
adjustment mechanisms that help to identify and correct imperfections. In the absence of 
such mechanisms, the risks of facing unforeseen conflicts will threaten the system’s long-
term stability. The institutional analysis will examine whether mechanisms for monitoring 
and evaluating the results of key institutional arrangements are in place, and if the decisions 
taken by the governance arenas are actually informed by the findings of these observations 
and analyses.
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Analyzing action arenas 
In mapping the institution system, the MANGO user has identified the 3 types of supply 
(capital good, service, and enabling service) arenas and the governance arenas at stake. Each 
of these action arenas will now be submitted to an in-depth analysis, by combining the stream 
of technical process with the stream of collective action.  The analysis will therefore use the 
techniques presented in Chapter 9 to establish the argument that not only explains the causal 
root of problems, but also supports the validity of the proposed optional solutions. It will provide 
the required technical means to continue the process of collective action that began with the 
mapping the institutional system and analyzing the results. Thus, system actors will be able to 
form an opinion on the critical issues, and to start thinking about the optional solutions available. 
By using the elements of knowledge presented in Chapter 8 (the stream of collective action), 
the facilitator will ensure a good contribution of each social group members and stimulate the 
cooperation between them for the establishment of new equilibriums that are likely to better 
deliver the expected results.  In line with Smyth & Checkland (1976) in their work on analyzing 
the problem roots, MANGO proposes to focus the analysis of actions arenas on: (i) the actors 
and their roles; (ii) the sharing of roles; (iii) their relationships; (iv) the rules and incentives; and 
(v) explaining causalities and identifying change needs. These areas of analyses are presented 
below in Sections 11.1 (Roles), 11.2 (Relationships), 11.3 (rules and incentives), and 11.4 (causalities), 
and illustrated in all Case Studies. Specifically, in Case Studies 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Chapters 15 - 18), the 
analysis led to developing proposals to restructure and upgrade the system arenas.     
11.1  Analyzing actors and roles 
Reviewing the key actors within the arena
As already explained, the operation of an action arena is a kind of game in which the three 
categories of actors (enablers, suppliers, and end-users) participate (see section 5.1). It is 
recommended to start with the different groups of users, i.e., those who aspire to improve their 
wellbeing and therefore have specific expectations with regard to each arena’s results. 
Finalizing the characterization of end-users 
For each action arena, the analysis will update the description of the social groups that rely on 
the arena’s results to improve their wellbeing.  It will build on the work already done during 
the mapping of the institutional system, on the characterization of end users. According to 
their context (historical, geographical, social, and cultural), assets and strengths, the goods 
and services that these people need in their livelihood strategy have been identified. Moreover, 
during the results analysis, their aspirations to improve their wellbeing indices were evaluated 
and implications for the consumption of goods and services were identified. This information 
will be capitalized to complete the characterization of the different groups of end users. For each 
of these social groups, the analyst must make sure that the following series of questions are 
answered: 
–  What are the salient features (historical, geographical, social, and cultural) of the members of 
the group? How many people are affected? What are their assets and their strengths?
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–  What is their current livelihood strategy? How do they use the goods and services identified 
in this strategy? For each specific good or service, what are the levels of access, use and 
transformation? What are the factors that explain these current levels of access and 
consumption (cost, geographic access, discriminatory factors...) and transformation (quantity 
and quality appropriate or not to the needs, ability to transform ...) of that good or service?
–  What are the well-being indices that these social group members achieve currently by 
incorporating this level of use goods and services in their livelihood strategy? What are the 
aspirations of these people to improve their well-being indices?
–  What goods and services in quantity and quality, and what capacity requirements (ability to 
transform) will they need to achieve these higher aspirations?
Completing the identification of the suppliers and enablers actors involved in action arenas 
The suppliers of goods and services involved in the action arena constitute the second category 
of actors after the end users.  Any actor who takes any part in the process of production and 
distribution of a key supply deserves special attention and will be the subject of a specific 
analysis. Suppliers may be individuals or public, semi-public or private agencies. Using the 
outcomes of the results analysis, the analyst will establish a comprehensive list of suppliers, 
with a first brief description of their roles. 
The enablers whose role is critical in the operation of the action arena constitute the third 
category of actors is constituted by. At this stage, the analyst will identify and list all agencies 
among the enablers who play a critical role within the supply or governance arena. 
Analyzing each specific actor
In accordance with Onibon et al. (2008), for each identified actor, the analysis will cover the 
following aspects: the roles and responsibilities of the actor, their ability to hold these mandates, 
his own expectations and motivations, their voice in the decision-making mechanisms. For 
example, in Case Study 2, the oversight role of the Members of the SaDEF Associations over the 
executive agency was found not to be clear and effective. Likewise, in most value chains (Case 
Study 5), the structure and role of farmer organizations was found inadequate.  
To analyze the roles and responsibilities of an actor, the analyst should remain focused on the 
action arena under study. Indeed, in some cases, one will find an actor playing different roles in 
different action arenas (i.e. end user in an arena, supplier or enabler in another one). Moreover, 
it is sometimes difficult to clearly differentiate these different roles, even within a single action 
arena. Ideally within an action arena, the roles of end users, suppliers and enablers should be 
clearly separated. To ensure accountability in the relationship between actors, no single actor 
should play two of these roles. But in problematic systems, the separation of roles is often 
vague. For instance, the enablers may be not content to merely allocate resources and set policy 
objectives with regard to the types of goods and services to be generated. It is not uncommon to 
see them also take a role in the production and distribution of goods and services (suppliers). To 
sort things out, the analysis will focus on the following key aspects:
–  What is the role that different actors or agencies say they play within the action arena? 
–  What are their formal mandates and responsibilities within the action arena, i.e. what are 
they supposed to do?
–  What is the source or the legal foundation of this mandate? Who has determined the mandate 
and the corresponding responsibilities? 
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–  Does the actor have the capacity (human, financial, technical) required to perform not only 
their formal mandates, but also what they actually do?
–  Do the actual activities of the actor within the action arena correspond to what they claim to 
be their mandate and their real legal mandate?
If well conducted, this analysis may begin to reveal a set of problems: duplication and even 
contradictions between the respective mandates of the various actors within arenas; gaps 
between what the actors are mandated to do and what they actually do; lack of ability to fulfill 
a mandate; lack of will and preference given to the exercise of other responsibilities that may 
also derive from mandates given by informal channels of power or simply from practices and 
habits. 
The analysis will also address the expectations and motivations of the actor and their ability 
to influence decision-making spheres responsible for shaping the factors of the institutional 
context that affect the operation of the arena.  The expectations of an actor vis-à-vis an action 
arena concern not only the range of goods and services to be generated, but also the governance 
patterns of the arena. When these expectations are inconsistent with those of the most affected 
social groups (usually the most disadvantaged) or governance values (equity, efficiency, and 
stability), the actor will tend to hide them. In the negotiation on the changes to be introduced, 
they will tend to fight to defend their interests, but without openly justifying their position. 
Therefore, institutional analysis must ensure to detect such hidden agendas and understand 
them by examining in depth the motivations that drive the behavior of an actor in an arena of 
action. These motivations may be of various types: (i) financial (the actor derives significant 
income regularly or irregularly, transparently or not transparently); (ii) recognition (in response 
to the support they receive from another powerful actor); (iii) social status (advocacy of a 
privileged class, for example); (iv) promotion (changes are promising promotion for them); (v) 
obligation or coercion (the situation or another actor forces them to keep a given position). 
A good analysis of the motivations will help collect information that will be useful later to 
position the actor in relation to the proposed changes (for or against, radical or moderate ...). In 
any case, it is important to ensure that an actor has enough motivation to decently play its role 
within in an action arena. Within an agency, analyzing the motivations must be pushed down to 
individual agents. Is the agent motivated enough to give the best of themselves in accordance 
with the established rules?
Finally, institutional analysis will look at the voice of the actor, i.e. the set of institutional 
mechanisms through which they can effectively express their expectations and opinions in face 
of enablers and other actors. Universal suffrages, union meetings and representation of a group 
of actors in a commission are examples of such mechanisms.
The user of MANGO will use all available tools to deepen the analysis of each individual actor 
identified. For example, for organizations and agencies, depending on the complexity of the 
situation, tools such as analysis of strengths and weaknesses, technical, administrative and 
financial audit, etc. can be used.
Analyzing the sharing of roles 
For an action arena to operate optimally, it is important to ensure that the roles are shared 
wisely. The sharing of roles can be analyzed from several perspectives: subsidiarity, separation 
of roles, the theory of goods, and actors’ voice in decision making. 
118 Part C
The principle of subsidiarity is based on the idea that social problems should be dealt with at 
the lowest level consistent with their solution. Nothing should be done by a larger and more 
complex organization that could be done as well by a smaller and simpler organization. In other 
words, any activity which can be performed by the most immediate or local actor should be. 
Any central authority should have a subsidiary performing only those tasks which cannot be 
performed effectively by the lower level. 
Figure 20: Institutional triangle and separation of roles between enablers, suppliers and end users  
   
The principle of separation of roles is based on the idea that in an action arena, any actor should 
be responsible for only one of the three categories of role, i.e. end-user, supplier or enabler. 
Actors belonging to three categories must be linked by processes that bring them together, 
but their functions must be kept separate. This is illustrated by the term ‘line of institutional 
gap’ (see figure 20) which means separated while linked. It is up to enablers to allocate roles 
and resources for suppliers (public, semi-public or private) and ensure that they have sufficient 
incentive to produce and/or distribute the range of quality goods and services that end-users 
need. The principle here is that the role of sponsor and/or facilitator played by enablers must 
be strictly separated from the one of production and distribution of goods and services played 
by suppliers. Similarly, suppliers’ role must be clearly separated from that of the consumption 
and transformation of supplies played by end users. It is equally important to make a clear 
distinction between the role of an enabler and the one of end users. Compliance to this principle 
allows end users to express their (dis)satisfaction with regard to the goods and services 
generated. Similarly, suppliers can express their views on the institutional environment in 
which they operate. Enablers, considering these various opinions, will improve their contractual 
relationships with suppliers and ensure that they meet their specifications. In other contexts, 
the rules established by the enablers will enable consumers and suppliers to develop directly 
beneficial market relationships. In general, the violation of the principles of subsidiarity and 
separation of powers will inevitably generate governance problems such as inefficiency or 
collusion.
Enablers
Line of institutional gap
Line of institutional gap
Line of institutional gap
User
Suppliers
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Table 2: Categorization of goods and services 
 
Feasibility of exclusion
High Low
Nature of 
 consumption
Subtractive Private Goods and Services Common Pool Goods and Services
Joint Toll Goods and Services Public Goods and Services
Source: Adapted from V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom (1977) and Thomson and Schoonmaker-Freudenberger (1997).
According to the theory of goods, we can distinguish public, private, toll and common pool 
goods and services. The characteristics of each these four types of good or service affect 
people’s incentives to protect and invest in the resource. As shown in Table 2, two properties are 
combined to determine these four classes: (i) the feasibility of exclusion; and (ii) the nature of 
consumption. 
–  Public goods and services are characterized by low feasibility of exclusion and joint 
consumption. For example, for goods and services such as air quality, shading provided by 
avenue trees, protection offered by windbreaks, consumption is collective, while preventing 
people from accessing is difficult. Indeed, it’s costly to set-up and enforce a private property 
right to such goods and services. Therefore, good governance of resources that provide public 
goods and services requires considerable efforts of organization of human society. 
–  On the opposite, private goods and services are characterized by high feasibility of exclusion 
and subtractive consumption. Cars, electricity services, drinking water, water for agriculture, 
agricultural inputs and forest products in a fenced perimeter are examples of private goods 
and services. When the supply of such goods and services is less than the demand, there 
arises a competition between users for access, which can cause an increase in price. The ease 
of access control then motivates actors to produce such goods as they are guaranteed to 
draw their benefit. For this type of goods and services, privatization may be an important 
policy component. So it will be better to promote private operators for their production and 
distribution, by creating an enabling institutional environment. 
–  Toll goods and services – High feasibility of exclusion (as for private goods) conjugated with 
joint consumption (as with public goods) are the properties of toll goods and services. For 
example, for services such as tourism in a national park or traffic on a highway, people pay to 
access (thus easy control), while the consumption is not subtractive. Toll goods and services 
are of particular interest for investments by private entrepreneurs, because they earn profits. 
Their management does not demand a collective action.
–  Common pool goods and services are goods and services for which feasibility of exclusion is low 
(as with public goods and services) while consumption is subtractive (as with private goods). 
For example, in a common pool pasture, grasses consumed by animals are not available for 
others. If the pasture’s carrying capacity is exceeded, the elasticity may be broken, and the 
pasture’s productivity may decline. According to Hardin’s (1968) analysis (in the tragedy of the 
commons), keeping common pool goods away from disaster is basically impossible because 
all individual users will tend to continue extracting at the cost of the others, because the gains 
of such behavior will accrue to the individual while the cost will be borne by all. The work of 
Ostrom (1990 – in Governing the Commons) and others have done much to counterbalance 
tis claim, showing that in reality, groups can be able to draft and implement rules of good 
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common property management. Since the ‘free rider’ logic of Harding will always continue 
to be at work however, common property management is inherently difficult, and conditions 
apply, such as non-interference of outside politics and clear social boundaries on who has 
rights and who has not (Ostrom 1990). MANGO users should be well aware of the mechanisms 
and conditions at work in common property cases and be aware that in cases of no property 
rights at all or weakly enforced public property (open access; ‘res nullis’), Hardin’s logic is in 
fact the only one at play. This is a threat especially when traditional common property rights 
are undermined by modern legal systems, as illustrated for instance in Case Study 1.
Applying the theory of goods is useful in analyzing the sharing of roles. Identifying to which 
of the four categories, a good or service generated by an action arena belong, will help the 
institutional analysis to better appreciate the potential complexity of governance issues in 
the concerned arena. Indeed, for each these categories, the theory of goods gives a clue of the 
difficulty in setting-up mechanisms that will guarantee good governance. Common pool goods 
and services as well as public goods and services, require special efforts by human society to 
establish sound governance mechanisms. If the institutional environment is conducive and 
transparent, private operators will efficiently supply private goods and services as well as toll 
goods and services. 
Examining the effectiveness of actors’ voices in the arena’s context. Beyond the roles 
of an actor in an action arena, the analysis will seek to understand if they also have a voice 
in the decision-making spheres that influence the arena. The following questions must be 
answered: what procedures are in place to ensure the participation of different categories of 
actors in contextual decision-making? How are the end users (who depend upon the goods and 
services generated by the action arena) represented in these decision-making mechanisms? 
To what extent their voice is effective, i.e. to what extent can they influence any changes in 
the institutional arrangements that govern the operation of the action arena? For example, in 
democratic and transparent systems, decentralization allows decision making at lower level, 
and participation mechanisms allow people to more effectively influence collective choice 
decisions. 
11.2  Analyzing relationships 
The nature of the relationships between enablers, suppliers and users determines to a large 
extent the quality of governance of an arena of action. Therefore, beyond the characterization 
of individual actors, it is by examining these relationships that the user of MANGO will identify 
some of the problems that hamper the smooth functioning of an institutional system. In 
accordance with Onibon et al. (2008), this analysis will be conducted by using the institutional 
triangle. 
As already explained, in an action arena, it’s important to keep the functions of end users, 
suppliers and enablers separated. Furthermore, the relationships between two of these three 
categories of actors can be analyzed through a number of general criteria. They can also be 
analyzed according to criteria specific to the relationships between ‘enablers and end users’, 
‘enablers and suppliers’, and ‘suppliers and end users’. The institutional triangle (Figures 21, 
22 and 23) show an overview of these specific relationships. The analysis will also consider the 
relationships between actors of the same category.
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General criteria
The general criteria for analysing relationships vary according to the circumstances and will 
depend on factors of the institutional context at large, such as cultural values, policies and 
tradition. However, in almost all circumstances, the analysis conducted using MANGO will 
advantageously consider the following criteria as initial starting points, open to later discussion 
and fine-tuning:  
–  Accountability – Are there mechanisms to keep each actor in the relationship accountable in 
place? The existence of effective accountability mechanisms provides remedies for each actor 
in the relationship, if the partner does not perform as agreed upon or as they should. 
–  Transparency – Does the relationship work in a transparent way? Transparency is an important 
way to ensure accountability. When the conditions of transparency are met, each partner 
actor can easily appreciate and motivate their opinion on how the relationship works. 
Without transparency partners may tend to be suspicious of each other.
–  Signed agreement – Is the relationship governed by a contract? Does the written agreement 
clarify each partner’s obligations and rights in the relationship? Does it clarify how the 
relationship should operate and how to ensure both transparency and accountability? 
–  Choice – Do actors have a choice as to the partner with whom they will establish a relationship? 
Choice possibilities provide opportunity to for each actor to develop relationship with the 
more responsive partner. 
–  Feed-back - What are the feed-back mechanisms in place that allow actors to mutually 
monitor and control the way the relationship operates? 
In a nutshell, if these general criteria are not met, it’s likely that an action arena will be 
confronted with serious governance problems: the enablers’ decisions might not reflect the 
interests of the most vulnerable end user groups; suppliers may not be accountable neither to 
the enablers, nor to end users; in such a messy context, it is likely that the supplies generated by 
the arena will not meet the end users’ needs or will not be affordable for them. The system will 
easily run into a crisis and become confrontational.
Analyzing the relationship between enablers and suppliers. 
These relationships are usually based on some sort of service provision contract (Figure 21). 
Generally, the enabling agency agrees to create the conditions required to render the institutional 
environment conductive, including setting up norms and standards. The suppliers on their side 
agrees to deliver the goods and services in accordance with these norms and standards. The 
contract between enabler and supplier should define the obligations and rights of both parties. 
In the best case, users will vote for the enablers to act on their behalf, as facilitator, creating the 
conditions that will stimulate suppliers to deliver the desired goods and services. The user of 
MANGO will consider the following questions: (i) Are the respective rights and obligations of the 
enabling agency and supplier defined appropriately? (ii) Are there some mechanisms in place to 
keep the supplier accountable to the enabling agency? (iii) Are there some mechanisms in place 
to enable the supplier, but also the enabler to record and take into account feedback from end 
users? 
122 Part C
Figure 21 Relationship between Enablers and Suppliers
Figure 22: Relationship between Suppliers and End Users
Analyzing the relationship between suppliers and end users
The relationship between suppliers and end users (Figure 22) are increasingly regarded as private 
and therefore governed by commercial type contracts. But in the public sector, relations between 
public agencies that deliver goods and services and the relevant end users are rather governed by 
participation mechanisms in which user organizations are represented. The analysis will focus 
on the following issues: (i) Can users choose their suppliers? (ii) Do they have the capacity to 
negotiate market relations favorable for them? (iii) If so, are there in place effective participation 
mechanisms? (iii) Are suppliers directly accountable to users? and (iv) Are the enablers interested 
in the end result, i.e. the extent to which users actually improve their welfare? 
Analyzing the relationship between end users and enablers
The relationship between users (often through user organizations) and enablers (Figure 23) can 
take many forms. Ideally, users vote for enablers who normally have constitutional power to 
create the conditions required for the delivery and effective consumption and transformation of 
the goods and services that end users need. But in practice, this ideal is seldom realized. Often, 
various other types of relational mechanisms are used to allow user organizations to express the 
aspirations and preferences of their members and express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction. 
Enabler
Enabler
Employement
Contract
Public Service Agreement
Lobby
Command
Negotiation
Market
End User
User
Supplier
Supplier
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Examples are democratic participation mechanisms such as impact studies, focus group 
method and accelerated participatory research techniques, citizen juries ... The analyst using 
MANGO will raise the following questions: (i) what feedback mechanisms are in place to allow 
users to communicate their views, opinions, satisfaction and dissatisfaction to enablers? (ii) To 
what extent these mechanisms oblige enablers to take into account the end-users’ voice? What 
recourse mechanisms are available for users in face of enablers? 
Figure 23: Relationship between End Users and Enablers
Analyzing the relationships between actors of the same category 
The types of relationships that actors belonging to the same category can develop with one 
another include: 
–  Partnership: two or more actors (agencies) with complementary skills working together with 
variable degrees of coordination, cooperation and collaboration towards a common goal.
–  Working in cluster: actors or agencies (especially businesses) that use the same types of 
supplies to generate the same type of products and services are established in the same 
geographical area, negotiate with the enablers for easy access to supplies, agree on production 
standards, negotiate a common access to market, and produce each autonomously. Cluster 
companies have greater control over the market and under certain conditions this power can 
be unfavorable for end users. 
–  Integrated chain: two or more agencies are linked together in a chain of supplies with variable 
degrees of integration. 
–  Competition: two or more agencies with similar qualifications can compete. Under certain 
conditions, this competition can be beneficial to consumers.
The institutional analysis will consider the following questions: what cooperation mechanisms 
are in place to allow actors (agencies) belonging to the same category to develop relationships 
beneficial for their individual performance? Are the conditions for competition fulfilled? Are 
these relationships ultimately beneficial for the end users? 
Enablers
Citizen’s Juries
Plebiscite
Participatory Evaluation
Technical Impact
Assessment User
Supplier
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11.3  Analyzing rules and identifying change needs 
Understanding the rules and incentives that shape actors’ behavior is critical in analyzing action 
arenas. These rules can be formal. In such a case, the arena is governed by a set of technical, 
administrative, and financial rules that actors have to comply to. These formal rules determine 
who should perform what actions, in what order, the technical processes to be followed by each 
actor, as well as the technical, administrative and financial instruments to be used to ensure 
success and transparency. They also clarify the way the resources are allocated within the action 
arena, and who can access what benefit. As such they shape individual actor’s behavior and the 
relationship between them. Depending on the context, the institutional analysis will use the 
expertise available in the various disciplines required (technical, administrative and financial) to 
analyze such rules and identify which specific issues explain the strengths and weaknesses of 
the action arena. 
However, the rules governing the allocation of roles, relationships between actors and the 
operation of an action arena can also be informal. Usually, people cite informal rules as ‘the way 
we do things here’. Because they are not written, the institutional analysis will seek to decipher 
these rules in order to understand the ins and outs. It could propose to formalize some of those 
informal rules who are conducive for the action arena. Well conducted the analysis of rules 
and incentives will help propose and argue the changes necessary to make the institutional 
environment more conducive for the action arena. Beyond the technical arguments, the analyst 
must remember that a reform is a process of collective action. Thus, the new rules should be 
adapted to the local culture, and the needs, preferences and ability of end users and suppliers 
operating within the arena. At this stage the findings of the analysis of the action arenas will be 
capitalized to develop and argue the proposals for changes to be introduced. As shown in Case 
Studies 3 and 4 (troubleshooting of a development action situation), the user of MANGO will use 
the pieces of information developed so far, to explain the problematic outcome results, causing 
problematic delivery results, the problematic elements in the concerned supply arenas, the 
factors of the institutional context affecting those supply arenas and the problematic elements 
of the governance arenas that explain those non-conducive factors. Because the process of 
change is a process of collective action, it is important that these findings be shared with all 
system actors (end users, suppliers and enablers). By using the available knowledge in these 
various areas, the analysis should have successfully helped system players understand how each 
of these problematic issues affects negatively the end results of the human activity system, 
the changes needed in the institutional arrangements, and the potential for success of these 
changes.
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Analyzing the institutional context 
As explained earlier, MANGO applications take place within a certain scope, focusing on a 
system-of-scope, often a program or project. Everything outside that scope, by definition, is 
context. In this chapter on institutional context, we will focus primarily on what could be called 
the ‘first contextual circle’ around the system-of-scope. Often, that will be the policy sector 
in which the MANGO application takes place (housing, finance, agriculture….). Other factors 
relevant in analysing the institutional context might be the legal framework, the resources and 
incentive mechanisms, and system management instruments. The logic is that these factors of 
the institutional context most directly pertain to the MANGO analyses, because they determine 
the way a governance system functions, and therefore the quality of governance of that system. 
In principle, during the preliminary analysis (Chapter 7), these key factors of the institutional 
context that influence decisively the system under study were identified. At this stage, the 
analysis of these factors will be deepened in order to develop proposals aimed at rendering the 
institutional context more conducive to improvement. In the spirit of what has been said in 
Chapter 9 about externalities, however, other sectors will be taken up in the text at some spots, 
and the chapter ends with a broader exploration on potential friends and enemies in the wider 
context. Sections 12.1 to 12.4 deal with analysing policies, the legal framework, resources and 
incentives and system management instruments, respectively. Finally, Section 14.5 deals with 
exploring the wider context. 
12.1  Analyzing the contextual policies 
Policies
Policy documents provide the framework in which the enablers set the social and economic 
objectives of human activity systems such as the ones studied through MANGO. To achieve 
these objectives, policy documents should provide a series of required measures (regulatory, 
organizational, technical, financial, etc.) to be implemented. Hence, in a MANGO application, 
the institutional analysis will first focus on the policy elements that affect directly the way 
the governance system operates. It will deal with the economic and social objectives set by 
those identified policies, examining the extent to which these objectives are consistent with 
the expectations of the various groups of actors involved, specifically the end users. Beyond 
the goals however, the institutional analysis will also focus on which measures are to be 
implemented to ensure the achievement of the social and economic objectives. Furthermore, it 
should pay attention to other policies that may indirectly influence the human activity system. 
The potential conflicts between forest policy, national economic policy and agricultural policy 
are an example. Forest policies set significant reduction of forest resources degradation as a 
priority. At the same time, the government may have chosen an economic growth strategy 
based on increased agricultural exports, which may hardly be successful without degradation of 
savannah and forest cover. 
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Analyzing policies 
The MANGO analysis will seek to understand how the policy context affects the system, by 
exploring the following questions: 
–  Are the objectives and subsequent strategies relevant? The analysis will examine if the 
objectives (economic and/or social and/or environmental) set for the human activity system 
meet the needs of the concerned people.  Then, given these priority objectives, it will seek 
to understand if the policy provides clear and relevant strategic directions, at least in terms 
of resource allocation and institutional arrangements. For example, in Case Studies 3 and 4 
dealing with micro-finance programs, the emphasis was put not on the rural poor’s access 
to required micro-finance services, but on strengthening the capacity of micro-finance 
institutions as service providers. Likewise, no arrangement was in place to ensure that these 
service providers would deliver the required services to the end users. 
–  Has the policy set the basic conditions for good governance? A good policy document should 
provide a set of conditions for good governance. This appeared to be a key problematic issue 
in Case Study 3. The Micro-Finance Support Program (the enabling agency) in charge of 
supporting micro-finance institutions was not empowered to keep these service providers 
accountable. Among the most important issues are: (i) What arrangements are in place for the 
enabling agencies to keep service providers accountable? (ii) What arrangements are in place 
for users to keep enablers accountable? And (iii) What arrangements are in place to ensure a 
smooth relationship between users and service providers? 
–  What concrete policy measures are in place that affect the system? Here, the analysis will 
establish which specific policy implementation measures (regulatory, organizational, 
technical, financial, etc.) are at stake. For example, in Case Study 3, the analysis revealed that 
one of the critical issues is the poorly described mandate and weak capacity of the national 
agencies responsible for enhancing and enforcing the micro-finance sector policy and 
regulation. As presented in Section 12.2, some of these policy elements might request some 
further analysis.   
12.2  Analyzing the legal framework 
The legal framework 
The legal framework includes the set of rules governing the functioning of a human activity 
system analyzed in MANGO applications. It is the translation of the policy governing the system 
into laws and rules, to achieve its final objectives. For example, the regulations governing the 
forest sector should determine how the sector contributes to the national economy. It should set 
out the roles of the public sector, local governments, private sector, civil society organizations 
(including community organizations) and individuals in the management of forest resources. It 
should clarify the rules for access to forest resources (who and how), their exploitation, managing 
(sharing of) forest revenues, as well as the obligations for the reinvestment of part of these 
revenues. This appeared to be problematic in Case Study 1, as the overlooking of the traditional 
systems for natural resources management by the official regulation led to a paralyzing duality. 
To ensure a proper management of a human activity system, three levels of regulations 
must be in place: The operational rules, the collective choice rules, and the constitutional 
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rules (Thomson and Schoonmaker-Freudenberger, 1997). Operational rules define the roles of 
individual actors within an action arena. They also shape the relationships between actors by 
specifying the sequence of actions, procedures, tools and resources to be used, requirements for 
transparency, etc. According to Bruce (1999), operational rules specify how people can organize 
themselves to be recognized by the enablers, and receive roles within action arenas, i.e. legal 
competencies and power. The collective choice rules are the rules that govern the development 
of operational rules. They specify by whom and how (in what conditions) operational rules are 
developed, modified and repealed. The constitutional rules are the rules that set procedures for 
the preparation of collective choice rules. They establish legal personality and membership of 
institutions empowered to develop procedures for the preparation of operational rules. They 
define the governing bodies of these institutions, their competencies, and how their leaders are 
chosen. They also specify how these rules regulating collective choices are developed, changed 
and repealed. 
Analysing the legal framework 
Here the MANGO analysis will focus on examining the legal basis for: (i) the technical and system 
functioning requirements; (ii) the environmental and international requirements that apply to 
the system; and (iii) ensuring the quality of the goods and services generated and guaranteeing 
end users’ access.  
Analyzing the legal basis for the technical operation of the system 
The legal framework must be comprehensive enough to provide the legal basis for the rules that 
shape the technical requirements and the overall functioning of a human activity system under 
study in a MANGO application. The institutional analysis conducted using MANGO will check 
whether the regulations that underlie the action arena under study meet these requirements, 
by answering the following questions: 
–  Are the three kinds of regulations in place? An adequate coverage of each of the three 
levels of rules is an indicator of the quality of the regulatory framework. The enablers, in 
consultation with system stakeholders should assess the needs and ensure that the required 
constitutional, collective choice and operational rules are enacted. If it is found that existing 
regulations fail to provide the action arena with all necessary rules, the MANGO analyst 
should propose additional rules to fill the gaps. Such repair actions will only be quasi-
legal and have a range of application limited to the system of the MANGO application, 
but having these is better than having nothing. This is illustrated in Case study 2, where 
the MANGO analysis led to adopting a new manual of operational procedures that ensures 
a better coverage of constitutional, collective choice and operational rules, to improve the 
functioning of the SaDEF system.    
–  Are the technical requirements regulated? Here, the analysis will examine whether the legal 
framework provides the legal basis for the standards of production and quality of the goods 
and services generated by the system. The legal basis can be considered adequate when it 
covers the main areas where technical requirements are necessary, is sufficiently explicit and 
firm to avoid anarchy, and flexible enough to avoid blocking initiatives. Here again, system-
specific rules need to be provided if the general legal framework is not fully adequate. For 
example, the lack of regulation on standards of production and goods and services appeared 
in most value chain analyses (Case Study 5). 
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–  Are the rules governing the operation of the system enacted?  Finally, the legal framework is not 
complete if it does not provide the essential rules required for the operation of various action 
arenas. In particular, the following aspects should be covered: (i) clarifying the respective roles, 
responsibilities and organizational statutes of the various actors; (ii) legal anchoring of the 
administrative, technical, financial, and procedures governing the different action arenas; (iii) 
taxation and pricing; (iv) the protection of consumers’ interests; (v) clarifying the mechanisms 
to make enablers and suppliers accountable; (vi) existence of appeal mechanisms for suppliers 
and end-users in case of conflict. Here too, the same principle of constructing specific, system-
level rules applies. An example of how the MANGO analysis addresses this issue is presented in 
the description of the seeds arena (figure 33 and Box 8) in Case Study 5. 
Examining the legal basis for environmental and international values
Any human activity system should comply with the environmental requirements and 
international agreements signed by the concerned country. The MANGO analysis will seek to 
understand whether the legal basis to meet these is in place, by raising the following questions: 
–  Are the proposals being generated in the on-going MANGO application in line with environmental 
requirements? Environmental norms for the goods and services generated by action arenas 
and for the techniques used to produce these goods and services should be a constant point 
of attention in MANGO application. If existing frameworks are vague, the MANGO analyst 
continues to have the general human responsibility to care for nature and future generations. 
–  Are the proposals being generated in the on-going MANGO application in line with international 
values? The same principles hold for issues such as human rights, child labor and so on. 
Guaranteeing the rights of access and quality of goods and services 
Finally, to ensure good governance, the legal framework should include provisions to ensure 
the quality of the goods and services generated as well as the access of end users (specifically 
the most vulnerable groups) to these livelihood inputs. The analysis will consider the following 
questions: 
–  Does the legal framework include provisions that regulate the quality of the supplies generated by 
the action arenas? Such provisions must include both preventive and corrective rules. Quality 
standards must be defined, and control mechanisms duly set up. Finally, regulations must 
exist to protect the health of workers in the production and distribution chains and that of 
consumers. If these are found lacking, measures should be taken to repair this within the 
system of the MANGO application, 
–  Does the legal framework guarantee access rights to the various groups of end users, specifically 
the most vulnerable? The goods and services generated by the human activity system studied 
in MANGO applications are often vital for the end user groups. Therefore, the institutional 
context of the human activity system should guarantee these rights and if necessary, 
additional provisions should be designed for the MANGO application system specifically. For 
example, as shown in Case Study 1, the Nago traditional system was set to ensure everyone’s 
access (including allochthones) to critical goods and services such as farming land and wood 
and non-wood forest products, upon which depend their livelihood. Likewise, in Case Study 
5, in MANGO value chain analyses, the MANGO facilitators supported the value chain players 
to reach agreement (rules of the game) on business relationships that guarantee smallholder 
farmers and other small and medium entrepreneurs to the supplies they need in sustainable 
and commercially viable way.  
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12.3  Analyzing resources and incentive structures 
Adequate funding and incentive mechanisms are needed for the proper functioning of a human 
activity system. When operational, these mechanisms: (i) enable an efficient production and 
distribution of the required goods and services; and (ii) encourage the rational management 
and conservation of the physical capital and discourage techniques as well as behaviors that 
constitute threats to its preservation. Here, the analysis will check if the institutional context 
is equipped with the financial mechanisms necessary to implement the policy guidelines and 
regulations that govern it. For example, in an agricultural value chain in which raw material 
must be provided by a multitude of smallholder farmers, enablers must ensure to put in place 
financing mechanisms responding to the needs of this group of actors. 
In developing countries, financing needs are often a limiting factor. The bulk of funding 
often comes from the public sector. Private financing through loans are often available, but 
the risks associated with loan mobilization appear very high. By putting in place risks sharing 
mechanisms, enablers will stimulate private financing and facilitate the access of end users to 
loans. The MANGO analysis will check the existence and effectiveness of such mechanisms. It 
will also consider community financing. Often, in development projects, communities or end 
user groups are requested to provide a financial contribution to the development of a facility 
that will generate specific supplies. Sometimes, the financial capacity of local communities 
is underestimated, and therefore poorly exploited. In cases where deep poverty is endemic, 
the financial capacity of end-users can be very low or even non-existent. Their financial 
contribution is then often envisaged in kind. If, however the financial capacity of end users is 
high enough, enablers can put some fiscal mechanisms in place, to mobilize resources that are 
then designed to help provide the required goods and services. Whatever the case may be, the 
MANGO analysis will check whether the mechanisms are in place to ensure a fair mobilization 
of financial contributions by end users and a wise use of these resources. Very often, a good 
coordination between public and private funding is necessary. Moreover, to ensure the financing 
sustainability of a human activity system studied in a MANGO application, adequate pricing 
and cost recovery mechanisms must be in place.
First, the analysis will focus on the internal mechanisms of the human activity system. It 
will examine whether the system has an investment strategy. This should have been developed 
in response to an investment needs assessment. The analysis will check if existing public and 
private funding mechanisms cover all the financing needs for the production and distribution of 
the required goods and services, as well as the maintenance of the physical capital. For example, 
for an agriculture value chain, the analysis will examine whether financing services are available 
for raw material producers (usually smallholder farmers), input dealers, processors, traders and 
so on.  
Analyzing the financing context
Based on the insights thus gathered, the analysis will proceed to examine the degree to which 
processes and institutions in the context of the human activity system are conducive or a risk 
to financing arrangements in the human activity system. The following questions can guide the 
analysis: 
–  How do macroeconomic policies affect the human activity system? Monetary, fiscal and trade 
policies affect the pace and determine the type of economic and social development. Thus, 
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they affect positively or negatively any human activity system. For example, the devaluation 
of the national currency might make agricultural product prices more attractive, generating 
a significant increase in exports. On the other hand, non-attractive taxes on locally processed 
food will inhibit the processing of local agricultural products. Applied indiscriminately 
to the agricultural sector, a general policy of liberalization can result in the uncontrolled 
liberalization of the marketing of agricultural inputs, generating negative changes in cropping 
patterns. The analysis conducted using MANGO will seek to understand what macroeconomic 
policies are in place and may be expected, and how they impact specific action arenas of the 
human activity system. 
–  How do external public investment policies affect the human activity system? The analysis 
here focuses on public investment in other spheres whose impacts affect the human 
activity system under study. For example, the demand for forest products is influenced by 
developments in the areas of energy, housing, industry etc. The promotion of alternative 
domestic fuels such as butane gas or ethanol gel will result in a decline in demand for wood 
energy. A vast economic housing program may result in an increased demand for timber and 
wood for furniture. Thus, investment in these contiguous sectors will have an influence on 
any human activity system in forestry. 
–  Are effective public-sector incentives in place? The analysis will focus on the degree to which 
enabling agencies can efficiently fulfill their functions within the human activity system. 
Specifically for public supplier agencies, requirements for  effectiveness are: (i) sufficient 
autonomy in administrative and financial management, protecting the agency against 
political interference; (ii) a commitment to meet performance goals (quantity and quality of 
production, expansion of distribution channels to geographic areas or specific layers of the 
population, reducing losses, improving recovery rates etc.); (iii) pricing reform for fairness 
and improved recovery rates; (iv) incentives to stimulate staff to meet the end users’ needs; 
(v) outsourcing of certain tasks to private operators, where feasible. Unfortunately, often, 
the divergent interest of public agencies and other actors hinder the fulfilment of these 
conditions. As always in such cases, the MANGO analysist will then explore options for 
internal solutions of the external dysfunctions. 
–  What measures are in place to stimulate private sector engagement? For many reasons, it’s 
important to promote the role of private operators in the operation of a human activity 
system.  One is that private operators can often raise funds at an affordable cost. A second 
reason is that politically, private operators can be better in implementing unpopular, but 
necessary reforms. This is often the case for the increase in prices or the recovery of unpaid 
debts. For enablers (politicians, and even the leaders of the end user organizations) it is often 
difficult to engage the implementation of such measures when they become necessary, but 
they may engage private operators to do so. In the area of expertise, private operators often 
possess a significant capital of knowledge. Finally, because private operators are often more 
likely to take risks, collaboration with them can help mover reform along.  In development 
settings, the analysis will pay special attention to small local private operators, by examining 
whether their access to financing is guaranteed. The terms privatization and public – private 
partnership refer to the involvement of the private sector in the operation of a human activity 
system. Box 2 presents some privatization mechanisms that MANGO analysts may propose to 
enabling agencies. 
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BOX 2: PRIVATIZATION MECHANISMS 
1  Contracting is the least controversial privatization mechanism. System enablers 
outsource certain functions to private operators under contract. For example, the 
government contracts with a private operator to manage a power grid.
2  Leasing – An infrastructure or resource remain a public property, but it is leased to one 
or more private operators.
3  Concession – The infrastructure or resource is a public property, but its exploitation is 
granted to one or more private operators for a period usually of 20 to 25 years. These 
operators are committed to invest in developing specific improvements, including 
the expansion. 
4  Build, Own, Operate and Transfer (BOOT) is a public - private partnership model 
applied for new equipment or infrastructure. The public sector usually provides 
some incentives such as tax exemption and/or little financing. The private operator 
plans, construct, operates and maintain the facility for a specified period, during 
which, they charge end users who use it. At the end of the period, the private operator 
transfers the ownership of the facility to the public sector. BOOT contracts are long-
term, and may exceed 25 to 40 years, or more. 
5  Joint Ventures - A public institution is associated with one or more private operators 
for a finite time to develop a new entity and new assets, with shared costs, risks and 
benefits. The partners exercise control over the new enterprise.
 6  Divestment - This is the extreme form of privatization. It is rather rare. A public entity 
transfers the entire capital ownership to a group of private actors, with strict public 
regulation measures.
Source: Adapted from Local Governments Association of South Australia (2002)
Through these analyses, the design of the financing strategy of the human activity system will 
take shape. Possibly in some complex cases (for example the MANGO value chain analyses in 
Case Study 5), a final cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken to acquire more certainty on 
the designed financial balance. But in the practice of most MANGO applications this has not 
been felt necessary by the participants.
12.4  Analyzing and improving adaptive capacity 
To function well, a human activity system must have ability to develop and update a knowledge 
base that helps monitoring the demand of supplies, plan, manage and monitor delivery, 
provide the necessary information to the various actor categories, and to provide them with the 
organizational capabilities required. Jointly, they may be called the system’s adaptive capacity, 
cf. (Gupta et al., 2010). The analysis using MANGO will check whether the following instruments 
are in place and operational and if not, propose options to fill the gap.
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Instruments for the development of knowledge base and monitoring
The analysis will check whether the human activity system is equipped with the following 
instruments, and if not develop proposals:
–  What mechanisms are in place for the development of knowledge? The analysis will seek 
to understand whether an assessment of the system needs with regard to knowledge 
development exist, and if roles and consequent resources have been allocated for that 
purpose. 
–  What resource assessment tools are available? The analysis will check if the system is equipped 
with tools such as guidelines for the inventory of the physical capital, environmental 
assessment… 
–  Is the system equipped with foresight to guide the long-term management choices? – The 
analysis will examine the existence of prospective studies that identify the major issues of 
interest to the human activity system, develop alternative scenarios, as well as criteria and 
mechanisms to make decision with respect to optional choices. 
–  Is the system equipped with indicators to monitor its functioning and assess its performance? 
The analysis will check whether the indicators to monitor the delivery of concerned goods and 
services, the quality of governance and assess the wellbeing of end users are in place.  
In case elements are lacking here, the MANGO application will explore options for improvement. 
In Case Study 2 for instance, neither councils, nor the executive agencies of the Sahel 
Development Fund Associations had any systematic monitoring mechanism in place. This was 
addressed by spelling-out the rules on the obligations, responsibilities and tools for monitoring 
in the adopted manual of operational procedures.  
The system planning instruments
Ideally, a well-organized human activity system is equipped with guidelines and capacities for 
planning, and if effective, these must be regularly translated into plans and programs of action. 
The analysis will consider the following questions: 
–  Are the guidelines for planning in place and effective? Guidelines for planning concern mainly 
enabling agencies. They institutionalize planning documents with their normative content, 
describe the process of developing these documents, specify the roles of the different 
actors and the minimum requirements for stakeholders’ participation, and set procedures 
with regard to quality control, approval, and monitoring-control of the implementation of 
approved plans. In most of the MANGO applications, it appeared necessary to strengthen this 
planning capacity. In Case Study 2, the new SaDEF’s manual of operational procedures clearly 
spelled out the rules, tools, responsibilities, and timing for planning. Likewise, in the MANGO 
value chain analyses (Case Study 5), the description of supply arenas spells out the way the 
value chain driver firms will assess the smallholder farmers’ needs, and organize the efficient 
delivery of the required goods and services.    
–  Are the guidelines for planning in accordance with the objectives and sustainability of the human 
activity system? This content analysis of the planning in the human activity system will 
examine the plans and programs in the system and its context, ask if these are in accordance 
with the system’s objectives and do so in an efficient manner (low transaction cost), thus 
enhancing system sustainability. This efficiency issue was addressed in Case Study 5, by 
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getting value chain players to agree on the way the upgraded business model (i.e. business 
arenas) will operate. 
The instruments to manage the demand of supplies 
Here, the analysis is concerned with the existence and effectiveness of mechanisms set to 
positively influence the end users’ attitude, promote (if applicable) recycling and reuse of goods, 
and to make efficient the of the supplies generates by the action arenas. 
–  What mechanisms are in place to positively influence the end users’ attitude? The analysis will 
check the existence and use of instruments such as: (i) tools for communication and end 
users’ education; (ii) economic instruments (pricing and taxation, access to credit ...) to 
positively influence consumption patterns; (iii) mechanisms for the development, adoption 
and diffusion of technologies; and (iv) regulatory instruments that set consumption 
standards and prevent wastage as well as misuse of supplies. 
–  What mechanisms are in place to encourage recycling and reuse of supplies? Here the analysis 
will first examine whether there are clear policy assertions in this area. Then it will examine 
what implementation measures (pricing mechanisms and taxation, regulatory ...) are in 
place.
–  What mechanisms are in place and effective to ensure efficient delivery of required supplies to 
end users, specifically to the most vulnerable social groups? The implementation of such 
mechanisms relies on the structuring of value chains, enhanced by the use of appropriate 
technologies.
In Case study 5, Chapter 18, this analysis led to the establishment of list of support measures by 
IFAD and the Government, including subsidizing farmers’ access to knowledge and equipment, 
promoting quality standards and enhancing quality control.
The mechanisms for training and communication
The analysis will check whether the human activity system is equipped with the following 
mechanisms: 
–  Organizational and financial mechanisms required to cover the training needs of the system. 
Such mechanisms should first of all allow the training of professionals and end users that 
need to handle new physical or meta-level methods (seed selection, accounting etc.) and 
preferably contribute also to a wider circle of education, e.g. contributing to the development 
of school curricula and training of trainers. 
–  Mechanisms to ensure communication with the wider public and political actors. Elements here 
may involve permanent outreach or more one-off (festival-type) actions, shaped though 
traditional oral and written means or social media. Groups for special attention are the most 
vulnerable sectors of society as well as, more strategically, political actors. 
As explained in Case Study 1 – Chapter 14, the Nago traditional system for natural resources 
management was well equipped with these mechanisms. Young hunters were trained to abide 
by the conservation rules, and the hunters’ brotherhoods exercised their responsibilities closely 
with the other organs of the system. In Case study 2 – Chapter 15, training and communication 
needed to receive specific attention to enhance the capacity of the actors of the SaDEF 
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Associations system to implement the newly adopted rules. Likewise, in Case Study 5, public 
support for training and communication appeared to be critical to enable value chain players 
implement the upgraded business models. 
12.5  Final checks of contextual risks and opportunities 
If working well, design-oriented groups have a natural tendency to concentrate their energies on 
that thing, that system to be designed, and ignore the wider context. Though this phenomenon 
may work well for the creation of stand-alone art or architecture, it is an obvious risk for the 
design of context-dependent systems such as the one of MANGO applications. These need to be 
thoroughly ‘embedded’ to work. It is for this reason that the MANGO analysis includes strong 
prescriptions to take context into account, such as always keep the eye on the end users in any 
analysis (Chapter 6) and the whole of the present chapter. This section does the same but in a 
more informal manner, focused especially on the final moments in the MANGO process, when 
the institutional design of the human activity system has taken a concrete shape. One approach 
is to, from the human activity system outward, search for potential enemies and friends and 
look-alikes. Enemies are created (apart from irrational mechanisms) by negative external effects 
of the MANGO application on other sectors. If, for instance, a MANGO-based institutional 
design in the agricultural sector contains a micro-finance scheme enabling all farmers to buy 
equipment for more intensive and sustainable land use and therewith escape from poverty, the 
same farmers may also discover that escaping from poverty would go much quicker when one 
would buy chainsaws and cut the nearby forest. This would not make the MANGO result very 
popular with the forestry agency. Potential enemies may also be turned into friends, however. 
Poor farmers have strong incentives to find additional livelihood support (firewood, NTFP, bush 
meat …) in the forest, while farmers with intensive, market-oriented and sustainable farms 
will be less interested in the forest and easier accept protective regulations issued by the forest 
agency. Thus, we define an avenue of making a friend by way of adding an equipment type 
restriction to the micro-finance scheme.
A situation such as this one occurred in Case Study 5, where the system is set in a way that 
farmers can access IFAD and Government’ subsidies to purchase only the eligible goods and 
services. 
A second approach to identity contextual risk and opportunity is to check for nearby structures 
and actors that may do basically the same things – partially or fully, actually or potentially – 
as the human activity system designed through the MANGO application. Such structures and 
actors may for instance be markets, delivery systems in other sectors, banks, micro-finance 
associations, NGOs, local government or the traditional structures of village chiefs and other 
village authorities. Any institutional reform effort should think twice about duplicating such 
structures, let alone competing with them. Rather, they should be treated as partners in the 
implementation (maybe even the design) of MANGO-based reform.  For example, in Case Study 
5, priority is given to existing private operators or farmer cooperatives in promoting value chain 
driver enterprises, even though promoting joint ventures between farmers, private firms, NGOs, 
and government is an option.   
Thus, exploring the wider context should help MANGO effectively prevent well-grounded 
animosities – to “deal with it before it happens”, as the ancient Chinese saying goes – and seek 
synergies.
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Planning for change 
It is important for the MANGO facilitator to keep in mind the remark of Machiavelli (1469-1527) in 
mind, who said that “there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, 
nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things” (Musa, 1964). 
While continuing to conjugate the streams of technical and collective action processes, the 
MANGO application will make its reform proposal more and more concrete and move to its 
final stage of planning the reform’s implementation, i.e. “planning for change”. The analyses 
developed so far will help justify the proposed changes and their potential for success, but it is 
important to keep and even enhance the consultation with system actors (the end user groups, 
suppliers, enablers) as well as external experts during this phase. Moreover, potential friends, 
enemies and implementation partners (see preceding section) may be drawn into the MANGO 
group at this point. 
 In accordance with UN-DESA (2002), MANGO proposes a comprehensive approach to develop 
change proposals. These concern the end users’ wellbeing aspirations, the supplies they need to 
achieve these outcomes, the action arenas that deliver these supplies, and a number of factors 
in the institutional context. 
13.1  Designing the final reform proposal 
The following steps are iterative, and the user of MANGO will easily move from one to the other, 
capitalizing on the information developed so far. The most important is to help the system 
actors in the puzzle of jointly developing the final reform proposal.  
Resizing the wellbeing aspirations of end-user groups
At the early stage of the MANGO analysis, the end user groups have been characterized and 
information on their situation and their aspirations was synthesized. In the present state of the 
MANGO process, an improved delivery system has taken shape, and the question is to specify 
as precisely as possible the degree to which the aspirations may really be met, and what the 
end user groups will have to invest themselves. This is essential for a good participation of 
the representatives of end users in the further MANGO process but also for later ‘expectations 
management’ in communication with end users themselves. The facilitator of MANGO will 
help the negotiation between end user representatives, key suppliers and enablers, to reach an 
agreement on the new final objectives of governance system. This new target will be usually 
higher than the standard of wellbeing in the current situation, but it might be lower than what 
was expressed at the starting of the negotiation, possibly with variation between target areas 
such as income, heath and sustainability.
Designing the reforms to be introduced in the supply arenas 
At this stage, the task of the institutional analysis is to help system actors to agree on the 
changes to be introduced in the supply arenas responsible for the production and distribution of 
the goods and services needed to enable the end user group to achieve their aspirations. These 
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reforms will concern dysfunctional elements but also opportunities revealed by the preceding 
analysis. 
The MANGO model proposes to begin by reviewing the mechanisms that function 
satisfactorily in order to consolidate these assets. In general, such measures will involve small 
changes in the relevant arenas, e.g. focusing on actors’ roles and responsibilities, rules of 
the game and relationships, access to technology and know-how for the different actors and 
agencies or introducing one or two new actors in a particular arena. 
Then, the analysis will look at the situations in which more radical changes in the functioning 
of arenas or even the creation of new  ones is needed (Onibon et al., 2008). The argumentation 
developed during the previous MANGO steps to justify these changes and demonstrate their 
potential for success will be recalled, synthetized and used to facilitate the final negotiation 
between system actors. For each supply, it must be specified which institutional arrangements 
must be changed and which stakeholders must be involved. For example, in Case Study 2, the 
SADeF system players in Mali adopted a new manual of operational procedures that spells-out 
such innovative institutional arrangements. Case study 5 provides another good example. In 
this MANGO application in Nigeria, commodity (cereals and beans) value chain players agreed on 
the critical role of a Hub firm as value driver. Likewise, they agreed to upgrade all the identified 
business arenas, with new operational rules clearly spelled-out. 
Then, the next step is to develop possible alternative options for achieving the desired 
changes and argue why it is better to choose a particular option. These proposals will be 
negotiated among system actors. In order to facilitate the comparisons and negotiations, the 
analysis must also clearly display the benefits and costs of the various proposed changes for 
each category of actors and society in general. To do this, in addition to the material generated 
from the analysis of action arenas and institutional context, the user of MANGO will recall all 
usable knowledge (data, information, know-how established, wisdom facts...) and one or other 
of the various forms of argumentation (classifier, intuitive, explanatory and pragmatic, based 
on ethics, authority) presented in Chapter 9. This technical work must be done carefully, and 
information should be presented in a form accessible to the various actors involved. Moreover, 
it is highly recommended to pay attention to how each actor interprets this information made 
available, as misinterpretation of findings and proposals by some actors can be a disturbing 
factor for the negotiation process. For example, in the Case Study 5, the MANGO facilitators 
provided alternative options (public, private, and joint-venture) for the status of the Hub Firm 
or value chain driver enterprise mentioned above, and in analyzing the pros and cons of these 
options, value chain players opted for promoting these Hub-Firms as a joint venture between a 
private operator, farmer organizations and other players such as State Government and NGOs.
Moreover, it is critical to pay attention to the elements in the context that strengthen but 
also weaken the proposed change in the human activity system. In principle, preceding 
analyses (Chapter 9) have revealed such elements. The most important ones of these are those 
that weaken or threaten the proposed change, without repair actions possibly to be taken in 
the system itself. Thus, the question is: accept these or try to change these elements in the 
context? The motivation of system actors will be clear. Thus, the question is: do they have the 
will, the capacity, and the power to do so? For instance, as shown in Case study 1, even though 
participatory approaches have been introduced in the national forest policy, there was no 
political will to formalize the role of the Nago traditional institutions in critical operational rules, 
such as the ones governing the issue of hunting and timber licenses, control patrols, reporting 
and punishment of offenses. Likewise, in Case Study 2, no player was committed to deal with 
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the confrontational institutional context, whereby the similarities between the functions 
of the newly created Sahel Development Fund Associations and some of their members and 
sister agencies, generated competition for the access to the resources of the Sahel Development 
Fund co-financed by Government and Donors. Hence the proposed reform did not provide any 
solution to changing the confrontational solution. 
13.2  Arranging actors and factors for change 
In order to facilitate the implementation of the reform proposals, it serves to pay attention to 
the position of the various actors concerned vis-à-vis the proposed changes. In addition, it is 
critical to examine strategic options to conduct the change process. 
–  Which actors would be champion or opponent of the reform? The information compiled so 
far during the analysis of supply and governance arenas will be used to establish the list 
of key actors who can influence positively or negatively the change process. By revisiting 
their interests, roles, responsibilities and formal mandates, and the types of authority and 
influence some of them exercise, the analysis will assess their relative levels of potential 
positive or negative influence on the reform process. Here the user of MANGO must recall 
some of the critical issues in dealing with the collective action process. Is the rationality of the 
proposed changes clearly established? In principle, the analysis of action arenas has helped to 
develop the arguments required to establish the evidence of the benefits that various social 
groups and the society in general will derive from the proposed changes. Furthermore, for 
each actor with a leading role, the analysis will examine the balance between what they earn 
and what they lose, respectively in the status quo and if the reform is implemented. In addition 
to the cultural, social and political factors that determine the position of individuals and 
agencies vis-à-vis the change, this information will help identify who may be considered as 
champion of the reform and who is more likely to be rather against the change. 
–  What options are available to stimulate actors’ cooperation for the reform? Once the various 
key actors are identified, the analysis will examine the means available to get them working 
together for change. First, it is necessary to get the actors agree on the diverging change 
issues and the rules for the negotiation. Then, the user of MANGO will continue facilitating 
the negotiation by using the transparent information developed so far, specifically on the 
costs and benefits of different optional equilibriums for each category of actor. Unfortunately, 
even in democratic contexts, collective action processes do not always proceed strictly 
in accordance with the rules of transparency that are supposed to govern them. Therefore, 
almost always, institutional analysis will have to make choices about strategic options 
necessary to advance the process of change. It will have to provide clear answers to the 
questions below. 
–  Which factors are likely to serve as an engine for the change?  As facilitator of the process, the user 
of MANGO will examine the existence of events or attitudes that can serve as engines for the 
change. For example, shocks and crises are often favorable to changing attitudes. Often, the 
change of enablers (new political authorities, new management team) offers opportunities 
to introduce new objectives and approaches and to renew the rules of the game. Sometimes 
it will be useful to take advantage of other ongoing change process that seems to work, by 
finely analyze what makes it work. It is also useful to examine which elements of the change 
can be used to leverage the whole reform process. These are the proposed new institutional 
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arrangements on which a specific minimum intervention is likely to generate sufficiently 
relevant impacts to create conditions for deeper changes. 
–  What pace of the reform process? Taking into account the time and resources available, the 
actors in place, their roles and power relations, the analysis will seek to identify which 
elements of the reform can realistically be achieved. Among these, it will consider the new 
institutional arrangements that are likely to generate significant results in the short-term, 
thus helping to create conditions for deeper changes. Finally, the analysis will identify which 
critical elements of change should rather be planned in the medium and long terms, waiting 
for on-going trends to do their work, as well as for more sudden windows of opportunity.
Case study 5 gives an illustration of dealing with these critical actors and factors for change. 
While all players agreed to introduce the new function of ‘the one player that will drive the 
commodity value chains development by linking all other players through commercially viable 
business relationships’, the Project Management Unit (PMU) staff had diverging positions on 
which player should perform this critical function. Most PMU experts (including the coordinator 
and the chief accountant) argued that the PMU should perform the value chain driver function, 
instead of staying in its role of merely external facilitator. To face this problematic situation, 
the MANGO facilitators (in this case national consultants) encouraged and enabled an opinion 
leader (an agricultural economist identified as champion) within PMU, to further explain to his 
opponent colleagues that, since the PMU was a mission agency with a limited lifespan, it could 
not assume the role of central actor within value chains; to ensure sustainability, the temporary 
agency should keep itself outside these systems. Moreover, what was at stake was a function to 
be performed by an enterprise, whereas the PMU was a public agency with an enabling function. 
Secondly, the MANGO facilitators took the opportunity of a supervision mission performed 
by IFAD and the Government, to foster building consensus within the PMU. The mission held 
a meeting to debate the issue with the PMU staff and the MANGO facilitators. The meeting 
deliberated that PMU would stay in its enabling role and facilitate the implementation of the 
upgraded value chain business models.   
13.3  Developing the action plan 
This final step is the culmination of the long and complex process of institutional analysis 
using MANGO. The challenge here is to clearly describe the activities to be implemented to 
bring about the proposed and agreed up-on changes. Despite the achievements in the previous 
steps, there is a risk that the institutional analysis would lead to planning superficial changes in 
institutional arrangements that will not result in improving the system governance, enhancing 
the functioning of supply arenas, ensuring the effective delivery of the required supplies, and 
the achievement of the end users’ aspirations for wellbeing. Often such cosmetic changes will 
focus on the creation of new inconsistent institutional structures and on strengthening the 
physical capabilities of agencies, without introducing the innovative mechanisms necessary 
to render them more effective. Even MANGO applications sometimes reproduce this problem, 
as can be seen in Case Study 2. Instead of empowering the Malian municipalities and building 
their capacity to fulfill their constitutional function of promoting local development, the reform 
sought by the sponsors of the MANGO process has been to improve the functioning of a new 
bureaucracy created through the Sahel Development Fund Associations. 
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Even if it is not always possible to avoid such pitfalls, MANGO’s approach is to develop a rigorous 
action plan by specifying: (i) the expected livelihood outcome results or development objectives 
of the reform; (ii) the expected delivery results or specific objectives; (iii) the reform components 
or clusters of supply and/or governance arenas to be built or rebuilt in order to achieve the 
delivery and outcome results; (iv) the activities to be implemented to build or rebuild these 
human activity system arenas; and (v) the actors and their roles, relationships and means in 
performing these activities. Writing the action plan is supported by a number of MANGO 
items and templates that are too technical to include in this dissertation. The reader is referred 
to resources of his choice in the literature on the development of a detailed roadmap or the 
formulation of a project, such as : (i) Everything You Need to Know about Project Roadmaps 
(https://www.smartsheet.com/answers-all-your-project-roadmap-questions); (ii) 10 Steps to 
Creating a Project Plan (https://www.projecttimes.com/articles/10-steps-to-creating-a-project-
plan.html);  and (iii) the FAO’s Investment Learning Platform (http://www.fao.org/investment-
learning-platform/home/en/). 
 

Part D
Case studies
In this part, I am reporting on five Case Studies drawn from my experiences of using MANGO in 
the field of agriculture and rural development, while improving the framework. In Case Study 
1, I unveil the Nago traditional system for natural resources management in Benin that was 
overlooked by the official conservation strategies, though they were based on participatory 
approaches. Case Study 2 provides an example of using MANGO to support a reform process. It 
presents my experience of using MANGO to support the actors of the Sahel Development Fund 
(SaDeF) Associations in Mali, to overcome their contradictions and reform their organization 
as well as the implementation of its program. In Case Study 3, I used MANGO to help redesign 
a Micro Finance Program in Cameroon. Case study 4 presents an example of using MANGO to 
explain the failure of a Micro finance program in Niger. Finally, Case Study 5 shows the amenity 
of MANGO to support the design of an agricultural value chain development plan. It is focused 
on the example of the cereals value chains in Nigeria. In this case study, MANGO was used by 
national experts that I trained and only remotely supervised.     
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1  The Mont Koufè Classified forest is the biggest of the three classified forests in the region.
Case Study 1 – Mapping the Nago 
traditional system for natural resources 
management in Benin 
14.1  The study 
In 1993, I was assigned by the Benin forestry administration to conduct a study on the perception 
by the population in the Mont Koufè1 ecological region (see map in Figure 24) of the natural 
resources management activities deployed by Government, through donor supported projects. 
The vegetation in the region is constituted by rain forests, semi-deciduous dense forests, and 
dry forests, gallery forests along the Ouémé River and its tributaries, and vast wooded savannas. 
Rainfall varies from 1,000 to 1,200 mm, sometimes up to 1,400 mm in dense forest ecosystems. 
Given the ecological importance of the region, three forests (Agoua, Wari-Maro, and Mont Koufè 
the biggest) were classified during the colonization period, representing about 370,000 ha. At the 
time of the study in 1993, this forest region was populated by about 80,000 inhabitants mostly 
belonging to the Nago ethnic group, well known for its attachment to nature and conservation 
values. The Nago group’s origin is the Yoruba cultural area in the current Federal Republic 
of Nigeria.  The group is divided into homogeneous units characterized by their own dialects. 
However, there is an inter-ethnic mix, at the borders of the Nago areas (with the Bariba in the 
North, the Lokpa in the North West, and the Fon-Mahi in the South). The region also witnessed 
a growing in-migration of Fulani herders from the Sahel in search of pasture, Somba farmers 
from the North West, Hollis farmers (another Nago subgroup from the South West) and Fon from 
Southern Benin, all in search of land and agricultural labor. Considering the usable agriculture 
area and the total population, the agriculture density is about 30 to 34 inhabitants/km².
Forests in the Mount Koufè region have been under increasing severe anthropogenic and 
livestock pressure, from the years 1970. The Agoua classified forest (see figure below) was by far 
the most degraded by agricultural occupation, compared to the Wari Maro and Mount Kouffè 
whose vegetation cover was relatively less affected. But despite this unfortunate situation, the 
14  
Fraudulent cutting of lumber in the Agoua Classified Forest
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Mount Koufè Region forests still possessed significant ecological and economic potential and 
the need for urgent action had become a priority for their protection. In 1992, the Government 
launched the Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP) with the support of donor 
agencies, aiming at the preservation and sustainable management of natural ecosystems of 
the country, with emphasis on the preservation of the forest ecosystems and biodiversity. The 
NRMP introduced the use of participatory approach in managing natural resources. The strategy 
was to promote and strengthen the capacity of local associations and administrative structures 
to participate in the project activities, and to support economic activities in the buffer zones. 
After two years of intervention, the project noticed the lack of cooperation by the Nago 
population, though they seemed to be attached to conservation values. For that reason, the 
project launched the study on the Nago perception of the project intervention. The objective of 
my assignment was to assess if people were aware of the degradation of forests and land, if they 
were willing to contribute to conservation, and how they perceived the NRMP project intervention. 
Figure 24 - Map of the study area (Adapted from BAD, 2008)
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I spent 2 weeks in the Mount Kouffè Region in February 1993, visiting farms, forests and 
watercourses and discussing conservation issues with farmers, hunters, traditional authorities, 
women and youth. This way I discovered the existence of the Nago traditional system for 
natural resources management, its amenity and effectiveness in the Nago society. Because the 
NRMP project team was ignoring this reality, they were not dealing with the right institutions 
recognized by the people, as far as natural resources management. I also found that, because 
of their conservation logic, the Nago farmers organize their farms in a way that plots are 
interspersed with strips of vegetation, which reduces the risk of erosion. Therefore, the erosion 
control and soil conservation activities by the project were less useful compared to neighboring 
areas where the vegetation cover is usually completely destroyed by farmers. Thirdly, the main 
conservation issues for the Nago were found to be: (i) the depletion of the wildlife stock and fish 
stock in the rivers, sources of animal protein; (ii) the disappearance of noble tree species; (iii) 
and the insecurity created by the large Fulani cattle herds, moving from the Sahel. In the Nago 
societies, there vivacious traditional institutions exist that are dedicated to dealing with each 
of these issues. Unfortunately, since the colonial period, the conservation of natural resources 
management in African countries is marked by the duality between formal and traditional 
systems. Even after the independence in 1960, the Benin forestry administration has totally 
ignored the existence and vivacity of the traditional systems (Onibon, 2000). I concluded that 
there is a need to undertake a deeper study of the Nago traditional system for natural resources 
management, in order to inform conservation strategies.  
In 1998 and 1999, with the financial support of the Royal Netherland Embassy in Benin, I was 
able to conduct the study of the Nago traditional system for natural resources management, 
with the support of my rural economist colleagues Jacob Yabi and Rachad Alimi. We paid many 
visits together in the Mount Kouffè region, and I benefitted from their contributions to the 
analysis. Our investigations took place in all the big representative villages such as Agbassa, 
Agoua, Alafiarou, Koda, Kilibo, Kokoro, Idouya, Agoua, and Boobè. The interviews were 
conducted in focus groups, as in the Nago tradition, it is forbidden to discuss issues of common 
interest with foreigners and specifically government officials on one’s own. Two kinds of focus 
groups were held, respectively with traditional authorities (village, clan council members, 
hunter brotherhood leaders), and ordinary villagers, men and women, youth and elders. In 
addition, by conducting many transect walks with hunters across forests and savannas, we were 
able to appreciate their deep knowledge of the ecology of their environment and to put the 
information received through the interviews into the ecological context. 
In 2002, I had begun developing the MANGO framework and I was curious to know if the 
many data I had gathered about the Nago system could be re-analyzed through the nascent 
MANGO framework. Since the framework by that time was not much more than its three major 
components, these were the focus of the analysis. They are reported in Sections 14.3, 14.4 and 
14.5. In order to capture the overall atmosphere, the next section starts out with a few quotations 
from field.  
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14.2  The Nago’s traditional perception of conservation issues 
The bitterness of the wise elder 
The statement in box 3 is from Aai Akoutin, the chairman of the hunter brotherhoods union 
of the Mount Koufè Region. It provides a good idea of how the Nago traditional authorities 
perceive conservation. 
BOX 3 – THE STATEMENT OF AN INDIGENOUS ECOLOGIST AND LEADER ON NATURAL 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT ISSUES
“Government has taken our lands pretending it will ensure 
the conservation of our ecosystems. The intention is good. 
But today, the result is very bitter for our people. We are 
disempowered, and we have become illegal. Our traditional 
legitimacy has been annihilated by the legality of the 
forestry administration. Thinking they can successfully 
manage our resources in our place is pretentious. The 
classification of our lands has been counterproductive. It has 
opened the door to anarchy. Losses are already very heavy. 
Noble tree species are since being intensively exploited. In 
many places the nature has lost its beauty. The wildlife stock 
is considerably depleted and some species such as elephant and lion have disappeared from 
our forests and savannas. The big mammals (antelopes, buffalos, and hippopotamus) are 
endangered today. Even fish stock depletion has become worrisome, since the last 15 years. 
Our women are now expressing great concern about the increasing lack of animal protein, 
especially to feed children. The worse is that our farms are invaded by countless herds of 
transhumants from the Sahel. Government eventually understands these problems, but all 
they offer is our participation in their management of our resources. These resources are 
our ancestral resources. It’s our people who suffers must form their degradation. Unlike the 
Government, our ancestors are very unhappy with their degradation because it constitutes 
a serious threat for our children and next generations. It is our ancestral duty to care for our 
resources, but Government is willing to continue keeping the responsibility of managing 
them in our place. The only change is that they seem now to be opened to our participation. 
With such an approach, the root of the evil is not extirpated. The door will remain open 
to anarchy, because by giving us the status of simple participant, the Government keeps 
us disempowered and maintains its claim to manage our resources in our place. For us 
and our people, this status is truly unacceptable. Rather, we need and we will accept that 
Government comes here to help us fulfil our own legendary responsibilities of managing 
our ancestral natural resources. Yes, it is to the Government to partner with us and help us 
in the management of our lands. That Government wants to make us happy in our place, 
and just asks us to participate, sounds weird”. 
Chief Aai Akoutin. Chairman of the Union of Hunter Brotherhoods of the Mount Koufè 
Region - (April 1998).
Chapter 14 147
Clearly, Aai Akoutin doesn’t trust the forestry administration. Moreover, he is claiming the 
recognition of the Nago traditional institutions by the Government. The statements in the box 
below confirm his concerns with regard to the degradation of natural resources.
A people committed to the conservation of its natural resources  
BOX 4:  OTHER STATEMENTS SHOWING THE NAGOS’ ATTACHMENT 
TO CONSERVATION VALUES  
“Forest means a lot for our people. Losing our forests would mean we have lost all. Forests 
feed us with meat, fish, and many other food products. What would our rivers become 
without the forests? Here we manage our natural resources in a way that allows everyone 
to find what they need to live. Each family has the right to live in peace. I have visited other 
countries in the Sahel, where children are malnourished and in poor health condition. We 
may fall in this situation if we don’t take good care of our forests. Our health is also our 
forests. Everyone can find leaves, roots or bark for their health. House construction and 
furniture wood is getting scarce, but we still have some. Our life will be very difficult if all 
these assets are lost. Moreover, there are religious ceremonies we can perform only in the 
depths of our forests. Our protective spirits live only in the deep nature. They are related 
to big trees, wildlife, water streams... We regularly ask for their protection by visiting the 
deep forests for meditation and sacrifices. Surrounded by forests, our village used to leave 
in peace. But since the herds from the North are invading us, we are facing tragic conflicts. 
Nowadays, cruel things are happening in our forests”. 
Chabi Kao. Hunter in the Wari Maro village - (November 1998).
 “Our land comes first. It gives us everything. What can you have in life that does not come 
from the land? Even the air must be purified by trees, and trees need land to grow. For us 
the land is sacred. It can give you a lot of blessing, but it can also curse you. Our ancestors 
have lent us this land for us to live a joyful life and transmit it in the same good condition 
to our children. Therefore, I have to ensure that today and tomorrow everyone meets their 
livelihood needs.” 
Alabi Bio. Traditional Chief, village Alafiarou (November 1998).
“If you are initiated, you can interrogate nature, and get responses. You can speak with such 
large trees, and they will tell you what medication to use to cure a persistent illness. But it 
only works in the dense forest, where you can find the centenary majestic trees, usually at 
the edge of the rivers. If you’re knowledgeable, animal tracks lead you to such places. The 
forest is full of health products: forest land itself, the water in the forest, all kind of plants, 
and even animal species, including aquatic animals and birds. In some cases, the patient 
cannot heal unless I take him to the forest, to put him in close contact with the spirits. Only 
ignorant are indifferent to the forest.” 
Amoussou. Traditional healer in the Boobe village (November 1998). 
>>
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“If the traps do not catch animal, I have to negotiate with the men to go hunting. 
Mushrooms are not always available and sometimes you have to go far. Children’s health 
starts deteriorating. I’m worried about the scarcity of wild animals and fish. The wildlife 
stock depletion gives worries to us women”. 
Ajoke, Amoussou’s wife, Boobe Village (November 1998).
“In our village here, our elders will provide land for anyone who wants to farm. The requester 
just has to follow our rules with regard to forest and land management.” 
Alamu Bio, a farmer in the Koda Village (November 1998).
The commitment of the Nago people to the conservation of its natural resources is explained by 
the effectiveness of the traditional system for natural resources management, described below, 
using the three components model of MANGO. 
14.3   The results component of the Nago traditional system 
for natural resources management 
The end result of the system: people’s wellbeing
The end result of the system is the wellbeing of the people. In using the variables proposed in the 
check-list provided in Section 10.1, I was able to capture and describe the wellbeing aspirations 
of the Nago people. 
–  Food and nutritional security is constantly raised – Anyone must have access to land resources 
in order to farm and produce food. In addition, people were harvesting non-wood forest 
products (mushrooms, fruits, leaves, roots, honey…) that play a key role in their diet. Traps for 
small mammals as well as regulated hunting and fishing were providing animal proteins that 
women used to feed their families.  
–  Health is also a key final objective raised – People in most villages of the Mount Koufè region 
did not have easy access to the official health system services. Health centers were not close 
by, and most people could not afford the cost of both transportation and services. So, people 
generally have a good knowledge of forest products used to cure frequent affections. And if 
need be, they refer to traditional healers. The good health of the people was a key objective 
with regard to biodiversity conservation.  
–  Housing was also a key concern – Everyone had easy access to wood and straws used to build 
their house and make furniture.  
–  Security – People could move securely in the region, crossing villages, farms, forests, savannas 
and rivers, because of the security services delivered by the hunter brotherhoods. With 
the arrival of transhumant herders from the Sahel, security has become a critical issue for 
everybody in the Mount Koufè region.  
–  Spiritual wellbeing and leisure – The Nago people believe that forests are home for the gods 
that they worship. They believe that forests are privileged place for mediation. Moreover, they 
enjoy the beauty of the nature, and pay efforts to maintain it for the future generations.  
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However, the end results of this traditional system calls for the following reflection. In the 
traditional system, the land gives people everything, as Alabi Bio said in the preceding section, 
and through the land, people could live a full and worthwhile life. But the reverse holds true 
too: all material goods that people had in the traditional society came from the land. Hence 
not from industry, services or the Internet. People desiring more material goods than what land 
could provide were longing for ‘development’. It is the Nago tragedy, and of so many balanced 
societies in Africa, that ‘development’, in the Western way, has been predatory, destroying 
traditional systems and traditional sense of life. One aspect of this is that sustainable local 
management systems are actively undermined by ‘development’ government, as Aai Akoutin 
explained in the preceding section. 
The goods and services delivered by the system 
In adapting the check-list of section 10.2, the goods and services delivered by the system can 
be grouped in two categories: (i) to farming lands and (ii) wood and non-wood forest products 
and services. We did not fully quantify these goods and services but focused on the equity and 
effectiveness of the delivery. 
–  Secured access to farming lands – Anyone who belongs to the community has a secured access 
to farming land. They can plant trees and enjoy their production. However, once the user 
stops using the land, it can be attributed to another clan member. Likewise, any non-Nago 
native can have access to farming land. But they are not entitled to planting trees.   
–  Access to wood and non-wood forest products and services – Under the established rules, 
anyone in the community (Nago and non-Nago native) has access to firewood and wood 
products for house construction and furniture. In addition, the importance of non-wood 
forest products to food security is unanimously recognized by people in the Mount Koufè 
region. These include a wide range of products and services: meat, fish, mushroom, fruits, 
and honey, medication (vegetal and animal products), and the beauty of landscapes, and 
spiritual services (inspirational nature and religious function of forest ecosystems). 
System performance in terms of MANGO’s governance criteria 
The three variables (equity, efficiency, stability) proposed in the checklist provided in Section 
10.3 were easily used to analyze the governance results. While the Nago traditional system for 
natural resources management is built to deliver equitable access to various goods and services 
to people, its efficiency and stability is being challenged by the legal system and the progressive 
adherence of community members to new religions, specifically Christianity. 
–  Equity values – The access of all community members and non-Nago native living within the 
community to faming land and range of wood and non-wood forest products they need is the 
aim of the system. This is the mandate of the traditional authorities and the rules in place are 
shaped consequently.   
–  Efficiency – In the traditional system, everyone knows the rules and strong social norms 
prevail. This assures basically zero implementation cost in the daily routines. And for special 
cases in which conflict arise, external authority is always directly at hand, in the form of chiefs 
and councils. Such conflict adjudication takes time, of course, but no financial cost. Compared 
with the enormously costly machinery of the forestry administration running in to explain 
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the rules, doing it again because everybody has forgotten them, the forestry administration 
checking up everybody and catching trespassers, the judiciary adjudicating conflicts, donor 
financed interventions (projects) sending out missions to assess sustainability, followed-up 
by MANGO re-assessments… If the traditional system would have been invented yesterday, it 
would have been called very, very modern.    
–  Stability – Because of its effectiveness and adaptability, the Nago traditional system for 
natural resources management has been stable for centuries. The rules, the organizational 
framework, the actors and their roles are still the same across the villages. 
14.4   The arenas of the Nago traditional system for natural 
resources management 
In using the MANGO approach proposed to deal with identifying action arenas in Section 7.2 we 
came to describe the Nago system as consisting of two main arenas: (i) the land management 
arena that delivers equitable access to farm land to people; and (ii) the forest and wildlife 
management arena that delivers equitable access to natural resources assets (wood and non-
wood forest products and other environmental services) to people. 
The land management arena
Rationale 
The system is based on the twin principle of managing village territory and its units. By 
territorial units, I mean lands devoted to farming, lands for forest and wildlife conservation 
purposes, and even water streams. The system gives provision for the management of the 
whole village territory, as well as its specific units. In the Nago cultural area, each village is a 
chieftaincy ruled by Baalè, the traditional Chief who exercises its authority over the village 
territory, the boundaries of which are formed by rivers, hills and trails. Each village territory 
is divided into clan territories, ruled by clan chiefs. These boundaries are the results of inter-
village and intra-village (inter-clans) agreements, with each village, each clan recognizing the 
authority of the others over the dedicated territory. Within a clan, each family has a farmland 
that they manage, but they cannot claim the property of the land, as it can be attributed to 
another clan member or even a foreigner, if anybody in the family is not anymore cultivating the 
land. These arrangements suggest a genuine decentralization in the land management arena. 
The chieftaincy represents the highest level, where the rules for the management of the village 
territory are enacted and monitored. The clan chief assisted by a council is responsible to enforce 
the implementation of these rules over the clan territory, and compliance to the day to day farm 
land management rules is monitored at family level. Each clan is responsible to manage the part 
of rivers and water streams in their territory. 
The rules
In using the approach proposed in section 11.4 with regard to analyzing rules and incentives, 
it appeared that the Nago system is made of a series of informal (due to the oral tradition) but 
very widely effective rules crafted to achieve the objective of managing natural resources for 
the benefit of the current and future generations, as well as the nature itself. It is important to 
emphasize that these rules are well known and accepted by the people.  
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2 Vitellaria paradoxa
3 Parkia biglobosa
4 Adansonia digtitata
–  The long fallow or non-permanent classified areas rule – According to this rule, clans must divide 
their territories into farmlands where families receive lands to farm, and classified areas 
that are left for, renaturalization over periods of 40 to 50 years. Long fallow lands contribute 
to regenerating soil fertility, while they are home to wildlife. They constitute some kind of 
‘non-permanent classified areas’, and for conservation purposes, at any time each clan must 
ensure to devote enough space to these conservation units. 
–  The forest areas as border between family lands and clan territories rule – According to this rule, 
large forest lands are preserved between clan territories.  These areas are home for wildlife. 
Likewise, in allocating farmland to families, clans must ensure to keep some areas under 
forest cover. These areas are home for the small mammals and birds to be captured by traps or 
destined for small game, and for proximity non-wood forest products. 
–  The farmland management rules – Each family must also ensure that member farmers keep 
substantial forest cover strips between their farms and between plots within a farm. Farmers 
must also keep some trees (Shea2, Nere3, baobab4…) on the farm. They must implement short 
fallows, on average 4 to 5 years, and rotation techniques.
–  Land access rules – Any human being can access farmland. Women are entitled, but usually 
because they lack means and capacity, they will not claim or will access just a small piece of 
land. Community members can grow trees and enjoy the harvest, but once they stop using 
the land it can be attributed to another person. Nobody can appropriate a land indefinitely. 
Allochthones can access land but cannot plant trees. Secured access is granted by clan 
authorities or family chiefs, with the authorization of clan authorities. Then they must comply 
with the rule to have tree strips between arable fields by protecting natural vegetation. 
–  Bush fire control rules – Early bush fires must be implemented across the territory between 
mid-October and at latest mid-December to prevent late fires that are much more damaging. 
Clans and families in collaboration with hunter brotherhoods must collaborate in their 
implementation. 
–  Water streams management rules – Each clan must protect the water streams under their 
responsibility. This includes the riparian forests as well as the aquatic fauna. Fishing must be 
strictly controlled, particularly at the spawning areas.       
The actors and their roles 
The key players in the land management arena are: (i) the Baalè or village chief and the village 
council; (ii) the clan chiefs and the clan council; (iii) the family chiefs and family council; (iv) the 
farmers and herders; and (v) the hunters. 
–  Baalè and the village council – Baalè (or the father of the land) oversees the enactment and 
implementation of land management rules. He is assisted by a village council composed of 
: (i) Ougba Keji (deputy Baalè); (ii) Asue Pegbe (messenger); (iii) Baba Isalè (adviser); (iv) Oni 
Moye (permanent assistant); (v) Baba Olosha (religious chief); (vi) Adajo (the judge); (viii) 
Agbooso (the spoken person); (ix) Iya Lode (women representative); (x) Onlè (watcher of land 
management rules); (xi) Akowe (the secretary); (xii) Akakpo (the treasurer); (xiii) Mengua (the 
responsible of cultural affairs); (xiv) Gomina Odo (Youth representative); and (xv) Ogatchokobo 
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(chief of royal guard). None of these players has witnessed 
change in the land management rules recently, but according 
to them, that would request consultation with the people 
and approval by clan representatives. At the decease of Baalè, 
a new Baalè is appointed among the members of the reigning 
families, usually the founders of the village. Apart from land 
management, Baalè governs all village affairs, but he cannot 
impose his opinion. He cannot discuss any village issue with 
a foreigner or official government delegate in the absence of 
some key council members and even clan chiefs. His role is to 
enforce consensual decisions hence he has to negotiate his own opinions and visions.     
–  Clan chief and clan council – Each clan (an ensemble of families) is ruled by a clan chief assisted 
by a council composed by representatives from each family (a group of households). They 
are in charge of implementing land management rules over the clan territory. They delimit 
the units of their territory to be destined to long fallow (40 to 50 years), and the ones for 
farmlands. They allocate farmland to families and foreigners, complying with the forest 
areas as border rule. They ensure that family chiefs enforce land as well as water streams 
management rules. They are also in charge of organizing early bush fires in their territory. 
–  Family chief and family council – Each family is ruled by a family chief assisted by a council 
composed by representatives from member households. They are responsible, with the 
authorization of clan authorities, to allocate farm land to family members, and sometimes, to 
locally settled Fulani herders or foreigners. In doing so they must comply with the forest strips 
as border rule. They also must ensure that farmers under their authority comply with the farm 
land management rules (forest strips between plots, trees on the land, rotation etc.).
–  Farmers and herders – Farmers must always comply to land management rules. Likewise, local 
Fulani herders under the authority of a family receive a land where they settle and can move 
their herds within a defined rangeland. They must strictly move within these allocated spaces 
in order to avoid conflict with farmers. 
–  Hunters – In this arena, they are responsible for organizing the early bush fire in order to 
protect plantations and granaries damage by late fires.   
Applying the institutional triangle model, to analyze roles and relationship 
The first element of the MANGO approach used here is to categorize the actors described above, 
using the institutional triangle proposed in ‘analyzing action arenas’ under Section 5.1. The 
distinctive roles of users, suppliers and enablers are presented below. Even if the suppliers and 
enablers are themselves farmers, i.e. users, check and balance mechanisms (see below) are in 
place to prevent the leaders using the rules to enrich themselves.  
–  Users – These are the Nago farmers, immigrant farmers, local Fulani herders, and transhumance 
pastoralists. Both Nago and immigrant farmers need land to establish or expand their farm. 
Herders are immigrants from the Fulani group and most of their herds belong to Nago people. 
Fulani herders need grazing land as well as corridors for local transhumance. Transhumance 
pastoralists move with large herds from the Sahel towards the south, during the dry season. 
They also need grazing lands and corridors.    
–  The suppliers – Anyone (farmer or herder) who wants a piece of land addresses a request to a 
family chief who invites a family council to deal with the issue. The family council will propose 
Chief Owo’ Mbe the reining 
Baalè of Koda Village
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the size and location of the land. Usually, this is done in consultation and agreement with 
the other family council members, and farmers located around the envisioned piece of land. 
Then, the family chief will transmit the request to the clan chief, with the offer proposed by 
the family council. The clan chief will organize a meeting of the clan council that will formally 
authorize the allocation of the land to the applicant, recalling the responsibility of the family 
chief in making sure that the applicant complies with the rules in force for indigenous and 
immigrants. But, unfortunately, the responsibility to allocate corridors and periodic stations 
to transhumance pastoralist has been taken away from the Nago traditional authorities. These 
immigrants pay legal and illegal fees to municipal authorities, the police and forestry officers, 
to get the right to move along defined corridors. Unfortunately, these corridors are poorly 
defined and not delimited. Moreover, the administration does not consult the traditional 
authorities, neither in defining the transhumance corridors, nor in awarding authorization to 
transhumance pastoralists. In addition, because of the illegal fees they pay, these immigrants 
do not comply with prescribed rules. They see the Nago traditional authorities as illegal and 
feel accountable only to the official authorities that protect them when conflicts arise with 
the local population. 
–  The Enablers – In the land management arena, the enablers are Baalè and the village council. 
They enact the rules on land management and back the roles of clan and family councils. 
The second element of MANGO used is the checklist provided in Section 13.3 with regard to 
analyzing relationships. The focus has been on checking accountability, transparency and feed-
back mechanisms. 
–  The relationship between enablers and suppliers – In this arena, the rules with regard to the 
roles village chiefs and village councils (enablers) and the clan chief, clan council, family chief 
and family council (suppliers) are well defined, and all players perform their duty accordingly. 
Any offense to land management rules is always detected by the Onlè (the watcher of land 
management rules) and his assistants, working in close collaboration with the hunters’ 
brotherhood. Any applicant who is not receiving a satisfactory response from a family chief, 
can refer to the village chief, who enforces the right for every human being to access a piece of 
land, in accordance with the rules in force. 
–  The relationship between users and providers – Any applicant (indigenous or immigrant) is sure 
to receive a piece of land. While indigenous people pass their application through their family 
council, immigrants can address any family in the village. A site visit is always organized 
with the applicant and their wishes (for example the crops they want to grow) are considered 
in making the decision on the size and location of the land. The family chief does not only 
monitor the applicant’s compliance to land management rules. He also watches if the land 
user achieves their livelihood objectives. If need be, the family chief will provide advice and 
help with regard to the new farmer or herder’s access to seeds, tools, knowledge. 
–  The relationship between users and enablers – Everyone has easy access to the village chief to 
report any conflict issue and seek arbitration. Because of the governance values that shape 
the system, but also because the village chief or father of the land pledge allegiance to the 
‘God of the land’ the decisions made by village council are equitable for all. If someone does 
not agree with a decision made by a village council, they can seek the intervention of another 
village chief, who will plead for the case to be reviewed. 
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The forest and wildlife management arena
Rationale 
This arena is devoted to the sound management of vegetation cover (forests, savannas) and 
wildlife, including aquatic fauna, considered as common goods. These resources are under 
the responsibility of the village hunters’ brotherhood that receives delegation of authority 
from the Baalè for their management. The hunters’ brotherhood exerts that authority over all 
lands, particularly the long fallow or non-permanent classified areas and any area with forest or 
savanna cover. In the traditional society, they play the roles of forestry administration, as well 
as police and army. They are responsible to ensure a wise use of biological resources, as well as 
everybody’s access to these resources, and security. Through these arrangements they perform 
the following functions that are critical for the wellbeing of the people: (i) ensure the security 
of goods and people; (ii) defend the village territory; (iii) contribute to managing the territory 
and its ecosystems; (iv) ensure the conservation of the biological resources that people depend 
upon for their livelihood; (v) supply bush meet for community ceremonies. Hunter brotherhoods 
cooperate closely with land management institutions at village, clans and family levels.
The rules 
As for the land management arena, the same approach proposed in Section 11.4 was used. Here 
as well, it appeared that a series of informal rules govern the management of forest and wildlife 
resources. In each village, these rules are proposed by the hunter brotherhood and enacted by 
Baalè with the approval of the village council. They are well known and accepted by the people. 
–  Sacred areas protection rules – In the Nago tradition, singular or fragile ecosystems such as 
river sections serving as spawning ground, a refuge site for wildlife, a particular section of 
a forest or savanna with singular biological resources are classified as sacred area. These 
singular ecosystems are identified by the hunter brotherhoods (using their knowledge in 
ecology and natural resources management), in collaboration with indigenous religion 
priests. The classification decision is made by Baalè, with the approval of the village council. 
Any sacred space is under the protection of a Divinity and is named after the name of that 
God. Moreover, everyone knows the priest in charge of the concerned Divinity. The religious 
dimension of sacred areas puts fear on people, and even Christians and Muslims respect the 
integrity of the ecosystem. It is forbidden to install a farm close to these protected areas. 
–  Rules for opening, closing, and ban on hunting – Every year, a period for opening and closure of 
hunting is set, to ensure the regeneration of animal species. The closure period corresponds 
to the gestation period of certain big mammals. Moreover, ban on hunting can be decreed for 
a specific threatened area or animal species. 
–  Collective hunting rules – Collective hunting is organized along with bush fires, by hunter 
brotherhoods, in collaboration with village and clan councils who determine the spaces where 
the collective hunting can take place and appoint senior hunters who supervise participants. 
–  Animal species protection rules – The shooting of pregnant females is forbidden. The hunting 
of large mammals (lion, hippopotamus, elephant, buffalo, panther, large antelopes…) is 
regulated. Only senior hunters are authorized to slaughter a limited number. Anyone breaking 
this rule must make a forgiveness ritual; otherwise a series of misfortunes will strike his family. 
Indeed, people believe that these animal species have a ‘protecting God’ that automatically 
triggers the punishment. Therefore, families ensure that their hunter members comply with 
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the rule. Forgiveness ritual is particularly complicated for most inoffensive animals such as 
the hippopotamus and big antelopes, and even more for rare or endangered species such as 
white hippopotamus, lion, cheetah, wild dog... The offender must fetch very difficult to find 
ingredients, often by traveling on very long distances, and pay a sum of money out of reach. 
–  Foreigners’ access to hunting lands rule – Access to a village hunting area by anyone outside 
of the village community requires authorization from Balodè, the chief of the hunter 
brotherhood. 
–  Fishing rule – Every year the hunter brotherhood indicates the water streams or river sections 
where fish resources are available to be taken, and fix the norms (fishing tools, quantity…) for 
exploitation.  
–  Drinking water point management rule – The hunters’ brotherhoods are also responsible to 
indicate where women can collect drinking water for domestic use. In addition, they are 
responsible to protect these strategic points against all pollution. 
The hunter brotherhoods and their roles 
Here, I found useful the theory of goods presented in Section 11.2 with regard to analyzing the 
sharing of roles that has been useful. It appeared that the Nago people have well understood 
that forests, wildlife, fisheries and water resources belong to the category of common pool 
goods and services, because the feasibility of exclusion is difficult, while the consumption is 
extractive. They have righty put in place an adequate organizational framework to govern 
the management of these resources. The main players in this arena are the village hunters’ 
brotherhoods, their association at regional level, and the hunter members.
–  The village hunter brotherhoods or Ègbè Odè – In each village of the Nago cultural area, hunters 
are members of a brotherhood led by a traditional authority called Balodè (literally ‘the hunt 
father’ in the Nago language) with respect and admiration. Indeed, the hunter brotherhood 
is responsible for the management of forest resources (wood cutting, hunting, protection of 
ecosystems and major rivers), but also for security. The Balodè is the head of an executive 
organ including a number of officials performing duties such as those of Balogoun (the 
warlord or chief of staff), Atchaaju (the commander who leads forest operations), Atchikpa 
(the rituals officer) and Ahinmondè (mission officer), to name a few. The Balodè is selected 
through a magic-religious trial. 
–  The regional union of hunter brotherhoods – In the traditional society, a formal regional union 
of hunters had not existed. But faced with the non-efficiency of the official system installed 
by the colonial administration and inherited by the independent state, hunter brotherhoods 
felt a great need for cooperation and coordination of activities in their territories. According 
to them, their forests and hunting areas have been turned into a no man’s land by the official 
administration. Thus, in 1963, three years after the independence of Benin, they decided to set 
up a regional union of hunter brotherhoods (Irepo Odè) in the Mount Kouffè region, chaired by 
Olu Odè (greater hunter in Yoruba language). The current Olu Odè is Aai Akoutin, the Balodè of 
Koda village who people believe has the strongest magic – religious power. The purpose of the 
Irepo Odè is to coordinate the activities of the village hunters’ brotherhoods and fight for the 
legal recognition of their role by the State. 
–  The hunters – Each brotherhood consists of two categories of hunters: the senior hunter or 
Odè category and the young hunter or Omo Odè category. The Odè category makes the major 
decisions within the brotherhood. The class of Omo Odè consists of hunters who have not yet 
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received the technical and ritual initiation required to hunt fearsome large mammals such as 
the forest elephant, forest buffalo, lion or cheetah, known in the Nago – Yoruba mythology as 
embodying supernatural forces. The class of Odè consists of hunters who are duly initiated 
and therefore authorized to hunt these fearsome animals. Within each category, the hierarchy 
is established according to trophies (number, animal species) made during the career. 
In accordance with Alimi (2001), the key functions performed by the hunter brotherhoods are 
described as following: 
–  Regulatory functions – Propose and enforce the rules presented above for hunting, fishing, 
logging, grazing and transhumance, bushfire, conservation of endangered species and fragile 
or singular ecosystems. 
–  Technical functions – Ensure continuous surveillance of the state of natural resources, inform 
about the availability and location of resources, and periodically review the exploitation 
norms; monitor unique and fragile ecosystems and propose management (preventive, 
corrective) measures; provide alerts; organize bushfires and supervise collective hunting; 
initiate and supervise young hunters; develop ecology knowledge; plan and supervise 
resource exploitation; determine grazing areas; propose areas to be classified for protection.  
–  Natural resources police and overall security – Arrest criminals and punish non-compliance with 
the rules; collaborate with Baalè and village council to manage conflicts related to natural 
resources management; defend the integrity of the village territory and ensure the security of 
people and goods within the territory. 
–  Socio-economic and cultural functions – Ensure durable availability of bush meat and fish 
stock; supply the community with bush meat, fish and other forest products for ceremonies; 
supply community members with traditional medicine products; officiate ceremonies 
dedicated to Ogou divinity, the god of iron (culturally, hunters are worshipers of Ogou). 
In performing these functions, the hunter brotherhoods operate under the overall supervision 
of Baalè. They collaborate with the village council and clan councils as well as with other external 
institutions (forestry and wildlife administration, gendarmerie, local governments…).   
Analyzing roles and relationship 
In using the institutional triangle, the three categories of actors are: 
–  The users – The Nago people, female, male, children, children youngster and old people who 
consume wood and non-wood forest products, including game and fish meat. 
–  Suppliers – These are the hunters who provide people with game meat. In addition, it is 
important to notice that farmers usually catch small animals in their trap and fish to feed 
their family. 
–  Enablers – These are the hunter brotherhoods and their association who look other the natural 
resources and regulate their utilization. 
In this arena, it is important to highlight the relationship between hunters (suppliers) and their 
brotherhoods (enablers), who train and initiate them, and make sure they comply with the rules 
in place. With regard to wood forest products, specifically timber, any user needs to request the 
Balodè’s authorization before they can cut noble species. The Balodè grants the authorization 
based on assessment by senior hunters.   
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The checks and balances in the functioning of the two arenas
In the Nago system for natural resources management, the relationship between users, suppliers 
and enablers is governed by three key checks and balances mechanisms: (i) the allegiance to a 
God that watches over the rules; (ii) the principle of control of any leader; (iii) transparency and 
feedback mechanisms. 
–  Leaders’ allegiance to a God is a precious asset for quality governance. In the Nago culture, it 
is believed that leaders derive their power from a God. Thus, each Baalè makes allegiance 
to a God recognized by the village. In fact, the Baalè’s authority derives from the power of 
that God. Each Balodè (like any hunter) makes allegiance to Ogou, the god of iron. The Balodè 
are also recognized for having personally acquired other mystical powers. In general, these 
divine entities prescribe rules such as leader’s integrity and the defense of people’s interests. 
Leaders believe they must comply with these values, otherwise they expose themselves and 
their family members to the Gods’ anger.
–  Any leader is under control. The Nago people believe that any leader who is not controlled 
is likely to become a devil who works against his people’s interest, e.g. by applying the 
rules in his own private interest. That is why decisions are made by the village council and 
announced in the name of Baalè. Likewise, the executive organ of the hunter brotherhoods 
makes the decisions announced in the name of Balodè. The same rule applies in the clans 
and the families, where the councils openly discuss issues and propose the decisions to be 
made. Thus leaders (Baalè, Balodè, clan and family chiefs) are not allowed to discuss any 
issue regarding the community with an external actor, in the absence of a number of key 
representatives of specific social groups, or holders of key functions. In addition, leaders are 
not allowed to make public declarations as they want. Usually decisions are announced in 
their name, and anyway, any public declaration from them is the result of negotiation and 
agreement with council members. Despite that people bow down to their leaders, through 
these provisions, they keep leaders under control and effectively ensure that the governance 
serves the interests of the public. 
–  Transparency and feedback mechanisms govern the functioning of the Nago institutions. People 
are allowed to talk openly and express their ideas and opinion. In addition, each household is 
represented in the family council, and each family is represented in the clan council. Likewise, 
each clan is represented in the village council. In the same vein, most families have also 
members representing them within the village hunters’ brotherhood. As such, enablers and 
suppliers are able to get the feedback from the end-users. Any problematic issue is openly 
discussed, and consensual solutions reached. Everybody understands where the decisions 
come from and what motivates them.         
14.5  The institutional context 
Examining the implicit policy 
Due to oral tradition, there is no official document containing the policy that guides the Nago 
traditional system for natural resources management. However, in using the approach proposed 
in section 12.1, with regard to analyzing policies, the main lines of the operating policy can be 
traced as following:  
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–  Noble objectives for both the people and the environment – By examining the rules in place, 
as well as the actors and their roles as described in sections 15.4 and 15.4 above, we can 
easily deduce that a key purpose of the Nago system for natural resources management 
was to ensure the sustainable access of every human being (both Nago and non-native) to 
the natural resources that constitute key livelihood assets for them. These include land (for 
farming and grazing), wood and non-wood forest products, as well as fishing products). 
The system also reflects a high level of environmental awareness. Indeed, it is implicit that 
another key purpose was to preserve the elasticity of the nature, to meet the requirements 
from God, maintain the beauty of nature and for the benefit of current and future generations. 
As mentioned by Aai Akoutin, “we cannot bear the wrath of the gods, if our people today 
and generations to come, cannot meet their needs, because we have failed in preserving the 
renewable natural resources, we depend up on for a dignified life”.
–  Conducive policy implementation mechanisms – It is interesting to notice that the institutional 
arrangements shaping the functioning of the system have been designed to implement 
the policy guidance above traced. The legal framework sets a number of rules conducive to 
achieving the above mentioned political objectives. Likewise, the organs in place (Baalè and 
the village council, the Clan Chief and the Clan Council, the Family Council, Olu Odè, Balodè 
and the hunters brotherhoods), and the rules governing the functions of these organs and 
actors behind them, as well as the relationship between these players, enable the effective 
achievement of the livelihood and environmental objectives of the system. This contrasts 
with most governance systems in the post-colonial Africa, where the official institutional 
arrangements in place are not conducive to the achievement of the policy objectives defined. 
This explains why the Nago people see the official forestry administration in Benin, as the 
main responsible of the accelerated degradation of the forests and fisheries in the recent 
decades. 
Resources and incentives
Traditionally, village and clan administrations rely on three sources of resources: (i) light in-
kind taxes paid by community members; (ii) the regular offerings they make to the authorities; 
(iii) light taxes paid at village borders by traders who, in return enjoy moving and doing their 
business in security. According to traditional leaders, their first source of motivation is the 
satisfaction they derive from the welfare the services they deliver provide to people. This 
altruism value seems to have been lost by the civil servants working in the public administration 
today. Another key incentive is certainly their allegiance to a God that they believe will punish 
them if they don’t comply with the Governance rules. Finally, the honors and prestige deriving 
from their functions is source of motivation. 
The knowledge of NRM
The hunters’ brotherhoods have developed in-depth knowledge of the ecosystems as well as 
ethology of vegetal, animal and fish species. This knowledge is passed from generation to 
generation and informs decision-making with regard the management of natural resources.
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14.6  Traditional versus official system: the paralyzing duality 
Throughout West-Africa, communities have established customary systems for managing 
natural resources (farmlands, forests, streams…) which satisfactorily balance human society 
needs and conservation. Moreover, these traditional systems were well adapted to the social 
and environmental conditions of their respective milieu (Onibon et al. 1998). Examples include 
the local system for fishery management in the floodplains of  the Logone River in Chad and 
Cameroon (Drijver et al., 1995), and fairly common local systems for managing Soudano-Guinean 
savannas for fuel wood and other domestic purposes in the Southern Sahara (Keita 1985). 
Unfortunately, these systems have become illegal, because official authorities, both in colonial 
time and after independence, ignored customary approaches to natural resources management. 
 A legitimate system, now operating illegally 
Since the colonial time, the official responsibility for the management of forest and wildlife 
resources has been vested in the forestry administration that introduced forest and hunting licenses, 
and created three classified forests (Wari Maro, Mont Koufè, and Agoua) in the Nago area. The Nago 
people have resented this major institutional change that has negatively affected their traditional 
management system, and consequently, the state of natural resources. Indeed, the Nago customary 
authorities became illegal and could not anymore exercise easily their legitimate responsibilities. 
During the colonial period, the forestry administration started delivering forest license to loggers 
who were allowed to use saws and later chainsaws, to cut noble tree species. Likewise, it started 
delivering hunting license to hunters using guns. According to the Nago informants, these licensees 
were non-Nago people, and neither did the administration have the capacity to monitor the way 
they exploited the resources, nor did it seek collaboration with customary authorities to enforce 
rules. Licensees did not recognize the responsibility of the Nago customary authorities other the 
resources. In defiance of all customary and official rules, they quietly plundered the resources. 
Unfortunately, after the independence in 1960, the forestry administration has continued to ignore 
customary approaches to natural resources, despite repeated objections by traditional authorities. 
The situation became worse with the advent of drought in the Sahel in the 1970s. The Nago area has 
since experienced a yearly in-migration of massive beef cattle during the dry season, as the forests 
and savannas of central and northern Benin have become grazing areas for these herds during the 
lean period. Quickly, political, administrative and military authorities instituted official and non-
official taxes paid by Fulani herders, who move with guns. Farm lands and sacred areas or singular 
ecosystems, as well wildlife protected by the Nagos are since being severely affected. The Nago 
people felt their security (physical, food) is threatened by these developments. To face this situation, 
the Nago customary authorities have sometimes undertaken to challenge both the licensees and 
Fulanis, but as their authority is not recognized, the arrests have often turned into altercation and 
sometimes armed conflicts with deaths. And very often, following complaints by licensees and 
Fulanis, customary authorities were sentenced and put in jail. 
Non-functioning modern legality 
Like in most West-African countries, the Benin state has declared itself the owner of the natural 
resources with authority over their management, but it has in practice been unable to assume 
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this responsibility. Since the Rio Summit, sustainable development has become a key concept, 
with emphasis on giving increasing importance to the role of people in and around the areas 
they feel should be protected. This led to the advent of participatory approaches, implemented 
in Benin since the early 1990s, through donor financed natural resources management projects. 
But it has to be noted that the results of investigations conducted among populations indicate 
quite worrying findings as to the degradation of natural resources and the socio-economic 
impacts thus generated. This was confirmed by the appraisal report of an African Development 
Bank financed project aiming at improving the management of natural resources in the Mont 
Kouffé, Wari-Maro and Agoua classified forests (Fonds Africain de Développement, 1999). 
Wildlife that represents the main source of protein for the local population, as well as noble 
tree species were decimated, even in the classified forests. Cassava plantations are increasingly 
grazed by herds because transhumant herders do not follow the planned corridors planned. 
To all this must be added a considerable loss of singular ecosystems that have a mystical and 
religious value for the local population. This accelerated degradation of the natural resources 
is the result of what Soumaré (1998) called a ‘non-functioning legality’. Clearly, for the Nagos, 
official institutions for natural resource management are not working effectively, while their 
traditional institutions remain resilient, but within a non-conducive institutional context.  
Paralyzing duality
The natural resources management system governing the Nago area still remains marked by a 
paralyzing duality. On the one hand we have the traditional system which remains resilient and 
vibrant in all villages of the Nago area, with its noble rules, the traditional authorities who run 
the system, and the checks and balances mechanisms in place. On the other side, we have the 
official system, which in principle is aimed at conservation and people’s wellness objectives but 
is struggling to realize these ideals. Though the ultimate goals of both systems are the same, 
none of them is likely to achieve these results by operating alone. This situation illustrates the 
challenge facing post-independence African States: to set up innovative institutions trusted by 
people, and that allow communities and individuals to realize their livelihood aspirations in a 
sustainable manner. 
14.7   The relevance of the Case Study for MANGO 
development 
Using the nascent MANGO to re-analyze the data collected earlier on the Nago traditional 
system for natural resources management encouraged me to further develop and test the 
methodological framework. The three components of the model worked, as well as the further 
concepts used. This shows that MANGO concepts, even though based on scientific language and 
style of thinking, could be used to analyze a traditional management and governance system. I 
found this important because it gives assurance that in other MANGO applications specifically 
with the aim of upgrading ‘modern human activity systems’, the MANGO concepts will not 
automatically bias against such systems.   
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Case Study 2 – Supporting the  
reform of the Sahel Development  
Fund Program (SaDeF)5  in Mali 
In this Case Study, I present my experience of using MANGO to support the reform of a system 
that is problematic because it duplicates other legal systems and it has been ineffective. 
However, the system enablers and other actors had decided to maintain the system and try to 
improve its operation through a reform. In Section 15.1, I present the context of the study, and in 
Section 15.2, the context of the system, specifically, the fact that the Associations of the Sahel 
Development Fund replicate other structures. Then, in Section 15.3 the reader is introduced to 
the study in brief.  Sections 15.4 and 15.5 present, the analyses of system results and the system 
arenas, respectively. Finally, in Section 15.6, I present a summary of the changes proposed to 
enhance the operation of the system, and Section 15.7 deals with the conclusions of the case 
study and reflects on the role of MANGO.    
15.1  Study context 
Introduction
In 2002, with my colleagues Norman Messer and Philip Townsley, I was tasked to prepare the 
IFAD guide to institutional analysis for rural development programs (Onibon et al., 2008) that 
was finally published in 2008. The guide is inspired by my work on MANGO. In 2003, in order 
to test and develop the approaches and tools, I was tasked to support the reform of the Sahel 
Development Fund (SaDeF) Associations in Mali. The innovative idea of SaDeF is that State 
(with the support of donors) entrusts the fund to a network of Associations at the regional 
and national levels, constituted by beneficiaries’ organizations. In 2002, after 4 years of 
implementation in the Segou and Koulikoro regions, the evaluation of the first phase raised 
concerns about both the poor results and the confrontational situation of the SaDeF program. 
In 2003, I was tasked by the IFAD country portfolio manager (CPM) for Mali to join the 
formulation mission of phase 2, in order to help understand the problems and develop a 
reform proposal with the contribution of all stakeholders. But, foremost, I must say that from 
the outset, my personal intuition was that the local governments installed after the first local 
elections in 1999 were the best vehicle for delivering development results to the rural poor. Their 
legal anchorage was in the constitution, they are elected, and the process of the local elections 
had been recognized as fair. Therefore, it would have been preferable for the IFAD intervention 
to at least investigate the option to focus on the local governments (municipalities), i.e. to 
enhance the municipalities’ ability to meet people’s aspirations, and help create mechanisms 
for feedback and accountability, rather than focus only on the SaDeF system But, as mentioned 
above, the Malian Government and IFAD had already decided to follow the recommendation of 
the phase 1 evaluation mission to prepare the second phase of SaDeF along with a reform the 
SaDeF system to improve its performance. 
5 In French: FODESA: Fonds pour le Développement du Sahel
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Presentation of the SaDeF associations
In 1999, the Mali Government and IFAD have joined effort to support the creation of the SaDeF 
Associations, as an institutional mechanism aimed at voicing the rural poor’s aspirations in 
implementing rural poverty reduction interventions. 
The overall structure 
The network of SaDeF Associations (figure 25) was composed by regional associations (RAs) 
and the National Association for economic and social development (NAESD) that forms their 
union. At the time of the study, only the associations of the Segou and Koulikoro regions were 
created and operational along with the NAESD. The associations from the two other Sahelian 
regions (Mopti and Kayes) were foreseen to join the network. In addition to the RAs, two other 
organizations are members of the NAESD. These were the order of consulting engineers and the 
NGOs’ coordinating committee.  
 
Figure 25: The network of the SaDeF Associations
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The regional associations
Each regional association was composed by representatives of beneficiary organizations, 
specifically, farmer organizations, chamber of agriculture, municipalities, and local NGOs. 
Unfortunately, the NGO members also operate as service providers, which creates a conflict of 
interest situation. The structure consists of a general assembly (GA), a council and a regional 
executive agency (REA). The council steers the activities of the executive agency. The general 
assembly adopts the policy and other decisions proposed by the council. The REA’s role is to 
implement the regional action plan of the SaDeF program. The staff is composed by a regional 
director, a finance director recruited by the council, and 2 professionals and other agents 
recruited by the regional director. In the Segou and Koulikoro associations, given their limited 
number, the member of the GA also officiated as member of the BD. 
The National Association for Economic and Social Development 
By principle, the membership of the NAESD should have been limited to the SaDeF’s regional 
associations and the permanent assembly of the chambers of agriculture. Unfortunately, as 
is the case for the AR, two other agencies representing service providers of the program were 
members. These are the NGOs’6 Coordinating Committee, and the Consulting Engineers’ Order. 
Besides the fact that this situation creates a conflict of interest, it also generated internal 
conflicts within these organizations. Members accused their representatives within SaDeF to 
abuse their position. 
Like the RAs, the NAESD was composed by a general assembly, a council and the national 
executive agency (NEA).  The general assembly adopted the policy and other decisions proposed 
by the council. The NEA’s role was to implement the national action plan of the SaDeF program. 
The staff was composed by a national coordinator, a finance director recruited by the council, 
and one professional and other agents recruited by the national coordinator. Here as well, given 
their limited number, the member of the GA also officiated as member of the council. 
Statutes and mandates
In accordance with the ordinance No. 41 PCG of 28 March 1959, the RAs and NAESD have the 
statute of a non-profit organization. Their goal is to reduce the rural households’ poverty in the 
Malian Sahel, through the implementation of the SaDeF. 
Overview on the SaDeF program 
Program objectives and resources
The end result of the fund was to reduce rural poverty in the Malian Sahel by: (i) developing 
infrastructure in order to increase agriculture production, revenues, and thus the wellbeing 
of the rural population; (ii) (increasing people’s access to micro-finance services through the 
promotion of new micro-finance institutions or the expansion of existing ones into rural areas; 
(iii) strengthening the capacity of beneficiaries, through farmer organizations. 
The intervention was scheduled for ten years (1999 – 2009), and organized in three phases 
to allow, during this long period, the adjustments that would be necessitated by the realities 
encountered in the field. The program was designed to cover the four regions of the Malian 
Sahel: Segou, Koulikoro, Mopti and Kayes. 
6 Non Governmental Organizations
164 Part D
For the first phase, about 71,200 households out of 170,000 were targeted in about 1,700 villages 
in the Segou and Koulikoro regions. 
The total resources for phase 1 were about USD 46 million, including an IFAD loan of about 
USD 22 million and Government resources of USD 6.4 million.  
Program components
One the innovative features of the SaDeF approach was that the program should assist village 
communities to assess their own needs and to identify, develop and implement micro-projects. 
The program consisted of 3 components: (1) Support to village development; (ii) Micro finance 
services, and (iii) Program management. 
–  Support to village development. Under this component, the program provided subsidies for the 
development of village infrastructures at village or farmer organizations levels.  The support 
included (i) the technical support (including training) required to identify, design, implement, 
operate and manage facilities and (ii) financial resources to complement beneficiaries’ own 
contributions.  Three types of investments (community, environmental, and productive) are 
eligible. The maximum cost per eligible investment program was set at about 34,000 USD. 
–  Micro-finance services. The aim of this component is to enhance the access of individuals 
to micro-finance services meeting their investment needs, by promoting micro-finance 
institutions (MFIs) in rural areas. Support to MFIs would include: (i) equipment (building, 
furniture, computer, vehicles), and (ii) subsidies to the operating costs during the first 3 years 
of existence.  In addition, in order to enhance women’s access to micro finance services, the 
program intended to guarantee up to 70% of their credit applications. 
–  Program Management. The SaDeF Program was managed nationally by the NAESD and at the 
regional level by the RAs. 
Program strategy
The SaDeF implementation strategy rested on the following considerations: (i) priorities are 
identified and decided by the people; no action can be committed without a clear demand with 
the commitment of the promoters to contribute to the costs of the investment; (ii) the SaDeF’s 
subsidy will complement the resources locally mobilized by beneficiaries; (iii) the program 
ensures that the proposed project is socially feasible and represents the interests of the village 
including the weakest social groups; especially it must be ensured that that women are fully 
involved in decision-making; (iv) support to individual productive investments should derive 
from the access of the promoter to micro finance services delivered by supported MFIs; (v) 
support to village groups  will include the promotion of their unions (ANCG, 2002). 
15.2  SaDeF replicating other structures 
The SaDeF Associations were evolving in a rather confrontational institutional context. Indeed, 
the similarity between their functions and some of their members and sister agencies created 
a competition for the access to resources provided by the Government and donors. The four 
key competitor players were: (i) the National Agency for Local Government Investments 
(NALGI)7 and the Local Governments, instituted by the national decentralization policy and its 
7 Agence Nationale d’Investissement des Collectivités Territoriale (ANICT) 
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implementation mechanisms for social and community development; (ii) the Mali Permanent 
Assembly of Chambers of Agriculture (MPACA)8; (iii) the World Bank-financed Agriculture Sector 
and Farmer’ Organizations Support Program (ASFOSP)9; and (iv) the Agency for the Promotion of 
Agricultural Value Chains (APAVC)10. 
SaDeF Associations versus other actors 
In reviewing the institutional framework for decentralization, a critical issue emerged. It 
was not clear why, instead of strengthening and using the decentralization mechanisms or 
other existing structures, the Government with the support of IFAD had chosen to create and 
entrust the SaDeF associations. What would be so wrong with the municipalities or any of the 
above-mentioned agencies such as NALGI and MPACA, that they would not be able to handle 
an IFAD loan? Why build a parallel structure of regional councils, national councils, directors, 
bureaucracy, check and balances, support missions etc. etc.? Why these huge transaction cost? 
This critical issue was not taken up in the mission’s tasks, and neither it was it raised in the 
MANGO application. Both the mission and the MANGO application had internal focus, looking 
at SaDeF without looking outside. I will come back to this later in this chapter. 
The SaDeF Associations shared the same mandates with the municipalities which are also 
their members  
Since 1993, Mali had established a legal framework for the decentralization of administration 
and development. The law 93-008 setting the conditions for the free administration of local 
governments provided for the transfer of the executive power (with legitimacy by the popular 
vote) as well competencies and resources at three levels of decentralized authorities: the region, 
the circle and the municipality. It sets the conditions for the free administration of these levels 
of local government.
The lowest administrative level is the municipality. Under the 95-034 Act, the municipal 
council through its deliberations manages the affairs of the municipality, including those 
relating to economic, social and cultural development programs. More specifically, the municipal 
council deliberates on subjects including:  (i) budget and municipal accounts; (ii) environmental 
protection; (iii) territorial development planning; (iv) management of state-owned lands and 
assets acquisition; (v) development and management of public facilities (pre-school education 
and literacy, the first cycle of basic education, clinics, maternity hospitals, public health, 
sanitation and community health centers, road and communication infrastructure classified 
in the municipal domain, public transport and traffic plans, water for households, industries 
and agriculture; fairs and markets, sports, arts and culture); (v) organization of rural activities 
and agro-forestry-pastoral production; (vi)  organization of handicraft and tourism activities; 
(vii) creation and management of municipal agencies, as well as interventions in the field of 
economic development; (viii) procurement for works and supplies, leases and other agreements. 
Clearly, while municipal councils are members of the SaDeF associations, their mandates cover 
the ones of these associations. But unlike the SaDeF associations, local governments have their 
legal ground in the decentralization law amd public elections. 
8  Assemblée permanente des chambres d’agriculture du Mali (APCAM)
9  Projet d’appui au secteur agricole et aux organisations des producteurs (PASAOP) 
10 Agence pour la Promotion des Filières Agricoles
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The National Agency for Local Government Investments (NALGI)11: a potential SaDeF 
competitor for resources
NALGI was established as a financial mechanism to support the implementation of 
decentralization. According to the 0042 Act of 7 July 2000, NALGI is an autonomous public 
agency with mandate to manage the financial transfers to local governments and to guarantee 
loans contracted by them. More specifically, NALGI’s functions were to: (i) ensure equitable 
distribution of domestic and external funds entrusted to NALGI to support local governments’ 
investments; (ii) manage the local governments’ drawing rights in accordance with the 
allocation criteria set by Government;  (iii) strengthen the local governments’ capacity with 
regard to financial management and equipment, as well as planning, developing and operating 
community infrastructures under their competencies; (iv) control the use of subsidies 
transferred to local governments. NALGI was represented in the field by its municipality support 
centers (MSC) that were active in supporting the municipal councils to: (i) prepare their economic 
and social development plan, including the required investments; (ii) develop feasibility studies 
for investments NALGI is committed to finance; (iii) manage the development of the investment, 
including the control of works. Here as well, like the SaDeF associations, NALGI aims to manage 
donor resources to support local development activities, and as ‘the national mechanism to 
provide technical and financial support to local governments’, the NALGI authorities could not 
be blamed to think that they should be entrusted to manage the IFAD resources channeled 
through the SaDeF associations. 
SaDeF Associations versus Chambers of Agriculture 
The Mali permanent assembly of Chambers of Agriculture appeared to be the most representative 
organization of the agricultural professions. Indeed, MPACA was structured from the village to 
the national level, with regional consular assemblies and a national consular assembly. The 
mandate was twofold: (i) firstly a representative function; the chambers of agriculture aimed 
at expressing the aspirations of the profession in the dialogue with Government and donors, 
in order to render rural development policies and interventions more responsive to people’s 
needs; (ii) secondly, through advisory support, the network aimed to strengthen the capacity 
of farmer organizations to effectively and efficiently deliver to their members. Clearly, the 
chambers of agriculture shared the same mandate as the SaDeF associations of which they are 
member. MPACA leaders claimed they were the most representative of the rural world, hence 
in competition with SaDeF associations with regard to resources allocated by Government and 
donors for rural development.  
The agriculture sector and farmer organizations support program 
(ASFOSP), a similar financing mechanism 
The ASFOSP was a World Bank financed intervention with an aim to support the chambers 
of agriculture in the specific area of strengthening the capacity of farmer organizations. The 
program provided financial support to farmer organizations, including the ones that were 
member of the SaDeF associations. 
 
11 In French, Agence Nationale d’Investissement des Collectivités Territoriale (ANICT)
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15.3  The study in brief 
To recall the mission context, Phase 1 of SaDeF implementation has been very confrontational. 
For example, in Segou, as the result of conflict between the council and the executive agency, 
the regional director was fired. In addition, the program performance was rated as poor. My 
task as institutional analyst was twofold: (i) help the SaDeF stakeholders understand their 
problems and agree on key reform elements; and (ii) support the development and adoption of 
the reform proposals. My mandate to contribute to preparing phase 2, and specifically support 
the reform process, appeared as a good opportunity to test a comprehensive use of MANGO. My 
personal objectives were to test as much as possible all the components and compartments 
of MANGO, including: (i) the iterative conduct of both the stream of technical process and the 
stream of collective action; (ii) the results focused analysis; (iii) mapping the action arenas and 
using the institutional triangle; (iv) analyzing the institutional context; (iv) development and 
adoption of the reform proposal.   The study consisted of two missions. The first mission took 
place in March and April 2003, when I joined the formulation team of phase 2 in Mali for three 
weeks. At the end of that mission, stakeholders agreed to work together to develop a reform 
proposal. Then I performed the second mission, spending about 8 weeks in Mali in November 
and December 2004. 
The process and achievements of mission 1 
First of all, in reviewing the documents at hand, I developed a conceptual model representing 
the SaDeF network as a purposeful human activity system. During the three weeks in March 
and April 2003, I consulted all system stakeholders in Bamako, Segou, Koulikoro and Mopti, 
including IFAD and Government Officials, councilors and staff of executive agencies of the SaDef 
Associations at the national and regional levels, municipality officials, farmer organization 
leaders, and farmers. Sharing parts of the conceptual model with them helped to structure and 
deepen the analysis, but also to improve the conceptual model. At the end of the mission, we 
reached an agreement on what where the key issues and the causing factors and on the need 
to reform the system in order to enhance its performance during phase 2. Based on this, I also 
contributed to the formulation of the project’s Phase 2.     
The process and achievements of mission 2  
Preparatory work - All system stakeholders were informed of my mission and ready to contribute 
to the reform. In November 2004, I spent the first 3 weeks in Bamako at the SaDeF Headquarters, 
working on the approach and refining the proposals that came out during the phase 1 mission, 
to propose a manual for operational procedures (MOP). I also got the chance to consult the 
presidents of the regional and national associations, as well as some staff of the executive 
agencies who were on duty travel to Bamako.
Stakeholders Workshop in Segou to discuss the proposals – During the fourth week, I traveled 
to Segou, where I facilitated a 4 days’ workshop attended by representative of all system 
stakeholders. All councilors and professional staff of the regional and national associations 
were represented as well as government officials. During the four days, the proposed Manual 
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for Operational Procedures was discussed in a comprehensive way. The manual consisted of 
three main parts (see section 16.5 below). Part 1 deals with what are the SaDeF associations 
and their aim, and operational approach. Part 2 deals with managing the SaDeF associations 
network to ensure quality governance. Part 3 provides guidance and tools to manage the cycle 
of SaDeF program activities in order to ensure effectiveness and accountability. For some issues, 
stakeholder categories (councilors, staffs of the executive agencies, government officials) were 
allowed to hold their internal consultation and clarify their positions with regard to role sharing 
and power relations between councils and executive agencies, regional and national levels, 
Governmental supervisory agencies and IFAD. At each step, I summarized the changes proposed 
and agreed upon by all stakeholders, and the manual was validated section after section. As 
facilitator of the process, it was important to be trusted by system stakeholders. Fortunately, 
this condition was achieved during my first mission. At the starting of the negotiation 
workshop some councilors kept showing skepticism with government officials and staffs of the 
executive agencies, but by lunch time on day 1, we were able to overcome this situation, because 
of my absolutely neutral position. I spent the last 4 weeks, in Bamako in finalizing the manual, 
in consistency with the workshop agreements, which involved a lot of work. Later in February 
2005, the manual was formally validated, and its implementation entered officially into force.  
Managing the stream of technical process 
I found MANGO’s stream of technical process very practical. I started with developing a 
conceptual model of the SaDeF system, based on literature review. This helped to structure my 
discussions with stakeholders met and to stimulate their own analysis. And progressively, I 
improved the model which helped at the end of mission 1 to develop proposals for Phase 2 and 
to agree on the need for a reform. During mission 2, the model guided the proposals with regard 
to the content of the manual for operational procedures that would serve as system regulation. 
The technical issues discussed during the process were: 
–  The sharing of roles and relationships between system actors. It appeared necessary to clarify 
the roles of the executive agencies vis-à-vis the councils. Likewise, it was necessary to clarify 
the roles of the national association versus the regional associations. 
–  The discussion on roles and relationships was closely linked with the rules of the game, 
specifically with regard to clarifying the procedure for activities, and tools to be used by 
actors in relating to each other. 
For some of the actors, specifically most of the illiterate members of the councils, these topics 
seemed too abstract. To stimulate their interest, I had to provide examples of what kind of 
arrangements should have been place. That way, they better understood the problems and got 
motivated to cooperate in questioning the proposals.          
Managing the stream of collective action process 
The stream of collective action process was quite iterative with the stream of technical 
process. During mission 1, I held many meetings and interviews with stakeholders individually 
and collectively, to discuss issues, introduce analytical tools (for example the institutional 
triangle) which helped people contribute to the analysis. Moreover, during the first 3 weeks on 
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mission 2, I also reached consensus with stakeholders on the format of the manual for 
operational procedures, and on the way to conduct the reform negotiation workshop. The 
negotiation itself has been the critical moment of the collective action process, and I can 
confirm that in addition to relevant proposals backed with solid argumentation, building trust 
among all participants has been a critical factor. In fact, that workshop made me discover my 
capacity to be a trusted facilitator, which was later confirmed through many other experiences 
not reported in this book. 
15.4  Analyzing the results of the SaDeF system
Overview of the three levels of results of the SaDeF system
Figure 26 shows the chain of results of the SaDeF system, as drawn from the evaluation of Phase 1 
of the program. The improved wellbeing of the rural poor, especially the most vulnerable people, 
is the final outcome. To achieve this end result, the system should contribute to delivering a 
range of goods and services which meet the needs of the concerned end users, and for that 
purpose, it must comply with quality governance principles.
Figure 26: the chain of results of the SaDeF system
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Assessing the achievement with regard to the wellbeing of the rural poor
In the program design, the wellbeing of the end users was considered as a result to be measured 
by an impact study, some years after the end of the intervention. Thus, the monitoring and 
evaluation system was not designed to provide information on whether, as the result of 
SaDeF intervention, the beneficiaries have effectively enhanced their wellbeing. Likewise, the 
evaluation mission of Phase 1 was not tasked to measure the impacts on beneficiaries. Therefore, 
there was no data available with regard to the system’s end results. 
Assessing the delivery results
Because the Phase 1 evaluation mission as a whole looked after the delivery results achieved 
by the project, my focus was rather on the governance results that tended to be overlooked. 
However, to give an idea, according to a report prepared by the NEA (ANCG 2002) the key 
achievements at the end of the Phase 1 were: 
–  Development of rural infrastructure: 18 wells; 12 literacy centers; 9 feeder roads; 1 (forest and 
fruits) plants nursery; 18 warehouses; 8 livestock markets; 4 vaccination parks; 2 solar pumps 
for gardening; 7 irrigated perimeters (6 for vegetables and 1 for rice); 2 ponds for gardening and 
watering animals. 
–  Support to village planning: about 75% of targeted villages in the Segou region and 50% in 
the Koulikoro region were supported to identify their needs in order to better negotiate with 
local governments and any other development agency. Unfortunately, this exercise which 
was outsourced to consultants, yielded only demand for infrastructures, probably because, 
people identify SaDeF with infrastructures. 
–  Literacy: 698 new literate including 166 women (24%)
–  Training on basics of management: 273 trainees, including 60 women (22%)
–  Technical training: 262 trainees, including 59 women (23%). 
–  Retraining: 189 beneficiaries
–  Capacity building for infrastructure management: 112 village committees supported
–  Advisory services to village committees: 57 committees supported
–  Rural finance services: only agreement was reached to partner with Kondo Jigima, a micro-
finance institution that would expand in rural areas, by opening new 21 village branches. 
Focus on the governance results 
The governance issues raised below were shared and agreed upon with system stakeholders 
(members of elected bodies, staffs of executive agencies, government and IFAD officials) which 
led to the decision to perform some institutional adjustments before the launching of Phase 2. 
Assessing system equity
As proposed by MANGO, the equity level of the SaDeF system was assessed through the following 
criteria: (i) representation of stakeholders; (ii) clarity of processes; (iii) access to information (iv) 
degree of consensus; (v) distributional effects; (vi) contribution to investment.
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–  Representation of stakeholders. As mentioned above, the added value of the SaDeF system is 
the use of the network of regional associations as a channel for the expression of beneficiaries’ 
voice. However, the organizational set-up created the following representation issues: 
–  The membership of the associations was opened to NGOs and the Order of Engineers 
which are service providers rather than users; 
–  The very small number of delegates sitting in the general assemblies has tainted the 
representativeness of the associations. For example, in Koulikoro, the farmer organizations 
members of the AR are considered unrepresentative of their base. Moreover, because 
of the small size of the general assemblies, it was decided that they will also operate 
as council. But the elected officials had the feeling that their knowledge and abilities 
were underestimated, and their role reduced to simply a ritual dimension, most of the 
responsibilities laying with the executive agency. In both Segou and Koulikoro regions, the 
members of the associations were unanimous in expressing frustrations. It was not clear 
for them that their duty as elected officials was to determine the policy and the priorities 
of the intervention and oversee the work of the executive agency. Moreover, there was no 
initiative to strengthen their capacity in that regard. 
–  Given the acuity of climate change in the Sahel, it also appeared necessary that the SaDeF 
program engages more on environmental issues (caring for future generations interest as 
well as biodiversity, considered as absent players).
–  Finally, the need to comply with the decentralization law that make municipalities 
responsible for planning, developing and operating community infrastructures, is a 
representation issue. It also explains the conflict between the SaDeF Associations and 
local governments. 
–  Clarity of processes. A manual of procedures was developed, but it focuses only on describing 
the network of associations, and on the administrative and financial rules the executive 
agencies should comply with. There was no rule clarifying the role of the general assembly 
and council in the implementation the program. Likewise, there was no rule shaping the 
relationship between the president of the council and the coordinator of the executive 
agency. Therefore, much remains to be done to meet the challenge of the clarifying system 
activity processes. Specifically, it appeared necessary to develop a manual of operating 
procedures, that clarifies the roles of elected officials, vis-à-vis the staffs of the executive 
agencies in fields such as associations’ policy, approval of executive agencies’ work plan, 
approval of beneficiaries’ micro-projects, monitoring and evaluation of implementation 
and so on.  The manual should also clarify the relationship between these players at regional 
and national levels, as well as the tools they should use in performing their duties. Moreover, 
attention should be paid getting the elected officials that are illiterate performing effectively 
their roles. Finally, the system was lacking the establishment of communication channels 
that ensure everyone to access the information they need.  
–  The degree of consensus. Depending on whether they belong to an elected or executive body 
and at national or regional level, people had different views on the operational modalities 
and on critical issues such as dealing with poor villages that cannot ensure their financial 
contribution or collaborating with municipalities. 
–  Distributive effects. As shown by the assessment of the delivery results presented above, the 
SaDeF has contributed in a certain way to improving the living conditions of people in the 
intervention areas. However, the Phase 1 evaluation report (ANCG, 2002), had expressed the 
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need to better target the poorest villages and the most vulnerable. For example, the program 
had to deliver community infrastructures through the municipalities, and rural finance 
products through micro-finance institutions. Thus, a critical question was: what leverage 
does the SaDeF have to make sure that these public and private outsourced agencies are well 
equipped to target the most vulnerable and effectively respond to their needs? Likewise, what 
leverage is there to stimulate these poorest layers of the population to be pro-active in taking 
advantage of the program’s delivery?  
–  Contribution to investment. Overall, the financial contribution of beneficiary communities was 
effective, but as mentioned above, some villages are so poor that they are unable to mobilize 
their own resources. In that case, it might be practical to accept in-kind contributions. The 
SaDeF associations themselves do not generate resources and rely only on subsidies entrusted 
by Government and IFAD. The mobilization of resources from other donors had still not been 
effective. This is a critical issue, because it affects the sustainability of the SaDeF system. 
Assessing system efficiency 
This consists of comparing the benefits generated, with the transaction costs. In addition, the 
impact on the resilience of the physical capital is examined. 
–  High transaction costs. According the Phase 1 evaluation report, compared to the operation 
of analogous project management units, the SaDeF system’s operating expenses are rather 
high. Moreover, administering the cycle (preparation, approval, disbursements, monitoring 
of implementation, evaluation and conclusion) of tens of micro-projects represented quite 
a heavy workload for the regional agencies. And with the foreseen increased number of 
demands during the second phase, the situation would worsen.  It was therefore necessary 
to review the operational procedures, by lightening the rules without losing transparency 
and accountability. Another issue was that, as already mentioned, the system has been costly 
because of significant misunderstandings between regional and national levels, executive 
and elected bodies. As a result, some staffs of the executive agencies, including the director in 
Segou, were fired by the president of the council, without the required notice of the minister 
of agriculture. These were structural issues that confirmed the need to redefine the roles and 
rules of the game and to empower both the elected and executive bodies to perform their 
duties and relate to each other in compliance with these procedures. 
–  The resilience of nature (environmental sustainability). Phase 1 activities did not have significant 
impact on the resilience of the physical capital, even though in general, trends with regard to 
natural resources degradation remain a critical concern in the Sahel. 
Assessment of system stability
In accordance with MANGO, the stability of the SaDeF system was examined through the 
following variables: (i) conflictuality; (ii) subsidiarity and separation of powers; (iii) ability 
of stakeholders to assume their function; (iv) accountability; and (v) existence of flexible 
institutional adjustment mechanisms. 
–  Propensity to conflict. As mentioned above, during phase 1, the operation of the SaDeF system 
has been confrontational, due to structural causes. Fortunately, all stakeholders were 
committed to contribute to reviewing the rules in place. 
–  Subsidiarity and the separation of powers. Firstly, stakeholders have agreed to separate the 
general assembly from the council. Secondly, according to the elected officials (most of 
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whom are illiterate), they were told (by some ‘experts’ committed by IFAD and Government) 
that once their capacity would be enhanced, they would take over the executive functions. 
Consequently, they thought they should be empowered to conduct tender procedures as well 
as feasibility studies in the beneficiary villages. I took the opportunity to explain to these 
leaders what should be their role, and what should the role of the executive agencies. They 
agreed to further discuss these issues during the system reform process. Moreover, the 
Phase 1 evaluation mission recommended compliance with the decentralization law, with 
regard to the responsibility of the municipalities in developing and operating community 
infrastructures. Municipalities might delegate this responsibility to village committees 
(subsidiarity)
–  The ability of actors to play their roles. With the new manual of operational procedures, the 
roles and responsibilities as well as the relationships were to be clarified, so that the capacity 
of the elected and executive bodies to perform their functions and smoothly relate to each 
other would be enhanced. 
–  Effective accountability mechanisms. The institutional arrangements in place during Phase 
1 were not proper for keeping the elected officials accountable to their basis. Likewise, the 
council was not empowered to examine the technical and financial reports prepared by the 
executive agencies, as well as the independent audit reports. Because some of these elected 
officials are illiterate, the procedures must prescribe some accompanying measures such as 
summarizing and translating the reports in local language, eventually, organizing an audio 
copy of the reports, formal sessions devoted to the examination and approval of these reports 
etc. Moreover, because the procedures were quite vague, the executive agencies were not 
empowered to keep the public and private agencies to which they outsource some activities 
accountable. 
–  Existence of flexible system adjustment mechanisms. The conflicts that arose, leading to firing 
some staffs of the executive agencies show that the SaDeF system needs to be empowered to 
detect potentially conflict issues, and collectively develop and implement system adjustment 
solutions. 
15.5  Analyzing the arenas of the SaDeF system 
Seeking to explain the results of SaDeF, the analysis shifted to the next component of MANGO, 
the arenas. And because the mission was now bent on creating an improved manual of 
operational procedures, the focus was on what the arenas should be like, i.e. a design question in 
terms of Chapter 9. 
After consultation with all system stakeholders (IFAD and Government, members of the 
associations at regional and national levels, service providers, and members of municipal 
councils etc.), I designed a conceptual model representing the SaDeF program as a purposeful 
human activity system. The conceptual model consists of 4 action arenas that I found 
convenient to number as follows: Arena 1 – managing the operation of the SaDeF Associations; 
Arena 2 – managing the cycle of program activities; Arena 3 – delivering micro finance services to 
the rural poor; and Arena 4 – implementing beneficiaries’ micro-projects. Some of these arenas 
include some sub-arenas (figure 27). In comparing the model to the situation on the ground, 
I was able to help system stakeholders better understand the problems met by the program 
174 Part D
and their causal factors and agree on reform proposals. As mentioned by the President of the 
SaDeF associations at the closure of the stakeholders’ workshop, without the rules shaping 
the operation of these arenas, SaDeF system will remain confrontational and unable to ensure, 
effectiveness, accountability and trust.   
Arena 1 – Managing the operation of the SaDeF Associations
This arena was designed to consist of two sub-arenas. The first sub-arena is responsible for 
generating and revising the system’s policy and regulatory framework. The second sub-arena is 
responsible for steering the implementation of the SaDeF program. 
Sub-Arena 1.1 – Developing and revising the SaDeF policy and regulation
Revising the Statues of the SaDeF Associations, adopting and revising the rules shaping the 
program implementation, and adopting the annual programmatic and budgetary framework 
letter (a policy document), and adopting the annual work plan and budget are the key mandates 
of this arena. The key players are the General Assembly, the Council, and the Executive Agency. 
–  Revising the Statutes of the Associations at national and regional levels – Firstly, the Council 
after discussing the problem raised would agree on the need to revise the statutes and 
request the no-objection of the National Association.  
 
The national association would request the no-objection from Government. With the no-
objection, the executive agency would prepare the revised document that will be pre-validated 
by the council and sent to the national association (case of regional associations) or the 
Government (case of national association) for remarks. The final version would be voted by 
the general assembly. The MOP would include a form ‘motivation and impacts of change in the 
statutes or procedures on the SaDeF system’ that would be used to explain the problem, the 
change to be introduced, and how it will solve the problem. 
–  Revising the rules shaping the program implementation – These rules should be defined 
in the Manual of operational procedures that should be consistent with the Manual for 
administrative and financial procedure. Members of the associations as well as government 
and IFAD officials can express the need to revise these manuals. Then, the formal decision 
to proceed would be made by the general assembly of NAESD, after consultation with the 
council of regional associations, and no objection from Government and IFAD. Then, the 
national agency would prepare the document in consultation with the regional associations. 
The council of NAESD would pre-validate the document, request the no-objection form 
Government and IFAD, and finally adopt the manual. 
–  Adopting the annual programmatic and budgetary framework letter (national and regional) that 
constitutes the tool the regional and national associations would use to specify their policy 
and monitor its implementation. The letter would be prepared annually, to allow regular 
updates, based on lessons learned. The process would start with the national executive 
agency developing a proposal that would be validated by the council and finally adopted by 
the general assembly of NAESD. The policy letter would then be transmitted to the president 
of each regional association. At regional level, a regional letter consistent with the national 
letter would be prepared by the regional executive agency, validated by the council, sent to 
the NAESD that would confirm the consistency with the national letter and give no-objection, 
and finally adopted by the general assembly. 
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Figure 27 – The SaDeF system arenas. Square boxes are arenas (1-4) with sub-arenas, ovals are results.
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Sub-Arena 1.2 – Steering the implementation of the SaDeF program
This arena manages four processes: (i) the development and approval of regional and national 
action plan and budget, and (ii) six-monthly implementation reports, which give the opportunity 
to discuss program activities and review its performance; (iii) holding regular sessions to review 
system governance and (iv) facilitating the General assembly sessions.   
–  Adopting the annual work plan and budget – The annual work plan and budget would be 
developed by the national and regional executive agencies. At regional level, the executive 
agency would prepare the document. The council would check the consistency with the policy 
framework letter and give no-objection. Then national executive agency would prepare the 
national annual work plan and budget by consolidating the documents transmitted by the 
regional associations, seek the approval of the national council that would check consistency 
with the policy guidelines, before the document is sent to Government and IFAD for approval. 
–  Adopting the six-monthly reports – The process would be the same as for the annual work 
plan and budget. Following the IFAD directives, the regional executive agencies would 
prepare the six-monthly implementation reports that would be examined by the council and 
consolidated at national level by the national executive agency. The consolidated national 
implementation report will then be examined by the national council before transmission to 
IFAD and Government. 
–  Six-monthly dialogue between executive agency and council on program performance and 
system governance – Following the six-monthly report, the members of the council and the 
staffs of the executive agencies (at national and regional levels) would meet to discuss the 
performance of the staffs and the challenges in implementing the program activities. 
–  General assemblies’ session on program performance and system governance – Every year, the 
chief of the executive agencies at regional and national levels would present the performance 
report to their respective general assemblies. The presentation would focus on the results 
achieved with regard to annual objectives and the adopted policy framework. It would also 
mention the lesson learned and adjustment proposals for the next period. 
The critical issues with this arena 
These two sub-arenas were much neglected during Phase 1. The general assemblies were not 
in place, and the roles of councilors at national and regional level, with regard to developing 
the policy and enforce its implementation were not clarified. No tool was in place to elicit 
the vision of the elected leaders on the policy and their implementation. This explains why 
they felt reduced to simple ritual roles, which generated frustrations and made the situation 
confrontational. 
Arena 2 – Managing the cycle of program activities 
The program is implemented through activities outsourced to delivery agencies which are 
municipalities, farmer organizations, micro-finance institutions or consultants, based on 
contracts. All stakeholders agreed to distinguish between three types of activities. Type 1 and 
2 consist of micro-projects respectively below and above 34,000 USD. Type 3 activities include 
activities outsourced to consultants, micro-project extension without additional financing, and 
additional financing commitment. Whatever the type, the cycle of each activity consists of 5 
phases: (i) preparation – selection; (ii) appraisal –approval; (iii) commitment; (iv) supervision – 
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monitoring; and (v) evaluation and closure. Each of these phases is considered as a sub-arena 
that generates specific results in the process of managing the program implementation to 
ensure results and accountability. The rules presented below would apply for each phase and 
each type of activity. 
Sub-Arena 2.1 – Managing the Preparation – Selection phase 
For type 1 activities (Micro-projects below 34,000 USD) 
This phase would consist of the following roles sharing: 
Call for proposals – Regional executive agencies would disseminate new call for proposals. On 
request, promoters can also be trained on how to prepare and submit a proposal.    
Selection exam – For each proposal, the REA would check the compliance with the priorities 
set by the Association in the annual work plan and budget framework letter, by filling a project 
selection form. Then the list of selected projects format would be filled and transmitted to the 
Council.
Council’s confirmation of selected projects – If need be, councilors might examine a project 
selection fiche. Any micro-project confirmed would move to the appraisal - approval phase. 
For type 2 activities (micro-projects above 34,000 USD) 
The steps are the same as described for type 1 activities, with the difference that the proposal is 
submitted to a further analysis by the regional agency, using a specific format, to recommend or 
not if the project should be considered for appraisal. This provision was specifically requested by 
the councilors to ensure transparency, given the higher amount. 
For type 3 activities 
This phase would consist of developing terms of reference for consultants or preparing a 
tender document, along with a memorandum that justifies the activity and its contribution to 
achieving the program objectives.  
Sub-Arena 2.2 – Managing the appraisal – approval phase
For type 1 activities
Stakeholders agreed on the following roles sharing: 
Potential external review – If need be, the regional executive agency might recruit a consultant 
to further review the proposal with regard to some technical aspects and provide advice with 
regard to its feasibility and/or improvement. 
Appraisal – The proposal would be appraised and the staff in charge would prepare an 
appreciation memorandum. The memorandum would confirm or re-evaluate the budget and 
clarify all the implementation issues that were not developed in the proposal. The memorandum 
would be cleared by the financial and administrative director and confirmed by the regional 
director. The confirmation means that the executive agency recommends the Council to approve 
the proposal. The memorandum could also lead to a refusal. 
Approval by the council – The executive agency would prepare a list of appraised micro-project 
proposals along with the memorandum to be submitted to the Council. Each councilor might 
request assistance to better understand the proposal or the compendious memorandum of 
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appreciation. The Council could make 3 kinds of decisions: (i) approve the micro-project; (ii) 
reject it; or (iii) ask the executive agency to further appraise the proposal.  
For type 2 activities   
The procedures would be the same as for type 1 activities, with the difference that for projects 
above 34,000 USD, no objection from both Government and IFAD is required before final 
approval
For type 3 activities 
The documents prepared in the previous phase (terms of reference, or tender document and 
compendious memorandum) are cleared by the director of administration and finance and 
confirmed by the regional director. 
Sub-arena 2.3 – Commitment
At this stage, for each approved proposal, the executive director will sign the agreement with 
the counterpart (promoter, consultant…) on behalf of the president of the council, and in 
compliance with the MOP’s guidelines with regard to agreements (with a private agency or a 
consultant, a beneficiary organization, or a municipality). Signe 
Sub-arena 2.4 – Supervision and monitoring. 
At this stage each approved activity is implemented by the promoter or whichever agency has 
signed the agreement. The executive agency’ staff in charge of the activity would perform 
the following actions, in compliance with the rules prescribed by the MOP : (i) monitor the 
performance of the project on regular basis; (ii) monitor the tender procedures performed by 
the outsourced agency; (iii) approve periodic work plan and budget; (iv) introduce and update 
disbursement plan in the computer system; (iv) assess project realization, in comparison 
with project expenses; (v) approve disbursement with the clearance of the administrative and 
financial director; (vi) if foreseen or if need be, organize external audit.
Sub-arena 2.5 – Evaluation and closure. 
Any outsourced activity should be dully concluded with an evaluation and closed. In case the 
project developed an infrastructure, the inauguration would be conducted in accordance with 
the regulation in Mali, and the inauguration report duly filed. The MOP also includes guidance 
and tools for the financial closure.   
The critical issues with this arena 
The rules to manage the cycle of activities were not in place during Phase 1. These rules are 
important for many reasons, however, such as the assurance of transparency and efficiency and 
clarity about the roles of elected counselors, vis-à-vis the executive director and staff.   
Arena 3 – Delivering micro-finance services  
The key players in this arena were micro-finance institutions (MFIs) as service providers, 
the regional executive agencies as enabler, and the rural poor. During Phase 1, no result was 
generated. Only the Segou regional agency was able to conduct a study to assess rural poor’s 
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needs with regard to micro-finance services, but no contract was signed until the end of the 
phase. It was to be expected that when the newly designed manual for operational procedures 
(MOP) that regulates the management of the cycle of activities would enter into force, the 
conditions required to run this arena during the Phase 2 would be met. These rules specified how 
REA would clarify the services to be delivered to the rural poor and how the support the FODESA 
system would be provided to the outsourced MFIs, and the indicators to monitor and evaluate 
results, the reporting obligations, and the mechanisms for beneficiaries’ feedback would be 
clear to all.  Councilors would be allowed to perform field visits to see realities on the ground, 
discuss issues with the service provider and get the feed-back of the end-users. 
Arena 4 – Implementing beneficiaries’ micro-projects 
This arena would operate exactly like arena 3, with the difference that REA signs agreement with 
municipalities, village councils or farmer organizations, for the implementation of their micro 
projects. 
The critical issues with this arena 
This arena was operational during phase 1, but unfortunately, the rules described above that 
clarify system actors’ roles and relationships as well as the tools to be used in managing the cycle 
of activities were not in place, leading to delays and conflicts. After the MANGO application, the 
new MOP was expected to resolve many of these issues.
15.6  Conclusion of the case study 
This case study came after the case study 1, in which MANGO was used to map and describe 
the Nago traditional system for natural resources management. It was important, because it 
offered the opportunity for using MANGO comprehensively to support the process of analysis 
and reform of a problematic development situation. The achievement was very satisfactory. 
The SaDeF stakeholders appreciated the added value of using MANGO. The reform proposal to 
which they all contributed was adopted and put into force. IFAD approved my report and sent 
me for other troubleshooting missions that are presented in case studies 3 and 4. Clearly I 
concluded that the approach and tools proposed by MANGO are powerful to help stakeholders 
join effort in mapping a governance system, identifying and analyzing the problems affecting 
the system performance and design a proposal for reform. And, according to the coordinator 
of the SADeF Associations during Phases 1 and 2, Mr. Fatogoma Diarra whom I met in Bamako 
in 2012, following the implementation of the proposed reform, the relationship between the 
players improved and the processes went smoothly during phase 2. 
More privately, with the eye on further development of MANGO, I had experienced that it is not 
always warranted to apply MANGO in full. In this case for example, it did not appear necessary to 
perform a deep actors’ analysis, as the focus was on the rules of the game. Likewise, the analysis 
of the institutional context was focused on the decentralization policy. Therefore, depending on 
the situation, using some specific aspects of MANGO might be enough. This finding has found a 
place in the last paragraph of Section 6.2 – Range of MANGO applications. 
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Another issue is the fact that the inconsistency of supply agents (NGOs and Order on Engineers) 
being member of SaDeF councils has not been solved. Though I raised the fact that this creates a 
conflict of interest, all stakeholders (IFAD, Government, representatives of these supply agents 
and other members of the councils) unanimously decided to maintain the status-quo. This 
shows that bringing evidence on the table is not always enough. 
Finally, due to the nature of this Case Study, the MANGO exercise amounted to improving 
a bureaucracy that possibly should not have existed in the first place, by reinforcing a third 
local/regional/national parallel structure next to the local governments and the structure 
of agricultural chambers. Even though the issue was raised during the analysis, IFAD and the 
Government had already decided to reinforce the SaDeF associations. In the development of 
MANGO however, the experience reinforced my resolve to include a strong analysis of context in 
MANGO (Chapter 12.5), including clear-cut advice to be aware of duplications.     
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Case Study 3 – Adjusting the  
strategy for the delivery of  
micro-finance services to the rural  
poor in Cameroon 
Introduction
In January 2003, IFAD organized a training workshop on institutional analysis for rural 
development projects. Participants were country portfolio managers (CPMs), consultants 
supporting IFAD projects in the field, and some project coordinators from beneficiary countries. 
I facilitated this training with my colleagues Philip Townsley, Norman Messer, and Rathindra 
Roy. After the training, the CPM for Cameroun shared with me his concerns with regard to the 
needs to adjust the intervention strategy of the Cameroun Micro-Finance Sector Program (MFSP) 
that was launched in 2002. We then agreed to field a troubleshooting mission, to review the 
program design, in using MANGO. The mission visited Cameroun from 22 April to 08 May 2003. 
In this chapter I elaborate on the results of this Case Study. In Section 16.1, I present the context 
of the study and Section 16.2 deals with using MANGO to identify and analyze the problem 
(results and action arenas analyses). Then Sections 16.3, 16.4 and 16.5 show how respectively the 
overview on the strategic adjustment proposal, the program objectives and components have 
been reformulated. Section 16.6 focuses on proposals with regard to accountability mechanisms 
in the reformed system. Finally, in Section 16.7, I conclude on how the Case Study informed the 
development of MANGO. 
16.1  The study context 
Overview on the Cameroon Micro-Finance Sector Program 
Both Government and IFAD, the co-financers of the MFSP, considered the program as a major 
government scheme aiming to meet the rural communities’ needs with regard to rural 
finance services. The strategy proposed by the program appraisal report (IFAD, 2000) focused 
on supporting micro-finance institutions (MFIs) and their networks: (i) consolidation and 
professionalization of these agencies; (ii) extension in rural areas; and (iii) development of new 
approaches. In addition, the MFSP was designed to perform and coordinate the efforts of various 
donors in the sector, especially by supporting the setting-up and operation of the National 
Micro-Finance Committee (NMFC). The MFSP’s intervention was proposed to be articulated 
around four components: 
–  Component A – ‘Professionalization and development of MFIs’, with the aim to promote 
professional and viable MFIs that would extend their activities in remote rural areas, in order 
to sustainably deliver quality micro-finance products meeting the needs of the rural poor.
–  Component B – Action-Research, aiming at developing knowledge on the needs and approach 
to meet the needs of the marginalized groups with regard to rural finance products.
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–  Component C – Institutional Support, with the aim to strengthen the capacity of the enabling 
agencies in charge of enhancing and enforcing sector policy and regulation. These are the 
Micro-Finance Cell (MFC) of the Directorate for Economic Control (DEC) of the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance (MEF), and the National Micro-Finance Committee (NMFC).      
–  Component D – Project Management. 
The implementation of MFSP is led by a light team composed by five staff members: (i) the 
coordinator; (ii) the micro-finance specialist; (iii) the monitoring and evaluation specialist; (iv) 
the administrative and financial responsible; and (v) the accountant.  
The need for a strategic adjustment 
The need for a strategic adjustment appeared soon after the project launch in July 2002. Firstly, 
participants to the project inception workshop stressed the need to quickly review the project 
strategy in order to ensure its effectiveness. Secondly, after 6 months of implementation, the first 
implementation support mission performed by the United Nations Office for Projects Support 
(UNOPS) in January 2003, had highlighted worrying institutional issues that would hamper the 
success of the project. In addition, the UNOPS mission noticed some internal conflicts within the 
program management unit as well as conflict relationships with other players. 
Mission objectives
The strategic adjustment mission was charged to review the program appraisal report and 
discuss with the program management staff and project stakeholders to: (i) identify and explain 
the institutional factors that hinder the effectiveness of the program; and (ii) develop proposals 
to adjust the intervention strategy. The team was composed by: the Cameroonian CPM who 
attended partially and introduced the team to the Cameroonian authorities, a Micro-Finance 
Specialist and consultant) and myself as Consultant Institutional Analyst and Team Leader. The 
team also benefited from contributions by a Micro-Finance Specialist) and a Monitoring and 
Evaluation Specialist, who were recruited by the program management unit. 
Study objective
In accepting to lead the team, my personal objective was to test the overall MANGO framework 
and to test the potential of the model to help improve the design of a development project as a 
development action situation. 
Study summary 
The team held many consultation meetings with public and private sector stakeholders, 
individually and in small groups, to seek their views on the problems and possible solutions, 
throughout the mission. While the first meetings were on understanding their perception, the 
subsequent meetings were devoted to sharing our own analysis and proposals with them.  
To support the analysis, I developed a model that represents the MFSP intervention as a human 
activity system, with the MFSP positioned as a temporary enabling agency established to facilitate 
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the reform of the whole National Micro Finance Sector (NMFS). The promise of MANGO was that, 
in comparing that conceptual model with the reality as captured in the MFSP design, we should be 
able to better define the problems and flesh out the causing factors. With my team members, we 
first mapped the system results and the action arenas that generate them. By comparing the chain 
of results in our conceptual model with the one described in the MFSP design, we realized that 
some results were overlooked, which means that the system arenas that should generate them 
were not organized. Then, in using the approach proposed by MANGO to analyze the results and 
action arenas, we were able to identify and explain the problems facing the program as designed. 
Moreover, in combining our respective expertise in institutional analysis, micro-finance, 
monitoring and evaluation, we were able to develop a proposal of a revised program strategy, with 
revised objectives and upgraded system arenas (structure and operation). Finally, the team also 
proposed the factors in the institutional context to be improved in order to empower the Project 
Management Unit to better support the responsible public agencies.    
The team held a 1-day workshop with public and private stakeholders of the sector, to present 
the findings of the analysis and the proposal for strategic adjustment. Participants validated 
both the analysis and the proposals. The result of the workshop was presented to the Director of 
the Directorate of Economic Control of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and his team. The 
director appreciated the outputs of the mission so far and encouraged the team to expedite the 
delivery of the report. 
The next sections provide the details of this MANGO process. 
16.2  Identifying and analyzing the problem 
Examining the expressed problem
In this case study, the expressed problem was located in the sphere of governance results, 
implying that for MANGO, the variables at stake were: (i) system equity; (ii) system efficiency, 
and (iii) system stability. Indeed, the first aspect of the expressed problem was the concern with 
regard to the ability of the whole National Micro Finance Sector to generate the expected results. 
In other words, participants were questioning if the intervention would benefit the vulnerable 
layers of the rural population, who were the priority beneficiaries for both the Government 
and IFAD. Indeed, the scheme might be of benefit to only the MFIs and/or the richer layers of 
the rural population. First of all, therefore, an equity issue was identified. The second aspect 
of the expressed problem related to the conflicts among players that already arose during the 
first six months of implementation. And as we know, conflicts represent a serious threat for 
system’ stability. Thus, this concern consists of questioning if the system will be stable enough 
to operate in the longer run. 
Mapping and analyzing the causal chain of results
Putting the end-users at the center of the analysis, the next step consisted of examining how 
the expressed problem would affect the livelihood outcomes of the rural poor and then, what 
delivery results were at stake, and how they affected this end result. This step consists of 
developing the causal chain of results proposed by MANGO. 
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The conceptual model shown in figure 28, presents the chain of 9 results (R) that the program 
was supposed to generate. Starting with the end-users’ results and counting upstream in the 
causal chain, these were: 
–  R 1 – Increased revenue of the rural poor, who are the end users. Rural poor will increase their 
revenues (outcome result), by consuming and transforming micro-finance products meeting 
their specific needs.
–  R 2 – Innovative micro-finance products (core service) delivered to the rural poor. This is 
the result of performing micro-finance Institutions, operating in a conducive institutional 
context. 
–  R 3 – Performing micro-finance institutions operating in institutional context conducive. 
This crucial (enabling result) result is the combination of R6, R5 and R4 below. 
–  R 4 – Strengthened MFIs (enabling service). This is the results of micro-finance institutions 
that enhance their professionalism and viability, through internal transformation. 
–  R 5 – Innovative rural finance products and approaches for delivery (enabling service), 
available. This result would be generated by research-development agencies.    
–  R 6 – Enforced sector policy and regulation (enabling service).  This is the results of dedicated 
enabling agencies, specifically the national micro finance committee (NMFC) and the micro 
finance unit (MFU) of the directorate for economic control (DEC) of the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (MinEFi), that’s capacity has been strengthened. 
–  R 7 – Strengthened Enablers (enabling service). This is the results of dedicated enabling 
agencies (NMFC and MFU) that enhance their capacity (through internal transformation) to 
enforce sector policy and regulation. 
–  R 8 – MFSP’ efficiency (governance result). This is the result of the MFSP as an internal 
temporary system stimulator, i.e. a national agency set-up to enhance the system, within a 
period of time.
And the achievement of all these results depends upon Result 9, the quality of the whole 
National Micro Finance Sector. 
–  R 9 – Equity, efficiency and stability of the NMFS (governance result).  
The MFSP’s objectives were formulated as follows (IFAD 2000): 
The MFSP’s goal was to enhance the access of the rural poor, specifically the vulnerable layers, 
to quality micro-finance services. This identifies with R 2 of Figure 28.
The objective is to promote a network of performing and well supervised micro finance 
institutions that sustainably deliver quality micro finance products to the vulnerable layers of 
the rural population. This identifies with R 3 of Figure 28. 
More specifically the program was formulated to aim at: 
–  To strengthen the Government’s capacity to enforce sector policy and regulation, which 
identifies with R 7 and R 6; 
–  To support the MFI to strengthen their capacity, and promote their expansion in rural areas 
and the diversification of their services to the rural poor, which identifies with R 4; and
–  To develop knowledge on innovative micro-finance products meeting the need of the rural 
poor, and approaches to deliver these products, which identifies with Result 5. 
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Figure 28: The chain of results in the micro-finance sector
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The comparison of the program’s objectives as stated with the results of conceptual model 
above, led to the following findings: 
–  In the program design, the focus was on R 4 (strengthened MFIs), R 5 (Knowledge on delivery 
to the rural poor) and R 6 (enforced sector policy and regulation), yielding Result 3 (performing 
MFIs, operating in a conducive context). 
–  There was no provision to care for R 2, meaning that the MFSP was not tasked to make sure 
that supported MFIs would effectively and sustainably deliver good quality and quantity of 
micro-finance products to the rural poor. 
–  Likewise, in the program design, there was no reference to R 1 (the outcome result of the rural 
poor), which means that nobody cared for whether the rural poor would be able to effectively 
consume and transform the delivered micro finance products into increased revenues.
–  R 9 was also ignored. There was no provision to measure the quality of the governance that 
displays the National Micro Finance Sector as an institutional system.  
–  With regard to R 8, the indicators proposed to measure the MFSP’s efficiency in the program 
design were the percentage of spending and the rate of activity realization. There was no 
reference to the effectiveness of the MFSP as facilitator to render the National Micro Finance 
Sector System robust enough to efficiently and sustainably generate an increased access to 
quality micro finance products to the rural poor. 
–  These findings were confirmed by the MFSP staff that seemed to be more focused on 
strengthening the capacity of MFIs (R 4), and even less on enhancing sector policy and regulation 
enforcement (R 6 and R 7) and innovative knowledge on products and approaches (R 5). 
The next step consisted of mapping the system arena.  
Mapping and analyzing the MFSP’ system arenas
In following the chain of results described above for the conceptual model, I described the MFSP 
system as composed of 6 arenas (Figure 29) (starting from the arena that should generate the 
micro finance services or delivery results that the rural poor need): 
Arena A – Delivering micro-finance products to the rural poor
This arena was important for two reasons. Firstly, as mentioned above, it should generate the 
delivery results (R2) and the outcome results (R1). Secondly, it operates independently from 
MFSP. If the transformation process by which the rural poor consume and transform the micro 
finance products delivered (R2) into increased revenue (R1) is not effective, the project will not 
achieve the expected outcome result (R1). Unfortunately, as mentioned under Arena B below, the 
MFSP was not equipped to keep supported MFIs accountable in this respect. They did not have 
any reporting obligation with regard to how they delivered to the rural poor and how the rural 
poor used the micro-finance for their benefit. The MFSP support was not linked to any delivery 
commitment by the MFIs. 
Arena B – Strengthening micro-finance institutions
The MFSP staff considered this arena as the most important. According to the project design, 
MFSP would sign a contract aiming at supporting MFIs in implementing their business plan by 
providing (i) training to staff and members of credit and surveillance committees; (ii) equipment 
(computer, communication, furniture) and vehicle; and (iii) office facility (building) in the rural 
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areas where they expand their activities. Unfortunately, there is no provision in the contract 
allowing MFSP to ensure that the supported MFI were effectively delivering the required micro-
finance products to the rural poor. 
 
Figure 29: Arenas of the MFSP System 
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Arena C – Developing sector knowledge
According to the design report, MFSP would sign service contracts with research agencies 
that would collaborate with selected MFIs (also under specific contract with MFSP) to develop 
knowledge on micro-finance products and approaches to deliver these products. Three research 
topics were defined: (i) study on the impact of MFIs on the revenues of selected marginalized 
rural households; (ii) testing innovative micro-finance products and approaches in rural area; and 
(iii) documentation and dissemination of information on micro-finance products, approaches 
and impacts. MFSP’s support would cover the cost of research operation, dissemination 
workshops, seminars, and publications. While these tasks were obviously relevant, MFSP staff 
were wondering how to define the outputs the partners should generate. In other words, MFSP 
was not equipped to keep these parties accountable. 
Arena D – Enforcing sector policy and regulation
This arena was supposed to run independently, i.e. without any role for MFSP. The two 
enabling agencies (NMFC and MFU) were supposed to relate to other public and private sector 
stakeholders to enhance and enforce sector policy and regulation. Unfortunately, there was 
no provision to monitor the progress of these agencies. No indicators had been defined to 
measure the effectiveness of sector policy and regulation enhancement and enforcement. In 
fact, therefore, this arena was missing in the MFSP design. Should it have been foreseen, the two 
agencies would have the obligation to report on their performances, based on specific criteria, 
and MFSP would have been empowered to hold a regular dialogue with high authorities within 
the MinEFi on that performance. In other words, the two governmental agencies would have 
been kept accountable. 
Arena E – Strengthening enabling agencies
This arena consists of MFSP strengthening the capacity of the two enabling agencies that 
play a key role in enhancing the sector policy and regulation context. These are the national 
micro-finance committee (NMFC) that regroups all public (including international donors) and 
private sector stakeholders, and the Micro-finance unit (MFU) of the directorate for economic 
control (DEC) of the Ministry Economy and Finance (MinEFi), that is in charge of holding the 
secretariat of NMFC and enforcing sector policy and regulation. MFSP’s support to MFU included 
vehicles, office and computer equipment and operating costs. The support to NMFC included 
the costs of visits to MFIs’ and neighboring countries. The overriding issue in this arena was 
that even though the general weakness had been mentioned in previous reports, the MFSP was 
just requested to provide them with vehicles and funds without addressing the underlying 
weaknesses. Consequently, this arena was not empowered to clarify which areas of capacity 
should be strengthened, in connection with arena C.    
Arena F – Sector system development facilitation 
Through MFSP’s activities, this arena supports all others. It consists of MFSP’s technical, 
financial and administrative functions, in compliance with the rules in force. In this particular 
context, it is important to emphasize MFSP’s role with regard to keeping all partners it supports 
(enablers and suppliers) accountable. Therefore, MFSP’s capacity to define the outputs each 
supported agency is supposed to generate, monitor the progress and measure the achievement 
is critical. Unfortunately, the project design did not mandate MFSP in performing such duties, 
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which partially explains why the concern arose in the expressed problem. Disbursement rules 
were based on financial report and not submitted to meeting critical passing criteria with 
regard to the outputs the strengthened agency was supposed to generate. Because MFSP was 
not empowered to keep supported agencies accountable, the risk was high that these partners 
might not generate the expected results.    
Analyzing how the problem reflects in the institutional context
The national micro-finance committee and the micro-finance unit have the double mandate 
to enhance and enforce sector policy and regulation. Unfortunately, these results as well as the 
arenas that would generate them were overlooked in the project design, and these two agencies 
are not kept accountable. Therefore, it was not likely that MFSP would lead to a more conducive 
institutional context. And if this context that currently generated a lack of trust would endure, 
the traditional banks would still not commit to refinance MFIs.
In conclusion, the MANGO-based analysis showed that by overlooking arenas D and A and their 
results, and not empowering MFSP not to keep accountable all players it supports across all other 
arenas, the project design had missed critical conditions to ensure the achievement of the 
project objectives. 
16.3  Overview on the strategic adjustment proposal 
Based on the findings of the analysis, the MANGO team developed a proposal for a strategic 
adjustment that covered the following new characteristics:
–  The rural poor are the end users, and the aim is their effective access to a range of quality 
micro-finance products that they will convert into increased revenue. It is important to note 
here that the financial cycle of what people in rural areas do (farming, livestock, fishing, 
trading) is usually short, not more than 6 to 12 months in most cases, which means that 
after maximum 6 to 18 months, people should be able to convert a micro-credit into revenue. 
Therefore, it is possible to measure the impact of credit during the NFSP’s life. This means 
that it is possible to keep supported MFIs accountable for the delivery of quality and quantity 
micro finance services to the end-users.
–  Micro-Finance Institutions are not the end users. They are the suppliers of the micro-finance 
services that the rural poor need. It will be important for MFSP to select those MFIs that 
are likely to effectively deliver the required services to the end users. Moreover, it will be 
important for MFSP to keep selected MFIs accountable. 
–  In order to better meet the specific demand of the rural poor that varies across regions, the 
adjusted MFSP should include regional action plans. 
–  The MFSP should also be empowered to keep supported governmental agencies accountable. 
–  A concrete manual of operational procedures (MOP) should be drafted to set the rules to be 
followed by the MFSP management Unit in managing the cycle of program activities and the 
activities outsourced to MFIs and other agents. 
–  The operational procedures will be consistent with the monitoring and evaluation system and 
the financial management rules. 
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In order to implement these new characteristics and improve on the existing ones insofar 
additionally necessary based on the analysis, the strategic adjustment proposal contained a 
re-design of the MFSP program, implemented through four components that encompassed all 
the action arenas. They were (1) Promoting the supply of micro finance services in rural areas; 
(2) Developing sector knowledge; (3) Enhancing sector policy and regulatory context; (4) Project 
management. The components are described in the two Sections below.  Acknowledging that 
this material may be too detailed for the general reader, the sections are printed in small font.
16.4  Reformulating program components 
Component 1: Promoting the supply of micro finance services in rural areas 
The specific objective of this component was “to promote the supply of micro-finance products 
meeting their need to the rural poor, specifically women, youth and the most vulnerable. In this 
initial design, the objective was framed with the focus on MFIs: “to strengthen MFIs’ capacity to 
deliver micro finance services to the rural poor” (IFAD, 2000). The adjustment proposal puts the 
focus on the end-users and the emphasis on the delivery result that they need to improve their 
livelihood outcome. Moreover, the component encompasses the Arenas B (Strengthening MFIs) 
and A (Delivering micro finance products). 
Main innovative arrangements proposed to ensure effectiveness and accountability  
The demand for micro-finance services varies according to the rural activities the various project 
area, which are determined mostly by the agro-ecological potential of each area. Therefore, 
to make sure the intervention will meet people’ specific demands, the project will implement 
a regional based approach that consist of the following 6 steps for each region: (1) guidelines 
on assessing the demand and supply of micro finance services in the intervention regions; 
(2)  assessment of the regional demand and supply for micro finance services; (3) proposal of 
partnership agreement with eligible MFIs; (4) developing regional action plans; (5) approval 
of regional action plans; (6) managing the implementation of regional action plans; and (7) 
evaluation of the regional action plans.  
Step 1 – Defining the criteria for assessing the demand and supply of micro finance services in rural areas
Firstly, MFSP will recruit a firm with effective competencies, to develop guidelines on 
characterizing the demand and supply of micro-finance services in rural areas in Cameroon. 
The guidelines will include: (i) a proposal organizing the country into intervention zones, 
each composed by several provinces (maximum 3) homogenous with regard to micro-finance 
problematic; (ii) the technical criteria to be used to characterize both the supply and demand 
of micro-finance services in rural areas; (iii) the technical criteria to be used in assessing the 
delivery capacity of micro finance institutions MFIs). The proposed criteria will be validated by 
the National Micro Finance Committee.  
Step 2 – Assessment of regional demand and supply for micro-finance services
For each region, MFSP will recruit a firm to conduct the study, using the criteria agreed upon in 
step 1. 
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 With regard to the demand of the rural poor for micro-finance services, the study will clarify the 
following issues: 
–  Characterization of the end-users. Who are the most vulnerable layers within the rural poor? 
What are their activities? What is their current level of revenue? What is their aspiration with 
regard to increasing their revenue and wellbeing? 
–  Characterization of their micro-finance service needs (both savings and credits). The study 
will include the needs with regard to ordinary saving products, but also other saving products 
that are not yet covered in rural areas. These are pension savings, life insurance and medical 
insurance. With regard to credits, the study will include the specific needs for priority farming 
(crop, livestock, fishing) and non-farming income generating activities. It will assess the 
needs for innovative products such as small credit for women, credit linked with training 
whereby beneficiaries get trained on literacy, basics of management, nutrition and health etc.
Whit regard to the supply, the study will clarify the following issues: 
–  Screening of the micro-finance institutions operating in the region. For each MFI identified, 
the screening will consist of checking compliance to the following critical conditions: (i) is the 
institution licensed? (ii) Does the institution have a policy targeting the rural poor or aiming 
at expanding into rural areas? (iii) Does the institution have business plan for its expansion 
in rural areas? (iv) Do they have a manual of procedures that sets the rules with regard to 
managing loans and keeping the books? Do they have a reliable data base? Any MFI not 
complying with these conditions will not be eligible to enter into partnership agreement with 
MFSP. 
–  Assessment of MFIs complying with the critical conditions. The assessment will examine 
the following characteristics of the institution: (i) the history of their settlement in the 
region; (ii) the geographic cover; (iii) the range of micro finance products delivered to which 
beneficiaries and how many of them; (iv) the appreciation of the micro finance products by 
the beneficiaries; (v) the structure and governance of the institutions (including the staffs); 
and (vi) the financial viability of the institution. 
–  Classification of the MFIs in 3 categories. The assessment will lead to classifying the assessed 
MFIs in 3 categories. 
–  Category 1 will include those MFIs that are most viable and effective in delivering to 
the rural poor. Through a partnership contract, MFSP will provide a substantial support 
(both technical and financial) to these MFIs that in return will deliver a package of micro-
finance services to specific layers of the rural poor. MFSP’ support to these MFIs might 
include the cost of: (i) improving the internal governance; (ii) expanding to new rural 
areas; (iii) developing innovative rural finance products. 
–  Category 2 will include, less performing MFIs to which MFSP will provide only technical 
support, collectively and through service providers.
–  Category 3 will include those MFIs not qualified to receive the program’ support. 
–  Further assessment of Category 1 MFIs, using the following criteria: 
–  History of the MFI – Owners, dates creation, license, start of operation, start in the 
region… 
–  Reach – Geographic cover (which provinces?); data on the number and gender of clients 
per province; 
–  Micro-finance products supply status – (i) Loans’ outstanding; (ii) Number of active 
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loans; (iii) Average amount of credit, (iv) Total deposits amount; (v) Number of savers, 
(vi) average outstanding deposits; (vii) current number of clients; (viii) characterization 
of the products ((creditor and debtor interest rate, guarantee, credit terms, conditions); 
(ix) methodology used by product (individual or group credit, surety practice...); (x) 
conclusions on which products the MFI would deliver, to meet specific needs of specific 
categories of the rural poor, to how many potential clients, in what zones, and what new 
zones. 
–  The profitability status: the operating account of the last three years; profitability and 
efficiency (including the operational autonomy) ratios; the medium-term outlook, 
including the conditions to achieve the planned profitability ratio; as appropriate, the 
contribution of local branches to the financing.
–  Financial security status: the record for the past three years; an analysis of key ratios 
(capital, liquidity, re-use of surplus); comparing the rate of return of outstanding credit 
with effective interest rates; the portfolio risk (the status of portfolio quality over three 
years); the financial management capacity of the institution including cash management, 
internal and external control system, physical security of the local branches, service 
outlets and transport of cash.
–  The financing sources of the MFI. The financial resources (reuse of savings, capital, grants, 
and loans); subsidy to credit fund by donors, amounts committed, amounts received and 
receivable. For loans, the same information is required and a column for reimbursements 
should be added; the cost of the resource; funding requirements; the possibilities 
of obtaining credit funds through savings, banks, financial markets and donors; the 
subsidies for investment and operation received during the last three years and to receive 
in the future.
–  The governance structure of the MFI. Typology (mutual, cooperatives, NGOs, other); 
the role and responsibilities of elected leaders; analysis of strengths and weaknesses of 
governance; relationship between individual MFIs, unions and management levels. 
–  Work plan and human resources management of the MFI. The effectiveness of work plans, 
budget and reports; description of the organogram and suggestions for its improvement; 
evaluation of the human resources policy (job description, remuneration, working 
conditions, hiring and evaluation); staff efficiency (ratio loans versus administrative 
officers); level of competence, motivation and satisfaction of the staffs; turnover of staff; 
training needs.
–  The management systems of the institution: the management procedures; the 
accounting system; the products management; the monitoring of the risks portfolio; 
the management information system (MIS); the monitoring of operating costs; the 
computerization of operations; the status of equipment.
The MFSP management unit will approve the report on the assessment of the demand and 
supply for each region, and then authorize the firm to proceed with the next step of the study, 
which consists of developing the proposal of partnership between MFSP and selected MFIs.  
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Step 3 – Proposal of partnership with Category 1 and 2 MFIs. 
With Category 1 MFIs
Based on the findings from the steps 1 and 2, the consultancy firm will propose the content and 
modalities of the partnership agreement between MFSP and the MFI, in discussion with the two 
partners. The proposal will include: 
–  Firstly, the financial services (well characterized using the required technical criteria) that the 
MFI is committed to deliver progressively (deadlines) to specified groups of beneficiaries (well 
characterized including number) in specific areas;  
–  Secondly, the areas where the MFI needs to enhance its capacity, for the delivery of the results 
it is committing for. These include, key governance areas and logistics, and the indicators to 
monitor and measure the progress; and  
–  Thirdly, the financial support to be provided by MFSP to the MFI that would cover expenses for: 
(i) improving the performance with regard to the governance of the institution; (ii) financing 
lines for credit and risk sharing; (iii) logistics for expansion in rural areas. 
–  The reporting obligations of the IMF linked to the modalities for disbursement. Clear 
indicators will be defined to monitor the progress and measure the achievements with regard 
to enhancing the internal capacity of the IMF, and to the delivery of the expected micro 
finance products to the end users. 
–  The budget
With Category 2 MFIs
MFSP’ support to these MFIs will include only trainings and/or technical assistance for 
governance reform. The consultancy firm will propose for each institution the implementation 
modalities of this support, including the reporting obligations. 
Once the program agrees with the proposal of partnership with selected categories 1 and 2 
MFIs, the next step will be to compile all the outputs of step 1, 2 and 3 into a regional action plan. 
Step 4 – Developing regional action plan
The consultancy firm will develop a regional action plan outlined as follows: 
–  Part 1 – Sector context
–  Part 2 – Regional context: characterization of the rural poor, the micro finance services 
demand and supply
–  Part 3 – Selected MFIs: history, governance, performance and viability, objectives and plan 
with regard to rural areas, capacity building needs…
–  Part 4: Regional strategy of the Program – outcome and delivery objectives; activities 
(partnership with Category 1 MFIs; partnership with Category 2 MFIs); implementation 
modalities; risks and conditions, results framework, budget. 
–  Annex: Partnership agreement with each individual selected MFI.     
Step 5 – Approval of regional action plans
Each regional action plan will be approved by a Committee composed by 1 representative of: (i) 
MFU/MINEF; (ii) Ministry of Agriculture; (iii) Ministry of women condition; (iv) Farmers Union in 
the region; (v) each category of rural poor identified as group of priority beneficiaries. The approval 
committee will examine an appraisal memorandum prepared by the Program and that checks and 
confirms the compliance of the regional action plan, with the project objectives and strategy.
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Step 6 – Managing the implementation of regional action plans
The regional action plans will be implemented by selected MFIs. The role of the MFSP’s 
management unit’s is to manage the cycle of these child projects, by implementing the 
following activities, in compliance with the rules described in the manual for operational 
procedures:
–  Signing implementation agreement with selected Category 1 MFIs. Once a regional action 
plan is approved, the Program will formalize and sign the implementation agreement with 
each selected Category 1 MFI. The contract will specify the consistence of the Program’ 
support to the MFI, the results the institution is committed to deliver to the rural poor, 
disbursement rules linked with reporting obligations, indicators to monitor and measure 
results. The support for governance reform and strengthening the capacity of staffs and 
member of committees will be provided directly by the MFSP, through technical assistance 
and training sessions, performed by a service provider. For lines of credit, risk sharing and 
logistics for expansion to new rural areas, the MFSP management unit will proceed by 
transferring financial resources to the institution.  
–  Likewise, the MSFP will sign a support agreement with selected Category 2 MFIs. The support 
will include the opportunity for their staffs and committee (credit and surveillance) members 
to attend trainings, and technical assistance to reform their governance system. Both 
trainings and technical assistance will be provided by firms recruited by the Program. The 
agreement will also include the commitment of the MFI with regard reforming its governance 
and improving its performance. 
–  Training modules will be developed to meet the needs assessed during the preparation of 
the regional action plan, and MFIs will be invited to send learners to attend sessions. For that 
purpose, the Program will develop a training plan that includes post-training monitoring 
activities. 
–  In accordance with the rules laid in the manual of operational procedures, MFSP will monitor 
the results achieved by MFIs, and disbursements will be triggered by some passing criteria, 
with regard to: (i) enhancing professional capacity and internal governance of the institution; 
(ii) increased number of branches or outlets in rural areas; (iii) range, of micro finance products 
delivered; (iv) categories and number of clients. Therefore, concerned MFIs will have to fulfil 
their reporting obligations. 
–  Field controls (technical audits). The MFSP will perform directly or through contractors, 
missions to assess the progress on the ground. These missions will collect the end users’ 
feedback, but also appreciate the progress made by MFIs with regard to their internal reform 
and development process.
Step 7 – Mid-term reviews and evaluation of the regional action plans 
Finally, the Program will organize mid-term reviews and evaluation of regional action plans, 
in compliance with the prescriptions of the manual of operational procedures. The indicators 
agreed upon in the agreements with various MFIs, specifically the service delivery to the end-
users, and their state of wellbeing will be measured. 
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Component 2: Action – research 
The specific objective of this component is twofold: (i) to increase knowledge on the impacts of 
MFIs on the rural poor; and (ii) to capitalize and disseminate success stories. 
Main change introduced
This component identifies to Arena C of the conceptual model. In the initial design it was 
dedicated to generate and transfer knowledge to MFIs, with regard to innovative micro finance 
products, and approach to deliver these products. Because MFIs would depend on this result 
for their delivery, it is difficult to keep them accountable. Hence, it is now proposed to focus 
the component on knowledge with regard to impacts and success stories. MFIs do not have to 
wait for these knowledges before they deliver. They are responsible to develop themselves some 
innovative products and approaches. 
Main innovative arrangements proposed to ensure effectiveness and accountability  
An ad hoc committee will be established to propose a list of priority research topics related to 
the role of micro finance in poverty reduction and agricultural development. This committee 
will be chaired by the NMFC and include representatives from the national association of 
micro finance professionals, MinAgri, MinEFi, other Ministries, projects and programs active 
in the field, etc. The committee will also be in charge of appreciating the results achieved for 
the proposed topics. MFSP will sign service contracts with research institutions or consultancy 
firms to perform the various topic studies. These service providers will be selected, and the MFSP 
will monitor implementation, in compliance with the rules laid in the manual of operational 
procedures. Disbursement will be based on pre-defined intermediary results. 
Component 3: Enhancing sector policy and regulatory context 
The specific objective of this component has been reformulated as following: (i) ‘to strengthen 
the capacity of State to regulate the sector; and (ii) strengthen the capacity of professionals and 
promote communication and sharing of experience. 
Main changes introduced to ensure accountability 
The component encompasses the arenas E and D of the conceptual model. The MFSP’s support 
will concern the three MinEFi’s agencies in charge of sector regulation: (i) the Micro Finance Unit; 
(ii) the credit institutions service (CIS); and (iii) the credit institutions control brigade (CICB). The 
key functions to be performed are licensing MFIs, inspecting MFIs, and holding an observatory 
of micro finance. Through technical assistance, the Program will help to: 
–  Firstly, clarify the sharing of roles among the 3 agencies with regard to these functions. 
–  Secondly, refine the procedures with regard to performing these functions
–  Thirdly, identify the challenges with regard to the capacity of these agencies to perform their 
role, and avenues for capacity building; and 
–  Fourthly, develop agencies’ action plans for performing these functions, with clear indicators 
to measure the expected results. The MFU’s action plan will include the activities for the 
operation of the National Micro Finance Committee.
196 Part D
Through an agreement with each agency, the MFSP’ support to the implementation of the action 
plan will include (i) training of staffs; and (ii) logistics capacity (vehicles, equipment). Moreover, 
the Program will manage the cycle of the action plan implementation in compliance with the 
rules prescribed by the manual of operational procedures. The three agencies will prepare 
quarterly reports, and MFSP will report any conflict issue to both the Director of Economic 
Control of MinEFi and the National Micro Finance Committee, as a national platform where 
sector stakeholder meet, discuss and make recommendations to Government.  In addition, 
MFSP will support the setting-up and operation of the National Association of Micro Finance 
Professionals (NAMFP). 
Component 4: Project management  
The specific objective of this component is to ensure a sound management of the project. 
The main innovations and clarifications introduced with regard to technical and administrative 
management: 
This component identifies to the arena F of the conceptual model. The technical management 
of the project will consist of two types of activities: activities out-sourced to other agencies and 
activities handled directly by the MFSP management unit. 
–  Out-sourced activities will consist of activities delegated to: 
 –  Implementation agencies – These are: (i) MFIs for the implementation of regional action 
plans; (ii) research institutions or consultancy firms for the implementation of the sector 
knowledge development and dissemination component; and (iii) enabling agencies (MFU, 
CIS, CICB, NMFC, and NAMFP) for the implementation of component 3; and   
 –  Service providers – These are consultancy firms specialized in charge of providing trainings, 
technical assistance for governance reform, conducting review and impact studies, with 
regard to regional action plans. 
–  Contract with out-sourced agencies. The relationship between the MFSP and outsourced 
agencies will be governed by agreement models, designed to empower the MFSP in keeping 
these agencies accountable. More specifically, performance requirements, and reporting 
obligations consistent with the monitoring and evaluation system will be clarified.
–  Activities directly handled by the MFSP are twofold: 
 –  Firstly, the management of the cycle of outsourced activities, in compliance with the 
rules prescribed by the manual of operational procedures, will constitute the bulk of the 
activities of the MFSP’ staffs. 
 –  Secondly, depending on their technical skills, the MFSP’ staffs might perform some 
capacity building activities (trainings, technical support) in support of partner agencies. 
–  Files management and archives. For each contract with an implementing agency or service 
provider, a dedicated file will be constituted, regularly updated to reflect the history from the 
initial phase to the conclusive phase of the activity. The following items should be regularly 
introduced in the file: the terms of reference of missions  and relating contracts; the report 
describing the consistency of the activity to be implemented by the outsourced agency; 
the agreement with the outsourced agency; all periodic reports on technical and financial 
activities; the approval sheets of these reports by the MFSP, the mails exchanged between 
the MFSP and the agency; the originals of financial documents will be duly archived at the 
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administrative and financial specialist level. Likewise, a file including the following items 
must be dedicated to each MFSP managed activity: a memorandum presenting the initial 
problem, the actions to be taken and the expected results; the periodic reports on performed 
activities and results achieved; all correspondences with the MFIs, enabling agencies and 
others concerned. Each MFSP’ professional staffs will be in charge of managing the cycle 
of each activity under their responsibility and therefore the activity’s file. Each activity file 
manager will work closely with the secretary in charge of managing the archives. 
–  A manual for operational procedures will be developed to provide clear rules and instruments 
for properly administer and technically manage the cycle of each activity. For each activity file, 
the manual will define the roles and responsibilities of a file manager, as well as the ones of 
the administrative and financial specialist. The MOP has both regulatory and technical status. 
It will be computerized and consistent with the computerized monitoring and evaluation 
system and financing management system. It will set the rules for the management of the 
financing resources transferred to outsourced agencies, and these rules will be integrated in 
the agreements. It will also set the rules with regard to procurement. The MFSP coordinator 
will be responsible to ensure a rigorous implementation of the manual. Institutional audits 
should be organized to stimulate the team to follow operating procedures. 
–  The monitoring and evaluation system will be linked with the operational procedures which 
will include M&E related directives. The M&E system will consist of 3 levels: (1) the monitoring 
of MFSP activities; (2) the monitoring of activities performed by outsourced agencies; and (3) 
the evaluation of impacts on the end-users. 
–  Technical audits. As already mentioned, in order to ensure compliance with operational 
procedures, technical audits of outsourced agencies will be organized once every six months 
in 2003 and 2004, and once a year thereafter. 
The changes proposed with regard to the MFSP management unit’s operation
To ensure the MFSP is equipped to implement this adjusted strategy, the following changes are 
proposed: 
–  Review of MFSP management unit’s mandates. As an autonomous agency under the 
supervision of MinEFi, MFSP’s mandates are: (i) manage program resources (government 
and donor contribution);; (ii) manage the implementation of the agreements signed with 
public and private agencies (including MFIs) for the delivery of program results, in compliance 
with the rules laid in the manual of operational procedures; (iii) establish and manage a 
project accounting system; (iv) monitor ongoing activities and measure the impacts; and (v) 
prepare comprehensive (technical and financial) six monthly report, in compliance with the 
prescriptions of the M&E system. 
–  Review of MFSP management unit’s organization. The unit will consist of 2 sections working 
under the authority of the coordinator: (i) a technical section; and (ii) an administration and 
accounting section. The technical section (the main innovation) will responsible for managing 
the cycle of program activities. It will consist of 3 professionals including 2 micro finance 
specialists and 1 monitoring and evaluation specialist, with experience in micro finance. Each 
of these professionals will be in charge of managing some activity files, i.e. the cycle of these 
activities in compliance with the rules laid in the MOP. Therefore, the recruitment of a second 
micro-finance specialist must be expedited. 
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–  Strengthening the capacity of staffs to implement the proposed strategy. Once, the MOP is 
adopted, all MFSP’s professional staffs including the coordinator and the administration and 
financial management specialist will be trained on: (i) the conceptual model (the chain of 
results, and the distinction between the MFSP’s inputs, the delivery results and the outcome 
results; (ii) the action arenas working with the MFSP’ support, and the ones operating 
independently from the MFSP; (iii) governance issues, specifically, keeping outsourced 
agencies accountable; (iv) managing the cycle of activities.
16.5  Empowering MFSP to keep other agents accountable 
Reviewing the mechanisms for MinEFi’s administrative supervision 
After having analyzed the Decision N ° 00969 / MINEFI / DCE / MFC establishing and organizing 
the MFSP management unit, the mission discussed and agreed with the Director of Economic 
Control on the following findings and proposals with regard to taking a new Decision: 
–  Relationship between DEC and MFSP. The new Decision will distinguish between two types of 
relationship: (i) the supervisory relationship (reflected in the current decision paper); and 
(ii) the functional relationship between the Program and DCE agencies in charge of sector 
regulation (MFU, CIS and CICB). While the supervision will be performed by the office of 
director, MFSP should be in capacity to keep supported DCE agencies, accountable.   
–  The need to clarify the line of institutional gap between MFSP and DCE. Article 3 of the Decision 
paper stipulates that the MFSP management unit is composed by two entities: (1) the 
project steering Committee; and (2) a project coordination unit. While Article 4 confirms 
the supervision role of the Committee, Article 6 specifies that it is chaired by the director 
of DEC. The fact that nor the steering committee nor the director of DCE can be part of the 
MFSP management unit, is a critical issue to be fixed. Therefore, it was agreed that the 
new Article 3 will clearly make the distinction between MSFP management unit and the 
Steering Committee as two different entities and put the director of DCE in his supervisory 
position. 
–  Reaffirming the effectiveness of MFSP’s autonomy. Articles 1 and 4 of the current decision are 
contradictory. Article 1 stipulates the administrative and financial autonomy of the MFSP 
management unit, which means that DEC should perform a posteriori controls. But paragraph 
1 of Article 4, stipulates that DCE will perform its supervision of MFSP by delivering no 
objections, but does not specify on what. As a result, the MFSP management unit is confused 
and wondering, when and for what they should request approval form DCE. By stipulating 
that the project coordinator will perform his duties under the direct authority of the MFU 
director, Paragraph 3 of Article 8 adds another layer of confusion and contradiction. To solve 
these issues, it is agreed to remove paragraphs 1 of Article 4 and 3 of Article 8. 
–  Clarifying the supervision mechanisms. The new Decision will specify the following: (i) formally, 
MFSP’ supervision is the responsibility of the director of DCE; (ii) MFSP management unit will 
hold periodic dialogue (each trimester) with the Director of DEC the performance of the DCE 
agencies (MFU, CIS and CICB) supported by the program; copy of the report on the outcome of 
the dialogue will be shared with IFAD and all members of the NMFC;  (iii) the director of DCE 
may formulate and submit comments to MFSP with copy to IFAD and members of NMFC; (iv) 
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the director of DCE may submit the MFSP management unit to a financial and/or technical 
audit; the director will seek IFAD’s agreement, through a notification letter explaining the 
motives.   
Clarifying the relationship between MFSP and supported enabling agencies
The following proposals have also been agreed upon, with the director of DEC: 
–  MFSP will keep MFU, CIS and CICB accountable. For that purpose, the directors of these DEC 
agencies will fulfil their contractual obligations vis-à-vis the MFSP management unit. 
–  Therefore, the director of DEC will not delegate his supervisory authority to any of these 
agencies.
16.6  Conclusions on MANGO development 
This case study was a good opportunity to apply MANGO in full, analyzing and re-designing 
a program in all its aspects and detail. With that, the case study had a broad power of proof 
of the MANGO structures and concepts: the results analysis, and mapping and analysis of the 
action arenas, to explain the results. In analyzing the action arenas, analyzing the sharing of 
roles among the actors, their individual capacity to perform their roles, and their relationships 
has helped in unraveling the problematic of this development situation, and help the concerned 
actors understand the causalities. Maybe most importantly, the case study confirmed the 
usefulness of the normative approach presented in Section 9.1. On a more detailed level, the 
case study helped to confirm the usefulness of mapping a development situation as human 
activity system, of which we can develop a normative (ideal) model that can be compared with 
the current reality, to propose system upgrading solutions. It also helped improve my practice 
with regard to mapping systems results and the action arenas that generate these results. 
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12  The agency in charge of providing regular administrative support and periodic technical 
supervision to the project, on behalf of IFAD
Case Study 4 – Explaining a failure in 
the delivery of micro-finance services 
to the rural poor in Niger 
Introduction
In 2006, I was assigned by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) to 
participate as institutional analyst in the final evaluation of the first cycle of the Rural Finance 
Services Development Project (RFSDP) in Niger. The evaluation mission was led by the IFAD’s 
Country Portfolio Manager for Niger, and the team included a Rural Finance Specialist, a Project 
Support Officer from the United Nations Office for Projects Services (UNOPS12) and myself. 
The team visited Niger from 21 November to 5 December 2006. Previous to our mission, an 
assessment of the project was performed from 21 March to 05 April 2005, which had concluded 
that the project was encountering challenges and might not achieve its results (FIDA, 2005). 
Therefore, my role within the team was to identify and explain the factors that underlined the 
lack of results. In this chapter, Section 17.1 presents the context of the study. In Section 17.2, I 
show how in a normative perspective, MANGO was used to redesign the project. Section 
17.3 presents how the normative approach was used to analyze and explain the factors that 
explain the poor performance of the project and Section 17.4 summarizes the conclusions and 
recommendations of the evaluation. Finally, in Section 17.5, I conclude on how the Case Study 
informed the development of MANGO. 
17.1  The study context 
Overview on the Rural Finance Sector Development Project    
The RFSDP had been launched by the Government of Niger in 2001, with the financial support 
of IFAD and AFD (Agence Française de Développement), for an estimated cost of 27 USD million. 
The aim was formulated as: “to support the micro finance sector, specifically the micro finance 
institutions (MFI), in order to ensure the provision of adequate finance services to the rural poor 
excluded from the traditional banking system”. It is important to mention that two other donors 
(the World Bank and the German Cooperation) did not fulfil their initial commitment to finance 
the project. The RFSDP consisted of four components: Component 1 – Contributing to creating 
an enabling environment; Component 2 – Research Development; Component 3 – Strengthening 
Micro finance Institutions; and Component 4 – Project Management. The implementation was 
the responsibility of a program management unit composed of two (contractual) staff, the 
program manager and an administrative and financial manager, assisted by an accountant, a 
secretary, a driver/logistician and a custodian. The execution was planned for a total of 10 years, 
divided into three cycles of respectively 4, 3 and 3 years. The passage from one cycle to the next 
was conditional to meeting 15 passing criteria (Table 5). The first 4 year-cycle ended on 31 May 
2005, with only 60% of the passing criteria met, with 49% of the budget spent. Given the poor 
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results achieved, it was decided to extend the cycle by 19 months, until 31 December 2006. It was 
also recommended that during this extension period, the project would focus on supporting 
four major MFIs (MCPEC, UMEC, KOKARI and TAANADI).  
Evaluation mission objectives
In consultation with the Government, IFAD assigned the following three objectives to the 
evaluation mission: (i) to assess the overall performance of the project; (ii) to determine whether 
it meets the passing criteria for the second cycle; and (iii) to formulate recommendations and 
concrete proposals for the continuation or discontinuation of the program.
Table 3: the 15 criteria
 Passing criteria
1 The micro finance policy letter is drafted and updated, in consultation with sector partners
2 The micro finance institutions involved in the project are effectively controlled
3  The Micro finance institutions association is operational and fulfils its mandate as the auto-regulator 
of the profession
4 Proposals for enhancing the sector regulation are developed in consultation with sector stakeholders
5 Two performance-contracts are signed with micro finance institutions
6  Supported micro finance institutions have enhanced their internal organizational setting, prepared a 
business plan, and satisfactorily passed the control sessions    
7  The technologies and products available for the delivery of rural finance services to the target 
population are disseminated
8  New rural finance technologies and products meeting the needs of the rural poor (specifically 
farmers), are tested and validated 
9  Approach and criteria to measure the impact of the development research activities are developed 
and implemented 
10 Micro finance institutions’ participation in development research activities is effective. 
11 The operational procedures manual is implemented
12 The mechanisms for allocating financing resources to project partners are clarified
13 Following the disengagement of some donors, the budget is revised to implement priority activities
14 Contracts with partners are properly administered
15 A monitoring and evaluation system amenable for measuring the project impacts is operational
Study objectives
When he contacted me, the team leader clearly notified that the assignment was a 
troubleshooting mission. Given the poor results of the project so far, IFAD would continue 
supporting the second cycle of the project, only if we would understand and develop relevant 
proposals to correct the institutional factors that hindered delivery. So, before the MANGO 
mission started, it was already clear that, having failed on half of the 15 criteria presented in 
Table 3 even after extension, a continuation of the project in the present format was not 
logical. In fact, the previous evaluations had already revealed, albeit implicitly, that the project 
failure was not due to operational management failures but that the problem lied deeper, in 
Chapter 17 203
the very design of the project. Therefore, in terms of the approaches and questions discussed 
in Section 9.1 (empirical and/or normative approach; descriptive, explanatory, evaluative and 
design questions), the goal of the mission was not so much descriptive (how is the project 
doing?) or evaluative (is the performance good in the light of certain external criteria?), but 
rather explanatory (why did it fail?) and normative (could it be improved in a new design?). I saw 
this challenge as a good opportunity to test MANGO and develop it further. In that regard, my 
specific objective, as institutional analyst, was to help the evaluation team identify, analyze and 
explain those factors that were hindering the performance of the project, in order to inform the 
recommendations of the evaluation, using MANGO.     
The study approach
At the mission’s starting meeting, I agreed with the team leader and team members, that I 
would not be in charge of evaluating a specific component. Rather I would work with all team 
members to: firstly, contribute to assessing the project performance; and secondly, help them 
analyze and explain the assessed results, using resources from MANGO. I explained that, for 
that purpose, we would use a methodological model that considers the RFSDP as a purposeful 
human activity system. By analyzing the system, we would be able to explain the causing 
factors of the results that the evaluation will find, and therefore inform the recommendation for 
IFAD to support or not the second project cycle. I was then asked to make a short presentation 
of MANGO. My colleagues found the whole approach interesting and understood the potential 
of the framework. After responding to their questions, I provided them with a handout on the 
three components of a human activity system, the institutional triangle, the results-focused 
analysis and mapping and analyzing action arenas. During our field visits, team work and 
informal events, I continued discussing those MANGO tools and approaches, which they found 
logic and easy to understand. This helped in conducting joint analyses, valorizing the technical 
contributions from my colleagues.  
17.2  MANGO-based model of RFSDP 
Discussing the expressed problem 
In this case study, the expressed problem is located in the results component. In the terms of 
reference of our mission, IFAD had raised concern with regard to the poor results of the project so 
far, with only 60% of the passing criteria met and only 49% of the budget spent. 
It can be noted that from the users’ perspective, among the 15 criteria, only numbers 8 and 
10 can be qualified as delivery results. All the other triggers are governance results, and none of 
them concerns the livelihood outcome results of the rural poor. This raised two critical issues: 
(1) What delivery results should be generated for which categories of the rural poor? Consulting 
the project formulation report, the team found that (i) the livelihood outcome of the rural poor 
was rightly defined as the revenues they generate by consuming and transforming rural finance 
products, and that they use to improve their wellbeing; (ii) the document stated that the rural 
finance services offered by MFIs do not match the needs of the rural poor, but (iii) the description 
of both the supply and demand was rather broad and no indicator was defined to measure 
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these delivery results. (2) If the 15 criteria would have been met, would the people’s outcome 
results have been achieved? In other terms, would the IMFs have delivered the required rural 
finance products to the rural poor, and would these people have successfully consumed and 
transformed these services, to increase their revenue? 
The team agreed that dealing with these issues amounted to finding out in which human activity 
system the RFSDP could efficiently deliver effective results.  Comparing the ideal system with 
the real one would enable the team to explain the results and inform its recommendations for 
IFAD and the Government of Niger. Thus, using MANGO, the team adopted a model representing 
the RFSDP system. Unsurprisingly, the model is quasi similar to that of MFSP presented in Case 
Study 3. The three components of the RFSDP system model are described, assessed and analyzed 
as presented below. 
The MANGO model of system results flow 
The team agreed on a causality chain consisting of nine results (figure 30). Starting from the 
end-users’ outcome results and moving backward, the nine results of the system model are: 
–  Result 1 – Increased revenue by the rural poor who consume and transform the rural financing 
services delivered into their activities. This is the end result of the RFSDP system, or the 
livelihood outcome of the end users. While RFSDP does not have any role to play, it should be 
monitoring and assessing the achievement. 
–  Result 2 – Quantity and quality rural finance products delivered by MFIs to the rural poor. 
This represents the delivery results or the effects of the RFSDP system. While it has no role to 
play, MFSP should be monitoring and assessing the achievement of this critical result, with 
indicators such as (i) the quantity and quality of micro finance products delivered to specific 
categories (farmers, herders, small, medium and big, women, youth, people developing 
non-farm income generating activities…) of rural poor; (ii) the level of consumption of these 
products by the beneficiaries (which would reflect the adequacy of the services to their 
needs).
–  Result 3 – Performing MFIs, operating in a conducive context. This result is achieved through 
the combination of Results 8, 7, 6 and 5. Here as well, while RFSDP does not have any role to 
play, it should be active in monitoring and assessing the achievement. 
–  Result 4 – Strengthened MFIs with enhanced organizational, operational, and financial 
capacity. This result is owned by the supported MFIs that are expected to convert RFSDP’ 
support into enhanced professional state.  
–  Result 5 – Innovative rural finance products developed and transferred to MFIs. Knowledge 
on what products for what categories of the rural poor and how to deliver these products is 
developed and disseminated, by research development agencies, with RFSDP’ support. 
–  Result 6 – Effectively enforced sector policy and regulation. MFIs must be regularly inspected, 
and sanctions against defaulting institutions must be implemented. This is the result of the 
Rural Finance Unit (RFU) of the Ministry of Finance, the agency in charge of enforcing the 
sector policy and regulation, and that should have been strengthened under Result 1. It is 
important to mention that, while RFSDP does not have any role to play in generating this 
result, it should be active in monitoring and assessing its achievement.  
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Figure 30: The chain of results
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–  Result 7 – Improved policy and legal context. This includes new sector policy and regulation 
documents, but also enhanced capacity for effective sector policy and regulation 
enforcement. These outputs should be generated by enabling agencies, specifically, the Rural 
Finance Unit (RFU) of the Ministry of Finance, with MFSP’ support. 
–  Result 8 – The efficiency of the RFSDP as an internal system actor tasked to enhance the 
system within a period of time. 
–  Result 9 – The equity, efficiency and stability of the whole micro finance sector. 
In examining the chains of causality, the team noted that neither the original project design nor 
the 15 passing criteria included indicators required to monitor and measure the achievement of 
Results 1 and 2, which are end-users focused. This explains the fact that the RFSDP management 
unit could not keep the supported MFIs accountable.  
 The MANGO model of the RFSDP system arenas
Following the chain of results, the team developed a model presenting the RFSDP human activity 
system as composed of seven action arenas (figure 31): 
–  Arena A – Delivering quality and quantity rural finance products to the rural poor, leading to 
Results 2 and 1. 
–  Arena B – Enabling MFIs, is a combination of arena F, E, D and C, leading to Result 3; 
–  Arena C – Supporting MFIs, generating Result 4 
–  Arena D – Developing innovative rural finance products, generating Result 5. 
–  Arena E – Enforcing sector policy and regulation, generating Result 6. 
–  Arena F – Enhancing the policy and legal context, generating Result 7. 
–  Arena G – Managing the project implementation, generating Result 8. This arena supports all 
the other 6 arenas. 
The team noted that Arena F and E identify with project component 1, but agreed that it is 
worth to separate them, considering that Arena E will function independently from the RFSDP. 
Arena D identifies with project component 2 and Arena C with project component 3. Arena B 
was not captured, and Arena A was foreseen as something the project should not pay attention 
to, during the implementation time, as the delivery and results were planned to be measured 
during impacts study, years after the end of the project. Then, the team reviewed the activities 
that were supposed to be implemented under each of these arenas. 
Arena F – Enhancing the policy and legal context. This arena consists of the following activities: 
Policy dialogue - The project management unit would support a policy dialogue involving all 
sector stakeholders and yielding two outputs: (i) a rural finance sector policy letter; (ii) proposals 
for enhancing the regulatory framework. Activities would be studies to draft the policy letter 
and the regulation, workshops and meetings where actor consultations take place.    
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Figure 31: Conceptual Model of the RFSDP System
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Support to enabling agencies. These include the Micro Finance Unit (MFU) of the Ministry of 
Finance, the Rural Finance Cell (RFC) of the Ministry of rural development, and the National Rural 
Finance Committee (NRFC). MFU’s mandates would include to: (i) enforce the implementation 
of the national micro finance policy and regulation, including by performing the regular control 
of MFIs’ activities; and (ii) coordinate foreign supports to the sector. NRFC’s role is to harmonize 
and coordinate donor financed project interventions in the field of rural finance. The NRFC which 
is composed by representatives from all stakeholders is in charge of overseeing the development 
of the sector. The RFSDP would strengthen the capacity of these agencies through provision of 
equipment, financial support and training of the staffs. The expected output was MFU, RFC and 
NRFC with enhanced capacity and better performing.
Support to the setting-up and operation of the National Association of Micro Finance Institutions 
(NAMFI) in charge of defending members’ interest, maintaining the dialogue with the State, and 
performing auto-regulation in order to promote internal discipline. The RFSDP’s role would also 
consist of: firstly, support the establishment of the NAMFI; and secondly build the capacity of 
the agency, through provision of equipment and training of staffs. The expected output would 
be NAMFI with enhanced capacity and better performing. 
Arena E – Enforcing the sector policy and regulation – Basically this arena would consist of the 
Micro Finance Unit (that capacity has been strengthened under Arena F) performing regular 
control of MFIs operating in the field. The RFSDP’s activities would consist of monitoring MFU’s 
performance, with regard to its inspection and overall surveillance activities, and keep the 
dialogue with Government in that regard. 
Arena D – Developing innovative rural finance products. The RFSDP’s role would be to: (i) sign 
contract with research development agencies, indicating clearly what result they are expected 
to deliver as well as their reporting obligations, and (ii) monitor and assess their delivery.  
Arena C – Supporting Micro finance Institutions – The RFSDP’ support to MFIs would include: (i) 
technical assistance to improve internal organization as well as their operation (management 
tools and practices); (ii) training of managers, and member of credit and surveillance 
committees; (iii) equipment (computers, printers…); (iv) financial support for expansion (new 
branches) in rural areas; and (v) setting aside a guarantee fund in order to incentivize the banks 
in refinancing MFIs. The RFSDP management unit should proceed by (i) signing performance 
contract with supported MFIs, specifying what results they should achieve, as well as their 
reporting obligation; and (ii) monitoring and assessing the results they achieve.    
Arena B – Enabling MFIs is a ‘virtual’ arena that combines the result of Arenas F, E, D, and C to 
generate Result 3. The interest of this arena lays in the fact that this result is critical for the 
achievement of the project’s outcome results. Therefore, the RFSDP’s activity here would consist 
of checking if the institutional context is conducive for the supported MFIs, and if they are 
effectively operational.   
Arena A - Delivering Micro Finance Services - MFIs are the key players here, as they should be 
in the capacity of delivering quality and quantity rural finance products to the rural poor. For 
that purpose, they have been strengthened by the project (under Arena C), and they should 
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be enjoying operating in a more conducive institutional environment. Should this arena have 
been planned in the original project design, the RFSDP’s role would be to monitor the level of 
delivery by supported MFIs, but also the effective use of the delivered products by end users, 
as well as the increased revenue they thus generate. Indeed, in the context of the rural areas in 
Niger, this transformation process takes place in six to twelve months, maximum. That time 
span is enough for beneficiaries developing farm and non-farm activities, to convert a loan into 
revenue. Unfortunately, the project designers considered that these effects and impacts would 
take place only years after the end of the project. Therefore, the RFSDP management unit was 
not in charge of keeping supported MFIs accountable.  
Arena G – Managing Project Implementation. This arena would be in charge of ensuring an 
effective and efficient implementation of project activities. The project management unit 
would consist of a light team composed by a coordinator, a rural finance specialist, a financial 
management specialist, and a monitoring and evaluation specialist. The RFSDP management 
unit would be in charge of: (i) signing contract with public and private service providers to 
deliver technical assistance to beneficiary agencies (governmental agencies and MFIs), organize 
trainings, prepare new regulation and policy documents, organize consultation workshops…; (ii) 
managing project resources (government and foreign); and (iii) monitor and report on project 
activities. A Steering Committee chaired by a representative by the Ministry of Finance and 
including representatives from other public and private actors of the sector, would be in charge 
of overseeing the whole implementation. 
Re-mapping the institutional context
The original project design report (IFAD, 1999), stated that there was a need to enhance the policy 
and regulatory framework and to strengthen government’s capacity to enforce sector policy and 
regulation. However, the team performed a re-mapping of the institutional context in order to 
better understand the context and to identify some key features of this context that might not 
have been considered in the original project design. 
Sector Policy – Niger did not have a proper policy document presenting a strategy for the 
development of the rural finance sector. Rural finance issues were only covered in the document 
entitled ‘Guidelines for rural development policy’ published by Government in 1992. This overall 
rural development policy document recognizes the importance of promoting a network of MFIs 
that will deliver rural finance services meeting the needs of the various categories of rural poor. 
Therefore, RFSDP was tasked to help Government develop a full rural finance sector policy. 
Regulatory framework – The legal framework on rural finance systems is far beyond the 
banking act. It has been promulgated by the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) in 1993 and adopted by the Government of Niger in 1996. It includes: (i) the PARMEC 
law that regulates the operation of Micro Finance Institutions, with the statute of cooperative; 
(ii) and a framework agreement signed by the Ministry of Finance with non-cooperative MFIs. 
While, the RFSDP is tasked to support in enhancing the legal framework, the original project 
design report did not state the critical issues for a reform. 
The Rural Finance Unit of the Ministry of Finance appeared to be a key agency, given its 
enabling functions: (i) deliver operation license to MFIs; (ii) ensure the surveillance of MFIs, by 
performing periodic document-based control, and on-the-site inspections; (iii) disseminate the 
sector regulation; (iv) incentivize licensed MFIs; and (v) collect and manage sector information. 
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Unfortunately, due to lack of capacity, the performance of the RFU was described as poor. 
Strengthening the capacity of the unit was a critical task for the RFSDP, but the original project 
report did not clarify which capacity areas should be strengthened. 
Micro finance Institutions are also key players in the sector. In total 167 MFIs were counted, 
including 119 cooperative MFIs, about 40 development projects with rural finance services 
component, other informal institutions. While their activities are increasing in the field, only 72 
of these MFIs were licensed, and 3 signed a framework agreement with the Ministry of Finance. 
It was also noted that about 80% of the delivery is performed by the 7 biggest MFIs. Only 3% of 
the rural poor had access to rural finance services. Given the low density of the rural population 
elsewhere, most MFIs were operating in the populated southern part of the country.
Risk-sharing and MFIs refinancing tools – These are critical instruments in making the 
institutional context conducive for MFIs and beneficiaries. Unfortunately, there was no 
incentive for commercial banks to invest in the rural sector, and MFIs were facing challenges to 
get refinanced. Only SONIBANK was implementing some refinancing funds provided by some 
development projects, and a risk-sharing fund provided by the USAID.  
After the having mapped the RFSDP system, the team proceeded with assessing its performance 
and identifying the explanatory factors. For the performance assessment, team members used 
their own methodology, and together, the approach proposed by MANGO for analyzing action 
arenas was used to identify and describe the factors that explain these performances. 
17.3  Explaining the performance of RFSDP
The MANGO team was now set to provide explanations for the poor performance of the project 
as it had been formulated and implemented, including against the 15 criteria presented in Table 
3. We successively focused on component 1 (contributing to creating enabling environment), 
2 (development research), and 3 (strengthening micro finance institutions). In order to have 
enough detail, we first re-assessed the performance, then moved to explanatory factors.  
Assessing and analyzing the performance of component 1 – Contributing 
to creating an enabling environment
This component was analyzed through Action Arena F – Enhancing the policy and legal context, 
and Action Arena E – Enforcing sector policy and regulation. 
Assessing the performance of Arena F – Enhancing the policy and legal context
The mission found that:
–  After a long process, a new national micro finance strategy document was prepared, validated 
by sector stakeholders, and adopted by a Governmental decree. Unfortunately, three years 
after its adoption, the implementation was still pending. 
–  The regulatory framework had not evolved, though some proposals have been developed. 
–  The capacity of the Rural Finance Unit had been strengthened (computer and communication 
equipment, training of inspectors, vehicles for inspection missions in the field, financial 
assistance to cover inspection missions and other administrative charges…)
–  The Ministry of finance had prepared a decree aiming at transforming the RFU into a full 
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sector regulation agency. Unfortunately, the adoption of this decree was pending. 
–  The MFSP also provided some support (office and communication equipment) to the Rural 
Finance Cell (RFC) of the Ministry of Rural Development.
–  The National Association of Micro Finance Institutions (NAMFI) was set up with MFSP support. 
In addition, the RFSDP provided financial assistance for the implementation of the NAMFI’s 
business plan, through a performance contract. 
Assessing the performance of Arena E – Enforcing the sector policy and regulation 
–  Despite the support received from the RFSDP, the performance of the Micro Finance Unit was 
rated as poor. All sector stakeholders deplored the lack of result with regard to inspecting 
MFIs. In 2005, only 14 institutions were inspected, out of 117 licensed. Moreover, the main 
penalties (for example criminal sanctions, withdrawal of license) have never been applied to 
defaulting MFIs. 
–  Likewise, the Rural Finance Cell of Ministry of Rural Development has not been effective in 
harmonizing and monitoring projects’ interventions in the field of rural finance. 
–  According to MFI managers, though it has adopted a code of ethic, the National Association of 
Micro Finance Institutions was still not effective in promoting discipline and auto-regulation. 
Moreover, because MFIs don’t trust the organization, their contribution to the budget has 
decreased from 20% in 2003 to 17% in 2004. Therefore, NAMFI depends heavily on donor 
subsidies. 
The efficacy of the whole component
Overall the mission found that, the results of this component, measured by the progress made 
in meeting the triggers for the second phase were mixed:
–  The national micro finance strategy validated in 2001 was finally adopted in March 2004 
thanks to the support of the project, but the document does not specify which operational 
mechanisms (organizational, regulatory, technical, financial) should be set up for its 
implementation;
–  MFIs involved in the project are not controlled effectively and there is still no overall sector 
control mechanism;
–  The NAMFI is malfunctioning, though it managed to offer some training services to its 
members and adopted a professional code of ethics; the organization remains dependent on 
external subsidies;
–  Micro finance stakeholders have developed some proposals for the improvement of the 
regulatory framework, but the follow-up depends on a regional (West Africa) processes out 
their control. 
–  Government (Ministry of Finance) has not fully met the expectations on the reorganization 
and professionalization of the sector.
Explaining the poor performance of the component  
The team flagged the following institutional explanatory factors: 
–  Poorly defined indicators – Indicators to measure the achievement of this component’s 
results were not well formulated. For example, it was not clear what capacity should the MFU 
acquire to perform its mandate with regard to MFIs’ control. Likewise, it was not clear what 
problematic issues should the policy document and the new regulation deal with.    
212 Part D
–  Lack of implementation mechanisms in the strategy document – The main reason why the 
national micro finance strategy was still not implemented three years after its adoption is that 
the document did not include the operational mechanisms required for its implementation. 
–  Low RFSDP capacity to support a policy process – The RFSDP management unit was not 
technically equipped to help the Government prepare a policy document that meets the 
criteria required to make it implementable. 
–  In general, the ability of the key agencies supported, to perform their mandates was not well 
evaluated – Obviously, the MFU did not have the capacity (human, technical, material and 
financial) required to ensure regular inspections over the wide Nigerien territory. Moreover, 
MFU was not empowered to enforce the application of sanctions against defaulting MFIs. 
Likewise, the organizational (structure) and operational capacity required for the NAMFI to 
be effective were poorly estimated. Because the organization was under-sized, despite the 
project’ support, it was not able to fulfill its mandate, specifically with regard to promoting 
auto-discipline. The same remarks apply for the RFC of the Ministry of Rural Development. 
These enabling agencies did not have the required levers to be operational. Hence they could 
not effectively convert the RFSDP’ support into the expected outputs.
–  Lack of accountability mechanisms – The responsibility of state agencies was not clearly 
engaged.  The RFSDP had no legal means to keep ministerial agencies such as the Micro 
Finance Unit of the Ministry of Finance or the Rural Finance Cell of the Ministry of Rural 
Development accountable. Obviously, the importance of Government’s political will was 
underestimated in the project design
–  In conclusion, poor component design – The component was poorly designed. The results to 
generate were not sufficiently characterized with a clear definition of the indicators. The 
actors involved, lacked the capacity (human, technical, material and financial) and powers 
required to perform their mandate.  
Assessing and analyzing the performance of Component 2 – Development 
research 
This component was analyzed through Arena D - Developing innovative rural finance products. 
Assessing the performance of Arena D – Developing innovative rural finance products
The ream agreed on the findings below: 
–  Six development research studies were planned. Only the study on resource mobilization by 
MFIs in Niger was finalized however. None of the topics on innovative rural finance services 
(i.e. warehouse receipt, herders financing, financing women income generating activities) 
was completed. 
–  It was also agreed to develop a Project Monitoring and Evaluation System under this 
component, and for that purpose, a contract was signed with a development research agency. 
The study on the project’s baseline was delivered only in November 2006, i.e. 5 years after 
the starting date. The database for monitoring the supported MFIs was created with a great 
delay. Moreover, little progress has been made in supporting MFIs for the establishment of 
an internal management information system (MIS) that includes monitoring and evaluation. 
Finally, no study had been performed to assess the impacts of the project. 
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Explaining the poor performance of the component  
The RFSDP signed contracts with selected operators in charge of conducting development 
research on 6 themes. The following institutional factors explain the poor results yielded: 
–  A delivery setting involving many players with a complex sharing of role – The examination of 
the terms of reference and the contacts, showed a very problematic delivery arena. Many 
players are engaged: (i) a research development agency as operator to carry-out the research; 
(ii) a working group to steer the work of the operator; (iii) another specialized agency to 
supervise the operator, by providing methodological support and follow up; (iv) students 
who are financed to take part to the research, but whose first interest is their thesis; and (v) 
MFIs that should participate. The contracts were evasive on the roles and relationship among 
these players, and it was difficult for the RFSDP management unit to determine who was 
responsible for what. 
–  Focus on activities and not on results – Again, disbursements were triggered by activity and 
financial reports, and not by the measurement of indicators showing the progress toward 
the delivery of the expected product. For example, the agreement with TERA - CIRAD did not 
specify the different products to be delivered by the service provider during the 3-year period 
of the contract, while payments are provided on an annual basis, and only on presentation of 
expenditures.
Assessing and analyzing the performance of Component 3 – Strengthening 
micro finance institutions
The team analyzed Arena C – Supporting Micro Finance Institutions that generates the results of 
this component. In addition, the team examined the Arenas B and A that were not foreseen by 
the project design.    
Assessing the performance of Arena C – Supporting Micro Finance Institutions 
The main findings are: 
–  In total, only four MFIs were supported by the project, and their performances were mixed. 
–  Because it was not planned in the project design, no guarantee fund has been set-up to share 
the risks with the Banks in refinancing MFIs. 
–  Among the four supported MFIs, two cooperative MFIs (SICR KOKARI and TAANADI) showed a 
positive trend with regard to financial autonomy and viability. They were increasingly engaging 
their own resources in delivering credit to beneficiaries organized in groups. The access 
to credit is not conditioned to prior savings or to a minimum period of membership in the 
structure. With regular and proximity monitoring activities performed by field agents, these 
institutions have become very familiar with the beneficiaries’ groups and the repayment rates 
(95 to 98%) were satisfactory. Their operating costs are lighter because, they don’t manage 
savings. The team acknowledged the increasing professionalism of the two MFIs. However, the 
team noted that their growth is slowed by the lack of refinancing. Indeed, because of the lack 
of risk sharing measure (guarantee fund), and because of the poor capacity of Government to 
regularly inspect MFIs and enforce the implementation of sanctions the traditional banking 
sector remained timid in investing in the refinancing of these two cooperatives. 
–  Unfortunately, the two other supported MFIs, the MCPEC and UMEC networks experienced 
a sharp deterioration of their situation. They heavily depended on donor support, and the 
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project that financed a significant part of their budgets withdrew its support. The loan 
delivered by these institutions is proportional to savings deposits and conditioned by a 
minimum period of membership. However, many adherents got discouraged because they 
have deposited their savings in the hope of credit, which they still had not received after 
the required period of membership. In addition, because they are elected, the members of 
the credit and monitoring committees were not free to make decision based on technical 
criteria. This results in a low rate of recovery. The mission also found that the apex bodies 
in these two networks were facing critical financial and organizational challenges and were 
not successfully performing their mandates with regard to strengthening the organizational, 
operational and financial capabilities to its members. As a result, seven UMEC members in 
the Tawa region were planning to leave the union. 
Examining the result of the ‘virtual’ Arena B – Enabling MFIs 
The results expected from Arena F, E, D and C were supposed to combine to generate this ‘virtual’ 
arena’s result, i.e. Result 3 – ‘performing MFIs operating in a conducive institutional context’. 
Unfortunately, the causal results 7, 6, 5 and 4 were poorly achieved. In summary, the improvement 
of the regulatory and policy frameworks was not effective (Result 7), and the performance with 
regard to inspecting MFIs and enforcing sanction against defaulting institutions was poor 
(Result 6); the innovative rural finance products meeting the needs of the rural poor have not 
been developed and disseminated (Result 5); only 4 IMFs were finally supported, and only two 
of these were growing, but slowly (Result 4). In fact, RFSDP did not make any positive difference 
for the 4 supported MFIs. But this does not mean that the enabling role of the public sector is 
not important or cannot be effective. Should RFSP have been better designed, it is likely that 
it would have been more effective in enabling MFIs. The two cooperatives would have grown 
faster, the other two supported MFIs would have been effective in delivering to the rural poor. 
The team recalled that, should this arena have been foreseen, the RFSDP would have been 
empowered to: (i) maintain dialogue with Government and sector stakeholders with regard to 
the progress achieved in rendering the institutional context more conducive; a roadmap with 
clear indicators and deadlines would have been defined, agreed upon, and periodically updated; 
and (ii) monitor the progress achieved by MFIs, with regard to their organizational, operational 
and financial capacity.     
The team concluded that the project failed in achieving Result 3 that was critical for achieving 
the project’s end result.  
Examining the results of the unforeseen Arena A  
Here, the evaluation team focused on examining whether the supported MFIs were able to 
deliver effectively quantity and quality rural finance products to the rural poor (Result 2). 
Unfortunately, this result has not been a concern during project implementation, and the RFSDP 
was not equipped to produce any evidence to the MANGO team. However, given that the Result 
3 that determines this result was rated as a failure, the team concluded that because of its poor 
design, the RFSDP has not contributed to improve the delivery of quantity and quality of rural 
finance products to the rural poor. Should this arena have been foreseen and well designed, the 
RFSDP’s role would have been to keep supported MFIs accountable to both the users and the 
program. Indicators would have been defined to measure this delivery result. MFIs would have 
been asked to report not only on their capacity development activities and expenses, but also on 
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what they finally deliver to the people. Feedback mechanisms should have been set up to assess 
how the rural poor perceive and appreciate the services delivered by the supported MFIs. The 
RFSDP would have been equipped to at least encourage the best performing MFIs and/or review 
its support to the non-performing ones.
Explaining the performance of the component
The following institutional factors explain the poor performance of this component: 
–  The RFSDP’s support to MFIs was focused on activities and not on results. In the contracts 
between RFSDP and MFIs, activities such as training of the staff or purchase of equipment 
were considered as the results for which the project pays. 
–  The RFSDP had no capacity to keep supported MFIs accountable – In addition to the lack of focus 
on the results, clear passing criteria showing the progress toward the achievement of these 
outputs, were not defined to trigger the MFSP’s disbursements. As a result, the program 
management unit blindly effectuated successive payments without any concern with regard 
to the true results.  
–  Likewise, the RFSDP had no capacity to keep service providers accountable for their delivery to 
MFIs. These service providers got paid for the activities (training, technical assistance) they 
perform and not for the impact of these activities on MFIs. For example, the mission noted 
a break in the transmission of knowledge between the apex bodies and the individual MFIs 
operating in the field. 
–  Supported MFIs lack the required financial capacity – The financial contribution expected from 
other donors has not been affective. Moreover, due to a non-conducive institutional context, 
traditional banks were not eager to refinance MFIs. 
–  Lack of concern for the effects and impacts during the life time of the project. In the project 
design, the rural finance products that supported MFIs will deliver to the rural poor, and the 
increased revenues generated by these end-users were to be measured by an impact study 
after the end of the project. Therefore, the Arena 6 was not planned, and as a result the 
program management unit was not equipped to care for these results during the life time 
of the project. The M&E system that proposes the indicators and approach to measure these 
results was adopted only at the very end of the project.
Overall, one could say, RFSDP had been designed as a toothless dole-out machine, seemingly in 
the hope that this would automatically improve system performance. The final recommendation 
of the MANGO-based analysis was to end the RFSDP’s intervention in its current form and 
to formulate a new operation that draw lessons from the weaknesses of the RFSDP design, 
specifically: (i) a clear definition of the chain of results, with clear indicators to monitor not only 
the activities, but also the achievement of the delivery results and the livelihood outcome of 
the rural poor; (ii) a design of project arenas that clarifies the role to be played by the key actors, 
ensures they will have the required capacities (organizational, technical, financial, legal…) and 
motivations, and ensures check and balances and accountability in their relationships; and (iii) 
the setting-up of a project management unit equipped to manage for results, and to hold an 
effective policy dialogue with Government and sector stakeholders. 
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17.4  Conclusions of the Case Study 
In this case study, because the evaluation mission was performed by a light team of 4 persons 
in short time (only 2 weeks in the field and 1 week for reporting), the stream of collective action 
process (prescribed by MANGO) consisted only of building consensus with the team leader and 
other team members on the approach and the conclusions of the analysis. Rather, the process 
relied heavily on the stream of technical analysis. Firstly, the results-focused analysis helped 
to quickly highlight the weaknesses in the project design regarding the characterization of the 
chain of results to be generated. This confirms the potential and power of the results- focused 
analysis as proposed by MANGO, as a tool to improve the development of results framework 
in a project formulation. Secondly, mapping and analyzing the RFSDP system’s action arenas 
has quickly and easily revealed that the institutional arrangements in place are not likely to 
bring about the desired results. In analyzing action arenas, the case study confirmed the power 
and potential of the institutional triangle as approach to detect the gaps in the institutional 
arrangements in place and to build new arrangements that better able to generate results 
expected. Thirdly, the case study confirmed the usefulness of a normative approach. Comparing 
the RFSDP system as designed and currently operating with a model of how it should have 
been designed and operating, helped understand and explain the problems. Overall, the test 
confirmed the potential for MANGO as a methodological approach to design governance 
systems that are more likely to generate the results that people expect. Finally, this Case Study 
helped confirm the MANGO’s way of mapping system results and arenas and drawing figures 
representing them. 
On a deeper level, the presence of the two MFIs that were making some progress in spite of 
very weak support from the Government and RFSDP could be interpreted as if micro-finance 
services to the poor can be delivered without the costly public system of ministries, projects, 
programs, check and balances, monitoring systems, international institutions. My personal 
opinion is that if the enabling functions of the public sector are not always necessary, they are 
critical in most development action situations where the delivery of goods and services to the 
vulnerable is weak, and where these end users’ capacity to convert these supply into wellbeing 
need to be strengthened. For example, in this Case Study, a guarantee fund would certainly have 
strengthened the two cooperatives who recorded some progress to mobilize more resources 
from commercial banks and deliver micro-finance services to a greater number of rural poor. 
Where such enabling results are necessary, the development challenge is how to design a public-
sector system that can deliver them efficiently. Designing such an efficient system, where 
public sector is focused on only its necessary enabling functions is the promise of MANGO. But 
as shown in Case Study 5, MANGO is also fit to help design more effective private sector-led 
systems. Basically, MANGO does this by tracing causality from the end-users outward.
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Case Study 5: MANGO for value  
chain development planning 
MANGO matured in various development situations (natural resources management, rural 
development and micro-finance). I remained curious if it would work elsewhere too and was 
therefore happy to get the opportunity to apply MANGO in the value chain sector, in several 
West African countries. The focus was on getting value chain actors to design the value chain 
as a governance system and to plan its development towards the achievement of specific 
objectives. In this Case Study I give a broad presentation of that exciting experience. Section 
19.1 presents the problem situation at the onset of the MANGO applications. Then, in Section 
19.2, I explain the processes of MANGO applications in the value chains sector. In section 19.3, 
I summarize the results achieved and illustrate these by presenting the participants’ opinions 
of the method. Section 19.4 is then focused on the MANGO application to support the design 
of value chain development plans for seven commodities in the Savannah Belt (covering seven 
States) in Nigeria. Finally, in Section 19.5, I conclude with my reflections on MANGO-based 
capacity building.   
18.1  The problem situation at the onset of MANGO applications   
In accordance with Neven (2015), an effective value chain is “the full range of farms and firms 
and their successive coordinated value-adding activities that produce particular raw agricultural 
materials and transform them into particular food products that are sold to final consumers and 
disposed of after use, in a manner that is profitable throughout, has broad-based benefits for 
society and does not permanently deplete natural resources”.  A value chain of peanut butter, for 
instance, starts out from farmers using a combination of inputs (certified seeds, fertilizer...) and 
services (mechanization, extension…) to grow peanut grains that are collected and delivered 
to a processing firm that produces and package the peanut butter, that is sold to wholesalers 
who distribute to retailers from who the consumers buy the product. In this value chain there 
are many other players such as bankers, transporters, insurers, packaging material suppliers 
and quality enforcement agencies, of which the roles are critical but often not that visible. 
In a poorly coordinated value chain, farmers might produce peanut grains that do not meet 
the quality standard required by the processor, or annual price fluctuation might represent a 
disincentive for them.
From the Government’s perspective, the question is how to promote value chain development. 
This question remains a challenge in many African countries where smallholder farmers 
represent the backbone of the agriculture production. From 2009 to 2011, all West-African 
countries prepared their national agriculture investment plan (NAIP), under the Comprehensive 
African Agriculture Development (CAADP) framework, an African Union initiative managed by 
the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD). All the prepared NAIPs included value 
chain development objectives, but during my missions to the countries, I noticed that until 2012, 
most countries were meeting many obstacles in implementation. Though many senior officers 
in the Ministries of agriculture attended trainings on value chains development, it was still not 
clear how to translate the acquired knowledge into an effective strategy, and these officers were 
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at a loss with what to do. To help facing that challenge, I got the opportunity to use MANGO 
in supporting value chain actors in designing value chain development plans in Benin, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Togo, between 2013 and 2017. I was curious whether MANGO application would work 
to produce a jump forward for the participants. 
In 2013, working as FAO investment support officer and in collaboration with World Bank 
financed projects in Benin and Togo and the FAO Country Office in Ghana, I performed several 
missions to the three countries to support the preparation of value chain development plans. 
In Benin, the process started in September 2013, when I supported the Ministry of Agriculture, 
prepare value chain development plans for 5 commodities (rice, cashew, fish, pine apple, and 
cereal seeds). The task was completed in August 2014. Later, the Ministry decided to launch the 
implementation, by promoting the development of fish clusters in the Southern part of the 
country. Then, from April to August 2015, I supported the Directorate of Fisheries in planning 
the development of 3 existing informal fish clusters. In Ghana, the process consisted of the 
preparation of value chain development plans for 8 commodities (rice, fish, maize, cassava, 
soy bean, tomato, poultry, pine apple), from May 2015 to May 2016. In Togo, I supported the 
preparation of value chain development plans for 5 commodities (rice, tomato, fish, seeds, and 
poultry) from May 2015 to October 2016. 
Likewise, in 2016 and 2017, I was tasked to support the IFAD financed Climate Change and 
Agribusiness Support Program (CASP) in the Savannah Belt in Nigeria, to apply MANGO in 
promoting value chain development. The decision to do a MANGO application in the Nigerian 
CASP resulted from a training on institutional analysis using the MANGO framework. Along with 
my IFAD colleague Norman Messer, I facilitated that training in October 2016. Participants were 
IFAD country office and IFAD financed project staff in Nigeria. In all four countries, the process 
was conducted by senior staff of the Ministries of Agriculture, project staff and consultants, and 
my task was just to provide training and supervision on using MANGO. From December 2016 to 
October 2017, I supported CASP in re-formulating the program’ strategy in support to 7 value 
chains (cowpea, groundnut, maize, millet, rice, sorghum, and wheat) in the seven States (Borno, 
Jigawa, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara) of the Savannah Belt. 
In all countries, the MANGO application consisted of 5 phases: 
(1)  The recruitment of one consultant to facilitate the MANGO process for each commodity 
value chain. In Nigeria and Ghana, a second consultant was also recruited as process 
coordinator, to facilitate the whole process and provide technical and logistical support 
to his colleagues. In Togo, in order to strengthen the capacity of civil servants with regard 
to value chain development, the Ministry of Agriculture appointed one officer as MANGO 
facilitator for each value chain, instead of recruiting external consultants. 
(2)  The second phase consisted of a 5 days training workshop on applying MANGO to prepare a 
value chain development plan. The workshop was attended by the consultants (to become 
MANGO facilitators), value chain actors, and officials from Government, Donor Agencies 
and development projects. During the first two days, participants were introduced to 
MANGO applied to value chains sector. Then, on days 3 and 4, they formed value chain 
groups, and each group simulated the MANGO application, which allowed them to identify: 
(i) the key value chain players and stakeholders to be consulted, the places to visit, as well as 
the information they needed to collect; and (ii) a road-map for the exercise, combining the 
stream of collective action and the stream of technical analyses. I attended to the queries 
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by the commodity working groups with regard to the practicalities of the methodological 
framework. On day 5, groups reported back to plenary. The focus was on further discussing 
the challenges they met and finding an answer to their questions, in order to make sure 
that they could successfully perform the MANGO application in the field. The plenary also 
discussed the road-map presented by each group. 
(3)  The third phase was the field application of MANGO, taking 4 to 6 weeks. The consultant, 
as MANGO facilitator, collected and processed technical information to inform a series of 
discussions between value chain actors, including Government officials. These discussions 
focused on: (i) value chain objectives for value chain actors and Government; (ii) how 
value chain actors would do business together to achieve those objectives; and (iii) what 
Government should do to render the business environment conducive and enable value 
chain actors to play their respective role effectively. During that phase, my role was to 
provide a remote support to the consultants and other players. I respond to their questions 
by E-mail, and sometimes a Skype conference was organized. National consultants were 
fully responsible to facilitate the MANGO process in the field.  
(4)  The fourth phase consisted of drafting the MANGO application report, i.e. the value chain 
plan. My experience of that phase was that, even when having done a good job in the field, 
the consultants (specifically the ones with the most experience), quickly moved back to 
business as usual, which meant presenting a very broad report that did not address the 
key governance issues, and rather presented a to-do list without clarification on how, by 
whom, with what resources, under what rules, for what benefits etc. – in short, dodging the 
very questions to which the MANGO process had been aimed at responding. Another issue 
was the delay in the submission of the reports. In Benin, Togo and Ghana, the new MANGO 
facilitators (consultants) had been asked to prepare their reports at home, but given the bad 
experience with the reports, in Nigeria we organized a 10-day writing retreat, which was very 
effective. During the retreat, assisted by an international consultant from Ghana, I worked 
with the national consultant – process coordinator, to support the MANGO facilitators 
(national consultants) in drafting their value chain plans (reports) in the MANGO way.  
(5)   The fifth phase was the validation workshop, followed by the finalization of the value 
chain plans. Participants examined the report, provided comments and suggestions, and 
validated it. Then, the MANGO facilitators incorporated these inputs and finalized the 
respective value chain plans. 
18.2  The MANGO approach to dealing with value chains 
As already explained, most participants in the value chain MANGO applications had attended 
one or more trainings on value chain, but they still felt confronted with the question of how 
to implement value chain development in practice. In fact, they continued see value chains 
as abstract structures. Out of that problem, MANGO proposed an innovative approach, which 
relied on the concept of ‘agricultural cluster’. An agricultural cluster is a locally connected set 
of value chain actors such as farmers, suppliers of goods and services, aggregators, processors, 
which relate to each other to generate a specific agricultural product delivered to the market. 
This ‘cluster’ image was felt as much less abstract, made up as it is of concrete actors with 
real connections. Moreover, the cluster is a governance system, therefore analyzable through 
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MANGO. From that conceptual discovery onwards, the MANGO approach to dealing with 
value chains was composed of three main aspects: (1) a value chain as a group of clusters; (2) 
by considering a cluster as a governance system we could use MANGO to map, analyze, and 
design an upgraded model of the system; and (3) moreover, we could identify the measures that 
enabling agencies should implement to promote the upgraded business models. 
The remainder of this section gives more detail on this approach.
A practical way of defining agricultural value chains: a group of 
agricultural clusters 
After visiting various definitions provided by my training participants, I lead them to agree 
on a simple and practical way of defining agricultural value chains. The key elements of the 
definition are: 
–  We think of a value chain as an ensemble of actors who relate to each other to produce, 
collect, group, process and deliver a specific agricultural product to a determined market. It is 
even more convenient to think of a value chain as composed by a group of similar units called 
agricultural clusters. Each cluster shares a geographical location and is composed of farmers, 
suppliers of goods and services, aggregators, processors, etc. that relate to each other to 
generate a specific agricultural product delivered to the market. The relationships between 
these actors are governed by a business model.
–  The business model describes the informal and/or formal business relationships between 
the actors of the cluster as well as the way they procure goods and services and market their 
product. 
–  A smallholder-inclusive business model is one that promotes smallholder farmers’ roles 
(usually raw material production and initial farm level processing) through fair business 
relationships between them and other actors of the cluster. In an inclusive business 
model, smallholder farmers have a secured access to the goods and services they need, in a 
commercially viable way. 
–  Moreover, we can think of each agricultural cluster as a purposeful human activity system or 
governance system, the operation of which is determined by its business model. 
–  By using MANGO, we can help concerned actors design upgraded business models to govern 
those clusters, and identify which measures enabling agencies should implement to support 
them. 
As a governance system, an agricultural cluster can be analyzed and 
designed through MANGO  
In using MANGO, we can conduct the analysis in the following areas: 
–  Analyzing the chain of cluster results 
–  The outcome results, i.e. the raw material, the byproducts and the marketable product, 
but also the revenues earned by smallholder farmers; 
–  The delivery results, specifically the goods and services that farmer and other cluster 
actors need, for the cluster to generate the expected outcomes;
–  The Governance results, specifically, yields and value addition (for system efficiency), the 
actors’ contribution to the value addition compared to their share of revenue (system 
equity).  
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–  Mapping the cluster arenas 
–  The delivery arenas that deliver the various goods and service that farmers and other 
actors need;
–  The enabling arenas that generate the factors of the institutional context affecting the 
operation of the cluster arenas.
–  Mapping the factors (policy, regulation, resource allocation…) of the institutional context that 
affect the operation of the cluster arenas
Finally, we can identify the list of policy measures to be implemented by enabling agencies 
(roughly, the government) to support value chain actors in developing the upgraded cluster 
models. Because the private sector (especially farmers) is responsible for most investment in 
agriculture, public resources committed to implement these policy measures should aim at 
leveraging private financing. The menu of policy measures aiming at boosting agricultural value 
chains includes: (i) smart subsidies; (ii) risk sharing facilities (agricultural insurance products; 
guarantee fund); (iii) fiscal measures; (iv) regulatory measures; (v) infrastructure development 
(production, transport and market); (vi) quality service measures; (vii) access to markets 
measures; (viii) trade oriented and macro-economic measures; etc. Other policy measures in 
promoting agriculture and rural development are nutrition and health assistance schemes, 
social protection schemes, sustainable use of natural resources schemes, rural economy 
diversification measures, etc.  
MANGO matrix for planning value chain development 
Based on the experiences gathered, the flow of the MANGO’s analysis to unravel a value chain 
as governance system and plan its development can be summarized as in Table 4. The content 
of this table also provides the annotated outline with the series of questions to answer for the 
design of a value chain development plan. Smallholder farmers are purposely placed at the 
center of the analysis. 
To answer these questions, the MANGO facilitator and value chain actors can use all 
elements of the MANGO framework they find convenient, but they are also requested to use 
all methodologies that can be helpful. In any case, they will perform the following activities: 
(i) literature review; (ii) field surveys; (iii) economic and financial analysis; and (iv) consultation 
meetings (collectively and individually) with various actor representatives, to discuss sector 
issues and explanatory factors, agree on upgrading issues, and on upgraded business model 
proposals.
 
Table 4: Applying MANGO to plan value chain development
Cluster locations and organization
Current geographic areas In what areas do the production and processing activities take 
place? 
What are the characteristics (ecological potentialities, infrastruc-
tures, others) of these areas?
Other potential areas for expansion What are the potential areas for expansion in the future? 
What are the characteristics of these areas?
What could be the main constraints for expansion? 
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Current formal or informal clusters How is the value chain organized, or what are the existing formal 
or informal clusters?  
Who are the cluster drivers? 
Mapping and analyzing the current cluster business models
The current results 
Overview of the commodity produc-
tion chain 
What is the commodity?
What are the different states of the product from raw material to 
marketable or processed products? Are there any by-product? 
End or processed products What are the characteristics of the end-products? 
What is the current level of production? 
What percentage of raw material is processed? 
What are the current results with regard to market access (quan-
tity, percentage of total production, where, price…) 
Raw material, intermediary products, 
and by-products 
What are the characteristics of the raw material?
What are the characteristics of the intermediary products (if 
applicable)?
What are the characteristics of the by-products (if applicable)?
What are the current levels of production?
What are the current results with regard to market access (quan-
tity, percentage of total production, where, price…)?
Market issues What are the critical issues with regard to market access? 
Characterization of producers (focus on smallholder farmers)
Farmer categories and farm size What are the categories of farmers involved in the production of 
the raw material?
What is the average size of their farm? 
Farmers’ livelihood objectives What are the livelihood objectives of farmers with regard to 
revenue and production?   
Technology and access to goods and 
services 
What technology are farmers using and what are their aspira-
tions for improvement? 
What goods and services (exhaustive list) do they use in their 
production?
What are the characteristics (quantity, quality, price, time and 
place of delivery…) of these goods and services? 
Which factors are hindering their access to these goods and 
services? 
What are their aspiration with regard to improved access to 
goods and services? 
Productivity What is the level of productivity achieved by smallholder farm-
ers?
Are there any productivity issue? 
Profitability What is the level of return on investment for smallholder 
farmers?  
Characterization of cluster drivers and other key players 
Categories and size of activity What other actors (input dealers, service providers, processors…) 
are playing a critical role in the value chain? 
What are their characteristics? What is the size of their activities?
Which actors can be promoted as cluster drivers?   
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Technology and access to goods and 
services
What technology are they using? 
What goods and services do they use?
What are the characteristics of these goods and services?  
What are their aspirations for improved technology and en-
hanced access to goods and services?
Value addition - profitability
Value addition What is the value addition at the whole system level?
What are the contributions from farmers and firms the value 
addition?
Profitability What are the revenues
How are revenues shared between farmers and firms
Equity issues What are the issues with regard contribution to value addition 
and sharing of revenues? 
Describing current business models 
Overall description What business models are currently there on the ground?
For each business model, which arenas generate the goods and 
services that producers and other key players need? 
What are the enabling arenas (regulation, standardization, 
quality control, etc.)? 
Analyzing current arenas For each delivery arena, what are the factors that prevent 
farmers or other actors to access the goods and services they 
need? 
What are the factors that are hindering the effectiveness of 
enabling arenas?   
Analyzing institutional contexts Which factors of the institutional context affects the operation 
of the various arenas? 
Concluding on system upgrading priorities
With regard to the product and 
market
What are the main upgrading priorities?
With regard to productivity and 
technology
What are the main upgrading priorities?
With regard to goods and services 
arenas
What are the main upgrading priorities?
With regard to enabling arenas What are the main upgrading priorities?
With regard to the factors of the 
institutional context
What are the main upgrading priorities?
The upgraded business models
New geographic coverage What are the old and new areas where the production and 
processing activities will take place? 
What are the characteristics (ecological potentialities, 
infrastructures, others) of these areas?
Formal clusters to be promoted How many clusters in which areas are to be promoted?  
Who are the cluster drivers? 
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The new objectives
The marketable product and mar-
ket objectives
What are the characteristics of the marketable product?
What are the characteristics of the targeted market? 
Raw material, intermediary prod-
ucts and by-products objectives
What are the characteristics of the raw material? 
What are the raw material production objectives? 
What are the characteristics of the intermediary products 
(if applicable)? 
What are the intermediary products production objectives 
(if applicable)? 
What are the characteristics of the by-products (if appli-
cable)? 
What are the by-products production objectives (if appli-
cable)? 
Farmers in the upgraded business model (Focus on smallholder famers)
Farmer categories and farm size What categories of farmers will be involved?
What are their characteristics and what will be the size of 
their farm?  
Farmers’ livelihood objectives What are the new livelihood objectives of these farmers?
Technology and access to goods 
and services
What improved technology will farmers use? 
What goods and services will they need? 
What are the characteristics (quantity, quality, price, time 
and delivery place) of these goods and services  
Productivity What is the new objective with regard to productivity for 
farmers? 
Profitability What is the return on investment for smallholder farmers 
in the new business model? 
Potential drivers and other actors in the upgraded model
Actors and size of activity Which actors will be promoted as cluster drivers?
What are their characteristics and what will be the size of 
their farm?
Which other actors play a critical role?
What are their characteristics and what will be the size of 
their activity  
Other actors, objectives What are the new objectives of these actors? 
Technology and access to goods 
and services
What improved technology will the cluster drivers or other 
actors use? 
What goods and services will they need? 
What are the characteristics (quantity, quality, price, time 
and delivery place) of these goods and services  
Productivity What is the new objective with regard to productivity, 
specifically for smallholder farmers?  
Profitability What is their return on investment in the new business 
model? 
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Describing the upgraded business models
Overall description of the improved 
business model
What business models will be promoted?
For each business model, which arenas will generate the 
goods and services that producers and other key players 
need? 
What will be the enabling arenas (regulation, standardiza-
tion, quality control, etc.)? 
Describing the improved arenas For each goods or services arena, describe how the players 
involved will relate to each other in order to generate the 
concerned goods and services. If need be, specify the 
rules of the game. 
For each enabling arenas, describe how the players in-
volved will relate to each other to generate the enabling 
result. If need be, specify the rules of the game. 
Describing improvement in the 
institutional context 
Describe the factors of the institutional context that will 
be improved to render the context more conducive.
Accompanying measures to be implemented by Government
Financing measures What risk-sharing measures (guarantee, insurance, others)? 
How? 
What subsidies? How? 
What fiscal incentives or disincentives? How? 
Infrastructure development What infrastructures will be developed in which areas? 
How and when? 
What are the characteristics of these infrastructures? 
Quality services How will government enhance the delivery of quality 
services (quality standard definition, quality control, 
building actors’ capacity to comply with quality require-
ments, etc.)?
Regulatory measures What regulatory measures will be implemented? To address 
what issue? What will be the enforcement mechanisms? 
Capacity building What support will be provided to strengthen the capacity 
of farmers, cluster drivers and other key players? How? 
What support will be provided to enhance value chain 
coordination capacity? How? 
Rhythm and Calendar
What will be the calendar for the promotion of the various 
clusters in various areas? 
Budget
What will be the budget? 
What is the contribution from central and local Govern-
ments? 
What are the expected investments from farmers, cluster 
drivers and other key players? 
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18.3  The field processes in the four countries 
The process in Benin 
The first application of MANGO in the value chain sector took place in Benin, and the process 
consisted of two phases. Phase 1 started in September 2013, when I supported the Ministry of 
Agriculture, to prepare value chain development plans for 5 commodities (rice, cashew, fish, 
pine apple, and cereal seeds). The task was completed in August 2014. The Fisheries Department 
(FD) was the first to commit to start the implementation by using MANGO to promote 3 existing 
informal clusters, and progressively apply the approach to developing other clusters. So, the 
second phase of the process took place from April to August 2015 and consisted of supporting 
stakeholders to plan the development of these 3 clusters, under the responsibility of FD. Both 
phases were financially supported by the World Bank financed Agricultural Diversification 
Support Project (ADSP). During the first phase, and second phase, ADSP recruited respectively, 
5 and 2 consultants as process facilitators. They worked in close collaboration with 4 staffs 
appointed by FD to follow the process. At the starting of the second phase, on the request of 
the Director of the Cabinet, I organized a shorter version of the training (1 full day) for all the 
directors of the Ministry of agriculture. Participants showed a particular interest to the idea of 
considering a value chain as a system that can be upgraded. There was also a vibrant discussion, 
on the policy measures Government could implement to promote smallholders inclusive and 
innovative business models. The main issues were: how can we adapt some of the existing 
policy measures (youth employment fund, micro-enterprise promotion facility…) to support 
agriculture? How can we convince Government in setting-up a wider range of innovative policy 
instruments? How can we prevent the mismanagement of such facilities? Even though the 
process could not provide answer to those questions, I felt it was good participants could raise 
them, which shows that the MANGO process has generated increased awareness of governance 
issues. However, it has not been easy to get the consultants presenting their reports on the 
MANGO way. They found it too demanding, and they kept asking for a model, which at that 
stage I could unfortunately not provide. 
Participants to the training workshop in Benin 
(September 2013)
A working-group ath the training workshop
in Benin (September 2013)
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The process in Ghana 
 
One interesting feature of the process in Ghana is the participation of university lecturers as 
consultant – MANGO facilitators. The preparation of value chain development plans for seven 
commodities (rice, fish, maize, cassava, soy bean, tomato, and poultry) took place from May 
2015 to May 2016. The FAO’s Ghana Country Office recruited 7 consultants (all lecturers) as 
commodity process facilitators, and 2 others as overall process facilitators. It is during the 
workshop in Ghana that participants contributed to refine the presentation of a value chain 
as a group of similar agricultural clusters. They also contributed to including value addition, 
and actors’ contribution to value addition into the economic and financial analysis. Moreover, 
participants discussed the idea of mainstreaming the policy implementation measures into 
the national agriculture investment plan. One of the lecturers also concluded on the need to 
improve one of their curricula in agriculture economics, using the content of MANGO. However, 
as was the case in Benin, consultants kept asking for a MANGO way of presenting their report, 
which I was not in capacity to provide. 
The process in Togo
In Togo, I supported the preparation of 
value chain development plans for 5 
commodities (rice, tomato, fish, seeds, 
and poultry) from May 2015 to October 
2016. The Ministry of Agriculture 
appointed senior officials to facilitate 
the MANGO process for each value 
chain. Here, probably because value 
chains were public sector driven since 
five decades, the discussion on private 
sector driven business models has 
been long and lively. While, some civil 
servants (including MANGO facilitators) 
resisted the idea of promoting private 
sector driven business models, most of the participants showed interest in understanding what 
Participants to the training workshop in Togo 
(May 2015)
Participants to the training workshop in Ghana (May 2015)
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a business model is and how to map an existing business model. They also wanted examples 
of innovative business models, and we made room to share information in that regard in order 
to nurture their inspiration. We also discussed action arenas at length, for participants to 
understand how to describe and present a chart of an action arena. In attempting to respond to 
their question, I developed the way I present action arenas in the charts of figures 33 to 39 – Case 
Study 5. Likewise, the discussion on the role of public sector took long. Participants wanted 
examples illustrating what measures Government could implement to promote agriculture 
mechanization, seeds industry, farmers and agribusinesses’ access to finance… However, due 
to the lack of motivation of civil servants, it has been challenging to deliver the reports on time 
and in the MANGO way.    
The Process in Nigeria
The process in Nigeria 
(December 2016 to September 
2017) was based on the lessons 
learned in Benin, Ghana and 
Togo. Three major innovations 
were brought in. Firstly, I 
developed the MANGO matrix 
for value chain planning 
presented in Table 4. The 
matrix shows what is expected 
from the whole MANGO 
process, and from each step. It 
also led participants to discuss 
what to do, what activities to 
perform, in order to fill the matrix, i.e. respond to the key questions. 
Secondly, the presentation on economic and financial analysis was based on software already 
used by the consultant team coordinator, a former banker. Thirdly, we decided to organize a 
writing retreat to support the consultants in drafting their report in the MANGO way, which 
was successful. In Nigeria some participants were dubious and some even showed resistance 
during the workshop, probably because they were not used to such a demanding approach and 
rigorous way of conducting an analysis and reporting on the findings. With my co-facilitator (an 
international consultant who attended the process in Ghana), it took us more efforts to loosen-
up the atmosphere, provide more explanations, and keep up the analytical quality. At the end 
of the training workshop, two of the consultants were even sacked, and two others recruited. 
Fortunately, they were able to cope, thanks to the support of their colleagues and to using 
the training material, specifically the MANGO matrix for planning value chain development. 
However, at the start of the drafting retreat, one of them showed fierce resistance to the idea 
of reformulating the measures CASP (the IFAD financed project) and the Governments (Federal 
and Local) would implement to support the proposed innovative business models. At the end of 
the writing workshop however, he became a MANGO champion. He expressed his satisfaction 
and presented other work areas (including in his private life) where he was committed to apply 
MANGO. Section 18.5 presents the result of the Nigeria CASP Case Study.  
Photo with Nigerian consultants at the
workshop retreat held in September 2017,
to review and help finalize their value chain
profiling reports
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18.4  The results and participants’ opinions on the method 
To evaluate the results of the MANGO applications for value chains described above, we must 
distinguish between the design of upgraded systems (supposed to yield upgraded results), 
and the results effectively created by the implementation of these upgraded systems. The only 
case where resources were immediately available for public sector to comprehensively support 
the implementation of the designed upgraded business models, is the one of CASP, the IFAD-
financed program in Nigeria, and there, the implementation will start only in 2018. For Benin, 
I could gather some informal information by phone in 2017 from the former monitoring and 
evaluation specialist of the World Bank financed project in Benin, who indicated that the fish 
clusters designed have been partially supported which resulted into a significant increase of fish 
farmer revenues. According to the informant, the number of aggregated farmers also increased 
slightly. Unfortunately, there was no data to further quantify these results. Therefore, my focus 
in the present section will be on participants’ opinions after the training sessions and on the 
success of applying MANGO to design upgraded value chain systems. 
Participants’ opinions on the method
During each MANGO training workshop, participants were asked to perform an evaluation of 
every single day, by responding to the following questions: (i) what I have learned today; (ii) 
what went well; and (iii) what needs to be improved. I have summarized the aggregate results of 
these evaluations in Table 5. We consider as satisfied a participant who declared having learned 
a specific aspect of MANGO presented during the day. However, that does not necessarily mean 
the learner is fully ready to put the aspect of MANGO into practice. Learners were very excited 
by the ‘systemness’ of a development action situation. Almost all learners (97%) showed 
satisfaction with regard to understanding the three components of a governance system. The 
percentage decreases slightly when it comes to mapping and analyzing system results. While 
most learners (87%) seemed to be excited to play with the chain of results (causality), about 
13% of them found it difficult or not relevant to use the MANGO’s three categories of results 
(outcome results, delivery results and governance results). The workshop sessions on Mapping 
and analyzing action arenas have been the longest and most animated. Learners always 
requested more explanation, more concrete examples, because they understood that if you 
properly design your action arenas, you are likely to have your results.
Table 5: Average percentage of MANGO learners satisfied
Aspect of MANGO framework Aggregate percentage of satisfied learners 
The three components (of a governance system) 
 framework 
97%
Mapping and analyzing results 87%
Mapping and analyzing action arenas 70%
Analyzing the factors of the institutional context 75%
Dealing with the stream of collective action 70%
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About 70% of learners showed satisfaction, but about 30% of them still found it complex 
to deal with action arenas. Satisfied learners point out the institutional triangle (the three 
categories of actors and the sharing of roles and the relationships between them, as well as 
their capacities, the rules of the game…). The percentage of satisfied learners amounted to 75 
when it comes to the factors of the institutional context (policy, regulation, resources allocation 
mechanisms, etc.). Satisfied learners showed excitement with the idea that by improving some 
of these factors, we can render the institutional context more conducive. Even though almost 
all learners found the discussion on the stream of collective action complex, up to 70% of them 
show satisfaction. In fact, they understood that each MANGO facilitator needs to strengthen 
his or her own capacity in that domain. My personal opinion is that we need further work to 
strengthen the training material on managing the stream of collective action.   
 Usually, participants appreciate the working group sessions as what went well, and they 
indicated the need to allocate more time for group work. On the last day of each training session, 
I ask participants to provide their overall appreciations. Some these appreciations on the added 
value of MANGO are shown in Box 5. 
BOX 5: APPRECIATIONS OF MANGO USERS ON THE ADDED VALUE OF MANGO. 
I understand now why our youth employment in agriculture operation has failed. The 
environment was not conducive for young people. There was no action arena to sustain 
the delivery of the goods and services they need. Government did not have the required 
policy measures to promote value chain business models that can work for the youth. As 
a veterinarian who will retire at the end of this year, I know now I can set up a firm to drive 
milk value chain in my region.
Director of Cabinet – Ministry of Agriculture – Benin – April 2015
In fact, as Directorate of fisheries, we are not empowered to promote fish value chains. 
For example, we did not understand that we can enhance fish farmers’ access to finance 
services by using risk sharing measures. We also understand now the urgency of removing 
taxes on feed imports. The country has capacity for fingerlings production, but because 
there is no innovative business model to connect fish farmers with suppliers of goods and 
services, the production is increasing in a rather slow pace. 
Senior Officer, Directorate of Fisheries and Aquaculture, Ministry of Agriculture, Benin 
– April 2015 
We actors of the poultry sector, have already agreed on a business model very close to what 
we have developed here. What we have not done, however, is to identify and agree with 
Government, on what concrete measures they should implement to enable us. We need 
to bring this to the parliament, to make sure it will happen. We can definitely reduce egg 
imports. 
A retired livestock officer reconverted into agri-business entrepreneur, Togo – May 2015
>>  
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It is now clear why our endeavor to enhance farmers’ access to quality seed is still not 
yielding the results. The seed industry is a system that we can upgrade with an innovative 
business model. We also need our Government to equip our Directorate, with the policy 
measures that will be required. We will develop a proposal, but we will need to work with the 
private sector to get the Government adopt it, and finance the implementation. 
Senior Officer – Seed and Planting Materials Directorate – Ministry of Agriculture, Togo 
– May 2015    
My students in agriculture economics need to understand the importance of goods and 
services arenas in a business model. We need the skills to identify and quantify the goods 
and services value chain actors need, and to design innovative business models composed 
by supply arenas that deliver in a way that is commercially viable for everyone. We need to 
revise our curricula accordingly. 
Lecturer university of Lagon, Ghana, May 2015 
Because we as Government are not clear on which policy measures should be implemented 
to support the upgrading of specific value chain business models, our approach to dealing 
with value chains is not effective. Moreover, for the same reason, we are also not effective in 
coordinating donor interventions, to ensure harmonization. 
Chief Director, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Ghana, May 2015       
At the starting of this workshop, I was skeptical about what added value the MANGO 
framework will bring in. Now, I fully realize the potential. A value chain can operate only 
if the goods and services arenas are well organized. I have learned how to map results and 
arenas, and I am confident I can apply this methodology in any life action situation. I still 
need to develop my skill on leading actors to reach agreements that work for all.
Participant, Nigeria MANGO training session, May 2017.         
 
18.5   Results of the Nigeria MANGO application: the CASP 
value chain support strategy  
This section presents the results of the MANGO application in Nigeria in more detail, illustrating 
for instance, the Hub Firm driven business model proposed as solution for the upgrading 
of existing inefficient value chain systems, as well as the measures that Government should 
implement to incentivize value chain players to move toward these innovative business models. 
Yunusa Gafai is the Nigerian consultant who coordinated the whole process, providing 
support to the national consultants who facilitated the MANGO process for each commodity 
value chain. In addition, Henry Anim Somuah, who co-facilitated the Case Study in Ghana, 
joined me (as international consultant) to provide remote support to the Nigerian team.      
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The overall result
In each of the 7 states, CASP will promote three commodity value chains. For each of these value 
chains, actors (farmers, input suppliers, mechanization service providers, collectors, processors, 
product wholesalers, and retailers) will be linked and supported to achieve the goal of supplying 
high quality commodities to the growing demand by domestic industrial processors. Across the 
7 States of the Savannah Belt, the intervention will promote 464,000 ha over 5-year periods. This 
will consist of 18,560 clusters, 92,800 production sites and 617,600 farmers. For each commodity 
value chain, actors agreed to work together to achieve specified results. Below, I present some 
examples of such results. 
Example of outcome results and governance results formulation 
As shown in Box 6, the quantity of production, the gross revenue and the profit per farmer, the 
quality standards (for end or processed product as well as raw material) and the market where 
the product will be sold are examples of variables used to assess outcome results in the current 
and the MANGO-based upgraded business models, for all commodity value chains. Likewise, 
the value chain team chose to use variables such as the percentage of yield increase, and the 
increased revenue to demonstrate the efficiency of the upgraded business compared to the 
current situation. In addition, the arrangements agreed upon for the upgraded business model 
make the price structure and the cost and benefit analysis, transparent for every group of value 
chain actor. These are example of variable chosen to for governance results values.  
BOX 6: EXAMPLE OF OUTCOME AND GOVERNANCE RESULTS FOR RICE 
Rain-fed and irrigated rice will be produced during the five-year intervention period 
of the project. A total of 157,500 ha of rice will be cultivated across the 7 participating 
states where production will take place across 628 clusters of 250 hectares each in 3,150 
production sites. In the first year, 21,000 ha comprising 12,500 and 8,500 ha for rain-
fed and irrigation, respectively will be cultivated by 29,400 farmers across the 7 states. 
The number of hectares will be progressively increased annually by 25% such that the 
production surfaces have doubled by the fifth year of the project. With potential yields 
of 6 t/ha (as against the current 2 t/ha), it is envisaged that yield increase of over 300% 
would be attained. Production financing would require a total of ₦ 62,523,247,500 in 
the five-year period. This is expected to generate a gross revenue of ₦ 125, 999,685,000 
and a net profit of ₦63,476,437,500. Annually, the gross revenue per farmer will amount 
to 857,141 and the net profit will amount 431,813 Naira, i.e. twice the current minimum 
wage (216,000 Naira) in the country. 
The raw material will be paddy (FARO 44 variety for irrigated rice production and NERICA 
variety for rain-fed upland production) with yield potentials of 6 tons/ha, with grains 
longer than 7mm. 
>>
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The processed product to be promoted is long grained (≥7mm) parboiled, milled, sorted, 
rice from either FARO 44 or NERICA varieties which are considered to have a longer 
post-cooking shelf-life and are also generally preferred by the consumers. The product 
should have good nutritional attributes containing about 89.44% carbohydrate, 
0.45% ash, 0.52% fat, and 9.59% protein. The rice should have an outstanding milling 
properties and low breakage and moderate water absorption and rupturing tendency at 
a temperature of 60-65°C that encourages better finished product. Therefore, the end-
product will be long grained parboiled well-polished sorted rice, free from stones and 
inert materials, packaged and branded in 50 kg, 10 kg and 5 kg bags. About 70% of the 
product should be consumed locally and about 30% of the product is to be exported. 
The rice should attract good price of about ₦15,000 per 50 kg bag. 
 
Delivery results 
For each the of 7 commodity value chains, the list of 9 critical supplies needed by value 
chain players, specifically smallholder farmers, has been established as follows: (i) farmer 
registration and profiling services; (ii) financing services; (iii) seeds; (iv) other material inputs; 
(v) mechanization services; (vi) extension services; (vii) transport services; (viii) support 
for vegetation cover restauration; (ix) marketing services. Each of these supplies has been 
characterized using quantitative and qualitative variables. For example, the characterization of 
seeds is shown in Box 7, with focus on rice seeds.  
BOX 7: CHARACTERIZATION OF DELIVERY RESULTS: EXAMPLE OF SEEDS SUPPLY
A total of 15,881,250 kg of certified seeds is required for the 5 years of intervention. 
The total cost amounts 6.91 billion Naira for all the 7 commodity value chains. The 
characteristics of the certified seeds are described for each commodity. For example, 
rice seeds to be used in the upgraded situation will be improved varieties (Faro 44 for 
the irrigated conditions and Nerica for the upland cultivation). The varieties are high 
yielding (6 t/ha). The seeds are characterized by long grains ≥7mm, high germination 
rate 85-95 % and short generation intervals (100-120 days). Seeds to be used by the 
farmers will be sourced from reputable seed suppliers at the cost of ₦ 400/kg. The 
farmers need 30 kg/ha of seed. 
Organizing the value chains as a system  
In order to generate the results described above, a business model (governance system) driven 
by Hub Firms (HFs) has been developed (Figure 32). As value chain driver, the mandate of HFs is to 
secure contracts with off-takers, develop planning production with farmer organizations, and 
fast-track the flow of goods and services. 
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Figure 32: Overview of the Hub Firm driven business model
 
The Hub Firms will be based on their commercial viability and will work across clusters and 
commodities, i.e. one HF can manage sectors that produce many commodities. A sector consists 
of 250 ha which is made of 5 sub-sectors of 50 ha each. The sub-sector is further sub-divided into 
5 production sites of 10 ha each. The geographical coverage of an HF will depend on how wide-
spread the production site is, and the threshold will be determined by the volume of business 
the enterprise will be conducting. A provisional estimate will be to keep a Hub Firm to cover 
about 20 sectors a total of 5,000 ha and about 10,000 farmers. Thus about 50 HFs will be steadily 
established over the project life. 
Each HF is to be registered as a limited liability company with a Corporate Affairs Commission 
to operate as a joint venture between the Farmer Based Organizations (FBO), existing Financial 
Service Associations (FSA), and a (private) Licensed Warehouse Collateral Management Company 
(LWCMC). Each HF will be: (i) governed by a Board of 9 Directors which consist of 3 representatives 
from the FBOs, 2 from the FSAs and the 4 from the LWCMC, and (ii) the executive management 
will be run by professional staff from the LWCMC. 
Organizing the system arenas
The HF driven business model consists of 9 supply arenas that will deliver each one of the 9 
critical supplies identified above, starting out with farmer registration and profiling services. 
Each of these supplies has been characterized using quantitative and qualitative variables. Each 
of these arenas is designed to sustainably link farmers and other value chain players in business, 
in a commercially viable way. The MANGO facilitators worked with the value chain players to 
agree on the way they will do business within each arena. Below, in Box 8 and Figure 33, I am 
presenting the example of the seed arena. 
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BOX 8: DESCRIPTION OF THE BUSINESS PROCESS FOR SEEDS ARENA
1 The farmers at the primary societies (FBO level 1) assess their demand for seeds.
2  The demands are compiled at the primary union (FBO level 2) level and sent to the 
secondary union.
3  The secondary union (FBO level 3) compiles and forwards same to the Hub Firm.
4  The Hub Firm will award a contract to a specialized agency to produce the breeder 
seeds. 
5  The specialized agency delivers breeder seeds to the Hub Firm.
6  The Hub Firm supplies breeder seeds to foundation seed producers along with other 
inputs.
7  The Hub Firm will pay the inspection and certification fees to a certification agency 
for foundation seeds and improved seed certification
8  Certification agency performs field inspection for foundation seed.
9  Foundation seed producer produces the foundation seeds and delivers to the Hub 
Firm.
10  Certification agency certifies the foundation seed.
11  The Hub Firm supplies foundation seeds and inputs to seed farmers.
12  Certification agency performs field inspection for improved seed.
13  Improved Seed farmers produce the improved seeds and delivers to the Hub Firm.
14  Certification agency certifies the improved seeds as certified seeds.
15  The Hub Firm distributes the certified seeds to farmers.
 
Figure 33: Seeds arena
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Seven accompanying measures to support value chain actors 
implementing the HF driven business model 
In summary, the negotiation between value chain actors and enablers led to the agreement 
on a list of seven measures to be implement by CASP in order to enable value chain actors in 
implementing the Hub Firm driven business model. The seven measures are summarized below. 
(1)  Farmer Registration/Profiling and organization facility. CASP will use this facility to 
subsidize 100% of the cost of: (i) reconnaissance survey; (ii) determination of the perimeter 
of the production sites; (iii) delineating of individual farm-holdings; (iv) profiling farmers 
and their land-holdings; (v) conducting soil capability mapping; (vi) creating manual 
database for about all farmers; and (vii) establishment of a total of 46,400 Primary 
Societies (PSs) at sector level, 9,280 Primary Unions (PUs) at production site levels, and 1,856 
Secondary Unions (SUs) at cluster level. 
(2)  Facility to link FSAs to Formal Financial Institutions. This is a subsidy to cover 100% of the 
expenditures for: (i) training of FSAs Executives on the Agency Banking; (ii) recruitment, 
training and deployment of village financial service promoters; (iii) procurement, hosting, 
and installation of FSAs’ operators on the cloud-based operation software for FSA Apexes; 
(iv) opening accounts for all farmers participating under the BOI/GEEP13’s loan beneficiaries 
in the first-year farming season. 
(3)  Payment of Equity Contributions for Enterprise Development. Under this facility, CASP 
will perform: (i) payment of 15% Equity on Loans to Farming Groups; (ii) payment of 30% 
Equity on Loans for eligible mechanization equipment such as seed drills, levellers, power 
tillers etc.; (iii) subsidy (percentage to be agreed upon between CASP and beneficiaries) 
of knapsack sprayers for unemployed youth; (iv) Subsidy (percentage to be agreed upon 
between CASP and beneficiaries) of sets of water pumps and accessories to faming groups. 
(4)  Hub Firms formation facility. Under this facility, CASP will subsidize 100% the cost of: (i) 
facilitation of the formation of HFs, as joint venture between FBOs, FSAs, and WCMCs; 
(ii) procurement and installation of the management information system to support the 
operations of HFs; (iii) capacity building of HF staff and board of directors. 
(5)  Farmer-based Revolving Fund. CASP will use this facility to support the development of 
Farmer Based Organizations in a way that ensures sustainability after project exit. Each 
beneficiary farmer’s repayment will be revolved to the same or another farmer. 
(6)  Farmer-based Organization’s Physical Assets Facility. Through this facility, CASP will 
support FBOs to acquire physical assets such as office accommodation, and field storage 
facility and equipment. 
(7)  Seed Industry Facility. CASP will use this facility to support the design and operation of a 
cereal seeds industry that will sustain the production of certified seeds for farmers in the 
seven States of the Savannah Belt at affordable cost.  
13 BOI: Bank of Industry – GEEP: Government Enterprise and Empowerment Program
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18.6  Reflections on MANGO capacity building 
The usefulness of MANGO has been attested by the various case studies reported in this book. 
The present chapter has moreover shown that MANGO can relatively easily be mastered by 
others to then function as MANGO facilitators.  During the first applications of MANGO, remote 
‘meta-facilitation’ by a MANGO expert is a low-budget option that has been shown to work. In 
this context, I experienced that the most experienced people are not necessarily the most eager 
or effective learners of MANGO. This has a positive aspect, in that they can bring in criticisms 
that work to improve MANGO. The negative aspect is that, as shown in this chapter as well, 
it tends to be risky to entrust experienced experts with writing up the report of a MANGO 
application at the home office, i.e. outside the MANGO team context. The collective ‘write shop 
retreat’ directly after the MANGO application worked much better. 
 Time has always been a constraint in the MANGO trainings. So far, the maximum has been 
five days training sessions, but three days have also been tried. Learners always appreciated 
practicing together in working groups, with recurrent requests to allocate more time to practice. 
My personal opinion is that we need to improve the instructions for the exercises proposed to 
the successive working groups. To do so, we can draw on the results of the case studies available 
today and keep improving, building on new experiences.
Another finding has been that the stream of collective action has been relatively tenuous in 
terms of time and content in the training sessions so far. During the trainings, we insisted on 
the importance of collective action for getting system actors to agree on common objectives 
and common arrangements to achieve these.  We asked the MANGO facilitators to identify what 
needs to be negotiated and how they will go about the negotiation. And we requested them to 
look for the knowledge required to manage such processes, for example to deal with conflictual 
situations. Clearly, MANGO’s content with regard to the stream collective action has to be 
improved, at least with more guidance on the areas of knowledge the user can look for. 

Part E
Conclusions 
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Conclusions 
This chapter concludes on what MANGO is and what it is not, by presenting the strengths, 
limitations and caveats of the framework. I also present what is my view with regard to further 
developing MANGO and promoting its use. 
19.1  MANGO’s strengths 
MANGO is a methodological framework rooted in system approaches, specifically soft system 
methodologies. The approach is based on the idea that many development situations can be 
considered as a governance system. The purpose of any such system is to improve people’s 
well-being. By designing a model that represents the system we can analyze the elements that 
make up the system components and the causal links between them, identify and explain the 
problems, and propose alternative solutions to improve the system and thus its propensity to 
generate better results for people. In order to carry out this analysis, the user of MANGO must 
resort to relevant existing knowledge in any field they deem necessary, to explain the problems, 
identify improved solutions and justify their rationality. 
Although MANGO’s aim is to support participants in rational assessment and planning, 
MANGO acknowledges that human beings are never all rational. This can work both ways for 
the success of collective action – which basically every MANGO application is. For that reason, 
MANGO contains a ‘stream of collective action’ that supplies the MANGO facilitator with 
awareness and some guidance on how to make social processes work for success in analysis and 
problem-solving.
As exemplified in the case studies of this thesis, MANGO has been applied successfully in the 
areas of natural resources management, rural finance and agricultural value chains, growing 
through the years from modest explorations to full-fledged applications on more than 20 value 
chain teams of MANGO-trained sector experts, there yielding results that other approaches have 
not been able to reach. The universal character of MANGO makes it plausible that the framework 
has applicability in other problem situations as well. Intuitively, one might draw ‘circles of 
applicability’ around the current MANGO version, with rural development as an area of plausibly 
hundred percent applicability, then moving to other development issues such as health, urban 
problems or conservation issues in which MANGO could be felt as quite relevant after reflections 
and experiments and re-design, and finally the broad field of any planning problem situation 
where using MANGO might be seen as an experiment worth trying. More about this is in the 
next section.
Another strength of MANGO is that the user is obliged to call upon other disciplines 
(technical, social, political and legal), and he is empowered to value the contributions of these 
various disciplines to argue the analysis and the proposals for upgrading. Thus, MANGO is a 
methodological framework which federates all other methods and approaches considered 
necessary for the institutional analysis, and its user is empowered to coordinate multi-
disciplinary teams.
MANGO’s applicability and the relevance of its results are much enhanced by the fact that 
the framework is not purely analytical. It invites the users to also search for explanatory 
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factors (e.g. in governance or delivery failures) and to use the causal logic of MANGO to design 
improved systems. In fact, the latter mode of application has been the major one in the MANGO 
applications described in the Case Studies. That way, a MANGO application does not end with a 
list of disparate policy recommendations but with a coherent design for improvement.
While the MANGO framework is holistic, it lends itself well to flexible use. As explained in 
Section 6.2, depending on the context and the nature of the problem, the user will resort to 
the elements of the methodological framework that appear to be useful in conducting the 
governance analysis process. 
Finally, MANGO can be applied in many ‘modes of application’, as the Case Studies exemplify. 
One is that of the lone researchers, aiming to come to grips with a development problem. The 
second is a group of experts and stakeholders (including end users) joining in the MANGO 
application, directly facilitated by the MANGO expert. Thirdly, MANGO can be applied in a mode 
of MANGO-trained people owning the process with only light and distanced guidance by the 
MANGO expert. More on this is in the Outlook section.
19.2  MANGO’s limitations 
As said already, the range of application of MANGO outside rural development is an open 
question. MANGO’s orientation is primarily causal, for instance (focusing on what and why 
questions), not geographical (focusing on what and where questions). In cases where spatial 
issues play and important role (say, transport or biodiversity issues) MANGO might lose relevance 
or need to be coupled with a GIS system, which may be difficult in developing countries. In such 
cases, other frameworks might have to be looked into. One of them is SEAN (Kessler 1999), a 
framework that does not start out from economic services to end users as MANGO does, but 
from ecosystem services to end users, thus creating a tight connection between people and 
environment in the analysis.
In Chapter 17, we encountered the phenomenon that in practice, some delivery institutions 
may appear to work well without any clear connection with government institutions, a 
phenomenon that was not discovered through MANGO. This may be caused by the strong 
MANGO’s strong focus on systems, carrying with it the implicit assumption that if the system 
doesn’t work, the components cannot work either. This is often true enough (and certainly 
much better than the reverse assumption), but MANGO users should remain aware that more 
causal linkages may exist than the ones analysed by MANGO. 
Another dimension of limitation is caused by the fact that MANGO is (or at least tries to be) 
a rational system of thought. This implies that MANGO will not work wonders in situations 
where people do not want to be rational, for good or bad reasons. A peace-seeking mission 
between warring parties, for instance, will probably do better with another framework, e.g. one 
that focuses much more on the restoration of relationships. And in situations where people 
are focused primarily on creativity rather than rationality, a framework that builds much more 
on inspiring slogans (Cradle To Cradle! Out of The Box!) will probably help more than MANGO. 
MANGO is simply not ‘wild’ enough to do such a thing.
In his book Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman (2011) has shown that humans make 
decisions through two ‘decision systems’. The first one is fast and does not require much energy. 
It is the intuitive system, the ‘gut feeling’. The second is the deliberative system, in which we 
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analyse situations, weigh the pros and cons of alternatives, and so on. The deliberative system 
is slow and requires a lot of brain work and energy. That is why we usually only use the intuitive 
system and might routinely call in the deliberative system only after the fact, if it’s necessary to 
explain the intuitive decision to ourselves or others. In fact, we only really use the deliberative 
system if confronted with a problem that routines, intuition and gut feelings cannot solve. As 
said and just like any framework, MANGO is a rational, deliberative system of reason. It ‘forces’ 
actors into the deliberative system. That’s its very purpose and major strength, of course, but at 
the same time its major limitation, and one that does not simply jump forward as the others do. 
This limitation is that for MANGO to really work (and not be a paper exercise done because the 
boss wants it), the participants in the MANGO process need to be committed to the application. 
Committed enough to go through the prescribed questions, the rational criteria, the emotional 
investment in other participants who need to be convinced, the rational letting go of one’s 
bright ideas, and so on. In short, MANGO will only work if the participants feel confronted with a 
real problem that necessitates real investment of brain and social energy. In the Case Studies of 
successful MANGO application, such problems are easy to spot: a program on the verge of being 
discontinued, value chain designs that never really worked, and so on. MANGO’s limitation is 
that it will only really work if such strong problems are felt to exist. 
This phenomenon also spells an ironic doom scenario for MANGO. The scenario is that 
MANGO applications might be seen as so obviously successful that some large global agency 
would adopt it as the thing to do in all government issues. MANGO would be confronted with 
many failures, simply because many of these issues are not felt as severe enough to warrant 
deliberative investment.
19.3  Outlook 
Currently, many studies on development issues result in proposals of an only technical nature. 
My hope is that the use of MANGO will allow to go beyond these, by specifying the institutional 
arrangements that must be put in place for people to access technologies and have the capacity 
to use them in a cost-effective and sustainable manner. Given the complexity of MANGO, it will 
probably be useful to adapt it to various fields of development, such as agricultural value chains, 
sector development (health, education, water and sanitation…), and the promotion of local 
economy by municipalities. The adaptation will reduce the complexity of the methodological 
framework to only the elements that are useful to conduct institutional analysis in each of these 
specific development areas. In the coming years, I will personally invest in adapting the use of 
MANGO to agricultural value chains. So far reports in this area describe commodities, markets, 
available technologies, existing business models with the roles of actors and relationships 
between them, present profitability and value addition calculations, and so on. But there are 
few concrete proposals on the institutional arrangements required for people to access these 
improved technologies and convert them into enhanced wellbeing. Such proposals should 
specify which supply (capital goods, core services, enabling services) arenas and governance 
arenas should be upgraded and how. 
Since 2002, many MANGO workshops have been organized, specifically in agriculture and rural 
development. Participants were livestock specialists, veterinarians, crop specialists, fishery and 
aquaculture specialists, economists, agribusiness specialists, nutritionists, gender specialists, 
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bankers, lawyers, policy makers, consultants, civil servants, farmers, entrepreneurs…  Basically, 
all these actors have confirmed the added value of the framework. But given its complexity and 
the present rather academic, book-type shape of MANGO, MANGO trainings remain quite an 
investment for trainers and participants. Therefore, we could also think of working to make 
MANGO more ‘fun’. In addition to training materials, we could make application materials: small 
videos, color cards for analytical exercises, color cards for criteria, boxes and arrows helping to 
get the causal structures easily done, etc. etc.  Physically, this will turn MANGO from a book into 
a box, filled with stuff. This may help reduce training and application cost and therewith also the 
degree of commitment needed to invest in MANGO. It will help turn MANGO from a very serious 
investment into something attractive about which people might say: ‘Mm, we have some sort 
of institutional problem here. Let’s try to MANGO it a little bit; take that box and see what we 
can arrive at’. 
Being a MANGO facilitator is teachable, as the value chain work (Case Study 5) have shown. It is 
my ambition to perform more experiments there and make a MANGO team of experts that really 
own MANGO and can teach it. It would be great to form MANGO experts at FAO, IFAD, UNDP, 
World Bank, African Development Bank, as well at African institutions levels (African Union, 
New Partnership for Africa Development…). It is my hope that these MANGO experts will further 
develop the framework and, in the end, own a ‘Super MANGO’ that will enhance the design, 
delivery, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of many development interventions. 
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Summary
Development aspiration moves people and nations. Despite the progress recorded in the second 
half of the 1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa has entered in the 21st century, with most countries 
classified in the pack of the poorest countries (World Bank, 2000; UNDP, 2000). The concept of 
development reminds us of the welfare of human beings and human society. Indeed, the result 
of development is the improvement of people’s wellbeing. Genuine development takes place 
when a human society goes through an internally driven process of changing the arrangements 
in place that shape political, economic and social life. Such a process is complex with social 
and technological dimensions and must be led by the actors themselves. If left to chance, 
genuine development might be slow and tentative. Hence the need for development process 
facilitation. When a demand for development process facilitation is expressed, the presence of 
a methodological framework, i.e. a coherent, valid and efficient set of guidelines for how to 
go about, will be helpful. That is what the framework called MANGO (Method for Analysis and 
Negotiation to Governance) is designed to be. 
My aim in developing MANGO has been to propose a methodological framework that can be 
used by actors and facilitators (internal and external) to stimulate the internal process of change 
in institutional arrangements that can bring about development results in a society. To this end, 
the framework is set to provide response to the following questions: (i) How to get stakeholders 
to commit and cooperate for such a collective action? (ii) How to map the human activity system 
at stake, understand the way it operates, identify the problems within the system and analyze 
them? (iii) How to technically develop proposals for change, based on argumentations adapted 
to local context? (iv) How to successfully use these proposals to inform decision making, ensure 
that stakeholders are committed and will keep engaged for implementation? and (v) What 
should be done to successfully manage and monitor the implementation process?  
The methodology to develop MANGO has taken place in three phases. First, I carried out a 
literature review on the structure and functioning of governance systems, the social feasibility of 
institutional reforms (given the plurality of actors and interests within a society), and the technical 
feasibility of those reforms. Secondly, I developed an initial design of MANGO in the year 2000, 
in the course of field missions to support the decentralization of natural resource management 
in Burkina Faso and Mali. Thirdly I went through a long process of further developing, testing 
and improving MANGO from 2002 to 2016, while performing missions aiming at facilitating the 
analysis and upgrading of institutional systems in various development situations such as natural 
resource management, micro-finance services delivery to the rural poor and including smallholder 
farmers into agriculture commodity value chains, in various countries in Africa. 
MANGO is a methodological framework rooted in system approaches, specifically, soft 
system methodologies. The approach is based on the idea that a development situation can 
be considered as a governance system with the purpose to improve people’s wellbeing. By 
drafting a model that represents the system we can analyze the elements that make up the 
system components and the causal links between them, identify and explain the problems, 
and propose alternative institutional arrangements that will upgrade the system and thus its 
propensity to generate development results for people. The MANGO framework proposes to 
consider such a governance system as composed by three components. The first component 
consists of the system results. Starting out from the end users’ results and moving backward 
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through the causal chains, these are (i) the outcomes or wellbeing of the people, (ii) the supplies 
or goods and services that people need to consume and transform to generate these results, and 
(iii) the quality of the system’s governance. The second component consists of the underlying 
action arenas where people negotiate over those supplies that people need and the quality 
of the system governance. Within these supply and governance arenas, there are players who 
perform a series of actions and develop relationships, according to the system’s rules of the 
game. The third component is the institutional context which includes the policies, the legal 
framework, the financing and incentive mechanisms, the management instruments and the 
broader context of power and processes where these rules are embedded. 
The ideal-type flow of a MANGO application consists of four steps. First, the MANGO 
facilitator will support system players in pre-analyzing the situation by mapping the system 
results, the action arenas that generate these results and the institutional context that shape 
the operation of these arenas. The conclusions of the pre-analysis help to prepare the deeper 
analysis. In practice, the second step (the stream of collective action) and third step (the stream 
of technical analysis) are run in parallel. The framework provides guidance to the MANGO 
facilitator to support the stream of collective action, by understanding actors’ choices, creating 
a positive atmosphere and facilitate negotiations. Likewise, guidance is provided to the MANGO 
facilitator to support the stream of technical analysis, by helping the system players to further 
analyze the system results, to identify the action arenas and the factors of the institutional 
context, and to establish the causal links between these system elements in order to explain 
the current non-satisfying results that impede the development of concerned people. Thus, 
relevant argumentation is developed to explain the problematic elements and to develop 
innovative institutional arrangements that would yield the expected results. This leads to the 
fourth step: planning for change. The framework provides guidance on how to design the final 
reform proposal, arrange actors and factors for change, and develop the action plan. Along the 
process of MANGO application, the MANGO facilitator is also encouraged to reflect and think 
about alternative approaches, explanations and solutions, so as to demonstrate the propensity 
of success of the proposed innovative institutional arrangements with the best arguments. 
The book demonstrates the embeddedness of MANGO in real-life development situations by 
presenting five Case Studies drawn from my experience of using MANGO in the fields of natural 
resources management, agriculture and rural development, while improving the framework. 
Case Study 1 shows how I used MANGO to unveil the traditional system for natural resources 
management of the Nago people (in Benin) that was overlooked by the official conservation 
strategies. Case Study 2 shows an example where I used MANGO to support the reform the Sahel 
Development Fund in Mali. Likewise, in Case Study 3, MANGO was used to redesign the Micro 
Finance Sector Program in Cameroun. In Case Study 4, MANGO was used to explain the failure of 
the Rural Finance Sector Development Project in Niger. Finally, Case Study 5 shows the amenity 
of MANGO to develop an upgraded business model for smallholder-inclusive value chains. It is 
focused on the example of grains value chains in the Savannah Belt in Nigeria.      
Finally, the strengths, limitations and caveats and outlook of the framework are presented. 
Some of these are: (i) MANGO values the contributions of other disciplines; (ii) MANGO is not 
purely analytical, as it invites the users to search for explanatory factors and use the causal logic 
to design upgraded systems; (iii) however, as a rational system of thought, MANGO will not work 
wonders in situations where people do not want to be rational; and (iv) for MANGO to work, the 
system players must be committed to the application. 
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Samenvatting
Het verlangen naar ontwikkeling beweegt mensen en staten. Ondanks de vooruitgang die is 
geboekt na 1990 zijn de meeste landen van sub-Sahara Afrika de 21-ste eeuw begonnen in de 
groep van armste naties (World Bank, 2000; UNDP 2000). Het begrip ontwikkeling is verbonden 
met de welvaart en het welzijn van mensen en samenlevingen. Werkelijke ontwikkeling is 
een intern gestuurd proces, anders dan het volgen van externe aanwijzingen aangedreven 
door extern geld. Werkelijke ontwikkeling vindt plaats als een samenleving door een intern 
gestuurd proces arrangementen verandert waarin het politieke, economische of sociale leven 
wordt vormgegeven.  Een dergelijk proces heeft complexe sociale en technologische dimensies, 
en moet worden geleid door de actoren zelf. Als dit aan het toeval wordt overgelaten kan dit 
proces echter langzaam en onvolledig verlopen, en daarom is er behoefte aan facilitering 
van ontwikkelingsprocessen. Daarvoor is MANGO (Method for Analysis and Negotiation to 
Governance) ontworpen, als samenhangend, valide en efficiënt raamwerk ter ondersteuning 
van acties voor intern gedragen, werkelijke ontwikkeling. 
Het doel van MANGO is daarom om gebruikt te worden door actoren en facilitators voor het 
stimuleren en structureren van interne veranderingsprocessen in institutionele arrangementen 
die ontwikkeling tot resultaat hebben.  MANGO geeft antwoorden op de volgende vragen: (i) Hoe 
kunnen stakeholders worden gemotiveerd voor de collectieve actie van het veranderingsproces? 
(ii) Hoe kunnen we het systeem dat veranderd moet worden het best in kaart brengen, begrijpen 
hoe het systeem werkt en de problemen in de werking van het systeem analyseren? (iii) Hoe 
kunnen we voorstellen tot verandering ontwikkelen die zijn gebaseerd op de lokale context? (iv) 
Hoe kunnen we deze voorstellen gebruiken in besluitvorming en de implementatie waarborgen? 
En (v) Hoe kunnen we de implementatie goed managen en monitoren? 
Het MANGO raamwerk is ontwikkeld in drie fasen.  Eerst heb ik een literatuurstudie uitgevoerd 
over de structuur en de werking van governance systemen, de sociale voorwaarden voor 
institutionele verandering en de technische voorwaarden daarvoor. Daarna, in het jaar 2000, heb 
ik de een eerste versie van MANGO ontworpen, in het kader van een veldstudie die ik uitvoerde 
ter ondersteuning van de decentralisatie van het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen in Burkina 
Faso en Mali. De derde fase duurde lang, van 2002 tot 2016, waarin ik MANGO verder heb 
ontwikkeld en getoetst door middel van toepassingen ervan in de praktijk. Die praktijk bestond 
uit ondersteuningsmissies voor de verbetering van het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen, 
micro-krediet services voor arme boeren, en de positie van boeren in productieketens (‘value 
chains’), in meerdere Afrikaanse landen.
MANGO is een methodisch raamwerk met wortels in systeembenaderingen, met name 
‘soft systems’. MANGO is gebaseerd op het idee dat een ontwikkelingssituatie kan worden 
opgevat als een governance-systeem dat de verbetering van het welzijn van mensen tot 
doel heeft. Door het opstellen van een model dat dit systeem in beeld brengt kunnen we de 
elementen van het systeem en de causale relatie daartussen analyseren, de problemen daarin 
identificeren en verklaren, en van daaruit nieuwe institutionele arrangementen voorstellen 
die betere ontwikkelingsresultaten kunnen produceren. In het MANGO framework bestaat 
het governance-systeem uit drie componenten. Het eerste component bevat de resultaten 
van het systeem. Beginnend bij de eindgebruikers (bijvoorbeeld boeren) en van daaruit 
terugkijkend langs de causale lijnen bestaan deze resultaten uit (i) de welzijnsuitkomsten 
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van de eindgebruikers, (ii) de goederen en diensten die zij gebruiken om tot die uitkomsten te 
komen, en (iii) de kwaliteit van de regels die het systeem bepalen. De tweede component van 
MANGO bestudeert de actie-arena’s waar actoren onderhandelen over de goederen en diensten 
en de regels. Binnen deze actie-arena’s ontwikkelen actoren relaties die bepaald worden door 
de diepere spelregels van het systeem. De derde component van MANGO richt zich op de 
institutionele context waarin bijvoorbeeld het sectorbeleid en de wetgeving een plaats hebben, 
evenals de financieringsmechanismen en overige beleidsinstrumenten en de bredere politieke 
context waarin deze zijn ingebed.
Het ideaaltypische verloop van een MANGO-toepassing bestaat uit vier stappen, waarvan 
er twee parallel worden uitgevoerd. Allereerst ondersteunt de MANGO expert/facilitator de 
actoren in een pre-analyse van de situatie door het in kaart brengen van de systeemresultaten, 
de actie-arena’s en de institutionele context. De conclusies hiervan helpen in de vormgeving 
van de diepere analyses in de twee volgende, parallelle stappen, die bestaan uit de ‘stroom 
van collectieve actie’ en de ‘stroom van technische analyse’. MANGO ondersteunt de stroom 
van collectieve actie door het helpen begrijpen van de keuzes van actoren, het tot stand 
brengen van een positieve atmosfeer en het faciliteren van onderhandeling tussen de actoren. 
Daarnaast ondersteunt MANGO de technische analyse met aanwijzingen voor het verder 
begrip van systeemresultaten, actie-arena’s en context en het identificeren van causale relaties 
daartussen, gericht op het verklaren van de tot nu toe onbevredigende werking van het systeem, 
die de ontwikkeling van eindgebruikers (de rurale bevolking) belemmert. Op deze manier wordt 
relevante argumentatie opgebouwd en kan institutionele innovatie worden ontworpen die 
ontwikkeling dichterbij brengt.  Dit leidt naar de vierde stap: het plannen van de verandering. 
MANGO helpt de actoren in het ontwerp van het uiteindelijke voorstel, het arrangeren van de 
spelers in het nieuwe institutionele systeem en het schrijven van het actieplan. Gedurende de 
hele toepassing van MANGO wordt de gebruiker aangemoedigd tot reflectie en nadenken over 
alternatieve benaderingen, verklaringen en oplossingen, zodat argumentaties echt overtuigend 
kunnen worden.
Dit boek demonstreert de verwevenheid van het MANGO raamwerk met de praktijk van 
ontwikkeling door de beschrijving van vijf case studies waarin MANGO is toegepast en 
aangepast. Case study 1 laat zien hoe ik MANGO heb gebruikt voor de beschrijving van het 
traditionele systeem van instituties van de Nago in Benin voor het duurzaam beheer van 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen, een systeem dat geheel genegeerd was in de duurzaamheidsplanning 
van de overheid. Case study 2 betreft een voorbeeld van hoe MANGO is gebruikt in de analyse 
en hervorming van het Sahel Development Fund in Mali. In Case study 3 wordt MANGO gebruikt 
voor het herontwerp van het sectorprogramma voor rurale micro-kredieten in Kameroen. In 
Case study 4 wordt MANGO toegepast voor het verklaren van het falen van het Rural Finance 
Sector Development Project in Niger. Case study 5 toont de toepasbaarheid van MANGO voor het 
ontwerp van een voor kleine boeren toegankelijke productieketen van granen in de savanneregio 
in Nigeria. 
Aan het einde van het boek wordt nagedacht over de sterktes, beperkingen en valkuilen van 
het raamwerk. Enkele daarvan zijn: (i) MANGO faciliteert de inbreng van vele disciplines, (ii) 
MANGO is niet alleen analytisch maar helpt ook in het vinden van verklaringen en het ontwerp van 
verbeterde institutionele systemen, (iii) echter, omdat MANGO een rationeel raamwerk is, zal het 
geen wonderen verrichten in situaties waarin mensen niet rationeel willen zijn, en (iv) om MANGO 
echt te laten doorwerken moeten de systeem-actoren achter de toepassing van MANGO staan.
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